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[tor/master] Implement and use crypto_pk_eq_keys
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit 62babcaf0a88edb081529977981cf8865b32ea21 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 15 03:52:13 2012 -0700 Implement and use crypto_pk_eq_keys --- src/common/crypto.c | 12 ++++++++++++ src/common/crypto.h | 1 + src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/or/router.c | 11 +++++------ src/or/routerlist.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 5b5fb75..283b005 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -774,6 +774,18 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b) return BN_cmp((a->key)->e, (b->key)->e); } +/** Compare the public-key components of a and b. Return non-zero iff + * a==b. A NULL key is considered to be distinct from all non-NULL + * keys, and equal to itself. + * + * Note that this may leak information about the keys through timing. + */ +int +crypto_pk_eq_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b) +{ + return (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(a, b) == 0); +} + /** Return the size of the public key modulus in env, in bytes. */ size_t crypto_pk_keysize(crypto_pk_t *env) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 456a611..e824850 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, int crypto_pk_check_key(crypto_pk_t *env); int crypto_pk_cmp_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b); +int crypto_pk_eq_keys(crypto_pk_t *a, crypto_pk_t *b); size_t crypto_pk_keysize(crypto_pk_t *env); int crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env); crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_dup_key(crypto_pk_t *orig); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 0bfa17d..0fa04b6 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -2730,7 +2730,7 @@ find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (service == NULL) return NULL; SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro_point, - if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(intro_point->intro_key, circ->intro_key) == 0) { + if (crypto_pk_eq_keys(intro_point->intro_key, circ->intro_key)) { return intro_point; }); diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 052ed38..2e80c54 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL; static void set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k) { - if (onionkey && !crypto_pk_cmp_keys(onionkey, k)) { + if (onionkey && crypto_pk_eq_keys(onionkey, k)) { /* k is already our onion key; free it and return */ crypto_pk_free(k); return; @@ -155,12 +155,11 @@ assert_identity_keys_ok(void) if (public_server_mode(get_options())) { /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */ tor_assert(server_identitykey); - tor_assert(0==crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); + tor_assert(crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); } else { /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */ if (server_identitykey) - tor_assert(0!=crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, - server_identitykey)); + tor_assert(!crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); } } @@ -400,7 +399,7 @@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out, log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname); goto done; } - if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key) != 0) { + if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key)) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in " "certificate"); goto done; @@ -2008,7 +2007,7 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, routerinfo_t *router, const or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */ - if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) { + if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't " "match router's public key!"); return -1; diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 98357d6..5327622 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -4529,8 +4529,8 @@ router_differences_are_cosmetic(const routerinfo_t *r1, const routerinfo_t *r2) r1->ipv6_orport != r2->ipv6_orport || r1->dir_port != r2->dir_port || r1->purpose != r2->purpose || - crypto_pk_cmp_keys(r1->onion_pkey, r2->onion_pkey) || - crypto_pk_cmp_keys(r1->identity_pkey, r2->identity_pkey) || + !crypto_pk_eq_keys(r1->onion_pkey, r2->onion_pkey) || + !crypto_pk_eq_keys(r1->identity_pkey, r2->identity_pkey) || strcasecmp(r1->platform, r2->platform) || (r1->contact_info && !r2->contact_info) || /* contact_info is optional */ (!r1->contact_info && r2->contact_info) ||

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[tor/master] Add unit test for crypto_pk_cmp_keys and NULL
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit 757b3b259eba27881a8b5616ba45d42798c1ade8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 17 10:34:08 2012 -0400 Add unit test for crypto_pk_cmp_keys and NULL --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 7f4347a..fd983de 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -427,6 +427,11 @@ test_crypto_pk(void) test_assert(! crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(pk2, encoded, size)); test_eq(0, crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1, pk2)); + /* comparison between keys and NULL */ + tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(NULL, pk1), <, 0); + tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(NULL, NULL), ==, 0); + tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1, NULL), >, 0); + test_eq(128, crypto_pk_keysize(pk1)); test_eq(1024, crypto_pk_num_bits(pk1)); test_eq(128, crypto_pk_keysize(pk2));

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[tor/master] Fix documentation for crypto_pk_cmp_keys
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit cd884c764b2e8c5b1127829706de59a71b362b4c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Sep 17 10:23:23 2012 -0400 Fix documentation for crypto_pk_cmp_keys Now that crypto_pk_cmp_keys might return the result of tor_memcmp, there is no guarantee that it will only return -1, 0, or 1. (It currently does only return -1, 0, or 1, but that's a lucky accident due to details of the current implementation of tor_memcmp and the particular input given to it.) Fortunately, none of crypto_pk_cmp_keys's callers rely on this behaviour, so changing its documentation is sufficient. --- src/common/crypto.c | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 283b005..5cab058 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -748,9 +748,9 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env) return BN_is_word(env->key->e, 65537); } -/** Compare the public-key components of a and b. Return -1 if a\<b, - * 0 if a==b, and 1 if a\>b. A NULL key is considered to be less than - * all non-NULL keys, and equal to itself. +/** Compare the public-key components of a and b. Return less than 0 + * if a\<b, 0 if a==b, and greater than 0 if a\>b. A NULL key is + * considered to be less than all non-NULL keys, and equal to itself. * * Note that this may leak information about the keys through timing. */

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[tor/master] Parse votes with >31 flags correctly
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit 414adb237bc51e0e1b7321364dd73d9b3e635733 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 17 10:24:52 2012 -0400 Parse votes with >31 flags correctly We were doing (1<<p) to generate a flag at position p, but we should have been doing (U64_LITERAL(1)<<p). Fixes bug 6861; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha; reported pseudonymously. --- changes/bug6853 | 3 +++ src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6853 b/changes/bug6853 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..382adfb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6853 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (directory authority): + - Correctly handle votes with more than 31 flags. Fixes bug 6853; + bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 2bf072b..022add3 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -2067,7 +2067,7 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, for (i=0; i < tok->n_args; ++i) { int p = smartlist_string_pos(vote->known_flags, tok->args[i]); if (p >= 0) { - vote_rs->flags |= (1<<p); + vote_rs->flags |= (U64_LITERAL(1)<<p); } else { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Flags line had a flag %s not listed in known_flags.", escaped(tok->args[i]));

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6853'
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit 32d9cea2892f79d8f16adcc5ae417980af33f082 Merge: 5511d21 414adb2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 17 10:50:48 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6853' changes/bug6853 | 3 +++ src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Avoid sign-extending when computing rend auth type.
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit 96d2a21683cdfe25b549e13fa450d4b12fb945b2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 17 09:52:43 2012 -0400 Avoid sign-extending when computing rend auth type. Right-shifting negative values has implementation-defined behavior. On all the platforms we work on right now, the behavior is to sign-extend the input. That isn't what we wanted in auth_type_val = (descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4) + 1; Fix for 6861; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha; reported pseudonymously. The broken behavior didn't actually hurt anything, I think, since the only way to get sign-extension to happen would be to have the top bit of descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] set, which would make the value of descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4 somewhere between 0b11111111 and 0b11111000 (that is, between -1 and -8). So auth_type_val would be between -7 and 0. And the immediate next line does: if (auth_type_val < 1 || auth_type_val > 2) { So the incorrectly computed auth_type_val would be rejected as invalid, just as a correctly computed auth_type_val would be. Still, this stuff shouldn't sit around the codebase. --- changes/bug6861 | 3 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6861 b/changes/bug6861 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1040bd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6861 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix handling of rendezvous client authorization types over 8. + Fixes bug 6841; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 73e1c41..2104a5b 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options, descriptor_cookie); goto err; } - auth_type_val = (descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4) + 1; + auth_type_val = (((uint8_t)descriptor_cookie_tmp[16]) >> 4) + 1; if (auth_type_val < 1 || auth_type_val > 2) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Authorization cookie has unknown authorization " "type encoded.");

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug6861_typofix'
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit 5511d21d2b99fb686f3ad57be1a16d383f77adc9 Merge: c3f526e 96d2a21 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 17 10:28:35 2012 -0400 Merge branch 'bug6861_typofix' changes/bug6861 | 3 +++ src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Handle FIFOs in read_file_to_str
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit d64bf286a175f590fc07f51f49584cf246eac9b2 Author: meejah <meejah(a)meejah.ca> Date: Wed Sep 12 13:26:34 2012 -0600 Handle FIFOs in read_file_to_str add read_file_to_str_until_eof which is used by read_file_to_str if the file happens to be a FIFO. change file_status() to return FN_FILE if st_mode matches S_IFIFO (on not-windows) so that init_key_from_file() will read from a FIFO. --- src/common/util.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/util.h | 3 + src/test/test_util.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 3efc253..feeaf74 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -1807,6 +1807,10 @@ file_status(const char *fname) return FN_DIR; else if (st.st_mode & S_IFREG) return FN_FILE; +#ifndef _WIN32 + else if (st.st_mode & S_IFIFO) + return FN_FILE; +#endif else return FN_ERROR; } @@ -2237,6 +2241,46 @@ write_bytes_to_new_file(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, (bin?O_BINARY:O_TEXT)); } +/** + * Read the contents of the open file fd presuming it is a FIFO + * (or similar) file descriptor for which the size of the file isn't + * known ahead of time. Return NULL on failure, and a NUL-terminated + * string on success. On success, set sz_out to the number of + * bytes read. + */ +char * +read_file_to_str_until_eof(int fd, size_t max_bytes_to_read, size_t *sz_out) +{ + ssize_t r; + size_t pos = 0; + char *string = NULL; + size_t string_max = 0; + + if (max_bytes_to_read+1 >= SIZE_T_CEILING) + return NULL; + + do { + /* XXXX This "add 1K" approach is a little goofy; if we care about + * performance here, we should be doubling. But in practice we shouldn't + * be using this function on big files anyway. */ + string_max = pos + 1024; + if (string_max > max_bytes_to_read) + string_max = max_bytes_to_read + 1; + string = tor_realloc(string, string_max); + r = read(fd, string + pos, string_max - pos - 1); + if (r < 0) { + tor_free(string); + return NULL; + } + + pos += r; + } while (r > 0 && pos < max_bytes_to_read); + + *sz_out = pos; + string[pos] = '\0'; + return string; +} + /** Read the contents of filename into a newly allocated * string; return the string on success or NULL on failure. * @@ -2285,6 +2329,22 @@ read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out) return NULL; } +#ifndef _WIN32 +/** When we detect that we're reading from a FIFO, don't read more than + * this many bytes. It's insane overkill for most uses. */ +#define FIFO_READ_MAX (1024*1024) + if (S_ISFIFO(statbuf.st_mode)) { + size_t sz = 0; + string = read_file_to_str_until_eof(fd, FIFO_READ_MAX, &sz); + if (string && stat_out) { + statbuf.st_size = sz; + memcpy(stat_out, &statbuf, sizeof(struct stat)); + } + close(fd); + return string; + } +#endif + if ((uint64_t)(statbuf.st_size)+1 >= SIZE_T_CEILING) return NULL; diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index a6944ac..0cfc1b9 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ struct stat; #endif char *read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out) ATTR_MALLOC; +char *read_file_to_str_until_eof(int fd, size_t max_bytes_to_read, + size_t *sz_out) + ATTR_MALLOC; const char *parse_config_line_from_str(const char *line, char **key_out, char **value_out); char *expand_filename(const char *filename); diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 64976f3..cc3a03f 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -19,6 +19,117 @@ #endif static void +test_util_read_file_fifo_tiny_limit(void *arg) +{ +#ifndef _WIN32 + char *fifo_name = NULL; + char *str = NULL; + int fd = -1; + int read_fd = -1; + size_t sz; + (void)arg; + + fifo_name = tor_strdup(get_fname("tor_test_fifo_tiny")); + fd = open(fifo_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600); + test_neq(fd, -1); + test_eq(write(fd, "short", 6), 6); + close(fd); + + // purposely set limit shorter than what we wrote to the FIFO to + // test the maximum, and that it puts the NUL in the right spot + + read_fd = open(fifo_name, O_RDONLY); + str = read_file_to_str_until_eof(read_fd, 4, &sz); + close(read_fd); + + test_eq(str[0], 's'); + test_eq(str[1], 'h'); + test_eq(str[2], 'o'); + test_eq(str[3], 'r'); + test_eq(str[4], '\0'); + + done: + unlink(fifo_name); + tor_free(fifo_name); + tor_free(str); +#endif +} + +static void +test_util_read_file_fifo_two_loops(void *arg) +{ +#ifndef _WIN32 + char *fifo_name = NULL; + char *str = NULL; + char data[2048]; + int i = 0; + int fd = -1; + int read_fd = -1; + size_t sz; + (void)arg; + + while (i < 2048) { + data[i] = (char)(i & 0xff); + ++i; + } + + // write more than 1024 bytes to the FIFO to test two passes through + // the loop in the method; if the re-alloc size is changed this + // should be updated as well. + + fifo_name = tor_strdup(get_fname("tor_fifo_test_2k")); + fd = open(fifo_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600); + test_neq(fd, -1); + test_eq(write(fd, data, 2048), 2048); + close(fd); + + read_fd = open(fifo_name, O_RDONLY); + str = read_file_to_str_until_eof(read_fd, 1024*1024, &sz); + close(read_fd); + + for (i = 0; i < 2048; ++i) { + test_eq(str[i], (char)(i & 0xff)); + } + + done: + unlink(fifo_name); + tor_free(fifo_name); + tor_free(str); +#endif +} + +static void +test_util_read_file_fifo_zero_bytes(void *arg) +{ +#ifndef _WIN32 + char *fifo_name = NULL; + char *str = NULL; + int fd = -1; + int read_fd = -1; + size_t sz; + (void)arg; + + fifo_name = tor_strdup(get_fname("tor_fifo_test_zero_bytes")); + // zero-byte fifo + fd = open(fifo_name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600); + test_neq(fd, -1); + close(fd); + + read_fd = open(fifo_name, O_RDONLY); + str = read_file_to_str_until_eof(read_fd, 1024, &sz); + close(read_fd); + + test_neq(str, NULL); + test_eq(str[0], '\0'); + + done: + unlink(fifo_name); + tor_free(fifo_name); + tor_free(str); +#endif +} + +static void test_util_time(void) { struct timeval start, end; @@ -3191,6 +3302,9 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_TEST(envnames, 0), UTIL_TEST(make_environment, 0), UTIL_TEST(set_env_var_in_sl, 0), + UTIL_TEST(read_file_fifo_tiny_limit, 0), + UTIL_TEST(read_file_fifo_two_loops, 0), + UTIL_TEST(read_file_fifo_zero_bytes, 0), END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/master] Merge branch '6044_nm_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit c3f526ed64012f64589b926082ff5e542ec7d18d Merge: 2939cc3 faab788 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 17 10:03:11 2012 -0400 Merge branch '6044_nm_squashed' changes/6044 | 5 +++ src/common/util.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/util.h | 3 ++ src/test/test_util.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --cc src/test/test_util.c index 2c65903,1734108..f615ead --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@@ -18,20 -18,75 +18,88 @@@ #include <tchar.h> #endif +/* XXXX this is a minimal wrapper to make the unit tests compile with the + * changed tor_timegm interface. */ +static time_t +tor_timegm_wrapper(const struct tm *tm) +{ + time_t t; + if (tor_timegm(tm, &t) < 0) + return -1; + return t; +} + +#define tor_timegm tor_timegm_wrapper + static void + test_util_read_until_eof_impl(const char *fname, size_t file_len, + size_t read_limit) + { + char *fifo_name = NULL; + char *test_str = NULL; + char *str = NULL; + size_t sz = 9999999; + int fd = -1; + int r; + + fifo_name = tor_strdup(get_fname(fname)); + test_str = tor_malloc(file_len); + crypto_rand(test_str, file_len); + + r = write_bytes_to_file(fifo_name, test_str, file_len, 1); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + fd = open(fifo_name, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY); + tt_int_op(fd, >=, 0); + str = read_file_to_str_until_eof(fd, read_limit, &sz); + close(fd); + tt_assert(str != NULL); + + if (read_limit < file_len) + tt_int_op(sz, ==, read_limit); + else + tt_int_op(sz, ==, file_len); + + test_mem_op(test_str, ==, str, sz); + test_assert(str[sz] == '\0'); + + done: + unlink(fifo_name); + tor_free(fifo_name); + tor_free(test_str); + tor_free(str); + } + + static void + test_util_read_file_eof_tiny_limit(void *arg) + { + (void)arg; + // purposely set limit shorter than what we wrote to the FIFO to + // test the maximum, and that it puts the NUL in the right spot + + test_util_read_until_eof_impl("tor_test_fifo_tiny", 5, 4); + } + + static void + test_util_read_file_eof_two_loops(void *arg) + { + (void)arg; + // write more than 1024 bytes to the FIFO to test two passes through + // the loop in the method; if the re-alloc size is changed this + // should be updated as well. + + test_util_read_until_eof_impl("tor_test_fifo_2k", 2048, 10000); + } + + static void + test_util_read_file_eof_zero_bytes(void *arg) + { + (void)arg; + // zero-byte fifo + test_util_read_until_eof_impl("tor_test_fifo_empty", 0, 10000); + } + + static void test_util_time(void) { struct timeval start, end;

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[tor/master] changes file for 6044
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '12

17 Sep '12

commit faab7881894e55e71c0a19654f3c733c8b0d2920 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Sep 14 14:10:08 2012 -0400 changes file for 6044 --- changes/6044 | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/6044 b/changes/6044 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f932a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/6044 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Enable Tor to read configuration, state, and key information from + a FIFO. Previously Tor would only read from files with a positive + stat.st_size. Code from meejah; fixes bug 6044. +

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