- tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tech-reports/master] Turn manual bibliography into BibTeX and footnotes.
by karsten＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit da2d7948c745bf7e9e74d450eba518010002e853 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Wed Aug 22 08:52:53 2012 +0200 Turn manual bibliography into BibTeX and footnotes. --- 2012/morpher/morpher.bib | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2012/morpher/morpher.tex | 80 ++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/2012/morpher/morpher.bib b/2012/morpher/morpher.bib new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7fa7712 --- /dev/null +++ b/2012/morpher/morpher.bib @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +@inproceedings{ll, + title = {{Inferring the Source of Encrypted HTTP Connections}}, + author = {Marc Liberatore and Brian Neil Levine}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and Communications + Security (CCS 2006)}, + year = {2006}, + month = {October}, + pages = {255--263}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#Liberatore:2006}}, +} + +@inproceedings{herrmann, + title = {Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy enhancing technologies with + the multinomial na\"{\i}ve-bayes classifier}, + author = {Dominik Herrmann and Rolf Wendolsky and Hannes Federrath}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security (CCSW + '09)}, + year = {2009}, + address = {New York, NY, USA}, + pages = {31--42}, + publisher = {ACM}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#ccsw09-fingerprinting}}, +} + +@inproceedings{panchenko, + title = {Website Fingerprinting in Onion Routing Based Anonymization Networks}, + author = {Andriy Panchenko and Lukas Niessen and Andreas Zinnen and Thomas Engel}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2011)}, + year = {2011}, + month = {October}, + publisher = {ACM}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wpes11-panchenko}}, +} + +@inproceedings{tm, + title = {Traffic Morphing: An efficient defense against statistical traffic analysis}, + author = {Charles Wright and Scott Coull and Fabian Monrose}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Security Symposium - {NDSS} '09}, + year = {2009}, + month = {February}, + publisher = {IEEE}, + note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#morphing09}}, +} + diff --git a/2012/morpher/morpher.tex b/2012/morpher/morpher.tex index 43442df..d1ee1de 100644 --- a/2012/morpher/morpher.tex +++ b/2012/morpher/morpher.tex @@ -23,19 +23,20 @@ sized Tor cells, most TCP packets of Tor traffic are 586 bytes in size \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{tor_cs.pdf} \end{center} -\caption{Packet size probability distribution of Tor Client-to-Server traffic \cite{caida}} +\caption{Packet size probability distribution of Tor Client-to-Server traffic} \label{tor_cs.pdf} \end{figure} -On the other hand, HTTPS, the protocol that Tor tries to simulate -\cite{tls_norm}, has a much more spread out packet size probability +On the other hand, HTTPS, the protocol that Tor tries to simulate,% +\footnote{\url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-January/001077.html}} +has a much more spread out packet size probability distribution (See Figure \ref{https_cs.pdf}) \begin{figure}[h] \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{https_cs.pdf} \end{center} -\caption{Packet size probability distribution of HTTPS Client-to-Server traffic \cite{caida}} +\caption{Packet size probability distribution of HTTPS Client-to-Server traffic} \label{https_cs.pdf} \end{figure} @@ -49,7 +50,11 @@ to Tor. Some network protocols already use padding to defend against traffic fingerprinting attacks. SSH and TLS, for example, both support padding -in their messages \cite{ssh} \cite{gnutls}. Most implementations of +in their messages% +\footnote{\url{https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4344.txt}}% +\textsuperscript{,}% +\footnote{\url{https://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/gnutls.html\#On-Record-Padding}}. +Most implementations of those protocols don't pad by default. The ones that do, add a random amount of padding to the protocol message. @@ -139,7 +144,11 @@ is what they did in their implementation. Unfortunately, the splitting problem of the previous section is not only theoretical. To evaluate the bandwidth overhead of morphing -matrices, we made software \cite{morpher_eval} that simulates the +matrices, we made software% +\footnote{\url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5023}}% +\textsuperscript{,}% +\footnote{\url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-January/001077.html}} +that simulates the morphing of a large number of packets. Specifically, our software morphs 500000 packets using both random sampling and traffic morphing, and plots the overhead. (In traffic morphing, we use random sampling @@ -245,60 +254,19 @@ with better resistance against payload fingerprinting, which we think real-life attackers are likely to do, and also pluggable transports which can get through HTTP proxy servers. -\section{Acknowledgments} +\section*{Acknowledgments} Thanks to Steven J. Murdoch and the Tor Project for the fruitful conversations on packet size pluggable transports. -\bibliographystyle{plain} -\begin{thebibliography}{9} +The packet length probability distributions were formed after +analysis of traffic traces kindly provided by CAIDA. The traffic +traces were captured by monitoring an Equinix datacenter in Chicago, +IL.% +\footnote{\url{https://gitorious.org/morpher/morpher/blobs/master/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS}}% +\textsuperscript{,}% +\footnote{\url{https://gitorious.org/morpher/morpher/trees/master/data}} -\bibitem{ssh} - \url{https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4344.txt} - -\bibitem{gnutls} - \url{https://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/gnutls.html\#On-Record-Padding} - -\bibitem{ll} - M. Liberatore, B. N. Levine, \textit{Inferring the Source - of Encrypted HTTP Connections}, CCS2006, October 2006. - -\bibitem{herrmann} - Dominik Herrmann, Rolf Wendolsky, and Hannes - Federrath. 2009. Website fingerprinting: attacking popular privacy - enhancing technologies with the multinomial naïve-bayes classifier. - -\bibitem{tls_norm} - \url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-January/001077.html} - -\bibitem{morpher_eval} - \textit{Morpher pluggable transport: Select algorithm for packet size morphing} - - \url{https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5023} - - \url{https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2011-January/001077.html} - -\bibitem{panchenko} - Andriy Panchenko, Lukas Niessen, Andreas Zinnen, and Thomas - Engel. 2011. \textit{Website fingerprinting in onion routing based - anonymization networks}. - -\bibitem{tm} - Charles Wright, Scott Coulls, Fabian Monrose. \textit{Traffic - Morphing: An efficient defense against statistical traffic - analysis.} In Proceedings of the 14th Annual Network and - Distributed Systems Symposium (NDSS), Feb, 2009. - -\bibitem{caida} - The packet length probability distributions were formed after - analysis of traffic traces kindly provided by CAIDA. The traffic - traces were captured by monitoring an Equinix datacenter in Chicago, - IL. - - \url{https://gitorious.org/morpher/morpher/blobs/master/ACKNOWLEDGMENTS} - - \url{https://gitorious.org/morpher/morpher/trees/master/data} - -\end{thebibliography} +\bibliography{morpher} \end{document}

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[metrics-web/master] Update almost-fast-exits graph to new #6498 requirements.
by karsten＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 2ede19c6fe571f43b523de7ae662ae14a0e6aa70 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Wed Aug 22 19:53:29 2012 +0200 Update almost-fast-exits graph to new #6498 requirements. --- rserve/graphs.R | 10 +++++----- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/rserve/graphs.R b/rserve/graphs.R index 4f444b3..c5712cd 100644 --- a/rserve/graphs.R +++ b/rserve/graphs.R @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ plot_fast_exits <- function(start, end, path, dpi) { r$valid_after <= paste(end, "23:59:59") & r$valid_after < paste(Sys.Date() - 1, "23:59:59"), ] r <- r[r$min_rate == 11875 & r$ports == "80-443-554-1755" & - r$min_advbw == 5000, ] + r$min_advbw == 5000 & r$same_network == TRUE, ] r <- aggregate(list(relays = r$relays, P_exit = 100 * r$exit_prob), by = list(date = as.Date(cut.Date(as.Date(r$valid_after), "day"))), FUN = median) @@ -954,11 +954,11 @@ plot_almost_fast_exits <- function(start, end, path, dpi) { t$valid_after <= paste(end, "23:59:59") & t$valid_after < paste(Sys.Date() - 1, "23:59:59"), ] t1 <- t[t$min_rate == 11875 & t$ports == "80-443-554-1755" & - t$min_advbw == 5000, ] + t$min_advbw == 5000 & t$same_network == TRUE, ] t2 <- t[t$min_rate == 10000 & t$ports == "80-443" & - t$min_advbw == 2000, ] - t <- rbind( - data.frame(t1, var = "95+ Mbit/s, 5000+ KB/s, 80/443/554/1755"), + t$min_advbw == 2000 & t$same_network == FALSE, ] + t <- rbind(data.frame(t1, var = paste("95+ Mbit/s, 5000+ KB/s,", + "80/443/554/1755, 2- per /24")), data.frame(t2, var = "80+ Mbit/s, 2000+ KB/s, 80/443")) t <- aggregate(list(relays = t$relays, P_exit = 100 * t$exit_prob), by = list(date = as.Date(cut.Date(as.Date(t$valid_after), "day")),

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 25e57b9f25d521b5ed05904b54f8b36d8c5d5c12 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 17:45:32 2012 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- pl/ssl-observatory.dtd | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd b/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd index 9a9a592..211cf32 100644 --- a/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ to turn it on?">--> ""> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.alt_roots_tooltip -""> +"Jest bezpiecznym, (i dobrym pomysłem), by włączyć tą opcję, chyba że używasz intruzywnej sieci korporacyjnej lub antywirusa firmy Kaspersky, które monitorują twoje przeglądanie za pomocą TLS proxy i prywatnego roota CA. Jeżeli ta opcja jest włączona na takich właśnie sieciach, opcja ta może przyczynić się do publikacji dowodów na temat stron, które były odwiedzane przez ten proxy, ponieważ unikalne certyfikaty zostaną utworzone. Dlatego też opcja ta domyślnie jest wyłączona."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Sprawdź certyfikaty używając Tora dla prywatności"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_unavailable

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[translation/whisperback] Update translations for whisperback
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit ed1136703beff10a0c862583fdb1d2981ec5cf10 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 17:45:28 2012 +0000 Update translations for whisperback --- nl/nl.po | 5 +++-- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/nl/nl.po b/nl/nl.po index 1ffd603..19382f1 100644 --- a/nl/nl.po +++ b/nl/nl.po @@ -3,14 +3,15 @@ # This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. # # Translators: +# <ayurveda63(a)gmail.com>, 2012. # Shondoit Walker <shondoit+transifex(a)gmail.com>, 2012. msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2012-02-16 22:33+0100\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-08-16 09:20+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Shondoit Walker <shondoit(a)gmail.com>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-08-22 17:28+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: JerBen <ayurveda63(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"

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[metrics-tasks/master] Update to new #6498 requirements.
by karsten＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 795c59b073582562bfcbc587b440cd9161366901 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Wed Aug 22 13:34:12 2012 +0200 Update to new #6498 requirements. - Remove /24 requirement for almost fast exits. - Remove code for comparing different advertised bandwidhts. --- task-6498/plot.R | 32 ++++++-------------------------- task-6498/src/Main.java | 37 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/task-6498/plot.R b/task-6498/plot.R index 9f7763d..cebe490 100644 --- a/task-6498/plot.R +++ b/task-6498/plot.R @@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ DETAIL <- "day" require(ggplot2) require(reshape) require(RColorBrewer) -data <- read.csv("results.csv", stringsAsFactors = FALSE) +data <- read.csv("task-6498-results.csv", stringsAsFactors = FALSE) data <- data[data$valid_after >= paste(CUTOFF, "00:00:00"), ] r <- data r <- r[r$min_rate == 11875 & r$ports == "80-443-554-1755" & - r$min_advbw == 5000, ] + r$min_advbw == 5000 & r$same_network == TRUE, ] r <- aggregate(list(relays = r$relays, P_exit = 100 * r$exit_prob), by = list(date = as.Date(cut.Date(as.Date(r$valid_after), DETAIL))), FUN = median) @@ -31,33 +31,13 @@ opts(title = paste("Fast relays (95+ Mbit/s configured bandwidth rate,\n", "at most 2 relays per /24 network)\n", sep = "")) ggsave("fast-exits.png", width = 8, height = 6, dpi = 100) -s <- data -s <- s[s$min_rate == 11875 & s$ports == "80-443-554-1755", ] -s <- aggregate(list(relays = s$relays, P_exit = 100 * s$exit_prob), - by = list(date = as.Date(cut.Date(as.Date(s$valid_after), DETAIL)), - min_advbw = s$min_advbw), FUN = median) -s <- melt(s, id.vars = c("date", "min_advbw")) -s <- data.frame(s, type = ifelse(s$variable == "P_exit", - "Total exit probability (in %)", "Number of relays")) -ggplot(s, aes(x = date, y = value, colour = as.factor(min_advbw))) + -geom_line() + -facet_grid(type ~ ., scales = "free_y") + -scale_x_date(name = "") + -scale_y_continuous(name = "") + -scale_colour_manual(name = "Advertised bandwidth (in KB/s)", - values = brewer.pal(6, "Purples")[2:6]) + -opts(title = paste("Relays meeting the fast-exit requirements\nwith", - "varying minimum advertised bandwidth capacities"), - legend.position = "top") -ggsave("advertised-bandwidths-requirement.png", width = 8, height = 6, - dpi = 100) - t <- data t1 <- t[t$min_rate == 11875 & t$ports == "80-443-554-1755" & - t$min_advbw == 5000, ] + t$min_advbw == 5000 & t$same_network == TRUE, ] t2 <- t[t$min_rate == 10000 & t$ports == "80-443" & - t$min_advbw == 2000, ] -t <- rbind(data.frame(t1, var = "95+ Mbit/s, 5000+ KB/s, 80/443/554/1755"), + t$min_advbw == 2000 & t$same_network == FALSE, ] +t <- rbind(data.frame(t1, var = paste("95+ Mbit/s, 5000+ KB/s,", + "80/443/554/1755, 2- per /24")), data.frame(t2, var = "80+ Mbit/s, 2000+ KB/s, 80/443")) t <- aggregate(list(relays = t$relays, P_exit = 100 * t$exit_prob), by = list(date = as.Date(cut.Date(as.Date(t$valid_after), DETAIL)), diff --git a/task-6498/src/Main.java b/task-6498/src/Main.java index 99e991b..8b24649 100644 --- a/task-6498/src/Main.java +++ b/task-6498/src/Main.java @@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ public class Main { BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(resultsFile, true)); if (writeHeader) { - bw.write("valid_after,min_rate,min_advbw,ports,relays,exit_prob\n"); + bw.write("valid_after,min_rate,min_advbw,ports,same_network,relays," + + "exit_prob\n"); } while (descriptorFiles.hasNext()) { DescriptorFile descriptorFile = descriptorFiles.next(); @@ -184,17 +185,11 @@ public class Main { * consider the fastest 2 relays per /24 with respect to exit * probability. Also vary requirements. Overall, analyze these * settings: - * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 5000, exit to 80, 443, 554, 1755 - * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 5000, exit to 80, 443 - * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 4000, exit to 80, 443, 554, 1755 - * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 3000, exit to 80, 443, 554, 1755 - * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 2000, exit to 80, 443, 554, 1755 - * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 1000, exit to 80, 443, 554, 1755 + * - rate >= 11875, advbw >= 5000, exit to 80, 443, 554, 1755, + * at most 2 relays per /24 * - rate >= 10000, advbw >= 2000, exit to 80, 443 */ - int[] minimumBandwidthRates = new int[] { 11875, 11875, 11875, - 11875, 11875, 11875, 10000 }; - int[] minimumAdvertisedBandwidths = new int[] { 5000, 5000, 4000, - 3000, 2000, 1000, 2000 }; + int[] minimumBandwidthRates = new int[] { 11875, 10000 }; + int[] minimumAdvertisedBandwidths = new int[] { 5000, 2000 }; Set<Integer> defaultPorts = new HashSet<Integer>(); defaultPorts.add(80); defaultPorts.add(443); @@ -206,15 +201,12 @@ public class Main { List<Set<Integer>> requiredPorts = new ArrayList<Set<Integer>>(); requiredPorts.add(defaultPorts); requiredPorts.add(reducedPorts); - requiredPorts.add(defaultPorts); - requiredPorts.add(defaultPorts); - requiredPorts.add(defaultPorts); - requiredPorts.add(defaultPorts); - requiredPorts.add(reducedPorts); + boolean[] sameNetworks = new boolean[] { true, false }; for (int i = 0; i < minimumBandwidthRates.length; i++) { int minimumBandwidthRate = minimumBandwidthRates[i]; int minimumAdvertisedBandwidth = minimumAdvertisedBandwidths[i]; Set<Integer> minimumRequiredPorts = requiredPorts.get(i); + boolean sameNetwork = sameNetworks[i]; Map<String, List<Double>> exitWeightFractionsByAddressParts = new HashMap<String, List<Double>>(); for (String fingerprint : fingerprints) { @@ -242,9 +234,11 @@ public class Main { int totalRelays = 0; for (List<Double> weightFractions : exitWeightFractionsByAddressParts.values()) { - Collections.sort(weightFractions); - while (weightFractions.size() > 2) { - weightFractions.remove(0); + if (sameNetwork) { + Collections.sort(weightFractions); + while (weightFractions.size() > 2) { + weightFractions.remove(0); + } } for (double weightFraction : weightFractions) { totalExitWeightFraction += weightFraction; @@ -259,10 +253,11 @@ public class Main { * - ports: "80-443" or "80-443-554-1755" * - relays: number of relays matching the requirements * - exit_prob: sum of exit probabilities */ - bw.write(String.format("%s,%d,%d,%s,%d,%.4f%n", + bw.write(String.format("%s,%d,%d,%s,%s,%d,%.4f%n", validAfter, minimumBandwidthRate, minimumAdvertisedBandwidth, minimumRequiredPorts.size() <= 2 - ? "80-443" : "80-443-554-1755", totalRelays, + ? "80-443" : "80-443-554-1755", + sameNetwork ? "TRUE" : "FALSE", totalRelays, totalExitWeightFraction)); } }

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 6d325c1ed24f3ca53d78ca5bb68ddfad4c5bedc7 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 17:15:31 2012 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- pl/ssl-observatory.dtd | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd b/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd index 5b2229c..9a9a592 100644 --- a/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ to turn it on?">--> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Sprawdź certyfikaty używając Tora dla prywatności"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_unavailable -""> +"Sprawdź certyfikaty używając Tora dla prywatności (wymaga aplikacji Torbutton)"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_tooltip -""> +"Ta opcja, do instalacji, wymaga Tora oraz aplikacji Torbutton "> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.asn -""> +"Jeżeli dostrzeżesz nowe certyfikaty, potwierdź SLL Observatory, do którego ISP jesteś obecnie podłączony"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.asn_tooltip ""> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ to turn it on?">--> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.done "Gotowe"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.explanation -""> +"HTTPS Everywhere może używać EFF's SSL Observatory. Daje to dwie rzeczy: (1) wysyła kopie certyfikatów HTTPS do SSL Observatory, pomagając nam wykryć ataki osób podsłuchujących; i (2) daje nam znać o niezabezpieczonych połączeniach lub atakach na twoją przeklądarkę.">  <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.explanation2 -""> +"Dla przykładu, jeżeli odwiedzasz https://www.something.com, certyfikat otrzymany przez SSL Observatory wskaże, że ktoś odwiedził https://www.something.com ale nie wskaże kto dokładnie ją odwiedzał i jakie strony przeglądał. Najedź kursorem na opcje by zobaczyć więcej szczegółów "> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.hide "Schowaj zaawansowane opcje"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.nonanon -""> +"Sprawdź certyfikaty nawet jeżeli Tor nie jest dostępny"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.nonanon_tooltip -""> +"Postaramy się zachować anonimowość twoich danych, jednak ta opcja jest mniej bezpieczna."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.priv_dns -""> +"Wyślij i sprawdź certyfikaty dla niepublicznych nazw DNSów"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.priv_dns_tooltip ""> @@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ Mouseover the options for further details:">--> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.title "Preferencje SLL Observatory"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.use "Użyj Observatory?"> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.title ""> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.title "OSTRZEŻENIE od EFF's SSL Observatory"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.showcert "Pokaż łańcuch certyfikatu"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.okay "Tak rozumie"> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.text ""> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.defense ""> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.text "EFF's SSL Observatory wystawił ostrzeżenie na temat certyfikatów HTTPS dla tej stron:"> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.defense "Jeżeli zalogowałeś się do tej strony, bezpiecznym będzie zmiana hasła, po ponownym połączeniu się z bezpieczną siecią."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.self_signed "">

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[translation/https_everywhere_completed] Update translations for https_everywhere_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 224a48029110d902ac68eb82df52336528ee7e78 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 16:45:35 2012 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere_completed --- pl/https-everywhere.properties | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/pl/https-everywhere.properties b/pl/https-everywhere.properties index 5bfff6e..d551642 100644 --- a/pl/https-everywhere.properties +++ b/pl/https-everywhere.properties @@ -1,2 +1,5 @@ https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable = Włącz HTTPS Everywhere https-everywhere.menu.globalDisable = Wyłącz HTTPS Everywhere +https-everywhere.menu.enableDisable = Włącz/Wyłącz reguły +https-everywhere.menu.noRules = (brak reguł dla tej strony) +https-everywhere.menu.unknownRules = (reguły dla strony nieznane)

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 0adf0f55802247e2a59c08c347d1e9f6da27884c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 16:45:31 2012 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- pl/https-everywhere.properties | 6 +++--- pl/ssl-observatory.dtd | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/pl/https-everywhere.properties b/pl/https-everywhere.properties index 741d9df..d551642 100644 --- a/pl/https-everywhere.properties +++ b/pl/https-everywhere.properties @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable = Włącz HTTPS Everywhere https-everywhere.menu.globalDisable = Wyłącz HTTPS Everywhere -# https-everywhere.menu.enableDisable = Enable / Disable Rules -# https-everywhere.menu.noRules = (No Rules for This Page) -# https-everywhere.menu.unknownRules = (Rules for This Page Unknown) +https-everywhere.menu.enableDisable = Włącz/Wyłącz reguły +https-everywhere.menu.noRules = (brak reguł dla tej strony) +https-everywhere.menu.unknownRules = (reguły dla strony nieznane) diff --git a/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd b/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd index fbaa8c6..5b2229c 100644 --- a/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/pl/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.popup.later "Zapytaj mnie później"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.popup.no "Nie"> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.popup.text ""> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.popup.text "HTTPS Everywhere może wykryć ataki na twoją przeglądarkę przez wysyłanie do ciebie certyfikatów, które otrzymujesz do "SSL Observatory". Włączyć tą opcję?">  <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.popup.title -""> +"Czy HTTPS Everywhere ma używać "SSL Observatory"?"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.popup.yes "Tak">  <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.adv_priv_opts1 -""> +"Bezpiecznym jest używanie tej opcji, chyba że korzystasz z intruzywnej. sieci korporacyjnej."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.adv_priv_opts2 -""> +"Bezpieczne, jeżeli używasz sieci korporacyjnej z ukrytymi nazwami serwerów Intranetowych."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.alt_roots "">

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[tor/master] Remove #6480 fix from 0.2.2.38 changelog - it was not included
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit 5b0ed1e344f47a584d529221fb9d39e54715732c Author: Peter Palfrader <peter(a)palfrader.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 17:51:01 2012 +0200 Remove #6480 fix from 0.2.2.38 changelog - it was not included (Forward-port from release-0.2.2 to master) --- ChangeLog | 3 --- ReleaseNotes | 3 --- changes/note-releasenote-fix | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 896fc70..3a1ad77 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12 could in theory leak path information. o Security fixes: - - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur - when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; - bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes index e9f6055..2782d37 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes +++ b/ReleaseNotes @@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12 could in theory leak path information. o Security fixes: - - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur - when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; - bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/changes/note-releasenote-fix b/changes/note-releasenote-fix new file mode 100644 index 0000000..586e2d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/note-releasenote-fix @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + + o Documentation fix: + Remove the following entry from the 0.2.2.38 changelog, since the patch + was not, in fact, included in 0.2.2.38: + . + - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur + when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; + bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + . + Fixes bug 6657; bugfix on 0.2.2.38.

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Remove #6480 fix from 0.2.2.38 changelog - it was not included
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Aug '12

22 Aug '12

commit e0d5dec3e25e35c7a52240bfa2ecc7e1bc845d56 Author: Peter Palfrader <peter(a)palfrader.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 17:51:01 2012 +0200 Remove #6480 fix from 0.2.2.38 changelog - it was not included (Forward-port change from release-0.2.2 into release-0.2.3) --- ChangeLog | 3 --- ReleaseNotes | 3 --- changes/note-releasenote-fix | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 896fc70..3a1ad77 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12 could in theory leak path information. o Security fixes: - - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur - when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; - bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes index e9f6055..2782d37 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes +++ b/ReleaseNotes @@ -9,9 +9,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12 could in theory leak path information. o Security fixes: - - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur - when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; - bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/changes/note-releasenote-fix b/changes/note-releasenote-fix new file mode 100644 index 0000000..586e2d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/note-releasenote-fix @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + + o Documentation fix: + Remove the following entry from the 0.2.2.38 changelog, since the patch + was not, in fact, included in 0.2.2.38: + . + - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur + when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480; + bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + . + Fixes bug 6657; bugfix on 0.2.2.38.

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