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[torbrowser/master] update libevent library names for linux
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 9df7c935f4284815b65d651e68780bf6e5b7378f Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 5 00:01:05 2012 +0100 update libevent library names for linux --- build-scripts/linux.mk | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/build-scripts/linux.mk b/build-scripts/linux.mk index 963da78..4f93eec 100644 --- a/build-scripts/linux.mk +++ b/build-scripts/linux.mk @@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ install-binaries: # zlib cp -d $(ZLIB)/libz.so $(ZLIB)/libz.so.1 $(ZLIB)/libz.so.1.2.5 $(LIBSDIR)/libz # Libevent - cp -d $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.3 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core.so \ - $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5.1.3 \ - $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5.1.3 \ + cp -d $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.4 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core.so \ + $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_core-2.0.so.5.1.4 \ + $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5 $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra-2.0.so.5.1.4 \ $(LIBEVENT)/libevent_extra.so $(LIBEVENT)/libevent.so $(LIBSDIR) # libpng cp -d $(LIBPNG)/libpng14.so* $(LIBSDIR)

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[torbrowser/maint-2.2] bump openssl to 1.0.0f
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit e7294698e0fe8e49786f47e42c05c54c0f4a7b40 Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 23:57:10 2012 +0100 bump openssl to 1.0.0f --- build-scripts/versions.mk | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/build-scripts/versions.mk b/build-scripts/versions.mk index 20cfd71..ec85656 100644 --- a/build-scripts/versions.mk +++ b/build-scripts/versions.mk @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HTTPSEVERY_VER=1.2.1 FIREFOX_VER=9.0.1 LIBEVENT_VER=2.0.16-stable LIBPNG_VER=1.4.8 -NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.4 -OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0e +NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.5 +OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0f OTR_VER=3.2.0 PIDGIN_VER=2.6.4 QT_VER=4.6.2

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[torbrowser/maint-2.3] bump openssl to 1.0.0f
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit e7294698e0fe8e49786f47e42c05c54c0f4a7b40 Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 23:57:10 2012 +0100 bump openssl to 1.0.0f --- build-scripts/versions.mk | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/build-scripts/versions.mk b/build-scripts/versions.mk index 20cfd71..ec85656 100644 --- a/build-scripts/versions.mk +++ b/build-scripts/versions.mk @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HTTPSEVERY_VER=1.2.1 FIREFOX_VER=9.0.1 LIBEVENT_VER=2.0.16-stable LIBPNG_VER=1.4.8 -NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.4 -OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0e +NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.5 +OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0f OTR_VER=3.2.0 PIDGIN_VER=2.6.4 QT_VER=4.6.2

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[torbrowser/master] bump openssl to 1.0.0f
by erinn＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit e7294698e0fe8e49786f47e42c05c54c0f4a7b40 Author: Erinn Clark <erinn(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 23:57:10 2012 +0100 bump openssl to 1.0.0f --- build-scripts/versions.mk | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/build-scripts/versions.mk b/build-scripts/versions.mk index 20cfd71..ec85656 100644 --- a/build-scripts/versions.mk +++ b/build-scripts/versions.mk @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HTTPSEVERY_VER=1.2.1 FIREFOX_VER=9.0.1 LIBEVENT_VER=2.0.16-stable LIBPNG_VER=1.4.8 -NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.4 -OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0e +NOSCRIPT_VER=2.2.5 +OPENSSL_VER=1.0.0f OTR_VER=3.2.0 PIDGIN_VER=2.6.4 QT_VER=4.6.2

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[tor/master] Move description of HidServAuth out of the FascistFirewall group
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit c6a8ee36fb42e5012704c2428772491ddf3057a6 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 01:28:35 2011 -0800 Move description of HidServAuth out of the FascistFirewall group --- doc/tor.1.txt | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 5662131..b373678 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -644,16 +644,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443) -**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]:: - Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 - characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 - characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal - purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times - for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and - this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden - services can be configured to require authorization using the - **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. - **ReachableAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...:: A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except @@ -683,6 +673,16 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to port 80. +**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]:: + Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 + characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 + characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal + purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times + for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and + this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden + services can be configured to require authorization using the + **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. + **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__:: A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these

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[tor/master] Don't close HS client circs which are 'almost connected' on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 4b13c33c0c18c66cc39caba9b70005bbe43c6613 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Dec 23 05:25:17 2011 -0800 Don't close HS client circs which are 'almost connected' on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 12 +++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 ++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 5 ++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b2754a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - Don't close hidden service client circuits which have almost + finished connecting to their destination when they reach the + normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would close + introduction circuits which are waiting for an acknowledgement + from the introduction-point relay and rendezvous circuits which + have been specified in an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden + service after the normal CBT; now, we mark them as 'timed out', + and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. Fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index ef4ac6f..58d8aa6 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; } + /* If this is a timed-out hidden service circuit, skip it. */ + if (origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) { + return 0; + } + if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) if (circ->timestamp_dirty && @@ -351,7 +356,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed * custom timeouts yet */ struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, - cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff; + cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, + hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct timeval now; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; @@ -371,6 +378,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff, + MAX(circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000, + options->SocksTimeout * 1000)); + while (next_circ) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; @@ -392,6 +403,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) else cutoff = general_cutoff; + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) + cutoff = hs_extremely_old_cutoff; + if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &cutoff, >)) continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */ @@ -497,6 +511,43 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } + /* If this is a hidden-service circuit which is far enough along + * in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already + * flagged it as 'timed out', flag it as 'timed out' so we'll + * launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it for close + * yet. + * + * (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout + * period above, so we won't close them in the next call to + * circuit_expire_building.) */ + if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { + switch (victim->purpose) { + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: + /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in + * an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. A circ's + * pending_final_cpath field is non-NULL iff it is a rend circ + * and we have tried to send an INTRODUCE1 cell specifying it. + * Thus, if the pending_final_cpath field *is* NULL, then we + * want to not spare it. */ + if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath == + NULL) + break; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: + /* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " + "as timed-out HS circ", + victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, + victim->n_circ_id, + victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), + victim->purpose); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; + continue; + default: + break; + } + } + if (victim->n_conn) log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 63ff5c4..63eb64c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2607,6 +2607,13 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * cannibalized circuits. */ unsigned int has_opened : 1; + /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out + * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has + * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to + * its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous + * circuit. */ + unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; + /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT]; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 84a9d49..17c92ab 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + /* Now that this circuit has finished connecting to its destination, + * make sure circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch is willing to return it + * so we can actually use it. */ + circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0; + onion_append_to_cpath(&circ->cpath, hop); circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */

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[tor/master] Add an option to close 'almost-connected' HS client circs on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 078e3e9dd59520b7f40a126a91e89eba91098c49 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 00:46:37 2011 -0800 Add an option to close 'almost-connected' HS client circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 6 ++++-- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 14 ++++++++------ src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 2b2754a..28b7564 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ from the introduction-point relay and rendezvous circuits which have been specified in an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service after the normal CBT; now, we mark them as 'timed out', - and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. Fixes part - of bug 1297. + and launch another rendezvous attempt in parallel. This + behaviour change can be disabled using the new + CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes part of + bug 1297. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index b373678..f942573 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -683,6 +683,16 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if services can be configured to require authorization using the **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. +**CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**:: + If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client circuits + which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination + hidden service when their internal state has not changed for the + duration of the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such + circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish + connecting to their destination hidden services. In either case, + another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same + destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0) + **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__:: A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 58d8aa6..d9d95bc 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -511,16 +511,18 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } - /* If this is a hidden-service circuit which is far enough along - * in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already - * flagged it as 'timed out', flag it as 'timed out' so we'll - * launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it for close - * yet. + /* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough + * along in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already + * flagged it as 'timed out', and the user has not told us to + * close such circs immediately on timeout, flag it as 'timed out' + * so we'll launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it + * for close yet. * * (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout * period above, so we won't close them in the next call to * circuit_expire_building.) */ - if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { + if (!(options->CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout) && + !(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { switch (victim->purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 521f760..3374459 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(HSAuthoritativeDir, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("HSAuthorityRecordStats"), + V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(HTTPProxy, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPProxyAuthenticator, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPSProxy, STRING, NULL), diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 63eb64c..d84f04b 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3057,6 +3057,11 @@ typedef struct { * circuits.) */ int Tor2webMode; + /** Close hidden service client circuits immediately when they reach + * the normal circuit-build timeout, even if they have already sent + * an INTRODUCE1 cell on its way to the service. */ + int CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout; + int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */ int _ConnLimit; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */ int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug1297b-v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 65420e4cb5edcd02b6f44462dcc5c3a7fa8bb2e9 Merge: 47b7a27 0bd53b8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 4 13:50:24 2012 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug1297b-v2' changes/bug1297b | 20 ++++++++++++++ changes/bug4759 | 14 +++++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------- src/or/circuitlist.c | 22 +++++++++------ src/or/circuitlist.h | 4 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/config.c | 2 + src/or/or.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 14 ++++++++- src/or/rendservice.c | 16 +++++++++++ 10 files changed, 211 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Don't close HS service-side rend circs on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit f88c8ca8c98dc3a0c9e63012ce425d1287625444 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 04:47:30 2011 -0800 Don't close HS service-side rend circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 4 ++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 28b7564..9cf2597 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -12,3 +12,7 @@ CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes part of bug 1297. + - Don't close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits when they + reach the normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would + close them. Fixes the remaining part of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index d9d95bc..9778ae7 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -550,6 +550,22 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } + /* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far + * enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing + * it. */ + if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && + victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " + "as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.", + victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, + victim->n_circ_id, + victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), + victim->purpose); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; + rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)); + continue; + } + if (victim->n_conn) log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index d84f04b..3ac8b92 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2614,6 +2614,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * circuit. */ unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; + /** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a + * new connection attempt has been launched. */ + unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1; + /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT]; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 76caeff..bbc9c91 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1419,6 +1419,17 @@ rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc) tor_assert(oldcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); + /* Don't relaunch the same rend circ twice. */ + if (oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit to %s has already been relaunched; " + "not relaunching it again.", + oldcirc->build_state ? + safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)) + : "*unknown*"); + return; + } + oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched = 1; + if (!oldcirc->build_state || oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES || oldcirc->build_state->expiry_time < time(NULL)) { @@ -1727,6 +1738,11 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) "cookie %s for service %s", circuit->_base.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid); + /* Clear the 'in-progress HS circ has timed out' flag for + * consistency with what happens on the client side; this line has + * no effect on Tor's behaviour. */ + circuit->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0; + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); if (!service) {

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[tor/master] Add an option to close HS service-side rend circs on timeout
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Jan '12

04 Jan '12

commit 836161c56062686d274abf4218779c4db5c8cf5c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 04:55:20 2011 -0800 Add an option to close HS service-side rend circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 4 +++- doc/tor.1.txt | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 3 ++- src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 9cf2597..fb0d00c 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -14,5 +14,7 @@ - Don't close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits when they reach the normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would - close them. Fixes the remaining part of bug 1297. + close them. This behaviour change can be disabled using the new + CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes + the remaining part of bug 1297. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index f942573..91a7c69 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -693,6 +693,14 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0) +**CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**:: + If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side rendezvous + circuits after the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such + circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish + connecting to their destinations. In either case, another + rendezvous circuit for the same destination client will be + launched. (Default: 0) + **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__:: A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 9778ae7..c07d434 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -553,7 +553,8 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) /* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far * enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing * it. */ - if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && + if (!(options->CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout) && + !(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " "as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.", diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 3374459..da4f3c1 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(HSAuthoritativeDir, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("HSAuthorityRecordStats"), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), + V(CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(HTTPProxy, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPProxyAuthenticator, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPSProxy, STRING, NULL), diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 3ac8b92..e246ac4 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3066,6 +3066,10 @@ typedef struct { * an INTRODUCE1 cell on its way to the service. */ int CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout; + /** Close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits immediately when + * they reach the normal circuit-build timeout. */ + int CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout; + int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */ int _ConnLimit; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */ int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */

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