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[tor/release-0.2.2] Simplify calls to routerset_equal
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 128582cc1f9fd363f3fb2a96b61fde1701a56970 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:13:36 2011 -0400 Simplify calls to routerset_equal The routerset_equal function explicitly handles NULL inputs, so there's no need to check inputs for NULL before calling it. Also fix a bug in routerset_equal where a non-NULL routerset with no entries didn't get counted as equal to a NULL routerset. This was untriggerable, I think, but potentially annoying down the road. --- src/or/config.c | 14 +++++--------- src/or/routerlist.c | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 404e648..44cde85 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1260,15 +1260,11 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check for transitions that need action. */ if (old_options) { if ((options->UseEntryGuards && !old_options->UseEntryGuards) || - (options->ExcludeNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes)) || - (options->ExcludeExitNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes, - options->ExcludeExitNodes)) || - (options->EntryNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes)) || - (options->ExitNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes)) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes, + options->ExcludeExitNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes) || options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Changed to using entry guards, or changed preferred or " diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index a9a216b..d5e8a6b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5473,14 +5473,12 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) return set && smartlist_len(set->country_names); } -#if 0 /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ static int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; } -#endif /** Helper. Return true iff set contains a router based on the other * provided fields. Return higher values for more specific subentries: a @@ -5659,10 +5657,15 @@ routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *set) int routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new) { - if (old == NULL && new == NULL) + if (routerset_is_empty(old) && routerset_is_empty(new)) { + /* Two empty sets are equal */ return 1; - else if (old == NULL || new == NULL) + } else if (routerset_is_empty(old) || routerset_is_empty(new)) { + /* An empty set is equal to nothing else. */ return 0; + } + tor_assert(old != NULL); + tor_assert(new != NULL); if (smartlist_len(old->list) != smartlist_len(new->list)) return 0;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad78bafb71fbd66e83b29aba612d17f7d03e575b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:59 2011 -0400 Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc. ExcludeExitNodes foo now means that foo.exit doesn't work. If StrictNodes is set, then ExcludeNodes foo also overrides foo.exit. foo.exit , however, still works even if foo is not listed in ExitNodes. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1f5eb70..f435976 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1497,9 +1497,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, hostname_type_t addresstype; or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct in_addr addr_tmp; + /* We set this to true if this is an address we should automatically + * remap to a local address in VirtualAddrNetwork */ int automap = 0; char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN]; time_t map_expires = TIME_MAX; + /* This will be set to true iff the address starts out as a non-.exit + address, and we remap it to one because of an entry in the addressmap. */ int remapped_to_exit = 0; time_t now = time(NULL); @@ -1610,18 +1614,24 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, /* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit * node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */ char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.'); + + /* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */ + routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ? + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion : options->ExcludeExitNodes; + /*XXX023 make this a node_t. */ + routerinfo_t *router; + tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { + /* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */ if (s[1] != '\0') { - /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's - * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, - * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business - * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; *s = 0; } else { + /* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit. That's not okay. */ log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", safe_str_client(socks->address)); control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s", @@ -1630,23 +1640,33 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, return -1; } } else { - routerinfo_t *r; + /* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); - r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); - *socks->address = 0; - if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || - !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, - r))) { - strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); - } else { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", - r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", - safe_str_client(socks->address)); - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); + if (router) { + *socks->address = 0; + strlcpy(socks->address, router->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } } + /* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */ + if (!router) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */ + if (routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* XXXX022-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and + Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch + implies no. */ } if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Note another place that we need to fix a 1090 issue.
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ed7c267743f2471a5a16c5ec437efda665f4c6af Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:29 2011 -0400 Note another place that we need to fix a 1090 issue. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 4c74426..1f5eb70 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -789,6 +789,9 @@ addressmap_ent_remove(const char *address, addressmap_entry_t *ent) static void clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) { + /* XXXX022-1090 We need a variant of this that clears all mappings no longer + permitted because of changes to the ExcludeNodes, ExitNodes, or + ExcludeExitNodes settings. */ char *suffix; size_t suffix_len; if (!addressmap || !exitname)

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[tor/release-0.2.2] When there is a transition in permitted nodes, apply it to trackexithosts map
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 80adb3de507db4cd67208396e1ea301f131c1228 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:43:47 2011 -0400 When there is a transition in permitted nodes, apply it to trackexithosts map IOW, if we were using TrackExitHosts, and we added an excluded node or removed a node from exitnodes, we wouldn't actually remove the mapping that points us at the new node. Also, note with an XXX022 comment a place that I think we are looking at the wrong string. --- src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/connection_edge.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/connection_edge.h | 1 + src/or/routerlist.c | 2 +- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 44cde85..f003e4d 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1271,6 +1271,7 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) "excluded node lists. Abandoning previous circuits."); circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(); circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(); + addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(options); } /* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge? diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index f435976..5f322ca 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -789,9 +789,6 @@ addressmap_ent_remove(const char *address, addressmap_entry_t *ent) static void clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) { - /* XXXX022-1090 We need a variant of this that clears all mappings no longer - permitted because of changes to the ExcludeNodes, ExitNodes, or - ExcludeExitNodes settings. */ char *suffix; size_t suffix_len; if (!addressmap || !exitname) @@ -802,6 +799,7 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) tor_strlower(suffix); STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) { + /* XXXX022 HEY! Shouldn't this look at ent->new_address? */ if (ent->source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT && !strcmpend(address, suffix)) { addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent); MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address); @@ -811,6 +809,56 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) tor_free(suffix); } +/** Remove all TRACKEXIT mappings from the addressmap for which the target + * host is unknown or no longer allowed. */ +void +addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) +{ + const routerset_t *allow_nodes = options->ExitNodes; + const routerset_t *exclude_nodes = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + + if (!addressmap) + return; + if (routerset_is_empty(allow_nodes)) + allow_nodes = NULL; + if (allow_nodes == NULL && routerset_is_empty(exclude_nodes)) + return; + + STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) { + size_t len; + const char *target = ent->new_address, *dot; + char *nodename; + routerinfo_t *ri; /* XXX023 Use node_t. */ + + if (strcmpend(target, ".exit")) { + /* Not a .exit mapping */ + continue; + } else if (ent->source != ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT) { + /* Not a trackexit mapping. */ + continue; + } + len = strlen(target); + if (len < 6) + continue; /* malformed. */ + dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + if (!dot) { + nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); + } else { + nodename = tor_strndup(dot+1, strlen(dot+1)-5); + } + ri = router_get_by_nickname(nodename, 0); + tor_free(nodename); + if (!ri || + (allow_nodes && !routerset_contains_router(allow_nodes, ri)) || + routerset_contains_router(exclude_nodes, ri)) { + /* We don't know this one, or we want to be rid of it. */ + addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent); + MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address); + } + } STRMAP_FOREACH_END; +} + /** Remove all entries from the addressmap that were set via the * configuration file or the command line. */ void diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index 0b08dd0..c4ae467 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ int connection_ap_process_transparent(edge_connection_t *conn); int address_is_invalid_destination(const char *address, int client); void addressmap_init(void); +void addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options); void addressmap_clean(time_t now); void addressmap_clear_configured(void); void addressmap_clear_transient(void); diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index d5e8a6b..d9f099b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5474,7 +5474,7 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) } /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ -static int +int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index 3bbdc42..fec1870 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int routerset_parse(routerset_t *target, const char *s, void routerset_union(routerset_t *target, const routerset_t *source); int routerset_is_list(const routerset_t *set); int routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set); +int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set); int routerset_contains_router(const routerset_t *set, routerinfo_t *ri); int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix a log msg
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8e2904e269e039713c2b2e7be10b82e11f239cd0 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:03:50 2011 +0200 Fix a log msg --- src/or/router.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 64cb079..0ef4728 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have " "listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. " - "We will cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " + "We cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " "be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg); tor_free(msg); }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 6afad6b691d577fba2fe88f2fe9ed76a2f80002d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:58:28 2011 -0400 When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it This could happen if StrictNodes was 0 and we were forced to pick an excluded node as the last hop of the circuit. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 42073fb..ce324ca 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -923,6 +923,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int need_uptime = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; int need_capacity = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; int internal = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) != 0; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* Make sure we're not trying to create a onehop circ by * cannibalization. */ @@ -933,11 +934,6 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); - /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it - * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and - * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory - * operation.) -NM */ - for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && @@ -966,6 +962,19 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, hop=hop->next; } while (hop!=circ->cpath); } + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* Make sure no existing nodes in the circuit are excluded for + * general use. (This may be possible if StrictNodes is 0, and we + * thought we needed to use an otherwise excluded node for, say, a + * directory operation.) */ + crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath; + do { + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + hop->extend_info)) + goto next; + hop = hop->next; + } while (hop != circ->cpath); + } if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime)) best = circ; next: ;

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.2] Explain the "using anyway" log message better
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 92ec36a061de17dd4e378d5ce34d82f91eee9f86 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:01:23 2011 +0200 Explain the "using anyway" log message better Also add a request to report any cases where we are not honoring StrictNodes to the developers: These should now all be bugs. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c58509f..681f524 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2896,7 +2896,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) return; - description = "Requested exit node"; + description = "requested exit node"; rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: @@ -2911,22 +2911,28 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: - description = "Chosen rendezvous point"; + description = "chosen rendezvous point"; domain = LD_BUG; break; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; - description = "Controller-selected circuit target"; + description = "controller-selected circuit target"; break; } if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) { - log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "%s '%s' is in ExcludeNodes%s. Using anyway " - "(circuit purpose %d).", + /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */ + if (options->StrictNodes) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using an excluded node with StrictNodes set. " + "Please report the following log message to the " + "developers."); + log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in " + "ExcludeNodes%s, because no other options were available. To " + "prevent this, set the StrictNodes configuration option." + "(Circuit purpose is %d)", description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); - /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); }

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Check transition of circuit purpose from INTRO->GENERAL if nodes are constrained
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 79a3b3cd3719b3b87b0edbab62b256e42c7b42de Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 20:06:31 2011 -0400 Check transition of circuit purpose from INTRO->GENERAL if nodes are constrained This looked at first like another fun way around our node selection logic: if we had introduction circuits, and we wound up building too many, we would turn extras into general-purpose circuits. But when we did so, we wouldn't necessarily check whether the general-purpose circuits conformed to our node constraints. For example, the last node could totally be in ExcludedExitNodes and we wouldn't have cared... ...except that the circuit should already be internal, so it won't get user streams attached to it, so the transition should generally be allowed. Add an assert to make sure we're right about this, and have it not check whether ExitNodes is set, since that's irrelevant to internal circuits. --- src/or/rendservice.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 5b85394..cd8f9ea 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1347,17 +1347,26 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) } /* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service, - * redefine this one as a general circuit. */ + * redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending. */ if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) { - log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " - "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " - "general."); - /* XXX022-1090: This can wind up violating ExcludeNodes/ - * ExitNodes/ExcludeExitNodes restrictions. - */ - TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; - circuit_has_opened(circuit); - return; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is + allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now, + this case, we might as well close the thing. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " + "circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it."); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE); + return; + } else { + tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal); + log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " + "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " + "general; leaving as internal."); + TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; + circuit_has_opened(circuit); + return; + } } log_info(LD_REND,

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix a check-spaces complaint
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e03e90bf591f649f7883807f99354634e837ee48 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:16:26 2011 +0200 Fix a check-spaces complaint --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 5f322ca..1ee57ab 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) if (len < 6) continue; /* malformed. */ dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ - dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit or NULL */ if (!dot) { nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); } else {

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add a circuit_purpose_to_string() function, and use it
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8ee92f28e056fd32f1faef62ae1523ad4d553a64 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 13:27:25 2011 -0400 Add a circuit_purpose_to_string() function, and use it We had a circuit_purpose_to_controller_string() function, but it was pretty coarse-grained and didn't try to be human-readable. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 +++++--- src/or/circuitlist.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.h | 1 + src/or/circuituse.c | 22 ++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 681f524..b963f1a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2051,8 +2051,9 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) */ if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", timediff, - circ->_base.purpose); + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff, + circ->_base.purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose)); } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) { /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */ if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) { @@ -2890,8 +2891,9 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d)", - (int)purpose); + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d, %s)", + (int)purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); return; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: if (circ->build_state->is_internal) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index ce324ca..33dc8f0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -378,6 +378,62 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose) } } +/** Return a human-readable string for the circuit purpose purpose. */ +const char * +circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose) +{ + static char buf[32]; + + switch (purpose) + { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR: + return "Circuit at relay"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: + return "Acting as intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING: + return "Acting as rendevous (pending)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED: + return "Acting as rendevous (established)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: + return "General-purpose client"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING: + return "Hidden service client: Connecting to intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: + return "Hidden service client: Waiting for ack from intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED: + return "Hidden service client: Received ack from intro point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND: + return "Hidden service client: Establishing rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: + return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: + return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point (ack received)"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED: + return "Hidden service client: Active rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT: + return "Measuring circuit timeout"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO: + return "Hidden service: Establishing introduction point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO: + return "Hidden service: Introduction point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND: + return "Hidden service: Connecting to rendezvous point"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED: + return "Hidden service: Active rendezvous point"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: + return "Testing circuit"; + + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: + return "Circuit made by controller"; + + default: + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose); + return buf; + } +} + /** Pick a reasonable package_window to start out for our circuits. * Originally this was hard-coded at 1000, but now the consensus votes * on the answer. See proposal 168. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index ef6fc3a..7b01ca3 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ circuit_t * _circuit_get_global_list(void); const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state); const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose); +const char *circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose); void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity); void circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, or_connection_t *conn); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 7b20f7f..530941c 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -392,10 +392,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN; if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->p_streams != NULL) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d) has timed out, " + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d, %s) has timed out, " "yet has attached streams!", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); tor_fragile_assert(); continue; } @@ -426,9 +427,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &extremely_old_cutoff, <)) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Extremely large value for circuit build timeout: %lds. " - "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", + "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", (long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec), - victim->purpose); + victim->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); } else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(&circ_times, first_hop_succeeded, victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) { @@ -794,12 +796,11 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Ancient non-dirty circuit %d is still around after " - "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d", + "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d (%s)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier, tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_created, &now), - circ->purpose); - /* FFFF implement a new circuit_purpose_to_string() so we don't - * just print out a number for circ->purpose */ + circ->purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose)); TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient = 1; } } @@ -1136,8 +1137,9 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */ circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags); if (circ) { - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d", - build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose); + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d (%s)", + build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose, + circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); circ->_base.purpose = purpose; /* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building * will see it and think it's been trying to build since it

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