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[tor/release-0.2.3] Raise the part of torrc mapaddress handling that knows wildcards
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 959f850056f5f6a7ebbe7ec0e56da239e4f7de3e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 17:49:18 2012 -0400 Raise the part of torrc mapaddress handling that knows wildcards This patch extracts the inner part of config_register_addressmaps -- the part that knows about detecting wildcard addresses addresses -- and makes it into a new function. The new function is deliberately not moved or reindented, so that the diff is smaller. I need this to fix bug 6244. --- src/or/config.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- src/or/config.h | 6 +++++ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index a369297..3498f60 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -4864,12 +4864,11 @@ config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options) { smartlist_t *elts; config_line_t *opt; - char *from, *to; + const char *from, *to, *msg; addressmap_clear_configured(); elts = smartlist_new(); for (opt = options->AddressMap; opt; opt = opt->next) { - int from_wildcard = 0, to_wildcard = 0; smartlist_split_string(elts, opt->value, NULL, SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 2); if (smartlist_len(elts) < 2) { @@ -4887,11 +4886,39 @@ config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options) goto cleanup; } - if (!strcmp(to, "*") || !strcmp(from, "*")) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"MapAddress '%s' is unsupported - can't remap from " - "or to *. Ignoring.",opt->value); + if (addressmap_register_auto(from, to, 0, ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC, &msg) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"MapAddress '%s' failed: %s. Ignoring.", opt->value, + msg); goto cleanup; } + + if (smartlist_len(elts) > 2) + log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Ignoring extra arguments to MapAddress."); + + cleanup: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elts, char*, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_clear(elts); + } + smartlist_free(elts); +} + +/** As addressmap_register(), but detect the wildcarded status of "from" and + * "to", and do not steal a reference to <b>to</b>. */ +/* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.c */ +int +addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to, + time_t expires, + addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source, + const char **msg) +{ + int from_wildcard = 0, to_wildcard = 0; + + *msg = "whoops, forgot the error message"; + if (1) { + if (!strcmp(to, "*") || !strcmp(from, "*")) { + *msg = "can't remap from or to *"; + return -1; + } /* Detect asterisks in expressions of type: '*.example.com' */ if (!strncmp(from,"*.",2)) { from += 2; @@ -4903,30 +4930,20 @@ config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options) } if (to_wildcard && !from_wildcard) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, - "Skipping invalid argument '%s' to MapAddress: " - "can only use wildcard (i.e. '*.') if 'from' address " - "uses wildcard also", opt->value); - goto cleanup; + *msg = "can only use wildcard (i.e. '*.') if 'from' address " + "uses wildcard also"; + return -1; } if (address_is_invalid_destination(to, 1)) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, - "Skipping invalid argument '%s' to MapAddress", opt->value); - goto cleanup; + *msg = "destination is invalid"; + return -1; } - addressmap_register(from, tor_strdup(to), 0, ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC, + addressmap_register(from, tor_strdup(to), expires, addrmap_source, from_wildcard, to_wildcard); - - if (smartlist_len(elts) > 2) - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Ignoring extra arguments to MapAddress."); - - cleanup: - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elts, char*, cp, tor_free(cp)); - smartlist_clear(elts); } - smartlist_free(elts); + return 0; } /** diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h index ce7e319..48f4e86 100644 --- a/src/or/config.h +++ b/src/or/config.h @@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ or_options_t *options_new(void); #endif void config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options); +/* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.h */ +int addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to, + time_t expires, + addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source, + const char **msg); + #endif

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Fix wildcarded address mappings from the control port
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 2ba52f409546961a0a950978a875b22bcb6bfaff Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 17:59:30 2012 -0400 Fix wildcarded address mappings from the control port Apparently, we weren't actually detecting wildcardedness when parsing them: whoops! bug 6244. Bugfix on 0.2.3.9-alpha --- changes/bug6244_part_c | 6 ++++++ src/or/control.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6244_part_c b/changes/bug6244_part_c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dea6e7b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6244_part_c @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Major bugfixes (controller): + - Make wildcarded addresses (that is, ones beginning with *.) work when + provided via the controller's MapAddress command. Previously, they + were accepted, but we never actually noticed that they were wildcards. + Fix for bug 6244; bugfix on 0.2.3.9-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index ce571f9..913d18a 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -1366,9 +1366,18 @@ handle_control_mapaddress(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "250-%s=%s", address, to); } } else { - addressmap_register(from, tor_strdup(to), 1, - ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER, 0, 0); - smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "250-%s", line); + const char *msg; + if (addressmap_register_auto(from, to, 1, + ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER, &msg) < 0) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, + "512-syntax error: invalid address mapping " + " '%s': %s", line, msg); + log_warn(LD_CONTROL, + "Skipping invalid argument '%s' in MapAddress msg: %s", + line, msg); + } else { + smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "250-%s", line); + } } } else { smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "512-syntax error: mapping '%s' is "

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Bug 6475: Explicitly track our path bias state.
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit ec6a7effb80af21484d83fd45d4e5eeb7c993dd4 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 19:59:55 2012 -0700 Bug 6475: Explicitly track our path bias state. This is done to avoid spurious warns. Additional log lines are also added to try to track down the codepaths where we are somehow overcounting success counts. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/or/or.h | 10 ++++++ 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b82cce9..7ac2b97 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2293,18 +2293,34 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest); if (guard) { - guard->circuit_successes++; + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) { + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED; + guard->circuit_successes++; - log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s", - guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s", + guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } else { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Succeeded circuit has strange path state %d. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circ->path_state, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); + } if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) " - "for guard %s", + "for guard %s=%s", guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, - guard->nickname); + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); } + } else { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Completed circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); } } if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { @@ -2666,8 +2682,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->circuit_successes /= scale_factor; } guard->first_hops++; - log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s", - guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname); + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s", + guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname, + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); return 0; } @@ -2690,6 +2707,16 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type, if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) { hop = circ->cpath; + + /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ + if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Opened circuit seems new. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); + } + /* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */ if (!circ->has_opened && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { entry_guard_t *guard; @@ -2697,13 +2724,40 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type, guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest); if (guard) { - if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) { - /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */ - return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP; + + if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) { + /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */ + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + } else { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Unopened circuit has strange path state %d. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circ->path_state, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); } + } else { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Opened circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); } } } else { + /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "New circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); + } + hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing."); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 3a53e5e..0db6137 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2596,6 +2596,12 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * circuit. */ #define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8 +typedef enum { + PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC = 0, + PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP = 1, + PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED = 2, +} path_state_t; + /** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit. */ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { @@ -2629,6 +2635,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * cannibalized circuits. */ unsigned int has_opened : 1; + /** Kludge to help us prevent the warn in bug #6475 and eventually + * debug why we are not seeing first hops in some cases. */ + path_state_t path_state; + /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.3] Fix warnings and 64-bit problems in openbsd-malloc code
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 6a33c33a12f3af414e97b91d5718ea16f2d26673 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 19:26:53 2012 -0400 Fix warnings and 64-bit problems in openbsd-malloc code The warning fixes are: - Only define issetugid if it's missing. - Explicitly ignore the return value of writev. - Explicitly cast the retval of readlink() to int. The 64-bit problems are related to just storing a size_t in an int. Not cool! Use a size_t instead. Fix for bug 6379. Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc, which introduced openbsd-malloc. --- changes/bug6379 | 6 ++++++ configure.in | 1 + src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6379 b/changes/bug6379 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f2b694 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6379 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix build warnings from --enable-openbsd-malloc with gcc warnings + enabled. Fixes bug 6379. + - Fix 64-bit warnings from --enable-openbsd-malloc. Fixes bug 6379. + Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc. + diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index 1db7d08..8aa90f6 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS( gmtime_r \ inet_aton \ ioctl \ + issetugid \ localtime_r \ lround \ memmem \ diff --git a/src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c b/src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c index 92ca9c0..39c8f8b 100644 --- a/src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c +++ b/src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c @@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* We use this macro to remove some code that we don't actually want, + * rather than to fix its warnings. */ +#define BUILDING_FOR_TOR + /* * Defining MALLOC_EXTRA_SANITY will enable extra checks which are * related to internal conditions and consistency in malloc.c. This has @@ -79,6 +83,7 @@ static size_t g_alignment = 0; extern int __libc_enable_secure; +#ifndef HAVE_ISSETUGID static int issetugid(void) { if (__libc_enable_secure) return 1; @@ -86,8 +91,10 @@ static int issetugid(void) if (getgid() != getegid()) return 1; return 0; } +#endif #define PGSHIFT 12 +#undef MADV_FREE #define MADV_FREE MADV_DONTNEED #include <pthread.h> static pthread_mutex_t gen_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; @@ -456,7 +463,7 @@ wrterror(const char *p) iov[3].iov_len = strlen(p); iov[4].iov_base = (char*)"\n"; iov[4].iov_len = 1; - writev(STDERR_FILENO, iov, 5); + (void) writev(STDERR_FILENO, iov, 5); suicide = 1; #ifdef MALLOC_STATS @@ -489,8 +496,8 @@ wrtwarning(const char *p) iov[3].iov_len = strlen(p); iov[4].iov_base = (char*)"\n"; iov[4].iov_len = 1; - - writev(STDERR_FILENO, iov, 5); + + (void) writev(STDERR_FILENO, iov, 5); } #ifdef MALLOC_STATS @@ -665,7 +672,7 @@ malloc_init(void) for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { switch (i) { case 0: - j = readlink("/etc/malloc.conf", b, sizeof b - 1); + j = (int) readlink("/etc/malloc.conf", b, sizeof b - 1); if (j <= 0) continue; b[j] = '\0'; @@ -1145,9 +1152,10 @@ malloc_bytes(size_t size) if (size == 0) j = 0; else { + size_t ii; j = 1; - i = size - 1; - while (i >>= 1) + ii = size - 1; + while (ii >>= 1) j++; } @@ -1971,6 +1979,7 @@ calloc(size_t num, size_t size) return(p); } +#ifndef BUILDING_FOR_TOR static int ispowerof2 (size_t a) { size_t b; for (b = 1ULL << (sizeof(size_t)*NBBY - 1); b > 1; b >>= 1) @@ -1978,7 +1987,9 @@ static int ispowerof2 (size_t a) { return 1; return 0; } +#endif +#ifndef BUILDING_FOR_TOR int posix_memalign(void **memptr, size_t alignment, size_t size) { void *r; @@ -2015,18 +2026,20 @@ void *valloc(size_t size) posix_memalign(&r, malloc_pagesize, size); return r; } +#endif size_t malloc_good_size(size_t size) { if (size == 0) { return 1; } else if (size <= malloc_maxsize) { - int i, j; + int j; + size_t ii; /* round up to the nearest power of 2, with same approach * as malloc_bytes() uses. */ j = 1; - i = size - 1; - while (i >>= 1) + ii = size - 1; + while (ii >>= 1) j++; return ((size_t)1) << j; } else {

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Address Nick's comments from code review.
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 4e42a8a2f20e501f9236452b41939964e6d942cf Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Thu Aug 16 16:29:19 2012 -0700 Address Nick's comments from code review. Also promote log messages to notice and rate-limit them. --- changes/bug6475 | 6 + src/or/circuitbuild.c | 284 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/or/or.h | 13 ++- 3 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6475 b/changes/bug6475 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67bab99 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6475 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Add internal circuit construction state to protect against + the noisy warn message "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes". + Also add some additional rate-limited notice messages to help + determine the root cause of the warn. Fixes bug 6475. + Bugfix against 0.2.3.17-beta. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 7ac2b97..2fa3dd5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ static entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest); static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge); +static int entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard); +static void pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ); + /** * This function decides if CBT learning should be disabled. It returns * true if one or more of the following four conditions are met: @@ -2285,44 +2288,11 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) } log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!"); circuit_reset_failure_count(0); - /* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */ + if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) { control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0); - } else { - entry_guard_t *guard = - entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest); - - if (guard) { - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) { - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED; - guard->circuit_successes++; - - log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s", - guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } else { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Succeeded circuit has strange path state %d. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circ->path_state, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); - } - - if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) " - "for guard %s=%s", - guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - } else { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Completed circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); - } } + if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); can_complete_circuit=1; @@ -2338,6 +2308,8 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) consider_testing_reachability(1, 1); } } + + pathbias_count_success(circ); circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ); circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */ @@ -2637,6 +2609,194 @@ pathbias_get_scale_factor(const or_options_t *options) DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 1, INT32_MAX); } +const char * +pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state) +{ + switch(state) { + case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC: + return "new"; + case PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP: + return "first hop"; + case PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED: + return "succeeded"; + } + + return "unknown"; +} + + +/** + * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful first hop. + * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias first_hop count. + * + * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475. + */ +static int +pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ +#define FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600) + static ratelim_t first_hop_notice_limit = RATELIM_INIT(FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL); + char *rate_msg = NULL; + + /* Completely ignore one hop circuits */ + if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { + tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1); + return 0; + } + + if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) { + /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ + if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + + /* Don't count cannibalized circs for path bias */ + if (!circ->has_opened) { + entry_guard_t *guard; + + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest); + if (guard) { + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP; + + if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) { + /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */ + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Unopened circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + } + } else { + /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit + * completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias + * success count. + * + * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475. + */ +static void +pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ +#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600) + static ratelim_t success_notice_limit = RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL); + char *rate_msg = NULL; + + /* Ignore one hop circuits */ + if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { + tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1); + return; + } + + /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias */ + if (!circ->has_opened) { + entry_guard_t *guard = + entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest); + + if (guard) { + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) { + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED; + guard->circuit_successes++; + + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s", + guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + + if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) " + "for guard %s=%s", + guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Completed circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + } else { + if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state), + rate_msg); + } + } + } +} + + /** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the @@ -2704,60 +2864,14 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type, { char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; crypt_path_t *hop; + int rv; + + if((rv = pathbias_count_first_hop(circ)) < 0) + return rv; if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) { hop = circ->cpath; - - /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ - if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Opened circuit seems new. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); - } - - /* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */ - if (!circ->has_opened && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { - entry_guard_t *guard; - - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest); - if (guard) { - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP; - - if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) { - /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */ - return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - } - } else { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Unopened circuit has strange path state %d. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circ->path_state, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); - } - } else { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Opened circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); - } - } } else { - /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "New circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state)); - } - hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing."); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 0db6137..d2cafb5 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2596,9 +2596,20 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * circuit. */ #define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8 +/** + * Describes the circuit building process in simplified terms based + * on the path bias accounting state for a circuit. Created to prevent + * overcounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See Bug #6475. + */ typedef enum { + /** This circuit is "new". It has not yet completed a first hop + * or been counted by the path bias code. */ PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC = 0, + /** This circuit has completed a first hop, and has been counted by + * the path bias logic. */ PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP = 1, + /** This circuit has been completely built, and has been counted as + * successful by the path bias logic. */ PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED = 2, } path_state_t; @@ -2637,7 +2648,7 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { /** Kludge to help us prevent the warn in bug #6475 and eventually * debug why we are not seeing first hops in some cases. */ - path_state_t path_state; + path_state_t path_state : 2; /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6514' into maint-0.2.3
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit f25e8d034b78be01c9fbe659d4686fc370083572 Merge: 91b52a2 2d6d5db Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 17 11:53:06 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6514' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6514 | 5 +++++ src/or/dirvote.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug6475' into maint-0.2.3
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 3621f30ad44973acef1ae0dc2e723fd8c9f1dc0d Merge: f25e8d0 4e42a8a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 17 12:08:42 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug6475' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6475 | 6 ++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/or/or.h | 21 +++++ 3 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Merge branch 'bug6379' into maint-0.2.3
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 97602c9de432cc1d49d4441de858ab73b8bf41c0 Merge: e9172e5 4c8fcba Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 17 13:57:07 2012 -0400 Merge branch 'bug6379' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6379 | 6 +++++ configure.in | 1 + src/common/OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6244_part_c' into maint-0.2.3
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit e9172e51fb13cfe5d4c70a98809a45e05b528482 Merge: 676f710 2ba52f4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 17 12:37:49 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6244_part_c' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6244_part_c | 6 ++++ src/or/config.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- src/or/config.h | 6 ++++ src/or/control.c | 15 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.2.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6507' into maint-0.2.3
by arma＠torproject.org 04 Sep '12

04 Sep '12

commit 676f71054f11727fdfa8707979d8c6fe143c9333 Merge: a74d418 d993b04 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 17 12:33:17 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6507' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6507 | 15 +++++ src/or/config.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- src/or/directory.c | 2 +- src/or/directory.h | 2 +- src/or/dirserv.c | 12 ++-- src/or/or.h | 35 +++++++++-- src/or/router.c | 5 +- src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 8 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

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