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r25570: {website} fix wording on torbrowser download page (website/trunk/projects/en)
by Erinn Clark 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

Author: erinn Date: 2012-03-26 21:03:55 +0000 (Mon, 26 Mar 2012) New Revision: 25570 Modified: website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml Log: fix wording on torbrowser download page Modified: website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml 2012-03-26 20:47:24 UTC (rev 25569) +++ website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml 2012-03-26 21:03:55 UTC (rev 25570) @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>_en-US.exe">Windows Tor Browser Bundle alpha</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>_en-US.exe.asc">signature</a>)</li> <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">Linux Tor Browser Bundle alpha (32-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz.asc">signature</a>)</li> <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">Linux Tor Browser Bundle alpha (64-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">signature</a>)</li> - <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip">Tor Browser Bundle alpha for Mac OS X (32-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip.asc">signature</a>)</li> + <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip">Mac OS X Tor Browser Bundle (32-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip.asc">signature</a>)</li> </ul>

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r25569: {website} add alpha tbbs to website for download (in website/trunk: download/en include projects/en)
by Erinn Clark 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

Author: erinn Date: 2012-03-26 20:47:24 +0000 (Mon, 26 Mar 2012) New Revision: 25569 Modified: website/trunk/download/en/download.wml website/trunk/include/versions.wmi website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml Log: add alpha tbbs to website for download Modified: website/trunk/download/en/download.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/download/en/download.wml 2012-03-26 17:23:01 UTC (rev 25568) +++ website/trunk/download/en/download.wml 2012-03-26 20:47:24 UTC (rev 25569) @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ <a class="lang-alt" href="<page projects/torbrowser>#Download-torbrowserbundle">Other Languages</a> (<a class="win-tbb-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundle>_<lang>.exe.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> - <a class="additional" href="<page projects/torbrowser-details>#build">Source Code</a> + <a class="additional" href="<page projects/torbrowser-details>#build">Source Code</a><br /> + <a class="additional" href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>_en-US.exe">Download Unstable</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>_en-US.exe.asc">sig</a>) </form> <h2>Tor Browser Bundle</h2> @@ -153,7 +154,8 @@ <a class="lang-alt" href="<page projects/torbrowser>#Download-torbrowserbundleosx">Other Languages</a> (<a class="osx-tbb64-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx64>-osx-x86_64-<lang>.zip.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> - <a href="<page projects/torbrowser-details>#build">Source Code</a> + <a href="<page projects/torbrowser-details>#build">Source Code</a><br /> + <a class="additional" href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip">Download Unstable</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip.asc">sig</a>) </form> <h2>Tor Browser Bundle</h2> @@ -197,6 +199,7 @@ <a class="lang-alt" href="<page projects/torbrowser>#Download-torbrowserbundlelinux">Other Languages</a> (<a class="lin-tbb32-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32>-dev-<lang>.tar.gz.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> + <a class="additional" href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">Download Unstable</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz.asc">sig</a>)<p> <a class="button lin-tbb64" href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64>-dev-<lang>.tar.gz"><span class="strong">Download</span><span class="normal"><button-lin-tbb64></span></a> <select name="language" id="lin-tbb64" class="lang"> @@ -206,7 +209,8 @@ <a class="lang-alt" href="<page projects/torbrowser>#Download-torbrowserbundlelinux">Other Languages</a> (<a class="lin-tbb64-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64>-dev-<lang>.tar.gz.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> - <a class="additional" href="<page projects/torbrowser-details>#build">Source Code</a> + <a class="additional" href="<page projects/torbrowser-details>#build">Source Code</a><br /> + <a class="additional" href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">Download Unstable</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz.asc">sig</a>) </form> <h2>Tor Browser Bundle</h2> Modified: website/trunk/include/versions.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/include/versions.wmi 2012-03-26 17:23:01 UTC (rev 25568) +++ website/trunk/include/versions.wmi 2012-03-26 20:47:24 UTC (rev 25569) @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ <define-tag version-torbrowser-otr whitespace=delete>3.2</define-tag> <define-tag version-torbrowser-vidalia whitespace=delete>0.2.17</define-tag> <define-tag version-torimbrowserbundle whitespace=delete>1.3.21</define-tag> +<define-tag version-torbrowserbundlealpha whitespace=delete>2.3.12-alpha-2</define-tag> <define-tag version-torbrowserbundlelinux32 whitespace=delete>2.2.35-9</define-tag> <define-tag version-torbrowserbundlelinux64 whitespace=delete>2.2.35-9</define-tag> @@ -44,6 +45,8 @@ <define-tag version-gnu-torbrowser-firefox whitespace=delete>11.0</define-tag> <define-tag version-gnu-torbrowser-torbutton whitespace=delete>1.4.5.1</define-tag> <define-tag version-gnu-torbrowser-vidalia whitespace=delete>0.2.17</define-tag> +<define-tag version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha whitespace=delete>2.3.12-alpha-2</define-tag> +<define-tag version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha whitespace=delete>2.3.12-alpha-2</define-tag> <define-tag version-torbrowserbundleosx32 whitespace=delete>2.2.35-8</define-tag> <define-tag version-torbrowserbundleosx64 whitespace=delete>2.2.35-8</define-tag> @@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ <define-tag version-osx-torbrowser-firefox whitespace=delete>11.0</define-tag> <define-tag version-osx-torbrowser-torbutton whitespace=delete>1.4.5.1</define-tag> <define-tag version-osx-torbrowser-vidalia whitespace=delete>0.2.17</define-tag> +<define-tag version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha whitespace=delete>2.3.12-alpha-2</define-tag> <define-tag version-vidalia-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.17</define-tag> Modified: website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml 2012-03-26 17:23:01 UTC (rev 25568) +++ website/trunk/projects/en/torbrowser.wml 2012-03-26 20:47:24 UTC (rev 25569) @@ -401,6 +401,16 @@ style="font-size: 90%;">signature</a>)</li> </ul> + + <p id="Download-torbrowserbundlealpha" style="font-size: 120%; margin: + 5mm">ALPHA: Tor Browser Bundle alpha versions for Windows (<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>), Linux 32-bit (<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>) and 64-bit (<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>), and Intel Mac OS X 10.6 and higher (<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>) with Firefox</p> + <ul> + <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>_en-US.exe">Windows Tor Browser Bundle alpha</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/tor-browser-<version-torbrowserbundlealpha>_en-US.exe.asc">signature</a>)</li> + <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">Linux Tor Browser Bundle alpha (32-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-i686-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz.asc">signature</a>)</li> + <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">Linux Tor Browser Bundle alpha (64-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/linux/tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64alpha>-dev-en-US.tar.gz">signature</a>)</li> + <li><a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip">Tor Browser Bundle alpha for Mac OS X (32-bit)</a> (<a href="../dist/torbrowser/osx/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx32alpha>-osx-i386-en-US.zip.asc">signature</a>)</li> + </ul> + <p>See our instructions on <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">how to verify package signatures</a>,

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[torspec/master] Add SAFECOOKIE control-port authentication method
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit c264c80df1772979caaa29191c228087f2d84299 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun Feb 5 04:02:23 2012 -0800 Add SAFECOOKIE control-port authentication method --- control-spec.txt | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index 66088f7..ed5d2fe 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -323,11 +323,12 @@ For information on how the implementation securely stores authentication information on disk, see section 5.1. - Before the client has authenticated, no command other than PROTOCOLINFO, - AUTHENTICATE, or QUIT is valid. If the controller sends any other command, - or sends a malformed command, or sends an unsuccessful AUTHENTICATE - command, or sends PROTOCOLINFO more than once, Tor sends an error reply and - closes the connection. + Before the client has authenticated, no command other than + PROTOCOLINFO, AUTHCHALLENGE, AUTHENTICATE, or QUIT is valid. If the + controller sends any other command, or sends a malformed command, or + sends an unsuccessful AUTHENTICATE command, or sends PROTOCOLINFO or + AUTHCHALLENGE more than once, Tor sends an error reply and closes + the connection. To prevent some cross-protocol attacks, the AUTHENTICATE command is still required even if all authentication methods in Tor are disabled. In this @@ -949,6 +950,7 @@ "NULL" / ; No authentication is required "HASHEDPASSWORD" / ; A controller must supply the original password "COOKIE" / ; A controller must supply the contents of a cookie + "SAFECOOKIE" ; A controller must prove knowledge of a cookie AuthCookieFile = QuotedString TorVersion = QuotedString @@ -970,9 +972,16 @@ methods that Tor currently accepts. AuthCookieFile specifies the absolute path and filename of the - authentication cookie that Tor is expecting and is provided iff - the METHODS field contains the method "COOKIE". Controllers MUST handle - escape sequences inside this string. + authentication cookie that Tor is expecting and is provided iff the + METHODS field contains the method "COOKIE" and/or "SAFECOOKIE". + Controllers MUST handle escape sequences inside this string. + + All authentication cookies are 32 bytes long. Controllers MUST NOT + use the contents of a non-32-byte-long file as an authentication + cookie. + + If the METHODS field contains the method "SAFECOOKIE", every + AuthCookieFile must contain the same authentication cookie. The VERSION line contains the Tor version. @@ -1033,6 +1042,45 @@ [TAKEOWNERSHIP was added in Tor 0.2.2.28-beta.] +3.24. AUTHCHALLENGE + + The syntax is: + "AUTHCHALLENGE" SP "SAFECOOKIE" + SP ClientNonce + CRLF + + ClientNonce = 2*HEXDIG / QuotedString + + If the server accepts the command, the server reply format is: + "250 AUTHCHALLENGE" + SP "SERVERHASH=" ServerHash + SP "SERVERNONCE=" ServerNonce + CRLF + + ServerHash = 64*64HEXDIG + ServerNonce = 64*64HEXDIG + + The ClientNonce, ServerHash, and ServerNonce values are + encoded/decoded in the same way as the argument passed to the + AUTHENTICATE command. ServerNonce MUST be 32 bytes long. + + ServerHash is computed as: + HMAC-SHA256("Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash", + CookieString | ClientNonce | ServerNonce) + (with the HMAC key as its first argument) + + After a controller sends a successful AUTHCHALLENGE command, the + next command sent on the connection must be an AUTHENTICATE command, + and the only authentication string which that AUTHENTICATE command + will accept is: + HMAC-SHA256("Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash", + CookieString | ClientNonce | ServerNonce) + + [Unlike other commands besides AUTHENTICATE, AUTHCHALLENGE may be + used (but only once!) before AUTHENTICATE.] + + [AUTHCHALLENGE was added in Tor FIXME.] + 4. Replies Reply codes follow the same 3-character format as used by SMTP, with the

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[torspec/master] Deprecate COOKIE authentication
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit c402bdfeb08a3aa14d29f340f2fe7b594d27d4c1 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Feb 20 08:47:50 2012 -0800 Deprecate COOKIE authentication --- control-spec.txt | 10 ++++++++++ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index ed5d2fe..b9ee997 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -983,6 +983,16 @@ If the METHODS field contains the method "SAFECOOKIE", every AuthCookieFile must contain the same authentication cookie. + The COOKIE authentication method exposes the user running a + controller to an unintended information disclosure attack whenever + the controller has greater filesystem read access than the process + that it has connected to. (Note that a controller may connect to a + process other than Tor.) It is almost never safe to use, even if + the controller's user has explicitly specified which filename to + read an authentication cookie from. For this reason, the COOKIE + authentication method has been deprecated and will be removed from + Tor before version 0.2.4.1-alpha. + The VERSION line contains the Tor version. [Unlike other commands besides AUTHENTICATE, PROTOCOLINFO may be used (but

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[torspec/master] Document cookie-based authentication protocols in the right place
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit 4f92a352429b8cf044f4299603baa2d9775ba1ac Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Feb 20 08:59:47 2012 -0800 Document cookie-based authentication protocols in the right place --- control-spec.txt | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index f583372..a838122 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -2104,8 +2104,26 @@ If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic cookie" file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory (or to another file specified in the 'CookieAuthFile' option). To - authenticate, the controller must send the contents of this file, - encoded in hexadecimal. + authenticate, the controller must demonstrate that it can read the + contents of the cookie file: + + * Versions of Tor before 0.2.4.1-alpha support cookie authentication + using the "COOKIE" authentication method: the controller sends the + contents of the cookie file, encoded in hexadecimal. This + authentication method exposes the user running a controller to an + unintended information disclosure attack whenever the controller + has greater filesystem read access than the process that it has + connected to. (Note that a controller may connect to a process + other than Tor.) It is almost never safe to use, even if the + controller's user has explicitly specified which filename to read + an authentication cookie from. For this reason, the COOKIE + authentication method has been deprecated and will be removed from + Tor before version 0.2.4.1-alpha. + + * 0.2.2.x versions of Tor after 0.2.2.XXXX, and all versions of Tor + after 0.2.3.XXXX-alpha, support cookie authentication using the + "SAFECOOKIE" authentication method, which discloses much less + information about the contents of the cookie file. If the 'HashedControlPassword' option is set, it must contain the salted hash of a secret password. The salted hash is computed according to the

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[torspec/master] Document CookieAuthFile
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit 6b6c7aa656e36ed67c7950b6ca7d367273b09697 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Feb 20 08:49:16 2012 -0800 Document CookieAuthFile --- control-spec.txt | 8 +++++--- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index b9ee997..f583372 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -2101,9 +2101,11 @@ trusts any local user that connects to the control port. This is generally a poor idea. - If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic cookie" - file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory. To authenticate, - the controller must send the contents of this file, encoded in hexadecimal. + If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic + cookie" file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory (or + to another file specified in the 'CookieAuthFile' option). To + authenticate, the controller must send the contents of this file, + encoded in hexadecimal. If the 'HashedControlPassword' option is set, it must contain the salted hash of a secret password. The salted hash is computed according to the

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[torspec/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/safecookie-v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit cd85eef84f0bc47e014dac63bde8271e5401678e Merge: 6a860e9 4f92a35 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 14:11:51 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/safecookie-v2' control-spec.txt | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[torspec/master] Proposal 193 is implemented and merged into the spec
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit d34f7379622641f9c6f3dd936c05754790ec368c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 14:16:53 2012 -0400 Proposal 193 is implemented and merged into the spec --- proposals/000-index.txt | 4 ++-- proposals/193-safe-cookie-authentication.txt | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index a15b02f..e35ce60 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Proposals by number: 190 Bridge Client Authorization Based on a Shared Secret [NEEDS-REVISION] 191 Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries [OPEN] 192 Automatically retrieve and store information about bridges [OPEN] -193 Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers [OPEN] +193 Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers [CLOSED] 194 Mnemonic .onion URLs [OPEN] 195 TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x [DRAFT] 196 Extended ORPort and TransportControlPort [OPEN] @@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ Proposals by status: 189 AUTHORIZE and AUTHORIZED cells 191 Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries 192 Automatically retrieve and store information about bridges [for 0.2.[45].x] - 193 Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers 194 Mnemonic .onion URLs 196 Extended ORPort and TransportControlPort [for 0.2.4.x] 197 Message-based Inter-Controller IPC Channel [for 0.2.4.x] @@ -221,6 +220,7 @@ Proposals by status: 183 Refill Intervals [in 0.2.3.5-alpha] 184 Miscellaneous changes for a v3 Tor link protocol [for 0.2.3.x] 187 Reserve a cell type to allow client authorization [for 0.2.3.x] + 193 Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers SUPERSEDED: 112 Bring Back Pathlen Coin Weight 113 Simplifying directory authority administration diff --git a/proposals/193-safe-cookie-authentication.txt b/proposals/193-safe-cookie-authentication.txt index 01d8720..a3717fe 100644 --- a/proposals/193-safe-cookie-authentication.txt +++ b/proposals/193-safe-cookie-authentication.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 193-safe-cookie-authentication.txt Title: Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers Author: Robert Ransom Created: 2012-02-04 -Status: Open +Status: Closed Overview:

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[torspec/master] We will remove COOKIE, but can't promise 0.2.4.1-alpha
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit 714b0d391e669bd4288814229ee47bb82a0f8859 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 14:15:10 2012 -0400 We will remove COOKIE, but can't promise 0.2.4.1-alpha Once COOKIE authentication is gone, we should edit again to say "Tor 0.2.4.xyz" rather than "a future version of Tor." --- control-spec.txt | 10 +++++----- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index a838122..15970e5 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ the controller's user has explicitly specified which filename to read an authentication cookie from. For this reason, the COOKIE authentication method has been deprecated and will be removed from - Tor before version 0.2.4.1-alpha. + a future version of Tor. The VERSION line contains the Tor version. @@ -2107,7 +2107,7 @@ authenticate, the controller must demonstrate that it can read the contents of the cookie file: - * Versions of Tor before 0.2.4.1-alpha support cookie authentication + * Current versions of Tor support cookie authentication using the "COOKIE" authentication method: the controller sends the contents of the cookie file, encoded in hexadecimal. This authentication method exposes the user running a controller to an @@ -2118,10 +2118,10 @@ controller's user has explicitly specified which filename to read an authentication cookie from. For this reason, the COOKIE authentication method has been deprecated and will be removed from - Tor before version 0.2.4.1-alpha. + Tor before some future version of Tor. - * 0.2.2.x versions of Tor after 0.2.2.XXXX, and all versions of Tor - after 0.2.3.XXXX-alpha, support cookie authentication using the + * 0.2.2.x versions of Tor starting with 0.2.2.36, and all versions of + Tor after 0.2.3.12-alpha, support cookie authentication using the "SAFECOOKIE" authentication method, which discloses much less information about the contents of the cookie file.

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Implement 'safe cookie authentication'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit e111e371b4f44456182e7f237837a0f9466487cd Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Feb 6 10:49:45 2012 -0800 Implement 'safe cookie authentication' --- src/or/connection.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 6 ++ 3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index a3481ec..36e192a 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn) } if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) { control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn); + tor_free(control_conn->safecookie_client_hash); tor_free(control_conn->incoming_cmd); } diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 1e411ec..ddfc80e 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; +#define SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT \ + "Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash" +#define SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT \ + "Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash" +#define SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN DIGEST256_LEN + /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */ #define BOOTSTRAP_MSG_LEN 1024 @@ -1078,6 +1084,32 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, used_quoted_string = 1; } + if (conn->safecookie_client_hash != NULL) { + /* The controller has chosen safe cookie authentication; the only + * acceptable authentication value is the controller-to-server + * response. */ + + tor_assert(authentication_cookie_is_set); + + if (password_len != DIGEST256_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_CONTROL, + "Got safe cookie authentication response with wrong length " + "(%d)", (int)password_len); + errstr = "Wrong length for safe cookie response."; + goto err; + } + + if (tor_memneq(conn->safecookie_client_hash, password, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_CONTROL, + "Got incorrect safe cookie authentication response"); + errstr = "Safe cookie response did not match expected value."; + goto err; + } + + tor_free(conn->safecookie_client_hash); + goto ok; + } + if (!options->CookieAuthentication && !options->HashedControlPassword && !options->HashedControlSessionPassword) { /* if Tor doesn't demand any stronger authentication, then @@ -2758,8 +2790,10 @@ handle_control_protocolinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, int passwd = (options->HashedControlPassword != NULL || options->HashedControlSessionPassword != NULL); smartlist_t *mlist = smartlist_create(); - if (cookies) + if (cookies) { smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"COOKIE"); + smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"SAFECOOKIE"); + } if (passwd) smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"HASHEDPASSWORD"); if (!cookies && !passwd) @@ -2787,6 +2821,121 @@ handle_control_protocolinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, return 0; } +/** Called when we get an AUTHCHALLENGE command. */ +static int +handle_control_authchallenge(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, + const char *body) +{ + const char *cp = body; + char *client_nonce; + size_t client_nonce_len; + char server_hash[DIGEST256_LEN]; + char server_hash_encoded[HEX_DIGEST256_LEN+1]; + char server_nonce[SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN]; + char server_nonce_encoded[(2*SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN) + 1]; + + cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r"); + if (!strcasecmpstart(cp, "SAFECOOKIE")) { + cp += strlen("SAFECOOKIE"); + } else { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 AUTHCHALLENGE only supports SAFECOOKIE " + "authentication", conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + + if (!authentication_cookie_is_set) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("515 Cookie authentication is disabled", conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + + cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r"); + if (*cp == '"') { + const char *newcp = + decode_escaped_string(cp, len - (cp - body), + &client_nonce, &client_nonce_len); + if (newcp == NULL) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Invalid quoted client nonce", + conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + cp = newcp; + } else { + size_t client_nonce_encoded_len = strspn(cp, "0123456789ABCDEFabcdef"); + + client_nonce_len = client_nonce_encoded_len / 2; + client_nonce = tor_malloc_zero(client_nonce_len); + + if (base16_decode(client_nonce, client_nonce_len, + cp, client_nonce_encoded_len) < 0) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Invalid base16 client nonce", + conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + + cp += client_nonce_encoded_len; + } + + cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r"); + if (*cp != '\0' || + cp != body + len) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Junk at end of AUTHCHALLENGE command", + conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + tor_free(client_nonce); + return -1; + } + + tor_assert(!crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN)); + + /* Now compute and send the server-to-controller response, and the + * server's nonce. */ + tor_assert(authentication_cookie != NULL); + + { + size_t tmp_len = (AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN + + client_nonce_len + + SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN); + char *tmp = tor_malloc_zero(tmp_len); + char *client_hash = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN); + memcpy(tmp, authentication_cookie, AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN); + memcpy(tmp + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN, client_nonce, client_nonce_len); + memcpy(tmp + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN + client_nonce_len, + server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN); + + crypto_hmac_sha256(server_hash, + SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT, + strlen(SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT), + tmp, + tmp_len); + + crypto_hmac_sha256(client_hash, + SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT, + strlen(SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT), + tmp, + tmp_len); + + conn->safecookie_client_hash = client_hash; + + tor_free(tmp); + } + + base16_encode(server_hash_encoded, sizeof(server_hash_encoded), + server_hash, sizeof(server_hash)); + base16_encode(server_nonce_encoded, sizeof(server_nonce_encoded), + server_nonce, sizeof(server_nonce)); + + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, + "250 AUTHCHALLENGE SERVERHASH=%s " + "SERVERNONCE=%s\r\n", + server_hash_encoded, + server_nonce_encoded); + return 0; +} + /** Called when we get a USEFEATURE command: parse the feature list, and * set up the control_connection's options properly. */ static int @@ -2888,7 +3037,10 @@ is_valid_initial_command(control_connection_t *conn, const char *cmd) if (conn->_base.state == CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN) return 1; if (!strcasecmp(cmd, "PROTOCOLINFO")) - return !conn->have_sent_protocolinfo; + return (!conn->have_sent_protocolinfo && + conn->safecookie_client_hash == NULL); + if (!strcasecmp(cmd, "AUTHCHALLENGE")) + return (conn->safecookie_client_hash == NULL); if (!strcasecmp(cmd, "AUTHENTICATE") || !strcasecmp(cmd, "QUIT")) return 1; @@ -3104,6 +3256,9 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "PROTOCOLINFO")) { if (handle_control_protocolinfo(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) return -1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "AUTHCHALLENGE")) { + if (handle_control_authchallenge(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) + return -1; } else { connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "510 Unrecognized command \"%s\"\r\n", conn->incoming_cmd); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index c0714ee..eecd375 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1254,6 +1254,12 @@ typedef struct control_connection_t { * connection. */ unsigned int is_owning_control_connection:1; + /** If we have sent an AUTHCHALLENGE reply on this connection and + * have not received a successful AUTHENTICATE command, points to + * the value which the client must send to authenticate itself; + * otherwise, NULL. */ + char *safecookie_client_hash; + /** Amount of space allocated in incoming_cmd. */ uint32_t incoming_cmd_len; /** Number of bytes currently stored in incoming_cmd. */

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