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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 05 Nov '12

05 Nov '12

commit 1f43224453447cd01786c03df3f5dfe52418e149 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 5 01:45:08 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-es/strings.xml | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index 3b018b3..7cbc857 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -126,42 +126,42 @@ <string name="pref_select_apps_summary">Escoja las aplicaciones a redirigir través de Tor </string> <string name="pref_node_configuration">Configuración de Nodos </string> <string name="pref_node_configuration_summary">¡Estas son configuraciones avanzadas que pueden reducir su anonimato! Afectan a las rutas del tráfico propio que envíe a través de Tor, si repite tráfico ajeno estas configuraciones no afectan a esos circuitos. </string> - <string name="pref_entrance_node">Nodos de Entrada (a la red Tor) </string> - <string name="pref_entrance_node_summary">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y rangos de direcciones) para el primer salto. Prevalecen las configuraciones de exclusión de nodos y las de bridges.</string> + <string name="pref_entrance_node">Nodos de Entrada </string> + <string name="pref_entrance_node_summary">Reglas de identificación de nodos, fingerprints (descriptores de nodo), nicks (alias), códigos de país y rangos de direcciones, para el primer salto. Prevalecen las configuraciones de exclusión de nodos y las de bridges.</string> <string name="pref_entrance_node_dialog">Introduzca reglas para nodos de entrada </string>  <string name="pref_proxy_title">Proxy al Exterior (outbound) en la Red </string> - <string name="pref_proxy_type_title">Tipo de Proxy Saliente (a internet, no a Tor) </string> - <string name="pref_proxy_type_summary">Protocolo a usar para el servidor proxy saliente: HTTP, HTTPS, SOCKS4, SOCKS5 </string> + <string name="pref_proxy_type_title">Tipo de Proxy Saliente</string> + <string name="pref_proxy_type_summary">Protocolo a usar para el servidor proxy saliente (si su conexión sale a internet por proxy): HTTP, HTTPS, SOCKS4, SOCKS5 </string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_dialog">Introduzca tipo de proxy</string> <string name="pref_proxy_host_title">Servidor Proxy Saliente</string> - <string name="pref_proxy_host_summary">Nombre del servidor proxy saliente (a internet, no a Tor) </string> + <string name="pref_proxy_host_summary">Nombre del servidor proxy saliente (si su conexión sale a internet por proxy) </string> <string name="pref_proxy_host_dialog">Introduzca la dirección del proxy </string> <string name="pref_proxy_port_title">Puerto del Proxy Saliente </string> - <string name="pref_proxy_port_summary">Puerto del servidor proxy saliente (a internet, no a Tor) </string> + <string name="pref_proxy_port_summary">Puerto del servidor proxy saliente (si su conexión sale a internet por proxy) </string> <string name="pref_proxy_port_dialog">Introduzca el puerto del proxy </string> <string name="status">Estado </string> <string name="setting_up_full_transparent_proxying_">Estableciendo proxyficación transparente completa... </string> <string name="setting_up_app_based_transparent_proxying_">Estableciendo proxyficación transparente por aplicaciones... </string> <string name="transparent_proxying_enabled">Proxyficación transparente ACTIVADA </string> - <string name="transproxy_enabled_for_tethering_">¡TransProxy habilitado para Tethering! (pasarela a internet para otros dispositivos) </string> + <string name="transproxy_enabled_for_tethering_">¡TransProxy habilitado para Tethering (pasarela a internet para otros dispositivos)! </string> <string name="warning_error_starting_transparent_proxying_">ADVERTENCIA: ¡Error al iniciar la proxyficación transparente! </string> <string name="transproxy_rules_cleared">Reglas de TransProxy borradas </string> <string name="couldn_t_start_tor_process_">No se pudo iniciar el proceso Tor: </string> <string name="privoxy_is_running_on_port_">Privoxy se está ejecutando en el puerto: </string> <string name="setting_up_port_based_transparent_proxying_">Estableciendo proxyficación transparente por puertos... </string> - <string name="bridge_error">Error de Bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor) </string> + <string name="bridge_error">Error de Bridge </string> <string name="bridge_requires_ip">Para utilizar la funcion bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor), debe introducir al menos una dirección IP de bridge. </string> <string name="send_email_for_bridges">Envie un correo a bridges(a)torproject.org sólo con el texto \"get bridges\" en el cuerpo del mensaje, desde una cuenta de gmail. </string> <string name="error">Error </string> <string name="your_reachableaddresses_settings_caused_an_exception_">¡Su configuración ReachableAdresses (direcciones alcanzables) ha producido una excepción! </string> <string name="your_relay_settings_caused_an_exception_">¡Su configuración de repetidor de tráfico (relay) ha producido una excepción! </string> - <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida (de la red Tor) </string> - <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> + <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida </string> + <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos, fingerprints (descriptores de nodo), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones, para el último salto (de la red Tor) </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor) </string> - <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Si se aplican prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada.</string> + <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (descriptores de nodo), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Si se aplican prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada.</string> <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír </string> <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación) </string> <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes">Usar *sólo* estos nodos especificados </string>

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[torspec/master] simple fixes to proposal 202
by arma＠torproject.org 05 Nov '12

05 Nov '12

commit b07f2d53cba33a6b2efed5904e5874b767a5406a Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 18:28:50 2012 -0500 simple fixes to proposal 202 --- proposals/202-improved-relay-crypto.txt | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/202-improved-relay-crypto.txt b/proposals/202-improved-relay-crypto.txt index dafafdd..695df30 100644 --- a/proposals/202-improved-relay-crypto.txt +++ b/proposals/202-improved-relay-crypto.txt @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Overview: * It permits tagging attacks. Because AES_CTR is an XOR-based stream cipher, an adversary who controls the first node in a circuit can XOR anything he likes into the relay cell, and - then see whether he/she encounters an correspondingly + then see whether he/she encounters a correspondingly defaced cell at some exit that he also controls. That is, the attacker picks some pattern P, and when he @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ Overview: This approach is also simple and (given good parameter choices) can achieve our goals. The trickiest part is the algorithm that - clients must follow to package cells, but that's no so bad. + clients must follow to package cells, but that's not so bad. It's not necessary to check MACs on inbound traffic, because nobody but the client can tell scrambled messages from good ones, @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ Overview: tweak with each cell (possibly based on the unused portion of the MAC). - This protocol does support loose source routing, so long as the + This protocol does support loose source routing, so long as no padding bytes are added by any router-added nodes. In a circuit, every node has at least one relay cell sent to it:

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[torspec/master] reindex
by arma＠torproject.org 05 Nov '12

05 Nov '12

commit 45e20fab4737865fa3ea5a642b8a5dcff7557371 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 18:29:15 2012 -0500 reindex --- proposals/000-index.txt | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index 02c88be..a23c412 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -129,11 +129,11 @@ Proposals by number: 206 Preconfigured directory sources for bootstrapping [OPEN] 207 Directory guards [OPEN] 208 IPv6 Exits Redux [OPEN] -209 Limit reported bandwidth of unmeasured nodes [OPEN] 209 Tuning the Parameters for the Path Bias Defense [OPEN] 210 Faster Headless Consensus Bootstrapping [OPEN] 211 Internal Mapaddress for Tor Configuration Testing [OPEN] 212 Increase Acceptable Consensus Age [OPEN] +213 Remove stream-level sendmes from the design [OPEN] Proposals by status: @@ -179,11 +179,11 @@ Proposals by status: 206 Preconfigured directory sources for bootstrapping [for 0.2.4.x] 207 Directory guards [for 0.2.4.x] 208 IPv6 Exits Redux [for 0.2.4.x] - 209 Limit reported bandwidth of unmeasured nodes [for 0.2.4.x] 209 Tuning the Parameters for the Path Bias Defense [for 0.2.4.x+] 210 Faster Headless Consensus Bootstrapping [for 0.2.4.x+] 211 Internal Mapaddress for Tor Configuration Testing [for 0.2.4.x+] 212 Increase Acceptable Consensus Age [for 0.2.4.x+] + 213 Remove stream-level sendmes from the design ACCEPTED: 117 IPv6 exits [for 0.2.4.x] 140 Provide diffs between consensuses

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[torspec/master] add proposal 213 (remove stream-level sendmes from the design)
by arma＠torproject.org 05 Nov '12

05 Nov '12

commit 6af9a2d4b4d6f6f1283d2049b4e9145bca9d1f3f Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 18:29:03 2012 -0500 add proposal 213 (remove stream-level sendmes from the design) --- proposals/213-remove-stream-sendmes.txt | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/213-remove-stream-sendmes.txt b/proposals/213-remove-stream-sendmes.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8d517d --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/213-remove-stream-sendmes.txt @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +Filename: 213-remove-stream-sendmes.txt +Title: Remove stream-level sendmes from the design +Author: Roger Dingledine +Created: 4-Nov-2012 +Status: Open + +1. Motivation + + Tor uses circuit-level sendme cells to handle congestion / flow + fairness at the circuit level, but it has a second stream-level + flow/congestion/fairness layer under that to share a given circuit + between multiple streams. + + The circuit-level flow control, or something like it, is needed + because different users are competing for the same resources. But the + stream-level flow control has a different threat model, since all the + streams belong to the same user. + + When the circuit has only one active stream, the downsides are a) + that we waste 2% of our bandwidth sending stream-level sendmes, and b) + because of the circuit-level and stream-level window parameters we + picked, we end up sending only half the cells we might otherwise send. + + When the circuit has two active streams, they each get to send 500 + cells for their window, because the circuit window is 1000. We still + spend the 2% overhead. + + When the circuit has three or more active streams, they're all typically + limited by the circuit window, since the stream-level window won't + kick in. We still spend the 2% overhead though. And depending on their + sending pattern, we could experience cases where a given stream might + be able to send more data on the circuit, but it chooses not to because + its stream-level window is empty. + + More generally, we don't have a good handle on the interactions between + all the layers of congestion control in Tor. It would behoove us to + simplify in the case where we're not clear on what it buys us. + +2. Design + + We should strip all aspects of this stream-level flow control from + the Tor design and code. + +2.1. But doesn't having a lower stream window than circuit window save + room for new streams? + + It could be that a feature of the stream window is that there's always + space in the circuit window for another begin cell, so new streams + will open faster than otherwise. But first, if there are two or more + active streams going, there won't be any extra space. Second, since + begin cells are client-to-exit, and typical circuits don't fill their + outbound circuit windows very often anyway, and also since we're hoping + to move to a world where we isolate more activities between circuits, + I'm not inclined to worry much about losing this maybe-feature. + + See also proposal 168, "reduce default circuit window" -- it's + interesting to note that proposal 168 was unknowingly dabbling in + exactly this question, since reducing the default circuit window to + 500 or less made stream windows moot. It might be worth resurrecting + the proposal 168 experiments once this proposal is implemented. + +2.2. If we dump stream windows, we're effectively doubling them. + + Right now the circuit window starts at 1000, and the stream window + starts at 500. So if we just rip out stream windows, we'll effectively + change the stream window default to 1000, doubling the amount of data + in flight and potentially clogging up the network more. + + We could either live with that, or we could change the default circuit + window to 500 (which is easy to do even in a backward compatible way, + since the edge connection can simply choose to not send as many cells). + +3. Evaluation + + It would be wise to have some plan for making sure we didn't screw + up the network too much with this change. The main trouble there is + that torperf et al only do one stream at a time, so we really have no + good baseline, or measurement tools, to capture network performance + for multiple parallel streams. + + Maybe we should resolve task 7168 before the transition, so we're + more prepared. + +4. Transition + + Option one is to do a two-phase transition. In the first phase, + edges stop enforcing the deliver window (i.e. stop closing circuits + when the stream deliver goes negative, but otherwise they send and + receive stream-level sendmes as now). In the second phase (once all + old versions are gone), we can start disobeying the deliver window, + and also stop sending stream-level sendmes back. + + That approach takes a while before it will matter. As an optimization, + since clients can know which relay versions support the new behavior, + we could have relays interpret violating the deliver window as signaling + support for removed stream-level sendmes: the relay would then stop + sending or expecting sendmes. That optimization is somewhat klunky + though, first because web-browsing clients don't generally finish out + a stream window in the upstream direction (so the klunky trick will + probably never happen by accident), and second because if we lower + the circuit window to 500 (see Sec 2.2), there's now no way to violate + stream deliver windows. + + Option two is to introduce another relay cell type, which the client + sends before opening any streams to let the other side know that + it shouldn't use or expect stream-level sendmes. A variation here + is to extend either the create cell or the begin cell (ha -- and they + thought I was crazy when I included the explicit \0 at the end of the + current begin cell payload), so we can specify our circuit preferences + without any extra overhead. + + Option three is to wait until we switch to a new circuit protocol + (e.g. when we move to ntor or ace), and use that as the signal to + drop stream-level sendmes from the design. And hey, if we're lucky, + by then we'll have sorted out the n23 questions (see ticket 4506) + and we might be dumping circuit-level sendmes at that point too. + + Options two or three seem way better than option one. + + And since it's not super-urgent, I suggest we hold off on option two + to see if option three makes sense. +

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[translation/orbot_completed] Update translations for orbot_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Nov '12

04 Nov '12

commit 8850d2a3d2cff4618d989c34b3164e24467df25b Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 21:45:11 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot_completed --- values-es/strings.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index ccdcd23..3b018b3 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor) </string> - <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada (si se aplican). </string> + <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Si se aplican prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada.</string> <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír </string> <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación) </string> <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes">Usar *sólo* estos nodos especificados </string>

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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Nov '12

04 Nov '12

commit 1e1d20c5f5cf8bdac66db9f18e441b12b0e88c5d Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 21:45:09 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-es/strings.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index ccdcd23..3b018b3 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor) </string> - <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada (si se aplican). </string> + <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Si se aplican prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada.</string> <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír </string> <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación) </string> <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes">Usar *sólo* estos nodos especificados </string>

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[translation/orbot_completed] Update translations for orbot_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Nov '12

04 Nov '12

commit 4b2beba782ab6d1320645a7a44b26a5a3725299d Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 21:15:12 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot_completed --- values-es/strings.xml | 14 +++++++------- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index 8bb50d4..ccdcd23 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ <string name="couldn_t_start_tor_process_">No se pudo iniciar el proceso Tor: </string> <string name="privoxy_is_running_on_port_">Privoxy se está ejecutando en el puerto: </string> <string name="setting_up_port_based_transparent_proxying_">Estableciendo proxyficación transparente por puertos... </string> - <string name="bridge_error">Error de Bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor)</string> + <string name="bridge_error">Error de Bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor) </string> <string name="bridge_requires_ip">Para utilizar la funcion bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor), debe introducir al menos una dirección IP de bridge. </string> <string name="send_email_for_bridges">Envie un correo a bridges(a)torproject.org sólo con el texto \"get bridges\" en el cuerpo del mensaje, desde una cuenta de gmail. </string> <string name="error">Error </string> @@ -160,17 +160,17 @@ <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida (de la red Tor) </string> <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> - <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor)</string> - <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír, siempre que sea posible sin fallos de comunicación. Prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada (si se aplican).</string> - <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír</string> - <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación)</string> + <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor) </string> + <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada (si se aplican). </string> + <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír </string> + <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación) </string> <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes">Usar *sólo* estos nodos especificados </string> <string name="bridges">Bridges (puentes en sombra con la red Tor) </string> <string name="use_bridges">Utilizar bridges (prevalece sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada) </string> <string name="bridges_obfuscated">Bridges (puentes entre subredes) ofuscados </string> - <string name="enable_alternate_entrance_nodes_into_the_tor_network">Habilitar nodos alternativos de entrada en la red Tor </string> + <string name="enable_alternate_entrance_nodes_into_the_tor_network">Habilita nodos alternativos de entrada en la red Tor </string> <string name="enable_if_configured_bridges_are_obfuscated_bridges">Habilitar si los bridges configurados están ofuscados </string> - <string name="ip_address_and_port_of_bridges">Direcciones IP y puertos de los bridges (puentes en sombra con la red Tor) </string> + <string name="ip_address_and_port_of_bridges">Direcciones IP y puertos de los bridges </string> <string name="enter_bridge_addresses">Introduzca direcciones de bridge </string> <string name="relays">Repetidores de Tráfico (Relays)</string> <string name="relaying">Repitiendo tráfico </string>

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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Nov '12

04 Nov '12

commit df56e1c1541ca47cef8bd4ae4373a2d52205dec4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 21:15:10 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-es/strings.xml | 14 +++++++------- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index 8bb50d4..ccdcd23 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ <string name="couldn_t_start_tor_process_">No se pudo iniciar el proceso Tor: </string> <string name="privoxy_is_running_on_port_">Privoxy se está ejecutando en el puerto: </string> <string name="setting_up_port_based_transparent_proxying_">Estableciendo proxyficación transparente por puertos... </string> - <string name="bridge_error">Error de Bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor)</string> + <string name="bridge_error">Error de Bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor) </string> <string name="bridge_requires_ip">Para utilizar la funcion bridge (puente en sombra con la red Tor), debe introducir al menos una dirección IP de bridge. </string> <string name="send_email_for_bridges">Envie un correo a bridges(a)torproject.org sólo con el texto \"get bridges\" en el cuerpo del mensaje, desde una cuenta de gmail. </string> <string name="error">Error </string> @@ -160,17 +160,17 @@ <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida (de la red Tor) </string> <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> - <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor)</string> - <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír, siempre que sea posible sin fallos de comunicación. Prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada (si se aplican).</string> - <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír</string> - <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación)</string> + <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor) </string> + <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) a excluír excepto si provocan fallos de comunicación. Prevalecen sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada (si se aplican). </string> + <string name="enter_exclude_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos a excluír </string> + <string name="strict_nodes">Hacer Estricta la Exclusión de Nodos (incluso si hay fallos de comunicación) </string> <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes">Usar *sólo* estos nodos especificados </string> <string name="bridges">Bridges (puentes en sombra con la red Tor) </string> <string name="use_bridges">Utilizar bridges (prevalece sobre la configuración de nodos de entrada) </string> <string name="bridges_obfuscated">Bridges (puentes entre subredes) ofuscados </string> - <string name="enable_alternate_entrance_nodes_into_the_tor_network">Habilitar nodos alternativos de entrada en la red Tor </string> + <string name="enable_alternate_entrance_nodes_into_the_tor_network">Habilita nodos alternativos de entrada en la red Tor </string> <string name="enable_if_configured_bridges_are_obfuscated_bridges">Habilitar si los bridges configurados están ofuscados </string> - <string name="ip_address_and_port_of_bridges">Direcciones IP y puertos de los bridges (puentes en sombra con la red Tor) </string> + <string name="ip_address_and_port_of_bridges">Direcciones IP y puertos de los bridges </string> <string name="enter_bridge_addresses">Introduzca direcciones de bridge </string> <string name="relays">Repetidores de Tráfico (Relays)</string> <string name="relaying">Repitiendo tráfico </string>

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[translation/orbot_completed] Update translations for orbot_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Nov '12

04 Nov '12

commit 7f3b72885abe13c463e6905192463295a7852428 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 20:45:11 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot_completed --- values-es/strings.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index c8e629d..8bb50d4 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ <string name="error">Error </string> <string name="your_reachableaddresses_settings_caused_an_exception_">¡Su configuración ReachableAdresses (direcciones alcanzables) ha producido una excepción! </string> <string name="your_relay_settings_caused_an_exception_">¡Su configuración de repetidor de tráfico (relay) ha producido una excepción! </string> - <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida</string> + <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida (de la red Tor) </string> <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor)</string>

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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 04 Nov '12

04 Nov '12

commit f53830049e764c0a7dfccf99dc4890f338bddbb9 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 20:45:08 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-es/strings.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-es/strings.xml b/values-es/strings.xml index c8e629d..8bb50d4 100644 --- a/values-es/strings.xml +++ b/values-es/strings.xml @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ <string name="error">Error </string> <string name="your_reachableaddresses_settings_caused_an_exception_">¡Su configuración ReachableAdresses (direcciones alcanzables) ha producido una excepción! </string> <string name="your_relay_settings_caused_an_exception_">¡Su configuración de repetidor de tráfico (relay) ha producido una excepción! </string> - <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida</string> + <string name="exit_nodes">Nodos de Salida (de la red Tor) </string> <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_for_the_last_hop">Reglas de identificación de nodos (fingerprints (huellas digitales), nicks (alias), códigos de país y direcciones) para el último salto </string> <string name="enter_exit_nodes">Introduzca reglas para nodos de salida </string> <string name="exclude_nodes">Excluír Nodos (evitarlos en la red Tor)</string>

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