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[flashproxy/master] This experiment 01 includes RTMFP, and takes an argument NUM_CLIENTS
by dcf＠torproject.org 12 Jul '11

12 Jul '11

commit db8e6cbfab6b4d86ea20eeb2e9e151126f90b286 Author: Jonathan Ellithorpe <jdellit(a)stanford.edu> Date: Mon Jul 11 18:19:31 2011 -0700 This experiment 01 includes RTMFP, and takes an argument NUM_CLIENTS --- experiments/01 | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/experiments/01 b/experiments/01 new file mode 100755 index 0000000..5b446b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/experiments/01 @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# Get arguments +if [ $1 ]; then + NUM_CLIENTS=$1 +else + NUM_CLIENTS=1 +fi + +# Go to flashproxy repo root dir +cd .. + +# Create 1GB dump file +echo "creating dump file..." +rm dump +dd if=/dev/null of=dump bs=1G seek=1 & + +# Start http server +echo "starting http server..." +thttpd -p 1080 + +# Start crossdomain policy server +echo "starting cross domain policy server..." +sudo ./crossdomaind.py & + +# Start the facilitator +echo "starting facilitator..." +./facilitator.py 4701 -r 127.0.0.1:1080 + +# Start socat adapters +echo "starting socat adapters..." +i=1 +until [ $i -gt $NUM_CLIENTS ]; do + let local_port=2000+i + let remote_port=9000+i + socat TCP-LISTEN:${remote_port},reuseaddr,fork TCP-LISTEN:${local_port},reuseaddr & + let i=i+1 +done + +# Start the flash proxy, client side +echo "starting flash proxy client side..." +i=1 +until [ $i -gt $NUM_CLIENTS ]; do + let local_port=9000+i + google-chrome --app="http://localhost:1080/swfcat.swf?local=127.0.0.1:${local_port}&client=1&fac…" + let i=i+1 + sleep 2 +done + +# Start the flash proxy, server side +echo "starting flash proxy server side..." +google-chrome --app="http://localhost:1080/swfcat.swf?debug=1&facilitator=127.0.0.1:4701" + +let query_fac_time=NUM_CLIENTS+2 +sleep ${query_fac_time} + +# wget the dump file +echo "getting the dump file..." +i=2 +until [ $i -gt $NUM_CLIENTS ]; do + let local_port=2000+i + gnome-terminal -e "/bin/bash -c 'wget http://localhost:${local_port}/dump -O - > /dev/null; exec /bin/bash -i'" + let i=i+1 +done + +# Use this one for delaying the termination of experiment below +wget http://localhost:2001/dump -O - > /dev/null + +# Slaughter the processes +sudo killall thttpd +ps -ef | sed -n '/crossdomaind.py/{/grep/!p;}' | awk '{print$2}' | sudo xargs -i kill {} +ps -ef | sed -n '/facilitator.py/{/grep/!p;}' | awk '{print$2}' | sudo xargs -i kill {} +sudo killall socat

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[tor/master] Avoid warning in broken_state_count_compare
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Jul '11

12 Jul '11

commit 9a6642f6f5681fe92b17b87304126d2a3b2dec02 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 12 11:23:55 2011 -0400 Avoid warning in broken_state_count_compare --- src/or/connection_or.c | 7 ++++++- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 94f8e22..2871f1f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -236,7 +236,12 @@ static int broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr) { const broken_state_count_t *a = *a_ptr, *b = *b_ptr; - return b->count - a->count; + if (b->count < a->count) + return -1; + else if (b->count == a->count) + return 0; + else + return 1; } /** Upper limit on the number of different states to report for connection

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[flashproxy/master] Fixed local parameter code bug
by dcf＠torproject.org 12 Jul '11

12 Jul '11

commit 844dab6eef0a03e27cc166336575ec98215b3575 Author: Jonathan Ellithorpe <jdellit(a)stanford.edu> Date: Mon Jul 11 17:33:18 2011 -0700 Fixed local parameter code bug --- swfcat.as | 6 ++---- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/swfcat.as b/swfcat.as index 76c3829..14c2d8c 100644 --- a/swfcat.as +++ b/swfcat.as @@ -108,10 +108,8 @@ package if (this.loaderInfo.parameters["local"]) local_addr = get_param_addr("local", DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR); - else { - local_addr.host = DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR.host; - local_addr.port = DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR.port; - } + else + local_addr = DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR; if (this.loaderInfo.parameters["client"]) client_main();

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[flashproxy/master] Merge branch 'master', remote branch 'origin'
by dcf＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit 91d82b9f5dcbee2f7ce98994a236d87d6e7c945c Author: Jonathan Ellithorpe <jdellit(a)stanford.edu> Date: Mon Jul 11 15:16:57 2011 -0700 Merge branch 'master', remote branch 'origin'

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[flashproxy/master] Added "local" parameter
by dcf＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit 711b607187040c8ef9b6f68d82ad45a7138d5dfc Author: Jonathan Ellithorpe <jdellit(a)stanford.edu> Date: Mon Jul 11 16:38:58 2011 -0700 Added "local" parameter This parameter can optionally specify the local addr:port to connect to in the case that you are a client swfcat. --- swfcat.as | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/swfcat.as b/swfcat.as index dbf2fb4..76c3829 100644 --- a/swfcat.as +++ b/swfcat.as @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ package }; /* Local Tor client to use in case of RTMFP connection. */ - private const LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR:Object = { + private const DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR:Object = { host: "127.0.0.1", port: 9002 }; - private const MAX_NUM_PROXY_PAIRS:uint = 1; + private const MAX_NUM_PROXY_PAIRS:uint = 2; // Milliseconds. private const FACILITATOR_POLL_INTERVAL:int = 10000; @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ package private var num_proxy_pairs:int = 0; private var fac_addr:Object; + + private var local_addr:Object; public var rate_limit:RateLimit; @@ -104,6 +106,13 @@ package return; } + if (this.loaderInfo.parameters["local"]) + local_addr = get_param_addr("local", DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR); + else { + local_addr.host = DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR.host; + local_addr.port = DEFAULT_LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR.port; + } + if (this.loaderInfo.parameters["client"]) client_main(); else @@ -221,7 +230,7 @@ package proxy_pair = new ProxyPair(this, rs, function ():void { /* Do nothing; already connected. */ }, s_t, function ():void { - s_t.connect(LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR.host, LOCAL_TOR_CLIENT_ADDR.port); + s_t.connect(local_addr.host, local_addr.port); }); proxy_pair.connect(); }

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[tor/master] Tweaks to bug2798 based on comments by arma
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit d82384658d77189cbfae9db90e6ec14af6572b5e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 11 17:02:03 2011 -0400 Tweaks to bug2798 based on comments by arma --- changes/bug2798 | 2 +- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 22 +++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2798 b/changes/bug2798 index e4ab8e5..8fd2243 100644 --- a/changes/bug2798 +++ b/changes/bug2798 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: + o Major bugfixes: - When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes (as with 'EntryNodes {cc}' or 'EntryNodes 1.1.1.1/16'), choose only a random subset to be guards, and choose them in random diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 5d40e0d..d86d049 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -3984,10 +3984,10 @@ entry_nodes_should_be_added(void) should_add_entry_nodes = 1; } -/** Add all nodes in EntryNodes that aren't currently guard nodes to the list - * of guard nodes, at the front. */ +/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from + * EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */ static void -entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) +entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options) { smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps; smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list; @@ -4017,12 +4017,6 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) /* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */ - /* XXXX023 Now that we allow countries and IP ranges in EntryNodes, this is - * potentially an enormous list. For now, we disable such values for - * EntryNodes in options_validate(); really, this wants a better solution. - * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers - * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. - */ routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes, options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node, @@ -4036,17 +4030,15 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) }); /* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable - * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_routers. */ + * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) { if (is_an_entry_guard(node->identity)) { SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); continue; } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) { - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: excluded"); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); continue; } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) { - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: fascist firewall"); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); continue; } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) { @@ -4059,7 +4051,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) smartlist_clear(entry_guards); /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */ smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list); - /* Next, scramble the reset of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */ + /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */ smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes); smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes); smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes); @@ -4125,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) entry_guards = smartlist_create(); if (should_add_entry_nodes) - entry_guards_prepend_from_config(options); + entry_guards_set_from_config(options); if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) && smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards) @@ -4150,7 +4142,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */ if (options->StrictNodes) { /* in theory this case should never happen, since - * entry_guards_prepend_from_config() drops unwanted relays */ + * entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */ tor_fragile_assert(); } else { log_info(LD_CIRC,

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[tor/master] Revise code for adding EntryNodes to guards.
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit 2797fd8f68df0a4ac9538cef6391b594e2cf9ecb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 11 10:48:46 2011 -0400 Revise code for adding EntryNodes to guards. Previously, we'd just take all the nodes in EntryNodes, see which ones were already in the guard list, and add the ones that weren't. There were some problems there, though: * We'd add _every_ entry in EntryNodes, and add them in the order they appeared in the routerlist. This wasn't a problem until we added the ability to give country-code or IP-range entries in the EntryNodes set, but now that we did, it is. (Fix: We now shuffle the entry nodes before adding them; only add up to 10*NumEntryGuards) * We didn't screen EntryNodes for the Guard flag. That's okay if the user has specified two or three entry nodes manually, but if they have listed a whole subcontinent, we should restrict ourselves to the entries that are currently guards. (Fix: separate out the new guard from the new non-guard nodes, and add the Guards first.) * We'd prepend new EntryNodes _before_ the already configured EntryNodes. This could lead to churn. (Fix: don't prepend these.) This patch also pre-screens EntryNodes entries for reachableaddresses/excludenodes, even though we check for that later. This is important now, since we cap the number of entries we'll add. --- changes/bug2798 | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2798 b/changes/bug2798 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4ab8e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2798 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes (as with + 'EntryNodes {cc}' or 'EntryNodes 1.1.1.1/16'), choose only a + random subset to be guards, and choose them in random + order. Bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha; fixes bug 2798. + + o Minor features: + - When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes, and there are + enough of them listed as Guard so that we don't need to consider + the non-guard entries, prefer the ones listed with the Guard flag. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 90d9280..5d40e0d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -3619,7 +3619,7 @@ control_event_guard_deferred(void) * already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*. * Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */ static const node_t * -add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status) +add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend) { const node_t *node; entry_guard_t *entry; @@ -3651,9 +3651,9 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status) * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */ entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30); entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION); - if (chosen) /* prepend */ + if (prepend) smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry); - else /* append */ + else smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry); control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "NEW"); control_event_guard_deferred(); @@ -3671,7 +3671,7 @@ pick_entry_guards(const or_options_t *options) tor_assert(entry_guards); while (num_live_entry_guards() < options->NumEntryGuards) { - if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0)) + if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0)) break; changed = 1; } @@ -3989,7 +3989,7 @@ entry_nodes_should_be_added(void) static void entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) { - smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *entry_fps; + smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps; smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list; tor_assert(entry_guards); @@ -4010,6 +4010,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) } entry_nodes = smartlist_create(); + worse_entry_nodes = smartlist_create(); entry_fps = smartlist_create(); old_entry_guards_on_list = smartlist_create(); old_entry_guards_not_on_list = smartlist_create(); @@ -4034,27 +4035,49 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, e); }); - /* Remove all currently configured entry guards from entry_routers. */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node, { + /* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable + * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_routers. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) { if (is_an_entry_guard(node->identity)) { SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + continue; + } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) { + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: excluded"); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + continue; + } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) { + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: fascist firewall"); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + continue; + } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) { + smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); } - }); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); /* Now build the new entry_guards list. */ smartlist_clear(entry_guards); /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */ smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list); + /* Next, scramble the reset of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */ + smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes); + smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes); + smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes); + /* Next, the rest of EntryNodes */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node, { - add_an_entry_guard(node, 0); - }); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) { + add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 0); + if (smartlist_len(entry_guards) > options->NumEntryGuards * 10) + break; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards", smartlist_len(entry_guards)); /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in * EntryNodes. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, entry_guard_free(e)); smartlist_free(entry_nodes); + smartlist_free(worse_entry_nodes); smartlist_free(entry_fps); smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_on_list); smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list); @@ -4165,7 +4188,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might * be a long time til we get it. -RD */ - node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0); + node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0); if (node) { entry_guards_changed(); /* XXX we start over here in case the new node we added shares @@ -4874,7 +4897,7 @@ learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache) node = node_get_mutable_by_id(ri->cache_info.identity_digest); tor_assert(node); rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(bridge, node); - add_an_entry_guard(node, 1); + add_an_entry_guard(node, 1, 1); log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s' (%s)", ri->nickname, from_cache ? "cached" : "fresh");

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug2798'
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit 597da4989e6f6a9c1a12ad3197dd6532b1a80035 Merge: b55e31a d823846 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 11 17:04:21 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug2798' changes/bug2798 | 10 +++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

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[torbrowser/master] bump tbb linux to 1.1.12 and tor to 0.2.2.30-rc
by erinn＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit 6b4e6b4bc02ddb40cef2bda6339bcdd20d48bdfc Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 11 17:51:22 2011 -0300 bump tbb linux to 1.1.12 and tor to 0.2.2.30-rc --- README.Linux | 14 ++++++++++---- build-scripts/linux.mk | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.Linux b/README.Linux index 05ea71b..850608c 100644 --- a/README.Linux +++ b/README.Linux @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ Included applications --------------------- Vidalia 0.2.12 (with Qt 4.6.2) -Tor 0.2.2.29-beta (with libevent-2.0.12-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-0.9.8p) -Firefox 3.6.17 +Tor 0.2.2.30-rc (with libevent-2.0.12-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-0.9.8p) +Firefox 3.6.18 \_ Torbutton 1.2.5 - |_ NoScript 2.1.1.1 + |_ NoScript 2.1.1.2 |_ BetterPrivacy 1.51 - |_ HTTPS Everywhere 0.9.9.development.6 + |_ HTTPS Everywhere 1.0.0development.4 Usage ----- @@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ To exit, close Firefox. Vidalia will automatically clean up and exit. Changelog --------- +1.1.12: Released 2011-07-11 + Update Tor to 0.2.2.30-rc + Update Firefox to 3.6.18 + Update NoScript to 2.1.1.2 + Update HTTPS-Everywhere to 1.0.0development.4 + 1.1.11: Released 2011-06-21 Update Tor to 0.2.2.29-beta Update NoScript to 2.1.1.1 diff --git a/build-scripts/linux.mk b/build-scripts/linux.mk index 079c21a..cc185be 100644 --- a/build-scripts/linux.mk +++ b/build-scripts/linux.mk @@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ BUILT_DIR=$(FETCH_DIR)/built TBB_FINAL=$(BUILT_DIR)/TBBL ## Versions for our source packages -HTTPSEVERY_VER=0.9.9.development.6 -FIREFOX_VER=3.6.17 +HTTPSEVERY_VER=1.0.0development.4 +FIREFOX_VER=3.6.18 LIBEVENT_VER=2.0.12-stable LIBPNG_VER=1.4.3 -NOSCRIPT_VER=2.1.1.1 +NOSCRIPT_VER=2.1.1.2 OPENSSL_VER=0.9.8p OTR_VER=3.2.0 PIDGIN_VER=2.6.4 POLIPO_VER=1.0.4.1 QT_VER=4.6.2 -TOR_VER=0.2.2.29-beta +TOR_VER=0.2.2.30-rc TORBUTTON_VER=1.2.5 VIDALIA_VER=0.2.12 ZLIB_VER=1.2.5 @@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ NAME=tor-browser DISTDIR=tbbl-dist ## Version and name of the compressed bundle (also used for source) -VERSION=1.1.11-dev +VERSION=1.1.12-dev DEFAULT_COMPRESSED_BASENAME=tor-browser-gnu-linux-$(ARCH_TYPE)-$(VERSION)- IM_COMPRESSED_BASENAME=tor-im-browser-gnu-linux-$(VERSION)- DEFAULT_COMPRESSED_NAME=$(DEFAULT_COMPRESSED_BASENAME)$(VERSION)

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[torbrowser/master] bump tbb osx to 1.0.20 and tor to 0.2.2.30-rc, update changelogs and readme
by erinn＠torproject.org 11 Jul '11

11 Jul '11

commit f547b5e55c9d48f1b99197d0b8c6760cb4f5a4d4 Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 11 16:59:37 2011 -0300 bump tbb osx to 1.0.20 and tor to 0.2.2.30-rc, update changelogs and readme --- README.OSX | 14 ++++++++++---- build-scripts/osx.mk | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.OSX b/README.OSX index 04358e8..6cd757c 100644 --- a/README.OSX +++ b/README.OSX @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ Included applications --------------------- Vidalia 0.2.12 (with Qt 4.6.2) -Tor 0.2.2.29-beta (with libevent-2.0.12-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-0.9.8p) +Tor 0.2.2.30-rc (with libevent-2.0.12-stable, zlib-1.2.5 and openssl-0.9.8p) Polipo 1.0.4.1 -Firefox 3.6.17 +Firefox 3.6.18 \_ Torbutton 1.2.5 - |_ NoScript 2.1.1.1 - |_ HTTPS-Everywhere 0.9.9.development.6 + |_ NoScript 2.1.1.2 + |_ HTTPS-Everywhere 1.0.0development.4 |_ BetterPrivacy 1.51 Usage @@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ To exit, close Firefox and Vidalia. Changelog --------- +1.0.20: Released 2011-07-10 + Update Tor to 0.2.2.30-rc + Update Firefox to 3.6.18 + Update HTTPS-Everywhere to 1.0.0development.4 + Update NoScript to 2.1.1.2 + 1.0.19: Released 2011-06-21 Update Tor to 0.2.2.29-beta Update NoScript to 2.1.1.1 diff --git a/build-scripts/osx.mk b/build-scripts/osx.mk index 6eca7be..2fa0a4d 100644 --- a/build-scripts/osx.mk +++ b/build-scripts/osx.mk @@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ BUILT_DIR=$(FETCH_DIR)/built TBB_FINAL=$(BUILT_DIR)/TBBL ## Versions for our source packages -HTTPSEVERY_VER=0.9.9.development.6 -FIREFOX_VER=3.6.17 +HTTPSEVERY_VER=1.0.0development.4 +FIREFOX_VER=3.6.18 LIBEVENT_VER=2.0.12-stable LIBPNG_VER=1.4.3 -NOSCRIPT_VER=2.1.1.1 +NOSCRIPT_VER=2.1.1.2 OPENSSL_VER=0.9.8p OTR_VER=3.2.0 PIDGIN_VER=2.6.4 POLIPO_VER=1.0.4.1 QT_VER=4.6.2 -TOR_VER=0.2.2.29-beta +TOR_VER=0.2.2.30-rc TORBUTTON_VER=1.2.5 VIDALIA_VER=0.2.12 ZLIB_VER=1.2.5 @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ NAME=TorBrowser DISTDIR=tbbosx-dist ## Version and name of the compressed bundle (also used for source) -VERSION=1.0.19-dev +VERSION=1.0.20-dev DEFAULT_COMPRESSED_BASENAME=TorBrowser-$(VERSION)-osx-$(ARCH_TYPE)- IM_COMPRESSED_BASENAME=TorBrowser-IM-$(VERSION)- DEFAULT_COMPRESSED_NAME=$(DEFAULT_COMPRESSED_BASENAME) @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ endif DEFAULT_EXTENSIONS=torbutton.xpi ## Where to download Torbutton from -TORBUTTON=https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/releases/torbutton-$(TORBUTTON_VER).xpi +TORBUTTON=https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/torbutton/torbutton-$(TORBUTTON_VER).xpi NOSCRIPT=https://secure.informaction.com/download/releases/noscript-$(NOSCR… BETTERPRIVACY=https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/downloads/latest/662… HTTPSEVERYWHERE=https://eff.org/files/https-everywhere-$(HTTPSEVERY_VER).xpi

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