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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3'
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit c49975a2b895b9742caba29e7cbd4067252c36c0 Merge: d4e2ccc 122c8ef Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 31 17:20:36 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3' changes/bug6480 | 5 +++++ src/or/dns.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Avoid hard (impossible?)-to-trigger double-free in dns_resolve()
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 62637fa22405278758febb1743da9af562524d4c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 31 12:58:19 2012 -0400 Avoid hard (impossible?)-to-trigger double-free in dns_resolve() Fixes 6480; fix on 0.2.0.1-alpha; based on pseudonymous patch. --- changes/bug6480 | 5 +++++ src/or/dns.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6480 b/changes/bug6480 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83ae00b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6480 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Avoid read-from-freed-RAM bug and related double-free bug that + could occur when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes + bug 6480; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index da11668..3e88fad 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static void add_wildcarded_test_address(const char *address); static int configure_nameservers(int force); static int answer_is_wildcarded(const char *ip); static int dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve, - or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **resolved_to_hostname); + or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **resolved_to_hostname, + int *made_connection_pending_out); #ifdef DEBUG_DNS_CACHE static void _assert_cache_ok(void); #define assert_cache_ok() _assert_cache_ok() @@ -596,10 +597,12 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn) { or_circuit_t *oncirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(exitconn->on_circuit); int is_resolve, r; + int made_connection_pending = 0; char *hostname = NULL; is_resolve = exitconn->_base.purpose == EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE; - r = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, is_resolve, oncirc, &hostname); + r = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, is_resolve, oncirc, &hostname, + &made_connection_pending); switch (r) { case 1: @@ -639,16 +642,11 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn) dns_cancel_pending_resolve(exitconn->_base.address); - if (!exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) { + if (!made_connection_pending && !exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) { + /* If we made the connection pending, then we freed it already in + * dns_cancel_pending_resolve(). If we marked it for close, it'll + * get freed from the main loop. Otherwise, can free it now. */ connection_free(TO_CONN(exitconn)); - // XXX ... and we just leak exitconn otherwise? -RD - // If it's marked for close, it's on closeable_connection_lst in - // main.c. If it's on the closeable list, it will get freed from - // main.c. -NM - // "<armadev> If that's true, there are other bugs around, where we - // don't check if it's marked, and will end up double-freeing." - // On the other hand, I don't know of any actual bugs here, so this - // shouldn't be holding up the rc. -RD } break; default: @@ -667,10 +665,15 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn) * Return -2 on a transient error. If it's a reverse resolve and it's * successful, sets *<b>hostname_out</b> to a newly allocated string * holding the cached reverse DNS value. + * + * Set *<b>made_connection_pending_out</b> to true if we have placed + * <b>exitconn</b> on the list of pending connections for some resolve; set it + * to false otherwise. */ static int dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve, - or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out) + or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out, + int *made_connection_pending_out) { cached_resolve_t *resolve; cached_resolve_t search; @@ -684,6 +687,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve, tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(exitconn->_base.s)); assert_cache_ok(); tor_assert(oncirc); + *made_connection_pending_out = 0; /* first check if exitconn->_base.address is an IP. If so, we already * know the answer. */ @@ -757,6 +761,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve, pending_connection->conn = exitconn; pending_connection->next = resolve->pending_connections; resolve->pending_connections = pending_connection; + *made_connection_pending_out = 1; log_debug(LD_EXIT,"Connection (fd %d) waiting for pending DNS " "resolve of %s", exitconn->_base.s, escaped_safe_str(exitconn->_base.address)); @@ -797,6 +802,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve, pending_connection = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(pending_connection_t)); pending_connection->conn = exitconn; resolve->pending_connections = pending_connection; + *made_connection_pending_out = 1; /* Add this resolve to the cache and priority queue. */ HT_INSERT(cache_map, &cache_root, resolve);

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Merge branch 'bug6480_squashed' into maint-0.2.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 122c8efb09643a65cbec6c991f3433774a4524ae Merge: ae75fb1 62637fa Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 31 17:19:47 2012 -0400 Merge branch 'bug6480_squashed' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6480 | 5 +++++ src/or/dns.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

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r25735: {website} add riseup to the list. (website/trunk/donate/en)
by Andrew Lewman 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

Author: phobos Date: 2012-07-31 21:17:44 +0000 (Tue, 31 Jul 2012) New Revision: 25735 Modified: website/trunk/donate/en/donate.wml Log: add riseup to the list. Modified: website/trunk/donate/en/donate.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/donate/en/donate.wml 2012-07-31 18:31:23 UTC (rev 25734) +++ website/trunk/donate/en/donate.wml 2012-07-31 21:17:44 UTC (rev 25735) @@ -214,11 +214,11 @@ <div class="hundred toptwenty"> <div class="dbox donate"> <h3>Bitcoins</h3> - <p>Instead of donating bitcoins to Tor, - please consider a donation to <a - href="https://www.torservers.net/donate.html">Torservers.net</a>, - which will turn your bitcoin donation into a faster, larger - Tor Network for all.</p> + <p>Instead of donating bitcoins to Tor, please consider a donation to + <a href="https://www.torservers.net/donate.html">Torservers.net</a> + or <a href="https://help.riseup.net/en/donate#bitcoin">Riseup</a> + which will turn your bitcoin donation into a faster, larger Tor + Network for all.</p> </div> </div>

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[tor/master] Implement replaycache_t for bug 6177, and unit tests for the preceding
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 8f63ef10ad3e10dada545b28b7a66c58edc70d75 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Thu Jul 5 14:01:42 2012 -0700 Implement replaycache_t for bug 6177, and unit tests for the preceding --- changes/bug6177 | 3 + src/or/Makefile.am | 1 + src/or/replaycache.c | 215 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/replaycache.h | 66 +++++++++++++++ src/test/Makefile.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 2 + src/test/test_replay.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 472 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6177 b/changes/bug6177 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c900c27 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6177 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features: + - Add replaycache_t structure, functions and unit tests, for future use + in refactoring rend_service_introduce() for bug 6177. diff --git a/src/or/Makefile.am b/src/or/Makefile.am index 3cc789a..70a0cb0 100644 --- a/src/or/Makefile.am +++ b/src/or/Makefile.am @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ libtor_a_SOURCES = \ rendmid.c \ rendservice.c \ rephist.c \ + replaycache.c \ router.c \ routerlist.c \ routerparse.c \ diff --git a/src/or/replaycache.c b/src/or/replaycache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09104a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/replaycache.c @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ + /* Copyright (c) 2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/* + * \file replaycache.c + * + * \brief Self-scrubbing replay cache for rendservice.c + */ + +#define REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE + +#include "or.h" +#include "replaycache.h" + +/** Free the replaycache r and all of its entries. + */ + +void +replaycache_free(replaycache_t *r) +{ + if (!r) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_free() called on NULL"); + return; + } + + if (r->digests_seen) digestmap_free(r->digests_seen, _tor_free); + + tor_free(r); +} + +/** Allocate a new, empty replay detection cache, where horizon is the time + * for entries to age out and interval is the time after which the cache + * should be scrubbed for old entries. + */ + +replaycache_t * +replaycache_new(time_t horizon, time_t interval) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + + if (horizon < 0) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_new() called with negative" + " horizon parameter"); + goto err; + } + + if (interval < 0) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_new() called with negative interval" + " parameter"); + interval = 0; + } + + r = tor_malloc(sizeof(*r)); + r->scrub_interval = interval; + r->scrubbed = 0; + r->horizon = horizon; + r->digests_seen = digestmap_new(); + + err: + return r; +} + +/** See documentation for replaycache_add_and_test() + */ + +int +replaycache_add_and_test_internal( + time_t present, replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, + time_t *elapsed) +{ + int rv = 0; + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + time_t *access_time; + + /* sanity check */ + if (present <= 0 || !r || !data || len <= 0) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_add_and_test_internal() called with stupid" + " parameters; please fix this."); + goto done; + } + + /* compute digest */ + crypto_digest(digest, (const char *)data, len); + + /* check map */ + access_time = digestmap_get(r->digests_seen, digest); + + /* seen before? */ + if (access_time != NULL) { + /* + * If it's far enough in the past, no hit. If the horizon is zero, we + * never expire. + */ + if (*access_time >= present - r->horizon || r->horizon == 0) { + /* replay cache hit, return 1 */ + rv = 1; + /* If we want to output an elapsed time, do so */ + if (elapsed) { + if (present >= *access_time) { + *elapsed = present - *access_time; + } else { + /* We shouldn't really be seeing hits from the future, but... */ + *elapsed = 0; + } + } + } + /* + * If it's ahead of the cached time, update + */ + if (*access_time < present) { + *access_time = present; + } + } else { + /* No, so no hit and update the digest map with the current time */ + access_time = tor_malloc(sizeof(*access_time)); + *access_time = present; + digestmap_set(r->digests_seen, digest, access_time); + } + + /* now scrub the cache if it's time */ + replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(present, r); + + done: + return rv; +} + +/** See documentation for replaycache_scrub_if_needed() + */ + +void +replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(time_t present, replaycache_t *r) +{ + digestmap_iter_t *itr = NULL; + const char *digest; + void *valp; + time_t *access_time; + char scrub_this; + + /* sanity check */ + if (!r || !(r->digests_seen)) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal() called with" + " stupid parameters; please fix this."); + return; + } + + /* scrub time yet? (scrubbed == 0 indicates never scrubbed before) */ + if (present - r->scrubbed < r->scrub_interval && r->scrubbed > 0) return; + + /* if we're never expiring, don't bother scrubbing */ + if (r->horizon == 0) return; + + /* okay, scrub time */ + itr = digestmap_iter_init(r->digests_seen); + while (!digestmap_iter_done(itr)) { + scrub_this = 0; + digestmap_iter_get(itr, &digest, &valp); + access_time = (time_t *)valp; + if (access_time) { + /* aged out yet? */ + if (*access_time < present - r->horizon) scrub_this = 1; + } else { + /* Buh? Get rid of it, anyway */ + log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal() saw a NULL" + " entry in the digestmap."); + scrub_this = 1; + } + + if (scrub_this) { + /* Advance the iterator and remove this one */ + itr = digestmap_iter_next_rmv(r->digests_seen, itr); + /* Free the value removed */ + tor_free(access_time); + } else { + /* Just advance the iterator */ + itr = digestmap_iter_next(r->digests_seen, itr); + } + } + + /* update scrubbed timestamp */ + if (present > r->scrubbed) r->scrubbed = present; +} + +/** Test the buffer of length len point to by data against the replay cache r; + * the digest of the buffer will be added to the cache at the current time, + * and the function will return 1 if it was already seen within the cache's + * horizon, or 0 otherwise. + */ + +int +replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len) +{ + return replaycache_add_and_test_internal(time(NULL), r, data, len, NULL); +} + +/** Like replaycache_add_and_test(), but if it's a hit also return the time + * elapsed since this digest was last seen. + */ + +int +replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( + replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, time_t *elapsed) +{ + return replaycache_add_and_test_internal(time(NULL), r, data, len, elapsed); +} + +/** Scrub aged entries out of r if sufficiently long has elapsed since r was + * last scrubbed. + */ + +void +replaycache_scrub_if_needed(replaycache_t *r) +{ + replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(time(NULL), r); +} + diff --git a/src/or/replaycache.h b/src/or/replaycache.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f3107c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/replaycache.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file replaycache.h + * \brief Header file for replaycache.c. + **/ + +#ifndef _TOR_REPLAYCACHE_H +#define _TOR_REPLAYCACHE_H + +typedef struct replaycache_s replaycache_t; + +#ifdef REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE + +struct replaycache_s { + /* Scrub interval */ + time_t scrub_interval; + /* Last scrubbed */ + time_t scrubbed; + /* + * Horizon + * (don't return true on digests in the cache but older than this) + */ + time_t horizon; + /* + * Digest map: keys are digests, values are times the digest was last seen + */ + digestmap_t *digests_seen; +}; + +#endif /* REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE */ + +/* replaycache_t free/new */ + +void replaycache_free(replaycache_t *r); +replaycache_t * replaycache_new(time_t horizon, time_t interval); + +#ifdef REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE + +/* + * replaycache_t internal functions: + * + * These take the time to treat as the present as an argument for easy unit + * testing. For everything else, use the wrappers below instead. + */ + +int replaycache_add_and_test_internal( + time_t present, replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, + time_t *elapsed); +void replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal( + time_t present, replaycache_t *r); + +#endif /* REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE */ + +/* + * replaycache_t methods + */ + +int replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len); +int replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( + replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, time_t *elapsed); +void replaycache_scrub_if_needed(replaycache_t *r); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/test/Makefile.am b/src/test/Makefile.am index 31a464e..3606686 100644 --- a/src/test/Makefile.am +++ b/src/test/Makefile.am @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ test_SOURCES = \ test_dir.c \ test_microdesc.c \ test_pt.c \ + test_replay.c \ test_util.c \ test_config.c \ tinytest.c diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 6bf2d28..1162b5c 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -1863,6 +1863,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t dir_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t microdesc_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t pt_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t config_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t replaycache_tests[]; static struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "", test_array }, @@ -1875,6 +1876,7 @@ static struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "dir/md/", microdesc_tests }, { "pt/", pt_tests }, { "config/", config_tests }, + { "replaycache/", replaycache_tests }, END_OF_GROUPS }; diff --git a/src/test/test_replay.c b/src/test/test_replay.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..217b555 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_replay.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "or.h" +#include "replaycache.h" +#include "test.h" + +static const char *test_buffer = + "Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisici elit, sed do eiusmod" + " tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim" + " veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea" + " commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate" + " velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint" + " occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt" + " mollit anim id est laborum."; + +static void +test_replaycache_alloc(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + if (!r) goto done; + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_miss(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + if (!r) goto done; + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_hit(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + if (!r) goto done; + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 1); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_age(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + if (!r) goto done; + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 1); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(3000, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_elapsed(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + time_t elapsed; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + if (!r) goto done; + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); + test_eq(result, 1); + test_eq(elapsed, 100); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_noexpire(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + + r = replaycache_new(0, 0); + test_assert(r != NULL); + if (!r) goto done; + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 1); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(3000, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 1); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +#define REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(name) \ + { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_replaycache_ ## name } + +struct testcase_t replaycache_tests[] = { + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(alloc), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(miss), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(hit), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(age), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(elapsed), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(noexpire), + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; +

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[tor/master] Refactor INTRODUCE2 parsing code in rend_service_introduce()
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 471ab34032581e6631c23ee05a2b212e757bafab Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Sun Jul 15 02:36:36 2012 -0700 Refactor INTRODUCE2 parsing code in rend_service_introduce() --- src/or/rendservice.c | 1161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- src/or/rendservice.h | 73 ++++ 2 files changed, 1055 insertions(+), 179 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 9c8017c..9355ed2 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ * \brief The hidden-service side of rendezvous functionality. **/ +#define RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE + #include "or.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" @@ -29,6 +31,10 @@ static origin_circuit_t *find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro, const char *pk_digest); static rend_intro_point_t *find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ); +static extend_info_t *find_rp_for_intro( + const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + uint8_t *need_free_out, char **err_msg_out); + static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro); static int intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro, time_t now); @@ -37,6 +43,22 @@ static int rend_service_load_keys(struct rend_service_t *s); static int rend_service_load_auth_keys(struct rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname); +static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out); +static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out); +static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out); + /** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to * a real port on some IP. */ @@ -1061,38 +1083,50 @@ rend_service_note_removing_intro_point(rend_service_t *service, /** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen * rendezvous point. */ - /* XXXX024 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */ int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) { - int status = 0; - char *ptr, *r_cookie; - extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL; + /* Global status stuff */ + int status = 0, result; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + char *err_msg = NULL; + const char *stage_descr = NULL; + int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + /* Service/circuit/key stuff we can learn before parsing */ + char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; + rend_service_t *service = NULL; + rend_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL; + /* Parsed cell */ + rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL; + /* Rendezvous point */ + extend_info_t *rp = NULL; + /* + * We need to look up and construct the extend_info_t for v0 and v1, + * but all the info is in the cell and it's constructed by the parser + * for v2 and v3, so freeing it would be a double-free. Use this to + * keep track of whether we should free it. + */ + uint8_t need_rp_free = 0; + /* XXX not handled yet */ char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; /* Holds KH, Df, Db, Kf, Kb */ - rend_service_t *service; - rend_intro_point_t *intro_point; - int r, i, v3_shift = 0; - size_t len, keylen; + int i; crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL; origin_circuit_t *launched = NULL; crypt_path_t *cpath = NULL; - char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; char hexcookie[9]; int circ_needs_uptime; - int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - crypto_pk_t *intro_key; char intro_key_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - int auth_type; size_t auth_len = 0; char auth_data[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN]; time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t elapsed; int replay; - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + /* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */ if (circuit->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got an INTRODUCE2 over a non-introduction circuit %d.", @@ -1105,57 +1139,60 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, #endif tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); + /* We'll use this in a bazillion log messages */ base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); - log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE2 cell for service %s on circ %d.", - escaped(serviceid), circuit->_base.n_circ_id); - - /* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */ - if (request_len < DIGEST_LEN+REND_COOKIE_LEN+(MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)+ - DH_KEY_LEN+42) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got a truncated INTRODUCE2 cell on circ %d.", - circuit->_base.n_circ_id); - goto err; - } /* look up service depending on circuit. */ - service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); + service = + rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); if (!service) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro " + log_warn(LD_BUG, + "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro " "circ for an unrecognized service %s.", escaped(serviceid)); goto err; } - /* use intro key instead of service key. */ - intro_key = circuit->intro_key; - - /* first DIGEST_LEN bytes of request is intro or service pk digest */ - crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, intro_key_digest); - if (tor_memneq(intro_key_digest, request, DIGEST_LEN)) { - base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, - (char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); - log_warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for the wrong service (%s).", - escaped(serviceid)); - goto err; - } - - keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key); - if (request_len < keylen+DIGEST_LEN) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "PK-encrypted portion of INTRODUCE2 cell was truncated."); - goto err; - } - intro_point = find_intro_point(circuit); if (intro_point == NULL) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro circ " - "(for service %s) with no corresponding rend_intro_point_t.", + log_warn(LD_BUG, + "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an " + "intro circ (for service %s) with no corresponding " + "rend_intro_point_t.", escaped(serviceid)); goto err; } + log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE2 cell for service %s on circ %d.", + escaped(serviceid), circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + + /* use intro key instead of service key. */ + intro_key = circuit->intro_key; + + tor_free(err_msg); + stage_descr = NULL; + + stage_descr = "early parsing"; + /* Early parsing pass (get pk, ciphertext); type 2 is INTRODUCE2 */ + parsed_req = + rend_service_begin_parse_intro(request, request_len, 2, &err_msg); + if (!parsed_req) goto err; + else if (err_msg) { + log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d.", err_msg, circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + tor_free(err_msg); + } + + stage_descr = "early validation"; + /* Early validation of pk/ciphertext part */ + result = rend_service_validate_intro_early(parsed_req, &err_msg); + if (result < 0) goto err; + else if (err_msg) { + log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d.", err_msg, circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + tor_free(err_msg); + } + + /* make sure service replay caches are present */ if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) { service->accepted_intro_dh_parts = replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL, @@ -1166,153 +1203,72 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts = replaycache_new(0, 0); } - /* Check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */ + /* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */ replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( - intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, - ((char*)request)+DIGEST_LEN, keylen, - &elapsed); + intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, + parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len, + &elapsed); if (replay) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an " - "INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d seconds ago. " - "Dropping cell.", (int)elapsed); - goto err; - } + log_warn(LD_REND, + "Possible replay detected! We received an " + "INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d " + "seconds ago. Dropping cell.", + (int)elapsed); + goto err; + } + + stage_descr = "decryption"; + /* Now try to decrypt it */ + result = rend_service_decrypt_intro(parsed_req, intro_key, &err_msg); + if (result < 0) goto err; + else if (err_msg) { + log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d.", err_msg, circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + tor_free(err_msg); + } + + stage_descr = "late parsing"; + /* Parse the plaintext */ + result = rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(parsed_req, &err_msg); + if (result < 0) goto err; + else if (err_msg) { + log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d.", err_msg, circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + tor_free(err_msg); + } + + stage_descr = "late validation"; + /* Validate the parsed plaintext parts */ + result = rend_service_validate_intro_late(parsed_req, &err_msg); + if (result < 0) goto err; + else if (err_msg) { + log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d.", err_msg, circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + tor_free(err_msg); + } + stage_descr = NULL; /* Increment INTRODUCE2 counter */ ++(intro_point->accepted_introduce2_count); - /* Next N bytes is encrypted with service key */ - note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER); - r = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt( - intro_key,buf,sizeof(buf), - (char*)(request+DIGEST_LEN),request_len-DIGEST_LEN, - PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1); - if (r<0) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE2 cell."); - goto err; - } - len = r; - if (*buf == 3) { - /* Version 3 INTRODUCE2 cell. */ - v3_shift = 1; - auth_type = buf[1]; - switch (auth_type) { - case REND_BASIC_AUTH: - /* fall through */ - case REND_STEALTH_AUTH: - auth_len = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+2)); - if (auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Wrong auth data size %d, should be %d.", - (int)auth_len, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); - goto err; - } - memcpy(auth_data, buf+4, sizeof(auth_data)); - v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN; - break; - case REND_NO_AUTH: - break; - default: - log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown authorization type '%d'", auth_type); - } - - /* Skip the timestamp field. We no longer use it. */ - v3_shift += 4; - } - if (*buf == 2 || *buf == 3) { - /* Version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell. */ - int klen; - extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t)); - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr, get_uint32(buf+v3_shift+1)); - extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+v3_shift+5)); - memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf+v3_shift+7, - DIGEST_LEN); - extend_info->nickname[0] = '$'; - base16_encode(extend_info->nickname+1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname)-1, - extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - - klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN)); - if ((int)len != v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+20+128) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad length %u for version %d INTRODUCE2 cell.", - (int)len, *buf); - reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - goto err; - } - extend_info->onion_key = - crypto_pk_asn1_decode(buf+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2, klen); - if (!extend_info->onion_key) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Error decoding onion key in version %d " - "INTRODUCE2 cell.", *buf); - reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - goto err; - } - ptr = buf+v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen; - len -= v3_shift+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen; - } else { - char *rp_nickname; - size_t nickname_field_len; - const node_t *node; - int version; - if (*buf == 1) { - rp_nickname = buf+1; - nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1; - version = 1; - } else { - nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1; - rp_nickname = buf; - version = 0; - } - ptr=memchr(rp_nickname,0,nickname_field_len); - if (!ptr || ptr == rp_nickname) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell."); - goto err; - } - if ((version == 0 && !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) || - (version == 1 && !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell."); - goto err; - } - /* Okay, now we know that a nickname is at the start of the buffer. */ - ptr = rp_nickname+nickname_field_len; - len -= nickname_field_len; - len -= rp_nickname - buf; /* also remove header space used by version, if - * any */ - node = node_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0); - if (!node) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Couldn't find router %s named in introduce2 cell.", - escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname)); - /* XXXX Add a no-such-router reason? */ - reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - goto err; - } - - extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); - } - - if (len != REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Bad length %u for INTRODUCE2 cell.", (int)len); - reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - goto err; - } + /* Find the rendezvous point */ + rp = find_rp_for_intro(parsed_req, &need_rp_free, &err_msg); + if (!rp) goto err; /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ if (options->StrictNodes && - routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, rp)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */ goto err; } - r_cookie = ptr; - base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); + base16_encode(hexcookie, 9, (const char *)(parsed_req->rc), 4); /* Check whether there is a past request with the same Diffie-Hellman, * part 1. */ replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( service->accepted_intro_dh_parts, - ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN, + parsed_req->dh, DH_KEY_LEN, &elapsed); if (replay) { @@ -1358,7 +1314,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; goto err; } - if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, + if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, + (char *)(parsed_req->dh), DH_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake"); @@ -1377,7 +1334,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL; if (circ_needs_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME; launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info( - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, extend_info, flags); + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, rp, flags); if (launched) break; @@ -1385,7 +1342,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, if (!launched) { /* give up */ log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous " "point %s for service %s.", - safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(extend_info)), + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp)), serviceid); reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED; goto err; @@ -1393,7 +1350,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND, "Accepted intro; launching circuit to %s " "(cookie %s) for service %s.", - safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(extend_info)), + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp)), hexcookie, serviceid); tor_assert(launched->build_state); /* Fill in the circuit's state. */ @@ -1401,7 +1358,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_cookie, r_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN); + memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_cookie, parsed_req->rc, REND_COOKIE_LEN); strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id, sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address)); @@ -1419,16 +1376,26 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0) goto err; memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN); - if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info); goto done; err: status = -1; + if (!err_msg) { + if (stage_descr) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "unknown %s error for INTRODUCE2", stage_descr); + } else { + err_msg = tor_strdup("unknown error for INTRODUCE2"); + } + } if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh); - if (launched) + if (launched) { circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason); - if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info); + } + log_warn(LD_REND, "%s on circ %d", err_msg, circuit->_base.n_circ_id); + tor_free(err_msg); + done: memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); @@ -1438,6 +1405,842 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, memset(auth_data, 0, sizeof(auth_data)); memset(diffie_hellman_hash, 0, sizeof(diffie_hellman_hash)); + /* Free the parsed cell */ + if (parsed_req) { + rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req); + parsed_req = NULL; + } + + /* Free rp if we must */ + if (need_rp_free) extend_info_free(rp); + + return status; +} + +/** Given a parsed and decrypted INTRODUCE2, find the rendezvous point or + * return NULL and an error string if we can't. + */ + +static extend_info_t * +find_rp_for_intro(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + uint8_t *need_free_out, char **err_msg_out) +{ + extend_info_t *rp = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + const char *rp_nickname = NULL; + const node_t *node = NULL; + uint8_t need_free = 0; + + if (!intro || !need_free_out) { + if (err_msg_out) + err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad parameters to find_rp_for_intro()"); + + goto err; + } + + if (intro->version == 0 || intro->version == 1) { + if (intro->version == 1) rp_nickname = (const char *)(intro->u.v1.rp); + else rp_nickname = (const char *)(intro->u.v0.rp); + + node = node_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0); + if (!node) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "Couldn't find router %s named in INTRODUCE2 cell", + escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname)); + } + + goto err; + } + + rp = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); + if (!rp) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "Could build extend_info_t for router %s named " + "in INTRODUCE2 cell", + escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname)); + } + + goto err; + } + else need_free = 1; + } else if (intro->version == 2) rp = intro->u.v2.extend_info; + else if (intro->version == 3) rp = intro->u.v3.extend_info; + else { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "Unknown version %d in INTRODUCE2 cell", + (int)(intro->version)); + } + + goto err; + } + + goto done; + + err: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + else tor_free(err_msg); + + done: + if (rp && need_free_out) *need_free_out = need_free; + + return rp; +} + +/** Remove unnecessary parts from a rend_intro_cell_t - the ciphertext if + * already decrypted, the plaintext too if already parsed + */ + +void +rend_service_compact_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) +{ + if (!request) return; + + if ((request->plaintext && request->plaintext_len > 0) || + request->parsed) { + tor_free(request->ciphertext); + request->ciphertext_len = 0; + } + + if (request->parsed) { + tor_free(request->plaintext); + request->plaintext_len = 0; + } +} + +/** Free a parsed INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell that was allocated by + * rend_service_parse_intro(). + */ +void +rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request) +{ + if (!request) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "rend_service_free_intro() called with NULL request!"); + return; + } + + /* Free ciphertext */ + tor_free(request->ciphertext); + request->ciphertext_len = 0; + + /* Have plaintext? */ + if (request->plaintext) { + /* Zero it out just to be safe */ + memset(request->plaintext, 0, request->plaintext_len); + tor_free(request->plaintext); + request->plaintext_len = 0; + } + + /* Have parsed plaintext? */ + if (request->parsed) { + switch (request->version) { + case 0: + case 1: + /* + * Nothing more to do; these formats have no further pointers + * in them. + */ + break; + case 2: + extend_info_free(request->u.v2.extend_info); + request->u.v2.extend_info = NULL; + break; + case 3: + if (request->u.v3.auth_data) { + memset(request->u.v3.auth_data, 0, request->u.v3.auth_len); + tor_free(request->u.v3.auth_data); + } + + extend_info_free(request->u.v3.extend_info); + request->u.v3.extend_info = NULL; + break; + default: + log_info(LD_BUG, + "rend_service_free_intro() saw unknown protocol " + "version %d.", + request->version); + } + } + + /* Zero it out to make sure sensitive stuff doesn't hang around in memory */ + memset(request, 0, sizeof(*request)); + + tor_free(request); +} + +/** Parse an INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell into a newly allocated + * rend_intro_cell_t structure. Free it with rend_service_free_intro() + * when finished. The type parameter should be 1 or 2 to indicate whether + * this is INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2. This parses only the non-encrypted + * parts; after this, call rend_service_decrypt_intro() with a key, then + * rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() to finish parsing. The optional + * err_msg_out parameter is set to a string suitable for log output + * if parsing fails. This function does some validation, but only + * that which depends solely on the contents of the cell and the + * key; it can be unit-tested. Further validation is done in + * rend_service_validate_intro(). + */ + +rend_intro_cell_t * +rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len, + uint8_t type, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + rend_intro_cell_t *rv = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + + if (!request || request_len <= 0) goto err; + if (!(type == 1 || type == 2)) goto err; + + /* First, check that the cell is long enough to be a sensible INTRODUCE */ + + /* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */ + if (request_len < + (DIGEST_LEN + REND_COOKIE_LEN + (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1) + + DH_KEY_LEN + 42)) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "got a truncated INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)type); + } + goto err; + } + + /* Allocate a new parsed cell structure */ + rv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rv)); + + /* Set the type */ + rv->type = type; + + /* Copy in the ID */ + memcpy(rv->pk, request, DIGEST_LEN); + + /* Copy in the ciphertext */ + rv->ciphertext = tor_malloc(request_len - DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(rv->ciphertext, request + DIGEST_LEN, request_len - DIGEST_LEN); + rv->ciphertext_len = request_len - DIGEST_LEN; + + goto done; + + err: + if (rv) rend_service_free_intro(rv); + rv = NULL; + if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "unknown INTRODUCE%d error", + (int)type); + } + + done: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + else tor_free(err_msg); + + return rv; +} + +/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v0 or v1 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 + * cell + */ + +static ssize_t +rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + const char *rp_nickname, *endptr; + size_t nickname_field_len, ver_specific_len; + + if (intro->version == 1) { + ver_specific_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 2; + rp_nickname = ((const char *)buf) + 1; + nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1; + } else if (intro->version == 0) { + ver_specific_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1; + rp_nickname = (const char *)buf; + nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1; + } else { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1() called with " + "bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + goto err; + } + + if (plaintext_len < ver_specific_len) { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "short plaintext of encrypted part in v1 INTRODUCE%d " + "cell (%lu bytes, needed %lu)", + (int)(intro->type), + (unsigned long)plaintext_len, + (unsigned long)ver_specific_len); + goto err; + } + + endptr = memchr(rp_nickname, 0, nickname_field_len); + if (!endptr || endptr == rp_nickname) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in " + "INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + goto err; + } + + if ((intro->version == 0 && + !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) || + (intro->version == 1 && + !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "bad nickname in INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + goto err; + } + + if (intro->version == 1) { + memcpy(intro->u.v1.rp, rp_nickname, endptr - rp_nickname + 1); + } else { + memcpy(intro->u.v0.rp, rp_nickname, endptr - rp_nickname + 1); + } + + return ver_specific_len; + + err: + return -1; +} + +/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v2 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell + */ + +static ssize_t +rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + unsigned int klen; + extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL; + ssize_t ver_specific_len; + + /* + * We accept version 3 too so that the v3 parser can call this with + * and adjusted buffer for the latter part of a v3 cell, which is + * identical to a v2 cell. + */ + if (!(intro->version == 2 || + intro->version == 3)) { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2() called with " + "bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + goto err; + } + + /* 7 == version, IP and port, DIGEST_LEN == id, 2 == key length */ + if (plaintext_len < 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t)); + tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr, get_uint32(buf + 1)); + extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 5)); + memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf + 7, DIGEST_LEN); + extend_info->nickname[0] = '$'; + base16_encode(extend_info->nickname + 1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname) - 1, + extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); + klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 7 + DIGEST_LEN)); + + /* 7 == version, IP and port, DIGEST_LEN == id, 2 == key length */ + if (plaintext_len < 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2 + klen) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + extend_info->onion_key = + crypto_pk_asn1_decode((const char *)(buf + 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2), klen); + if (!extend_info->onion_key) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "error decoding onion key in version %d " + "INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + ver_specific_len = 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen; + + if (intro->version == 2) intro->u.v2.extend_info = extend_info; + else intro->u.v3.extend_info = extend_info; + + return ver_specific_len; + + err: + extend_info_free(extend_info); + + return -1; +} + +/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v3 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell + */ + +static ssize_t +rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + const uint8_t *buf, + size_t plaintext_len, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + ssize_t adjust, v2_ver_specific_len, ts_offset; + + /* This should only be called on v3 cells */ + if (intro->version != 3) { + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3() called with " + "bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Check that we have at least enough to get auth_len: + * + * 1 octet for version, 1 for auth_type, 2 for auth_len + */ + if (plaintext_len < 4) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + /* + * The rend_client_send_introduction() function over in rendclient.c is + * broken (i.e., fails to match the spec) in such a way that we can't + * change it without breaking the protocol. Specifically, it doesn't + * emit auth_len when auth-type is REND_NO_AUTH, so everything is off + * by two bytes after that. Calculate ts_offset and do everything from + * the timestamp on relative to that to handle this dain bramage. + */ + + intro->u.v3.auth_type = buf[1]; + if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) { + intro->u.v3.auth_len = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 2)); + ts_offset = 4 + intro->u.v3.auth_len; + } + else { + intro->u.v3.auth_len = 0; + ts_offset = 2; + } + + /* Check that auth len makes sense for this auth type */ + if (intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH || + intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) { + if (intro->u.v3.auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "wrong auth data size %d for INTRODUCE%d cell, " + "should be %d", + (int)(intro->u.v3.auth_len), + (int)(intro->type), + REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); + } + + goto err; + } + } + + /* Check that we actually have everything up to the timestamp */ + if (plaintext_len < (size_t)(ts_offset)) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of " + "version %d INTRODUCE%d cell", + intro->version, + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + goto err; + } + + if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH && + intro->u.v3.auth_len > 0) { + /* Okay, we can go ahead and copy auth_data */ + intro->u.v3.auth_data = tor_malloc(intro->u.v3.auth_len); + /* + * We know we had an auth_len field in this case, so 4 is + * always right. + */ + memcpy(intro->u.v3.auth_data, buf + 4, intro->u.v3.auth_len); + } + + /* + * Apparently we don't use the timestamp any more, but might as well copy + * over just in case we ever care about it. + */ + intro->u.v3.timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(buf + ts_offset)); + + /* + * From here on, the format is as in v2, so we call the v2 parser with + * adjusted buffer and length. We are 4 + ts_offset octets in, but the + * v2 parser expects to skip over a version byte at the start, so we + * adjust by 3 + ts_offset. + */ + adjust = 3 + ts_offset; + + v2_ver_specific_len = + rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(intro, + buf + adjust, plaintext_len - adjust, + err_msg_out); + + /* Success in v2 parser */ + if (v2_ver_specific_len >= 0) return v2_ver_specific_len + adjust; + /* Failure in v2 parser; it will have provided an err_msg */ + else return v2_ver_specific_len; + + err: + return -1; +} + +/** Table of parser functions for version-specific parts of an INTRODUCE2 + * cell. + */ + +static ssize_t + (*intro_version_handlers[])( + rend_intro_cell_t *, + const uint8_t *, + size_t, + char **) = +{ rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1, + rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1, + rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2, + rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3 }; + +/** Decrypt the encrypted part of an INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell, + * return 0 if successful, or < 0 and write an error message to + * *err_msg_out if provided. + */ + +int +rend_service_decrypt_intro( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + crypto_pk_t *key, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + char *err_msg = NULL; + uint8_t key_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + char service_id[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; + ssize_t key_len; + uint8_t buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; + int result, status = 0; + + if (!intro || !key) { + if (err_msg_out) { + err_msg = + tor_strdup("rend_service_decrypt_intro() called with bad " + "parameters"); + } + + status = -2; + goto err; + } + + /* Make sure we have ciphertext */ + if (!(intro->ciphertext) || intro->ciphertext_len <= 0) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "rend_intro_cell_t was missing ciphertext for " + "INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + status = -3; + goto err; + } + + /* Check that this cell actually matches this service key */ + + /* first DIGEST_LEN bytes of request is intro or service pk digest */ + crypto_pk_get_digest(key, (char *)key_digest); + if (tor_memneq(key_digest, intro->pk, DIGEST_LEN)) { + if (err_msg_out) { + base32_encode(service_id, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 + 1, + (char*)(intro->pk), REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "got an INTRODUCE%d cell for the wrong service (%s)", + (int)(intro->type), + escaped(service_id)); + } + + status = -4; + goto err; + } + + /* Make sure the encrypted part is long enough to decrypt */ + + key_len = crypto_pk_keysize(key); + if (intro->ciphertext_len < key_len) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "got an INTRODUCE%d cell with a truncated PK-encrypted " + "part", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + + status = -5; + goto err; + } + + /* Decrypt the encrypted part */ + + note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER); + result = + crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt( + key, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf), + (const char *)(intro->ciphertext), intro->ciphertext_len, + PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1); + if (result < 0) { + if (err_msg_out) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE%d cell", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + status = -6; + goto err; + } + intro->plaintext_len = result; + intro->plaintext = tor_malloc(intro->plaintext_len); + memcpy(intro->plaintext, buf, intro->plaintext_len); + + goto done; + + err: + if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "unknown INTRODUCE%d error decrypting encrypted part", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + if (status >= 0) status = -1; + + done: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + else tor_free(err_msg); + + /* clean up potentially sensitive material */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memset(key_digest, 0, sizeof(key_digest)); + memset(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id)); + + return status; +} + +/** Parse the plaintext of the encrypted part of an INTRODUCE1 or + * INTRODUCE2 cell, return 0 if successful, or < 0 and write an error + * message to *err_msg_out if provided. + */ + +int +rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext( + rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + char *err_msg = NULL; + ssize_t ver_specific_len, ver_invariant_len; + uint8_t version; + int status = 0; + + if (!intro) { + if (err_msg_out) { + err_msg = + tor_strdup("rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() called with NULL " + "rend_intro_cell_t"); + } + + status = -2; + goto err; + } + + /* Check that we have plaintext */ + if (!(intro->plaintext) || intro->plaintext_len <= 0) { + if (err_msg_out) { + err_msg = tor_strdup("rend_intro_cell_t was missing plaintext"); + } + status = -3; + goto err; + } + + /* In all formats except v0, the first byte is a version number */ + version = intro->plaintext[0]; + + /* v0 has no version byte (stupid...), so handle it as a fallback */ + if (version > 3) version = 0; + + /* Copy the version into the parsed cell structure */ + intro->version = version; + + /* Call the version-specific parser from the table */ + ver_specific_len = + intro_version_handlers[version](intro, + intro->plaintext, intro->plaintext_len, + &err_msg); + if (ver_specific_len < 0) { + status = -4; + goto err; + } + + /** The rendezvous cookie and Diffie-Hellman stuff are version-invariant + * and at the end of the plaintext of the encrypted part of the cell. + */ + + ver_invariant_len = intro->plaintext_len - ver_specific_len; + if (ver_invariant_len < REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was truncated (%ld bytes)", + (int)(intro->type), + (long)(intro->plaintext_len)); + status = -5; + goto err; + } else if (ver_invariant_len > REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was too long (%ld bytes)", + (int)(intro->type), + (long)(intro->plaintext_len)); + status = -6; + } else { + memcpy(intro->rc, + intro->plaintext + ver_specific_len, + REND_COOKIE_LEN); + memcpy(intro->dh, + intro->plaintext + ver_specific_len + REND_COOKIE_LEN, + DH_KEY_LEN); + } + + /* Flag it as being fully parsed */ + intro->parsed = 1; + + goto done; + + err: + if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, + "unknown INTRODUCE%d error parsing encrypted part", + (int)(intro->type)); + } + if (status >= 0) status = -1; + + done: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + else tor_free(err_msg); + + return status; +} + +/** Do validity checks on a parsed intro cell before decryption; some of + * these are not done in rend_service_begin_parse_intro() itself because + * they depend on a lot of other state and would make it hard to unit test. + * Returns >= 0 if successful or < 0 if the intro cell is invalid, and + * optionally writes out an error message for logging. If an err_msg + * pointer is provided, it is the caller's responsibility to free any + * provided message. + */ + +int +rend_service_validate_intro_early(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + int status = 0; + + if (!intro) { + if (err_msg_out) + *err_msg_out = + tor_strdup("NULL intro cell passed to " + "rend_service_validate_intro_early()"); + + status = -1; + goto err; + } + + /* TODO */ + + err: + return status; +} + +/** Do validity checks on a parsed intro cell after decryption; some of + * these are not done in rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() itself because + * they depend on a lot of other state and would make it hard to unit test. + * Returns >= 0 if successful or < 0 if the intro cell is invalid, and + * optionally writes out an error message for logging. If an err_msg + * pointer is provided, it is the caller's responsibility to free any + * provided message. + */ + +int +rend_service_validate_intro_late(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + int status = 0; + + if (!intro) { + if (err_msg_out) + *err_msg_out = + tor_strdup("NULL intro cell passed to " + "rend_service_validate_intro_late()"); + + status = -1; + goto err; + } + + if (intro->version == 3 && intro->parsed) { + if (!(intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH || + intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH || + intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH)) { + /* This is an informative message, not an error, as in the old code */ + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(err_msg_out, + "unknown authorization type %d", + intro->u.v3.auth_type); + } + } + + err: return status; } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h index baf8d5f..0d6edda 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.h +++ b/src/or/rendservice.h @@ -12,6 +12,64 @@ #ifndef _TOR_RENDSERVICE_H #define _TOR_RENDSERVICE_H +#include "or.h" + +typedef struct rend_intro_cell_s rend_intro_cell_t; + +#ifdef RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE + +/* This can be used for both INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE2 */ + +struct rend_intro_cell_s { + /* Is this an INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2? (set to 1 or 2) */ + uint8_t type; + /* Public key digest */ + uint8_t pk[DIGEST_LEN]; + /* Optionally, store ciphertext here */ + uint8_t *ciphertext; + ssize_t ciphertext_len; + /* Optionally, store plaintext */ + uint8_t *plaintext; + ssize_t plaintext_len; + /* Have we parsed the plaintext? */ + uint8_t parsed; + /* intro protocol version (0, 1, 2 or 3) */ + uint8_t version; + /* Version-specific parts */ + union { + struct { + /* Rendezvous point nickname */ + uint8_t rp[20]; + } v0; + struct { + /* Rendezvous point nickname or hex-encoded key digest */ + uint8_t rp[42]; + } v1; + struct { + /* The extend_info_t struct has everything v2 uses */ + extend_info_t *extend_info; + } v2; + struct { + /* Auth type used */ + uint8_t auth_type; + /* Length of auth data */ + uint16_t auth_len; + /* Auth data */ + uint8_t *auth_data; + /* timestamp */ + uint32_t timestamp; + /* Rendezvous point's IP address/port, identity digest and onion key */ + extend_info_t *extend_info; + } v3; + } u; + /* Rendezvous cookie */ + uint8_t rc[REND_COOKIE_LEN]; + /* Diffie-Hellman data */ + uint8_t dh[DH_KEY_LEN]; +}; + +#endif + int num_rend_services(void); int rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only); int rend_service_load_all_keys(void); @@ -27,6 +85,21 @@ int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, void rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit); int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len); +void rend_service_compact_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request); +int rend_service_decrypt_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request, + crypto_pk_t *key, + char **err_msg_out); +void rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request); +rend_intro_cell_t * rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request, + size_t request_len, + uint8_t type, + char **err_msg_out); +int rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + char **err_msg_out); +int rend_service_validate_intro_early(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + char **err_msg_out); +int rend_service_validate_intro_late(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro, + char **err_msg_out); void rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc); int rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn, origin_circuit_t *circ);

1 0

[tor/master] Add replaycache.h to noinst_HEADERS in src/or/Makefile.am
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 048c128f935a3f037a81523fc20437f75b358af4 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Thu Jul 19 22:47:25 2012 -0700 Add replaycache.h to noinst_HEADERS in src/or/Makefile.am --- src/or/Makefile.am | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/Makefile.am b/src/or/Makefile.am index 70a0cb0..27eb607 100644 --- a/src/or/Makefile.am +++ b/src/or/Makefile.am @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS = \ rendmid.h \ rendservice.h \ rephist.h \ + replaycache.h \ router.h \ routerlist.h \ routerparse.h \

1 0

[tor/master] Use new replaycache_t structure for replay detection in rend_service_introduce()
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 36c968491f424b4a9d4ad2b3eb69a29f9102a749 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Tue Jul 10 19:18:47 2012 -0700 Use new replaycache_t structure for replay detection in rend_service_introduce() --- src/or/or.h | 16 ++++--- src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index b6cffd4..2ce95c6 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ #include "address.h" #include "compat_libevent.h" #include "ht.h" +#include "replaycache.h" /* These signals are defined to help handle_control_signal work. */ @@ -4214,12 +4215,15 @@ typedef struct rend_intro_point_t { * intro point. */ unsigned int rend_service_note_removing_intro_point_called : 1; - /** (Service side only) A digestmap recording the INTRODUCE2 cells - * this intro point's circuit has received. Each key is the digest - * of the RSA-encrypted part of a received INTRODUCE2 cell; each - * value is a pointer to the time_t at which the cell was received. - * This digestmap is used to prevent replay attacks. */ - digestmap_t *accepted_intro_rsa_parts; + /** (Service side only) A replay cache recording the RSA-encrypted parts + * of INTRODUCE2 cells this intro point's circuit has received. This is + * used to prevent replay attacks. */ + replaycache_t *accepted_intro_rsa_parts; + + /** (Service side only) Count of INTRODUCE2 cells accepted from this + * intro point. + */ + int accepted_introduce2_count; /** (Service side only) The time at which this intro point was first * published, or -1 if this intro point has not yet been diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 4722690..f6b1bf9 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ rend_intro_point_free(rend_intro_point_t *intro) crypto_pk_free(intro->intro_key); if (intro->accepted_intro_rsa_parts != NULL) { - digestmap_free(intro->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, _tor_free); + replaycache_free(intro->accepted_intro_rsa_parts); } tor_free(intro); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index daa1651..9c8017c 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "router.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rephist.h" +#include "replaycache.h" #include "routerlist.h" #include "routerparse.h" @@ -95,16 +96,12 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t { * up-to-date. */ time_t next_upload_time; /**< Scheduled next hidden service descriptor * upload time. */ - /** Map from digests of Diffie-Hellman values INTRODUCE2 to time_t - * of when they were received. Clients may send INTRODUCE1 cells - * for the same rendezvous point through two or more different - * introduction points; when they do, this digestmap keeps us from - * launching multiple simultaneous attempts to connect to the same - * rend point. */ - digestmap_t *accepted_intro_dh_parts; - /** Time at which we last removed expired values from - * accepted_intro_dh_parts. */ - time_t last_cleaned_accepted_intro_dh_parts; + /** Replay cache for Diffie-Hellman values of INTRODUCE2 cells, to + * detect repeats. Clients may send INTRODUCE1 cells for the same + * rendezvous point through two or more different introduction points; + * when they do, this keeps us from launching multiple simultaneous attempts + * to connect to the same rend point. */ + replaycache_t *accepted_intro_dh_parts; } rend_service_t; /** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP. @@ -177,7 +174,9 @@ rend_service_free(rend_service_t *service) rend_authorized_client_free(c);); smartlist_free(service->clients); } - digestmap_free(service->accepted_intro_dh_parts, _tor_free); + if (service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) { + replaycache_free(service->accepted_intro_dh_parts); + } tor_free(service); } @@ -955,26 +954,6 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, return 1; } -/** Remove elements from <b>service</b>'s replay cache that are old enough to - * be noticed by timestamp checking. */ -static void -clean_accepted_intro_dh_parts(rend_service_t *service, time_t now) -{ - const time_t cutoff = now - REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL; - - service->last_cleaned_accepted_intro_dh_parts = now; - if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) - return; - - DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(service->accepted_intro_dh_parts, digest, - time_t *, t) { - if (*t < cutoff) { - tor_free(t); - MAP_DEL_CURRENT(digest); - } - } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END; -} - /** Called when <b>intro</b> will soon be removed from * <b>service</b>'s list of intro points. */ static void @@ -1108,10 +1087,10 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, int auth_type; size_t auth_len = 0; char auth_data[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN]; - crypto_digest_t *digest = NULL; time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; - time_t *access_time; + time_t elapsed; + int replay; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (circuit->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) { @@ -1177,30 +1156,32 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } - if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) - service->accepted_intro_dh_parts = digestmap_new(); + if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) { + service->accepted_intro_dh_parts = + replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL, + REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL); + } - if (!intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts) - intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts = digestmap_new(); + if (!intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts) { + intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts = replaycache_new(0, 0); + } - { - char pkpart_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - /* Check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */ - crypto_digest(pkpart_digest, (char*)request+DIGEST_LEN, keylen); - access_time = digestmap_get(intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, - pkpart_digest); - if (access_time != NULL) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an " - "INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d seconds ago. " - "Dropping cell.", (int)(now-*access_time)); - goto err; - } - access_time = tor_malloc(sizeof(time_t)); - *access_time = now; - digestmap_set(intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, - pkpart_digest, access_time); + /* Check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */ + replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( + intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, + ((char*)request)+DIGEST_LEN, keylen, + &elapsed); + + if (replay) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an " + "INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d seconds ago. " + "Dropping cell.", (int)elapsed); + goto err; } + /* Increment INTRODUCE2 counter */ + ++(intro_point->accepted_introduce2_count); + /* Next N bytes is encrypted with service key */ note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER); r = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt( @@ -1327,17 +1308,14 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, r_cookie = ptr; base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); - /* Determine hash of Diffie-Hellman, part 1 to detect replays. */ - digest = crypto_digest_new(); - crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN); - crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, diffie_hellman_hash, DIGEST_LEN); - crypto_digest_free(digest); - /* Check whether there is a past request with the same Diffie-Hellman, * part 1. */ - access_time = digestmap_get(service->accepted_intro_dh_parts, - diffie_hellman_hash); - if (access_time != NULL) { + replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( + service->accepted_intro_dh_parts, + ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN, + &elapsed); + + if (replay) { /* A Tor client will send a new INTRODUCE1 cell with the same rend * cookie and DH public key as its previous one if its intro circ * times out while in state CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT . @@ -1349,21 +1327,10 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, "INTRODUCE2 cell with same first part of " "Diffie-Hellman handshake %d seconds ago. Dropping " "cell.", - (int) (now - *access_time)); + (int) elapsed); goto err; } - /* Add request to access history, including time and hash of Diffie-Hellman, - * part 1, and possibly remove requests from the history that are older than - * one hour. */ - access_time = tor_malloc(sizeof(time_t)); - *access_time = now; - digestmap_set(service->accepted_intro_dh_parts, - diffie_hellman_hash, access_time); - if (service->last_cleaned_accepted_intro_dh_parts + REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL - < now) - clean_accepted_intro_dh_parts(service, now); - /* If the service performs client authorization, check included auth data. */ if (service->clients) { if (auth_len > 0) { @@ -2164,11 +2131,7 @@ upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service) static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro) { - if (intro->accepted_intro_rsa_parts == NULL) { - return 0; - } else { - return digestmap_size(intro->accepted_intro_rsa_parts); - } + return intro->accepted_introduce2_count; } /** Return non-zero iff <b>intro</b> should 'expire' now (i.e. we

1 0

[tor/master] Unit tests for new rend_intro_cell_t parser
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit 96c7612679f029102faa688e436a927eecc008aa Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Sun Jul 22 01:50:33 2012 -0700 Unit tests for new rend_intro_cell_t parser --- src/test/Makefile.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 2 + src/test/test_introduce.c | 608 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 611 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/Makefile.am b/src/test/Makefile.am index 3606686..f3efdcc 100644 --- a/src/test/Makefile.am +++ b/src/test/Makefile.am @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ test_SOURCES = \ test_crypto.c \ test_data.c \ test_dir.c \ + test_introduce.c \ test_microdesc.c \ test_pt.c \ test_replay.c \ diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 1162b5c..8117279 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -1863,6 +1863,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t dir_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t microdesc_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t pt_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t config_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t introduce_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t replaycache_tests[]; static struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { @@ -1877,6 +1878,7 @@ static struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "pt/", pt_tests }, { "config/", config_tests }, { "replaycache/", replaycache_tests }, + { "introduce/", introduce_tests }, END_OF_GROUPS }; diff --git a/src/test/test_introduce.c b/src/test/test_introduce.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5953a28 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_introduce.c @@ -0,0 +1,608 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "or.h" +#include "test.h" + +#define RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE +#include "rendservice.h" + +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1[]; + +static uint8_t v0_test_plaintext[] = + /* 20 bytes of rendezvous point nickname */ + { 0x4e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous cookie */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 128 bytes dummy DH handshake data */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static uint8_t v1_test_plaintext[] = + /* Version byte */ + { 0x01, + /* 42 bytes of dummy rendezvous point hex digest */ + 0x24, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, + 0x33, 0x30, 0x34, 0x30, 0x35, 0x30, 0x36, 0x30, + 0x37, 0x30, 0x38, 0x30, 0x39, 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, + 0x42, 0x30, 0x43, 0x30, 0x44, 0x30, 0x45, 0x30, + 0x46, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x31, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, + 0x33, 0x00, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous cookie */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 128 bytes dummy DH handshake data */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static uint8_t v2_test_plaintext[] = + /* Version byte */ + { 0x02, + /* 4 bytes rendezvous point's IP address */ + 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x00, 0x01, + /* 2 bytes rendezvous point's OR port */ + 0x23, 0x5a, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous point's identity digest */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 2 bytes length of onion key */ + 0x00, 0x8c, + /* Onion key (140 bytes taken from live test) */ + 0x30, 0x81, 0x89, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xb1, + 0xcd, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x18, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xf8, + 0xb2, 0xad, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0x4b, 0xf4, + 0x54, 0x1e, 0x3f, 0x03, 0x54, 0xcf, 0x7c, 0xb6, + 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xed, 0x4b, 0x7d, 0xd7, 0x61, + 0xdb, 0x6d, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe2, 0x72, 0x04, 0xaa, + 0x3e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x14, 0x62, 0x9a, 0x6c, 0x11, + 0x0b, 0x35, 0x99, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x2c, 0x64, 0xa1, + 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x88, 0xce, 0xf6, 0x54, 0xfe, 0x1d, + 0x37, 0x5e, 0x6d, 0x73, 0x95, 0x54, 0x90, 0xf0, + 0x7b, 0xfa, 0xd4, 0x44, 0xac, 0xb2, 0x23, 0x9f, + 0x75, 0x36, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x62, 0x82, 0x80, 0xa4, + 0x23, 0x22, 0xc9, 0xbf, 0xc4, 0x36, 0xd1, 0x31, + 0x33, 0x8e, 0x64, 0xb4, 0xa9, 0x74, 0xa1, 0xcb, + 0x42, 0x8d, 0x60, 0xc7, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x6e, 0x0f, + 0x36, 0x74, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0x08, 0x99, 0x06, 0x92, + 0xb1, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0xdd, 0xed, 0xf7, 0xc9, 0x02, + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous cookie */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 128 bytes dummy DH handshake data */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static uint8_t v3_no_auth_test_plaintext[] = + /* Version byte */ + { 0x03, + /* Auth type (0 for no auth len/auth data) */ + 0x00, + /* Timestamp */ + 0x50, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xaa, + /* 4 bytes rendezvous point's IP address */ + 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x00, 0x01, + /* 2 bytes rendezvous point's OR port */ + 0x23, 0x5a, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous point's identity digest */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 2 bytes length of onion key */ + 0x00, 0x8c, + /* Onion key (140 bytes taken from live test) */ + 0x30, 0x81, 0x89, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xb1, + 0xcd, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x18, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xf8, + 0xb2, 0xad, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0x4b, 0xf4, + 0x54, 0x1e, 0x3f, 0x03, 0x54, 0xcf, 0x7c, 0xb6, + 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xed, 0x4b, 0x7d, 0xd7, 0x61, + 0xdb, 0x6d, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe2, 0x72, 0x04, 0xaa, + 0x3e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x14, 0x62, 0x9a, 0x6c, 0x11, + 0x0b, 0x35, 0x99, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x2c, 0x64, 0xa1, + 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x88, 0xce, 0xf6, 0x54, 0xfe, 0x1d, + 0x37, 0x5e, 0x6d, 0x73, 0x95, 0x54, 0x90, 0xf0, + 0x7b, 0xfa, 0xd4, 0x44, 0xac, 0xb2, 0x23, 0x9f, + 0x75, 0x36, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x62, 0x82, 0x80, 0xa4, + 0x23, 0x22, 0xc9, 0xbf, 0xc4, 0x36, 0xd1, 0x31, + 0x33, 0x8e, 0x64, 0xb4, 0xa9, 0x74, 0xa1, 0xcb, + 0x42, 0x8d, 0x60, 0xc7, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x6e, 0x0f, + 0x36, 0x74, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0x08, 0x99, 0x06, 0x92, + 0xb1, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0xdd, 0xed, 0xf7, 0xc9, 0x02, + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous cookie */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 128 bytes dummy DH handshake data */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static uint8_t v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext[] = + /* Version byte */ + { 0x03, + /* Auth type (1 for REND_BASIC_AUTH) */ + 0x01, + /* Auth len (must be 16 bytes for REND_BASIC_AUTH) */ + 0x00, 0x10, + /* Auth data (a 16-byte dummy descriptor cookie) */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + /* Timestamp */ + 0x50, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xaa, + /* 4 bytes rendezvous point's IP address */ + 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x00, 0x01, + /* 2 bytes rendezvous point's OR port */ + 0x23, 0x5a, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous point's identity digest */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 2 bytes length of onion key */ + 0x00, 0x8c, + /* Onion key (140 bytes taken from live test) */ + 0x30, 0x81, 0x89, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xb1, + 0xcd, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x18, 0xd2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xf8, + 0xb2, 0xad, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0x4b, 0xf4, + 0x54, 0x1e, 0x3f, 0x03, 0x54, 0xcf, 0x7c, 0xb6, + 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xed, 0x4b, 0x7d, 0xd7, 0x61, + 0xdb, 0x6d, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe2, 0x72, 0x04, 0xaa, + 0x3e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x14, 0x62, 0x9a, 0x6c, 0x11, + 0x0b, 0x35, 0x99, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x2c, 0x64, 0xa1, + 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x88, 0xce, 0xf6, 0x54, 0xfe, 0x1d, + 0x37, 0x5e, 0x6d, 0x73, 0x95, 0x54, 0x90, 0xf0, + 0x7b, 0xfa, 0xd4, 0x44, 0xac, 0xb2, 0x23, 0x9f, + 0x75, 0x36, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x62, 0x82, 0x80, 0xa4, + 0x23, 0x22, 0xc9, 0xbf, 0xc4, 0x36, 0xd1, 0x31, + 0x33, 0x8e, 0x64, 0xb4, 0xa9, 0x74, 0xa1, 0xcb, + 0x42, 0x8d, 0x60, 0xc7, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x6e, 0x0f, + 0x36, 0x74, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0x08, 0x99, 0x06, 0x92, + 0xb1, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0xdd, 0xed, 0xf7, 0xc9, 0x02, + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, + /* 20 bytes dummy rendezvous cookie */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, + /* 128 bytes dummy DH handshake data */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x0f, 0x0e, 0x0d, 0x0c, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x08, + 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static void do_decrypt_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len); +static void do_early_parse_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len); +static void do_late_parse_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len); +static ssize_t make_intro_from_plaintext( + void *buf, size_t len, crypto_pk_t *key, void **cell_out); + +/** Decryption test utility function + */ + +static void +do_decrypt_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len) +{ + crypto_pk_t *k = NULL; + int r; + uint8_t *cell = NULL; + size_t cell_len; + rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /* Get a key */ + k = crypto_pk_new(); + test_assert(k); + if (!k) goto done; + r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1, -1); + test_assert(!r); + if (r) goto done; + + /* Get digest for future comparison */ + r = crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest); + test_assert(r >= 0); + + /* Make a cell out of it */ + r = make_intro_from_plaintext( + plaintext, plaintext_len, + k, (void **)(&cell)); + test_assert(r > 0); + test_assert(cell); + if (!(cell && r > 0)) goto done; + cell_len = r; + + /* Do early parsing */ + parsed_req = rend_service_begin_parse_intro(cell, cell_len, 2, &err_msg); + test_assert(parsed_req); + test_assert(!err_msg); + test_memeq(parsed_req->pk, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + test_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext); + test_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext_len > 0); + + /* Do decryption */ + r = rend_service_decrypt_intro(parsed_req, k, &err_msg); + test_assert(!r); + test_assert(!err_msg); + test_assert(parsed_req->plaintext); + test_assert(parsed_req->plaintext_len > 0); + + done: + tor_free(cell); + crypto_pk_free(k); + rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req); + tor_free(err_msg); +} + +/** Early parsing test utility function + */ + +static void +do_early_parse_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len) +{ + crypto_pk_t *k = NULL; + int r; + uint8_t *cell = NULL; + size_t cell_len; + rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /* Get a key */ + k = crypto_pk_new(); + test_assert(k); + if (!k) goto done; + r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1, -1); + test_assert(!r); + if (r) goto done; + + /* Get digest for future comparison */ + r = crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest); + test_assert(r >= 0); + + /* Make a cell out of it */ + r = make_intro_from_plaintext( + plaintext, plaintext_len, + k, (void **)(&cell)); + test_assert(r > 0); + test_assert(cell); + if (!(cell && r > 0)) goto done; + cell_len = r; + + /* Do early parsing */ + parsed_req = rend_service_begin_parse_intro(cell, cell_len, 2, &err_msg); + test_assert(parsed_req); + test_memeq(parsed_req->pk, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + test_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext); + test_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext_len > 0); + + done: + tor_free(cell); + crypto_pk_free(k); + rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req); + tor_free(err_msg); +} + +/** Late parsing test utility function + */ + +static void +do_late_parse_test(uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len) +{ + crypto_pk_t *k = NULL; + int r; + uint8_t *cell = NULL; + size_t cell_len; + rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /* Get a key */ + k = crypto_pk_new(); + test_assert(k); + if (!k) goto done; + r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1, -1); + test_assert(!r); + if (r) goto done; + + /* Get digest for future comparison */ + r = crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest); + test_assert(r >= 0); + + /* Make a cell out of it */ + r = make_intro_from_plaintext( + plaintext, plaintext_len, + k, (void **)(&cell)); + test_assert(r > 0); + test_assert(cell); + if (!(cell && r > 0)) goto done; + cell_len = r; + + /* Do early parsing */ + parsed_req = rend_service_begin_parse_intro(cell, cell_len, 2, &err_msg); + test_assert(parsed_req); + test_assert(!err_msg); + test_memeq(parsed_req->pk, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + test_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext); + test_assert(parsed_req->ciphertext_len > 0); + + /* Do decryption */ + r = rend_service_decrypt_intro(parsed_req, k, &err_msg); + test_assert(!r); + test_assert(!err_msg); + test_assert(parsed_req->plaintext); + test_assert(parsed_req->plaintext_len > 0); + + /* Do late parsing */ + r = rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(parsed_req, &err_msg); + test_assert(!r); + test_assert(!err_msg); + test_assert(parsed_req->parsed); + + done: + tor_free(cell); + crypto_pk_free(k); + rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req); + tor_free(err_msg); +} + +/** Given the plaintext of the encrypted part of an INTRODUCE1/2 and a key, + * construct the encrypted cell for testing. + */ + +static ssize_t +make_intro_from_plaintext( + void *buf, size_t len, crypto_pk_t *key, void **cell_out) +{ + char *cell = NULL; + ssize_t cell_len = -1, r; + /* Assemble key digest and ciphertext, then construct the cell */ + ssize_t ciphertext_size; + + if (!(buf && key && len > 0 && cell_out)) goto done; + + /* + * Figure out an upper bound on how big the ciphertext will be + * (see crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt()) + */ + ciphertext_size = PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD; + ciphertext_size += crypto_pk_keysize(key); + ciphertext_size += CIPHER_KEY_LEN; + ciphertext_size += len; + + /* + * Allocate space for the cell + */ + cell = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN + ciphertext_size); + + /* Compute key digest (will be first DIGEST_LEN octets of cell) */ + r = crypto_pk_get_digest(key, cell); + test_assert(r >= 0); + + /* Do encryption */ + r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt( + key, cell + DIGEST_LEN, ciphertext_size, + buf, len, + PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0); + test_assert(r >= 0); + + /* Figure out cell length */ + cell_len = DIGEST_LEN + r; + + /* Output the cell */ + *cell_out = cell; + + done: + return cell_len; +} + +/** Test v0 INTRODUCE2 parsing through decryption only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_decrypt_v0(void) +{ + do_decrypt_test(v0_test_plaintext, sizeof(v0_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v1 INTRODUCE2 parsing through decryption only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_decrypt_v1(void) +{ + do_decrypt_test(v1_test_plaintext, sizeof(v1_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v2 INTRODUCE2 parsing through decryption only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_decrypt_v2(void) +{ + do_decrypt_test(v2_test_plaintext, sizeof(v2_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v3 INTRODUCE2 parsing through decryption only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_decrypt_v3(void) +{ + do_decrypt_test( + v3_no_auth_test_plaintext, sizeof(v3_no_auth_test_plaintext)); + do_decrypt_test( + v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext, sizeof(v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v0 INTRODUCE2 parsing through early parsing only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_early_parse_v0(void) +{ + do_early_parse_test(v0_test_plaintext, sizeof(v0_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v1 INTRODUCE2 parsing through early parsing only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_early_parse_v1(void) +{ + do_early_parse_test(v1_test_plaintext, sizeof(v1_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v2 INTRODUCE2 parsing through early parsing only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_early_parse_v2(void) +{ + do_early_parse_test(v2_test_plaintext, sizeof(v2_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v3 INTRODUCE2 parsing through early parsing only + */ + +static void +test_introduce_early_parse_v3(void) +{ + do_early_parse_test( + v3_no_auth_test_plaintext, sizeof(v3_no_auth_test_plaintext)); + do_early_parse_test( + v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext, sizeof(v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v0 INTRODUCE2 parsing + */ + +static void +test_introduce_late_parse_v0(void) +{ + do_late_parse_test(v0_test_plaintext, sizeof(v0_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v1 INTRODUCE2 parsing + */ + +static void +test_introduce_late_parse_v1(void) +{ + do_late_parse_test(v1_test_plaintext, sizeof(v1_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v2 INTRODUCE2 parsing + */ + +static void +test_introduce_late_parse_v2(void) +{ + do_late_parse_test(v2_test_plaintext, sizeof(v2_test_plaintext)); +} + +/** Test v3 INTRODUCE2 parsing + */ + +static void +test_introduce_late_parse_v3(void) +{ + do_late_parse_test( + v3_no_auth_test_plaintext, sizeof(v3_no_auth_test_plaintext)); + do_late_parse_test( + v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext, sizeof(v3_basic_auth_test_plaintext)); +} + +#define INTRODUCE_LEGACY(name) \ + { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_introduce_ ## name } + +struct testcase_t introduce_tests[] = { + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(early_parse_v0), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(early_parse_v1), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(early_parse_v2), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(early_parse_v3), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(decrypt_v0), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(decrypt_v1), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(decrypt_v2), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(decrypt_v3), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(late_parse_v0), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(late_parse_v1), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(late_parse_v2), + INTRODUCE_LEGACY(late_parse_v3), + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; +

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug6177_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 Jul '12

31 Jul '12

commit d4e2ccc387bbcc2184ae027fa0fccc897a9f51c3 Merge: 43b8132 0e35e92 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 31 17:09:47 2012 -0400 Merge branch 'bug6177_squashed' changes/bug6177 | 5 + src/or/Makefile.am | 2 + src/or/or.h | 16 +- src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- src/or/rendservice.c | 1254 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/or/rendservice.h | 73 +++ src/or/replaycache.c | 215 ++++++++ src/or/replaycache.h | 66 +++ src/test/Makefile.am | 2 + src/test/test.c | 4 + src/test/test_introduce.c | 528 +++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_replay.c | 184 +++++++ 12 files changed, 2101 insertions(+), 250 deletions(-)

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