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[tor/master] Fix another check_private_dir instance in master
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit 22efe2030901e7ef878c8ec358e819bbdb1239f6 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 12:28:16 2011 -0400 Fix another check_private_dir instance in master --- src/or/rephist.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 3cc6185..b4dbba7 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ rep_hist_conn_stats_write(time_t now) /* Try to write to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); goto done; }

1 0

[tor/master] remove some dead code, found by coverity
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit db7dd3ee7a07d9bc121d1c8f353e206327bb72c5 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 8 20:02:16 2011 +0200 remove some dead code, found by coverity --- changes/coverity_maint | 3 +++ src/or/rephist.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/coverity_maint b/changes/coverity_maint new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec25d09 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/coverity_maint @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Code simplifications and refactoring: + - Remove some dead code as indicated by coverity. + diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 6be8484..242fe81 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2401,8 +2401,7 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_add_circ(circuit_t *circ, time_t end_of_interval) stat = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circ_buffer_stats_t)); stat->processed_cells = orcirc->processed_cells; /* 1000.0 for s -> ms; 2.0 because of app-ward and exit-ward queues */ - stat->mean_num_cells_in_queue = interval_length == 0 ? 0.0 : - (double) orcirc->total_cell_waiting_time / + stat->mean_num_cells_in_queue = (double) orcirc->total_cell_waiting_time / (double) interval_length / 1000.0 / 2.0; stat->mean_time_cells_in_queue = (double) orcirc->total_cell_waiting_time /

1 0

[tor/master] Check some more return values in unit tests
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit ff75e8b02dbf35c2ecc82ffd4d2b2112a144322e Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 8 21:06:01 2011 +0200 Check some more return values in unit tests --- changes/coverity_maint | 3 +++ src/test/test_addr.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/coverity_maint b/changes/coverity_maint index ec25d09..1bd1c41 100644 --- a/changes/coverity_maint +++ b/changes/coverity_maint @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ o Code simplifications and refactoring: - Remove some dead code as indicated by coverity. + o Minor bugfixes: + - Add some forgotten return value checks during unit tests. Found + by coverity. diff --git a/src/test/test_addr.c b/src/test/test_addr.c index 6db4ee2..1dab0e0 100644 --- a/src/test/test_addr.c +++ b/src/test/test_addr.c @@ -436,13 +436,16 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) /* test tor_addr_parse_mask_ports */ test_addr_mask_ports_parse("[::f]/17:47-95", AF_INET6, 0, 0, 0, 0x0000000f, 17, 47, 95); + test_streq(p1, "::f"); //test_addr_parse("[::fefe:4.1.1.7/120]:999-1000"); //test_addr_parse_check("::fefe:401:107", 120, 999, 1000); test_addr_mask_ports_parse("[::ffff:4.1.1.7]/120:443", AF_INET6, 0, 0, 0x0000ffff, 0x04010107, 120, 443, 443); + test_streq(p1, "::ffff:4.1.1.7"); test_addr_mask_ports_parse("[abcd:2::44a:0]:2-65000", AF_INET6, 0xabcd0002, 0, 0, 0x044a0000, 128, 2, 65000); + test_streq(p1, "abcd:2::44a:0"); r=tor_addr_parse_mask_ports("[fefef::]/112", &t1, NULL, NULL, NULL); test_assert(r == -1); r=tor_addr_parse_mask_ports("efef::/112", &t1, NULL, NULL, NULL);

1 0

[tor/master] Remove a few dead assignments during router parsing
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit e6fff7235e46b794cd77af516a1ecfab9c87de7f Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 8 21:16:11 2011 +0200 Remove a few dead assignments during router parsing --- changes/coverity_maint | 1 + src/or/routerparse.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/coverity_maint b/changes/coverity_maint index 1bd1c41..fd8c440 100644 --- a/changes/coverity_maint +++ b/changes/coverity_maint @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ o Code simplifications and refactoring: - Remove some dead code as indicated by coverity. + - Remove a few dead assignments during router parsing. Found by coverity. o Minor bugfixes: - Add some forgotten return value checks during unit tests. Found by coverity. diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index f855f9d..42dbcac 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -1544,10 +1544,10 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, } } - if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO))) + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO)) router->caches_extra_info = 1; - if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS))) + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS)) router->allow_single_hop_exits = 1; if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST))) { @@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, } } - if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR))) { + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR)) { router->wants_to_be_hs_dir = 1; }

1 0

[tor/master] Comment out some obviously dead code.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit 9e56ac27da80969fadaad7eaf64a8384e68a778e Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 8 21:23:05 2011 +0200 Comment out some obviously dead code. Coverity warned about it, it's harmless to comment out. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 4ad244d..8534c38 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -775,8 +775,8 @@ circuit_get_by_circid_orconn_impl(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn) return found->circuit; return NULL; - /* The rest of this checks for bugs. Disabled by default. */ + /* We comment it out because coverity complains otherwise. { circuit_t *circ; for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { @@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ circuit_get_by_circid_orconn_impl(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn) } } return NULL; - } + } */ } /** Return a circ such that:

1 0

[tor/master] Don't use signed 1-bit bitfields
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit 680646e0de29454f92d57bc3a4895d75c95e158c Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 8 21:27:32 2011 +0200 Don't use signed 1-bit bitfields This was harmless, we never compared it to anything but itself or 0. But Coverity complained, and it had a point. --- changes/coverity_maint | 1 + src/or/policies.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/coverity_maint b/changes/coverity_maint index fd8c440..6d60355 100644 --- a/changes/coverity_maint +++ b/changes/coverity_maint @@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Add some forgotten return value checks during unit tests. Found by coverity. + - Don't use 1-bit wide signed bit fields. Found by coverity. diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index e48f420..c870360 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ typedef struct policy_summary_item_t { uint16_t prt_max; /**< Highest port number to accept/reject. */ uint64_t reject_count; /**< Number of IP-Addresses that are rejected to this port range. */ - int accepted:1; /** Has this port already been accepted */ + unsigned int accepted:1; /** Has this port already been accepted */ } policy_summary_item_t; /** Private networks. This list is used in two places, once to expand the

1 0

[tor/master] Fix a rare memleak during stats writing
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit f30327449009a7f00b0f5c2bd09a7eff615df3dd Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 8 21:35:26 2011 +0200 Fix a rare memleak during stats writing If rep_hist_buffer_stats_write() was called unitinitalized, we'd leak memory. --- changes/coverity_maint | 1 + src/or/rephist.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/coverity_maint b/changes/coverity_maint index 6d60355..e7be90a 100644 --- a/changes/coverity_maint +++ b/changes/coverity_maint @@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ - Add some forgotten return value checks during unit tests. Found by coverity. - Don't use 1-bit wide signed bit fields. Found by coverity. + - Fix a rare memory leak during stats writing. Found by coverity. diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 242fe81..54593a0 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2451,8 +2451,8 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) int processed_cells[SHARES], circs_in_share[SHARES], number_of_circuits, i; double queued_cells[SHARES], time_in_queue[SHARES]; - smartlist_t *str_build = smartlist_create(); - char *str = NULL, *buf=NULL; + smartlist_t *str_build = NULL; + char *str = NULL, *buf = NULL; circuit_t *circ; if (!start_of_buffer_stats_interval) @@ -2460,6 +2460,8 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) if (start_of_buffer_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL > now) goto done; /* Not ready to write */ + str_build = smartlist_create(); + /* add current circuits to stats */ for (circ = _circuit_get_global_list(); circ; circ = circ->next) rep_hist_buffer_stats_add_circ(circ, now);

1 0

[tor/master] Make ControlSocketsGroupWritable work with User.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit 54d7d31cba84232b50fef4287951b2c4bfa746c2 Author: Jérémy Bobbio <lunar(a)debian.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 12:18:32 2011 -0400 Make ControlSocketsGroupWritable work with User. Original message from bug3393: check_private_dir() to ensure that ControlSocketsGroupWritable is safe to use. Unfortunately, check_private_dir() only checks against the currently running user… which can be root until privileges are dropped to the user and group configured by the User config option. The attached patch fixes the issue by adding a new effective_user argument to check_private_dir() and updating the callers. It might not be the best way to fix the issue, but it did in my tests. (Code by lunar; changelog by nickm) --- src/common/util.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/common/util.h | 3 ++- src/or/config.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/geoip.c | 6 +++--- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/or/rephist.c | 4 ++-- src/or/router.c | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 6f323dd..36aa9cc 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1677,15 +1677,20 @@ file_status(const char *fname) * is group-readable, but in all cases we create the directory mode 0700. * If CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY is set, then we don't alter the directory permissions * if they are too permissive: we just return -1. + * When effective_user is not NULL, check permissions against the given user and + * its primary group. */ int -check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) +check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, const char *effective_user) { int r; struct stat st; char *f; #ifndef MS_WINDOWS int mask; + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + uid_t running_uid; + gid_t running_gid; #endif tor_assert(dirname); @@ -1724,33 +1729,47 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) return -1; } #ifndef MS_WINDOWS - if (st.st_uid != getuid()) { + if (effective_user) { + /* Lookup the user and group information, if we have a problem, bail out. */ + pw = getpwnam(effective_user); + if (pw == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error setting configured user: %s not found", effective_user); + return -1; + } + running_uid = pw->pw_uid; + running_gid = pw->pw_gid; + } else { + running_uid = getuid(); + running_gid = getgid(); + } + + if (st.st_uid != running_uid) { struct passwd *pw = NULL; char *process_ownername = NULL; - pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + pw = getpwuid(running_uid); process_ownername = pw ? tor_strdup(pw->pw_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); pw = getpwuid(st.st_uid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this user (%s, %d) but by " "%s (%d). Perhaps you are running Tor as the wrong user?", - dirname, process_ownername, (int)getuid(), + dirname, process_ownername, (int)running_uid, pw ? pw->pw_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_uid); tor_free(process_ownername); return -1; } - if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != getgid()) { + if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != running_gid) { struct group *gr; char *process_groupname = NULL; - gr = getgrgid(getgid()); + gr = getgrgid(running_gid); process_groupname = gr ? tor_strdup(gr->gr_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); gr = getgrgid(st.st_gid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this group (%s, %d) but by group " "%s (%d). Are you running Tor as the wrong user?", - dirname, process_groupname, (int)getgid(), + dirname, process_groupname, (int)running_gid, gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid); tor_free(process_groupname); diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index d657db6..b9db25c 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ typedef unsigned int cpd_check_t; #define CPD_CHECK 2 #define CPD_GROUP_OK 4 #define CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY 8 -int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check); +int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, + const char *effective_user); #define OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) #define OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND) typedef struct open_file_t open_file_t; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 44cecf3..8ab23a3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) /* Ensure data directory is private; create if possible. */ if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, - running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK)<0) { + running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK, + options->User)<0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", options->DataDirectory); @@ -1038,7 +1039,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) char *fn = tor_malloc(len); tor_snprintf(fn, len, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-status", options->DataDirectory); - if (check_private_dir(fn, running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(fn, running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK, + options->User) < 0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", fn); tor_free(fn); diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 3f4ca1d..a9e3a74 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ check_location_for_unix_socket(or_options_t *options, const char *path) if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; - if (check_private_dir(p, flags) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { char *escpath, *escdir; escpath = esc_for_log(path); escdir = esc_for_log(p); diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 5bb2410..c621ea8 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ geoip_dirreq_stats_write(time_t now) geoip_remove_old_clients(start_of_dirreq_stats_interval); statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "dirreq-stats"); data_v2 = geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS_V2); @@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ geoip_bridge_stats_write(time_t now) /* Write it to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "bridge-stats"); @@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ geoip_entry_stats_write(time_t now) geoip_remove_old_clients(start_of_entry_stats_interval); statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "entry-stats"); data = geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index a10e43f..d9a9364 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ rend_service_load_keys(void) s->directory); /* Check/create directory */ - if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) return -1; /* Load key */ diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 54593a0..b7341f3 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ rep_hist_exit_stats_write(time_t now) /* Try to write to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); goto done; } @@ -2497,7 +2497,7 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) smartlist_clear(circuits_for_buffer_stats); /* write to file */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "buffer-stats"); out = start_writing_to_stdio_file(filename, OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND, diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 68e29bb..2165e6e 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -533,12 +533,12 @@ init_keys(void) return 0; } /* Make sure DataDirectory exists, and is private. */ - if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE)) { + if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE, options->User)) { return -1; } /* Check the key directory. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname("keys"); - if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE)) { + if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE, options->User)) { tor_free(keydir); return -1; }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.2] Make ControlSocketsGroupWritable work with User.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit 54d7d31cba84232b50fef4287951b2c4bfa746c2 Author: Jérémy Bobbio <lunar(a)debian.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 12:18:32 2011 -0400 Make ControlSocketsGroupWritable work with User. Original message from bug3393: check_private_dir() to ensure that ControlSocketsGroupWritable is safe to use. Unfortunately, check_private_dir() only checks against the currently running user… which can be root until privileges are dropped to the user and group configured by the User config option. The attached patch fixes the issue by adding a new effective_user argument to check_private_dir() and updating the callers. It might not be the best way to fix the issue, but it did in my tests. (Code by lunar; changelog by nickm) --- src/common/util.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/common/util.h | 3 ++- src/or/config.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/connection.c | 2 +- src/or/geoip.c | 6 +++--- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/or/rephist.c | 4 ++-- src/or/router.c | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 6f323dd..36aa9cc 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1677,15 +1677,20 @@ file_status(const char *fname) * is group-readable, but in all cases we create the directory mode 0700. * If CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY is set, then we don't alter the directory permissions * if they are too permissive: we just return -1. + * When effective_user is not NULL, check permissions against the given user and + * its primary group. */ int -check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) +check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, const char *effective_user) { int r; struct stat st; char *f; #ifndef MS_WINDOWS int mask; + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + uid_t running_uid; + gid_t running_gid; #endif tor_assert(dirname); @@ -1724,33 +1729,47 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check) return -1; } #ifndef MS_WINDOWS - if (st.st_uid != getuid()) { + if (effective_user) { + /* Lookup the user and group information, if we have a problem, bail out. */ + pw = getpwnam(effective_user); + if (pw == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error setting configured user: %s not found", effective_user); + return -1; + } + running_uid = pw->pw_uid; + running_gid = pw->pw_gid; + } else { + running_uid = getuid(); + running_gid = getgid(); + } + + if (st.st_uid != running_uid) { struct passwd *pw = NULL; char *process_ownername = NULL; - pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + pw = getpwuid(running_uid); process_ownername = pw ? tor_strdup(pw->pw_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); pw = getpwuid(st.st_uid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this user (%s, %d) but by " "%s (%d). Perhaps you are running Tor as the wrong user?", - dirname, process_ownername, (int)getuid(), + dirname, process_ownername, (int)running_uid, pw ? pw->pw_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_uid); tor_free(process_ownername); return -1; } - if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != getgid()) { + if ((check & CPD_GROUP_OK) && st.st_gid != running_gid) { struct group *gr; char *process_groupname = NULL; - gr = getgrgid(getgid()); + gr = getgrgid(running_gid); process_groupname = gr ? tor_strdup(gr->gr_name) : tor_strdup("<unknown>"); gr = getgrgid(st.st_gid); log_warn(LD_FS, "%s is not owned by this group (%s, %d) but by group " "%s (%d). Are you running Tor as the wrong user?", - dirname, process_groupname, (int)getgid(), + dirname, process_groupname, (int)running_gid, gr ? gr->gr_name : "<unknown>", (int)st.st_gid); tor_free(process_groupname); diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index d657db6..b9db25c 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ typedef unsigned int cpd_check_t; #define CPD_CHECK 2 #define CPD_GROUP_OK 4 #define CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY 8 -int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check); +int check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, + const char *effective_user); #define OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) #define OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND (O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND) typedef struct open_file_t open_file_t; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 44cecf3..8ab23a3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) /* Ensure data directory is private; create if possible. */ if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, - running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK)<0) { + running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK, + options->User)<0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", options->DataDirectory); @@ -1038,7 +1039,8 @@ options_act_reversible(or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) char *fn = tor_malloc(len); tor_snprintf(fn, len, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-status", options->DataDirectory); - if (check_private_dir(fn, running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(fn, running_tor ? CPD_CREATE : CPD_CHECK, + options->User) < 0) { tor_asprintf(msg, "Couldn't access/create private data directory \"%s\"", fn); tor_free(fn); diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 3f4ca1d..a9e3a74 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ check_location_for_unix_socket(or_options_t *options, const char *path) if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; - if (check_private_dir(p, flags) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { char *escpath, *escdir; escpath = esc_for_log(path); escdir = esc_for_log(p); diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 5bb2410..c621ea8 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ geoip_dirreq_stats_write(time_t now) geoip_remove_old_clients(start_of_dirreq_stats_interval); statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "dirreq-stats"); data_v2 = geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS_V2); @@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ geoip_bridge_stats_write(time_t now) /* Write it to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "bridge-stats"); @@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ geoip_entry_stats_write(time_t now) geoip_remove_old_clients(start_of_entry_stats_interval); statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "entry-stats"); data = geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index a10e43f..d9a9364 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ rend_service_load_keys(void) s->directory); /* Check/create directory */ - if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(s->directory, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) return -1; /* Load key */ diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 54593a0..b7341f3 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ rep_hist_exit_stats_write(time_t now) /* Try to write to disk. */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) { + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); goto done; } @@ -2497,7 +2497,7 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) smartlist_clear(circuits_for_buffer_stats); /* write to file */ statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE) < 0) + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) goto done; filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "buffer-stats"); out = start_writing_to_stdio_file(filename, OPEN_FLAGS_APPEND, diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 68e29bb..2165e6e 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -533,12 +533,12 @@ init_keys(void) return 0; } /* Make sure DataDirectory exists, and is private. */ - if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE)) { + if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE, options->User)) { return -1; } /* Check the key directory. */ keydir = get_datadir_fname("keys"); - if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE)) { + if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE, options->User)) { tor_free(keydir); return -1; }

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[arm/master] Toggling the INCLUDE_GUI flag back to being off
by atagar＠torproject.org 14 Jun '11

14 Jun '11

commit a5af27f67a0c07b190997f36ed829b6a05b83a91 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jun 13 19:46:57 2011 -0700 Toggling the INCLUDE_GUI flag back to being off It isn't ready yet for users so toggling the gui back to being disabled. --- src/starter.py | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/starter.py b/src/starter.py index 50feceb..d2ac910 100644 --- a/src/starter.py +++ b/src/starter.py @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ import util.uiTools import TorCtl.TorCtl import TorCtl.TorUtil -INCLUDE_GUI = True +INCLUDE_GUI = False LOG_DUMP_PATH = os.path.expanduser("~/.arm/log") DEFAULT_CONFIG = os.path.expanduser("~/.arm/armrc") CONFIG = {"startup.controlPassword": None,

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