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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Use strlcpy in create_unix_sockaddr()
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 959da6b7f2b5ed63426fd12a9046ac06033f6db1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:06:54 2011 -0400 Use strlcpy in create_unix_sockaddr() Using strncpy meant that if listenaddress were ever >= sizeof(sockaddr_un.sun_path), we would fail to nul-terminate sun_path. This isn't a big deal: we never read sun_path, and the kernel is smart enough to reject the sockaddr_un if it isn't nul-terminated. Nonetheless, it's a dumb failure mode. Instead, we should reject addresses that don't fit in sockaddr_un.sun_path. Coverity found this; it's CID 428. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. --- changes/cid_428 | 5 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/cid_428 b/changes/cid_428 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb0fc8c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/cid_428 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before + passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are + smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity; CID + # 428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 4869a24..2897fe1 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -804,7 +804,13 @@ create_unix_sockaddr(const char *listenaddress, char **readable_address, sockaddr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); sockaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; - strncpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)); + if (strlcpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) + >= sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unix socket path '%s' is too long to fit.", + escaped(listenaddress)); + tor_free(sockaddr); + return NULL; + } if (readable_address) *readable_address = tor_strdup(listenaddress);

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branches 'cov217_021' and 'cid_450' into maint-0.2.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 021cf3f0521375f1722a7fb82ce286086db79142 Merge: 959da6b d25fead Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:54:51 2011 -0400 Merge branches 'cov217_021' and 'cid_450' into maint-0.2.1 changes/cid_450 | 5 +++++ src/common/compat.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'cid30_changelog' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 5cf725e3c691ac3e5674ce64bd2be410a9cb0ede Merge: 2ba19f9 359a30d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:55:27 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'cid30_changelog' into maint-0.2.2 changes/memleak_rendcache | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 2ba19f9b4a052dcaa5ebd3c6a629e1ec67a595f9 Merge: 2b5ebc7 021cf3f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:55:23 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2 changes/cid_428 | 5 +++++ changes/cid_450 | 5 +++++ src/common/compat.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- src/or/connection.c | 8 +++++++- src/or/rendcommon.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'cov217_022_squashed' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 06f0c1aa6a4ad0a6dfc93b1637214c307feed566 Merge: 5cf725e bc91cb6 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:56:14 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'cov217_022_squashed' into maint-0.2.2 src/or/dirserv.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Use strlcpy when copying node IDs into measured_bw_line_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit bc91cb6e459042e11be11e50050ac086fdcb33dd Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:14:44 2011 -0400 Use strlcpy when copying node IDs into measured_bw_line_t We were using strncpy before, which isn't our style for stuff like this. This isn't a bug, though: before calling strncpy, we were checking that strlen(src) was indeed == HEX_DIGEST_LEN, which is less than sizeof(dst), so there was no way we could fail to NUL-terminate. Still, strncpy(a,b,sizeof(a)) is an idiom that we ought to squash everyplace. Fixes CID #427. --- src/or/dirserv.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index d114d86..7df9a2f 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -2415,7 +2415,7 @@ measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line) tor_free(line); return -1; } - strncpy(out->node_hex, cp, sizeof(out->node_hex)); + strlcpy(out->node_hex, cp, sizeof(out->node_hex)); got_node_id=1; } } while ((cp = tor_strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &strtok_state)));

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix insanely large stack_allocation in log_credential_status
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit d25feadebbf05d6fce55cfee1e3c8f928903f543 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:36:33 2011 -0400 Fix insanely large stack_allocation in log_credential_status I'm not one to insist on C's miserly stack limits, but allocating a 256K array on the stack is too much even for me. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha. Found by coverity. Fixes CID # 450. --- changes/cid_450 | 5 +++++ src/common/compat.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/cid_450 b/changes/cid_450 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2045fca --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/cid_450 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Don't stack-allocate the list of supplementary GIDs when we're + about to log them. Stack-allocating NGROUPS_MAX gid_t elements + could take up to 256K, which is way too much stack. Found by + Coverity; CID #450. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha. diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 3965108..9533c11 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1080,7 +1080,8 @@ log_credential_status(void) /* Read, effective and saved GIDs */ gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; /* Supplementary groups */ - gid_t sup_gids[NGROUPS_MAX + 1]; + gid_t *sup_gids = NULL; + int sup_gids_size; /* Number of supplementary groups */ int ngids; @@ -1126,9 +1127,19 @@ log_credential_status(void) #endif /* log supplementary groups */ - if ((ngids = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX + 1, sup_gids)) < 0) { + sup_gids_size = 64; + sup_gids = tor_malloc(sizeof(gid_t) * 64); + while ((ngids = getgroups(sup_gids_size, sup_gids)) < 0 && + errno == EINVAL && + sup_gids_size < NGROUPS_MAX) { + sup_gids_size *= 2; + sup_gids = tor_realloc(sup_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * sup_gids_size); + } + + if (ngids < 0) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Error getting supplementary GIDs: %s", strerror(errno)); + tor_free(sup_gids); return -1; } else { int i, retval = 0; @@ -1158,6 +1169,7 @@ log_credential_status(void) tor_free(cp); }); smartlist_free(elts); + tor_free(sup_gids); return retval; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add a changelog entry for cid30 fix.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 359a30d52e01e6413a052f03b7067c40b10336d2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:46:26 2011 -0400 Add a changelog entry for cid30 fix. --- changes/memleak_rendcache | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/memleak_rendcache b/changes/memleak_rendcache new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93b1f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/memleak_rendcache @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix a memory leak when receiving a descriptor for a hidden + service we didn't ask for. Found by Coverity; CID#30. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.26-beta.

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix a rare memory leak in rend_cache_store
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 46297bc7bd86826fa79195f36059ce408ef45b6c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 11:52:39 2011 -0400 Fix a rare memory leak in rend_cache_store When we rejected a descriptor for not being the one we wanted, we were letting the parsed descriptor go out of scope. Found by Coverity; CID # 30. Bugfix on 0.2.1.26. (No changes file yet, since this is not in any 0.2.1.x release.) --- src/or/rendcommon.c | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 8727a70..e0c101e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -1077,6 +1077,7 @@ rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len, int published, log_warn(LD_REND, "Received service descriptor for service ID %s; " "expected descriptor for service ID %s.", query, safe_str(service_id)); + rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed); return -2; } now = time(NULL);

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[tor/maint-0.2.1] Use strlcpy in create_unix_sockaddr()
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Jul '11

01 Jul '11

commit 959da6b7f2b5ed63426fd12a9046ac06033f6db1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 1 12:06:54 2011 -0400 Use strlcpy in create_unix_sockaddr() Using strncpy meant that if listenaddress were ever >= sizeof(sockaddr_un.sun_path), we would fail to nul-terminate sun_path. This isn't a big deal: we never read sun_path, and the kernel is smart enough to reject the sockaddr_un if it isn't nul-terminated. Nonetheless, it's a dumb failure mode. Instead, we should reject addresses that don't fit in sockaddr_un.sun_path. Coverity found this; it's CID 428. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. --- changes/cid_428 | 5 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/cid_428 b/changes/cid_428 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb0fc8c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/cid_428 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before + passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are + smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity; CID + # 428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 4869a24..2897fe1 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -804,7 +804,13 @@ create_unix_sockaddr(const char *listenaddress, char **readable_address, sockaddr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); sockaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; - strncpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)); + if (strlcpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) + >= sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unix socket path '%s' is too long to fit.", + escaped(listenaddress)); + tor_free(sockaddr); + return NULL; + } if (readable_address) *readable_address = tor_strdup(listenaddress);

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