- tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor-design-2012/master] Quick pass to revise the rest of the tor-design section
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit f77b7a6e255319c259daf0d060444d2909fd8d3e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 01:13:57 2012 -0500 Quick pass to revise the rest of the tor-design section --- tor-design-2012.tex | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 38a6eed..43cf08b 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1140,8 +1140,11 @@ reply to notify the application of its success. The OP now accepts data from the application's TCP stream, packaging it into \emph{relay data} cells and sending those cells along the circuit to the chosen OR. -% Mention the optimistic data extension: clients can send data before getting -% a relay_connected cell. -NM + +(As an optimization, to avoid a round-trip while waiting for a +connected reply, clients may send data immediately after the +connected cell. The need to be ready to send the same data to +another stream, though, if no connected cell arrives.) There's a catch to using SOCKS, however---some applications pass the alphanumeric hostname to the Tor client, while others @@ -1153,8 +1156,6 @@ resolved at the far end. Common applications like Firefox and SSH need to be configured to use SOCKS4A or SOCKS5 (with the option to send hostnames rather than IP address) to avoid this vulnerability. -% No longer true wrt mozilla and SSH. -NM -% Believed done -SJM With Firefox, the Torbutton add-on ensures that the browser sends requests via Tor by configuring Firefox to correctly use a @@ -1177,12 +1178,10 @@ Other applications, which can be configured to use SOCKS (and send the proxy a hostname rather than IP address), may be connected directly to Tor. Other options available are to intercept calls to the resolver and sockets libraries with -\emph{torsocks} or to use a firewall (Tor supports BSD and -Linux's in-built firewall) to intercept outgoing DNS requests +\emph{torsocks} or to use an operating system firewall's transparent +port-forwarding mechanism (Tor supports BSD and +Linux's in-built port-forwarding) to intercept outgoing DNS requests and TCP connections, sending them via Tor. -% We don't recommend privoxy any more. Proxies are one solution though. But -% for web, we think you need a custom browser. -NM -% Believed done -SJM Closing a Tor stream is analogous to closing a TCP stream: it uses a two-step handshake for normal operation, or a one-step @@ -1216,8 +1215,8 @@ modify data. Addressing the insider malleability attack, however, is more complex. We could do integrity checking of the relay cells at each hop, -either by including hashes or by using an authenticating cipher -mode like EAX~\cite{eax}, but there are some problems. First, +either by including MACs or by using an authenticating cipher +mode like GCM~\cite{gcm}, but there are some problems. First, these approaches impose a message-expansion overhead at each hop, and so we would have to either leak the path length or waste bytes by padding to a maximum path length. Second, these @@ -1228,10 +1227,6 @@ session keys. Third, we have already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks; so tagging attacks performed within the circuit provide no additional information to the attacker. -% This "no additional information to the attacker" claim is less great than -% it might have seemed in 2004. We're looking towards wide-block approaches -% here instead. Also we should really not cite EAX and hashes but probably -% GCM and MACs as the likelier alternatives. -NM Thus, we check integrity only at the edges of each stream. (Remember that in our leaky-pipe circuit topology, a @@ -1244,8 +1239,6 @@ cells they create, and include with each relay cell the first four bytes of the current digest. Each also keeps a SHA-1 digest of data received, to verify that the received hashes are correct. -% Mention that sha-1 is showing its age, and we're moving away from it in our -% next relay protocol. -NM To be sure of removing or modifying a cell, the attacker must be able to deduce the current digest state (which depends on all @@ -1260,6 +1253,17 @@ overhead; the chance that an adversary will correctly guess a valid hash is acceptably low, given that the OP or OR tear down the circuit if they receive a bad hash. +This approach has, however, appeared less robust than we hoped; +while tagging attacks don't provide more information than an +end-to-end attacker could get through passive correlation attacks, +they succeed more quickly. Even that isn't such a big deal, were +it not for a class of attacks that become possible if an attacker +can detect non-corelatable circuits early and kill them (see +\ref{???XXXsomewhere-in-attacks-and-defenses}). We are therefore looking +into improved constructions for integrity, especially ones based +on wide-block ciphers. We hope to also take the opportunity to +move the authentication mechanism away from the moribund SHA-1. + \subsection{Rate limiting and fairness} \label{subsec:rate-limit} @@ -1348,9 +1352,10 @@ cell only when the number of bytes pending to be flushed is under some threshold (currently 10 cells' worth). % I don't believe that the numbers are 1000 and 100 any more. Must check -NM -These arbitrarily chosen parameters seem to give tolerable -throughput and delay; see Section~\ref{sec:in-the-wild}. -% The above paragraph has not held up over time -NM +These arbitrarily chosen parameters give tolerable but not great +throughput and delay; see Section~\ref{sec:in-the-wild}. See also +Section~\ref{????:how-to-really-ratelim} for discussion of future +work directions on the topic. \section{Rendezvous Points and hidden services} \label{sec:rendezvous} @@ -1405,9 +1410,6 @@ community finds objectionable, or if Bob's service tends to get attacked by network vandals). The extra level of indirection also allows Bob to respond to some requests and ignore others. -% Mention that the list of introduction points can now be encrypted. -NM -% Mention user authentication? -NM -% Believed done -SJM \subsection{Rendezvous points in Tor} @@ -1481,7 +1483,7 @@ points available. Bob could also give secret public keys for consulting the lookup service. All of these approaches limit exposure even when some selected users collude in the DoS\@. -% Thiss whole section is dated in ways I don't know off the top of my head. +% Thiss whole section may be dated in ways I don't know off the top of my head. % Gotta review the protocol revisions over the years. -NM @@ -1501,15 +1503,12 @@ remains a SOCKS proxy. We encode all of the necessary information into the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) Alice uses when establishing her connection. Location-hidden services use a virtual top level domain called {\tt .onion}: thus -hostnames take the form {\tt x.y.onion} where {\tt x} is the -authorization cookie and {\tt y} encodes the hash of the public +hostnames take the form {\tt y.onion} where +\tt y} encodes the hash of the public key. Alice's onion proxy examines addresses; if they're destined for a hidden server, it decodes the key and starts the rendezvous as described above. -% Authorization cookies never got built, right? it turns out that -% ``x.y.onion'' as a format for conveying them is a bad idea, due to the -% referer headers and stuff like that -NM \subsection{Previous rendezvous work}

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[tor-design-2012/master] add a bit more about the control protocol
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit d69a468a07322588d60820c3e5752be05d97cdbc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 01:04:09 2012 -0500 add a bit more about the control protocol --- todo | 4 ++-- tor-design-2012.tex | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index da35f25..aab4d6a 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ ITEMS: o Bandwidth authorities o Path selection rules o stream isolation - . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] + o Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls X rise and fall of .exit - . controller protocol + o controller protocol o torbutton o tor browser bundle diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 69c04a6..38a6eed 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1826,6 +1826,37 @@ caches,'' and periodically fetch network consensus documents; clients can contact a cache instead, once they know who the caches are. +\subsection{The Tor controller protocol} + +Tor has always had a minimalist user interface---it can be +configured on the command line or a configuration file and sends +output to a log file. This was fine for advanced users, but most +users will prefer a GUI. Building a GUI into Tor would be +difficult, and would force certain choices (e.g. GUI toolkit) to +be made which might not suit all users and all +platforms. Therefore Tor includes an interface for other programs to +communicate with the Tor daemon, extracting information to display +on the GUI and changing the Tor configuration based on user +actions. This interface is an ASCII-based protocol, implemented +over a local socket, to allow another program to control Tor. + +The control protocol has also proven useful to researchers +experimenting with Tor. Initially the functionality exposed in the +control protocol was simply that exposed by the configuration file +and log files. Providing status information in a specified and +machine-readable format made the task of monitoring and +controlling Tor easier. Later, functionality was added to the +control protocol which should not be exposed to ordinary Tor users +but is useful to researchers, such as allowing controllers to +arbitrarily control the path selection process. + +To prevent arbitrary local processes from changing Tor's +configuration to make it less secure, the control protocol +provides authentication mechanisms so that only authorized local +processes (ones that can read an appropriate file on the +filesystem, or that know an appropriate passord) can connect to +the controller port. + \section{Attacks and Defenses} \label{sec:attacks}

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r25887: {website} Adding project to update tor's documentation Project idea by (website/trunk/getinvolved/en)
by Damian Johnson 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

Author: atagar Date: 2012-11-14 05:50:42 +0000 (Wed, 14 Nov 2012) New Revision: 25887 Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml Log: Adding project to update tor's documentation Project idea by Runa. Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-14 05:44:16 UTC (rev 25886) +++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-14 05:50:42 UTC (rev 25887) @@ -1014,6 +1014,27 @@ </li> + <a id="docUpdate"></a> + <li> + Website and video documentation update + + Priority: High + + Effort Level: Medium + + Skill Level: Medium + + Likely Mentors: Runa, Karen + + Identify outdated and/or weak pages on torproject.org and re-write the + documentation to appeal to a less technical, more goal-oriented + audience. Create a number of 3-5 minute videos with graphically + portray the written documentation. See + <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?component=Website&status=new">the + website tickets</a> for more information and a starting point. + + </li> + <a id="torCleanup"></a> <li> Tor Codebase Cleanup

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[tor-design-2012/master] Integrate path selection material from the blog posts
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 7b05ef4dbef55f73ba9e87caf8a9e5a090cf2c31 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 00:46:50 2012 -0500 Integrate path selection material from the blog posts --- todo | 10 ++---- tor-design-2012.tex | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index 489ae86..da35f25 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ ITEMS: o Improved authorization model for hidden services o Faster first-hop circuit establishment with CREATE_FAST o Cell queueing and scheduling. - . Integrate content from the second blog post [steven] + o Integrate content from the second blog post [steven] o guard nodes o Bridges, censorship resistance, and pluggable transports - - Changes and complexities in our path selection algorithms - - Bandwidth authorities - - Path selection rules + o Changes and complexities in our path selection algorithms + o Bandwidth authorities + o Path selection rules o stream isolation . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ ITEMS: o Revise "other design decisions" [nick] - - CAN DO AFTER SPONSOR DEADLINE: - Revise related work [steven] - Revise "attacks and defenses" [steven] diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index bb856e7..ebe39e8 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -996,6 +996,87 @@ attack~\cite{freedom21-security} is weakened. % We never made any support for the above; when a node goes down, the % circuits through it get destroyed. (Check that.) -NM +\subsection{Choosing nodes for circuits} + +Early onion routing designs assumed a set of uniform nodes, from +which clients would therefore choose uniformly at random. But this +approach creates terrible bandwidth bottlenecks: a server that would +allow 10x as many bytes per second as another would still get the +same number of circuits constructed through it, leading to +overloaded low-capacity relays and underutilized high-capacity +bandwidth. + +Therefore, Tor now weights\footnote{In the original paper, we + imagined that we might take Morphmix's approach, and divide nodes + into "bandwidth classes", such that clients would choose only from + among nodes having at least the same approximate bandwidth as the + clients. This may be a good design for peer-to-peer anonymity + networks, but it doesn't seem to work for the Tor network: the + most useful high-capacity nodes have more capacity than nearly any + typical client.} +its choice of nodes by servers' bandwidths, so +that a server with more bandwidth gets more circuits, and therefore +(probabilistically) more of the traffic. + +Later, it proved that weighting by bandwidth was also suboptimal, +because of nonuniformity in path selection rules. Consider that if +node A is suitable for use at any point in a circuit, but node B is +suitable only as the middle node, then node A will be considered for +use three times as often as B. If the two nodes have equal +bandwidth, node A will be chosen three times as often, leading to it +being overloaded in comparison with B. So now +0.2.2.10-alpha, we moved to a more sophisticated approach, where +nodes are chosen proportionally to their bandwidth, as weighted by +an algorithm to optimize load-balancing between nodes of different +capabilities. + +Weighting by \emph{advertised} bandwidth would open the possibility +of an attacker trying to see a disproportionate number of +circuits---not by running an extra-high number of nodes---but by +claiming to have a very large bandwidth. + +For a while, Tor tried to limit the impact of this attack by limiting +the maximum bandwidth that a client would believe, so that a single +rogue node couldn't just claim to have infinite bandwidth. This +approach proved unuseful, since some real nodes did in fact have +very high bandwidth. + +But now, clients use \emph{measured} bandwidth values published in +the network status consensus document (see +section~\ref{what?XXX}). A subset of the authorities measure and +vote on nodes' observed bandwidth, to prevent misbehaving nodes from +claiming (intentionally or accidentally) to have too much capacity. + +\subsubection{Avoiding duplicate node families in the same circuit} + +As mentioned above, if the first and last node in a circuit are +controlled by an adversary, they can use traffic correlation attacks +to notice that the traffic entering the network at the first hop +matches traffic leaving the circuit at the last hop, and thereby +trace a client's activity with high probability. Research on +preventing this attack has not yet come up with any affordable, +effective defense suitable for use in a low-latency anonymity +network. Therefore, the most promising mitigation strategies seem to +involve lowering the attacker's chances of controlling both ends of +a circuit. + +To this end, clients do not use any two nodes in a circuit whose IP +addresses are in the same /16. (When we designed the network, it was +marginally more difficult to acquire a large number of disparate +addresses than it was to get a large number of concentrated +addresses. This approach is imperfect, but possibly better than +nothing. + +To allow honest node operators to run more than one server without +inadvertently giving themselves the chance to see more traffic than +they should, we also allow nodes to declare themselves to be members +of the same ``family,'' such that a client won't use two nodes in the +same family in the same circuit. (Clients only believe mutual family +declarations, so that an adversary can't capture routes by having +his nodes claim unilaterally to be in a family with every node the +adversary doesn't control.) + + \subsection{Opening and closing streams} \label{subsec:tcp}

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[tor-design-2012/master] integrate more of the guard nodes section
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 005d4af2af8e7af5888e7151f0dcd1892a24b014 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 00:50:25 2012 -0500 integrate more of the guard nodes section --- tor-design-2012.tex | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index ebe39e8..69c04a6 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1047,7 +1047,53 @@ section~\ref{what?XXX}). A subset of the authorities measure and vote on nodes' observed bandwidth, to prevent misbehaving nodes from claiming (intentionally or accidentally) to have too much capacity. -\subsubection{Avoiding duplicate node families in the same circuit} +\subsubsection{Guard nodes} + +We assume that if an +attacker controls or monitors the first hop and last hop of a +circuit, then the attacker can de-anonymize the user by correlating +timing and volume information. Many of the security improvements to +path selection discussed in this post concentrate on reducing the +probability that an attacker can be in this position, but no +reasonably efficient proposal can eliminate the possibility. + +Therefore, each time a user creates a circuit, there is a small +chance that the circuit will be compromised. However, most users +create a large number of Tor circuits, so with the original path +selection algorithm, these small chances would build up into a +large chance that at least one of their circuits would be +compromised. For users whose goal is to avoid having any of their +communications partners learned, having a fraction of their circuits +compromised is as unacceptable as having all of them compromised. + +To help improve this situation Tor uses Guard Nodes (initially +called "helper nodes", invented by Wright, Adler, Levine, and +Shields and proposed for use in Tor by Øverlier and Syverson). Each +Tor client picks a few Tor nodes to use persistently as its +"guards", and uses one of them as the first hop for all circuits (as +long as those nodes remain operational). + +This doesn't affect the probability that the first circuit is +compromised, but it does mean that if the guard nodes chosen by a +user are not attacker-controlled all their future circuits will be +safe. On the other hand, users who choose attacker-controlled guards +will have about $c/N$ of their circuits compromised, where $c$ is the +amount of attacker-controlled network resource and $N$ is the total +network resource. Without guard nodes every circuit has a $(c/N)^2$ +probability of being compromised. + +Essentially, the guard node approach recognises that some circuits +are going to be compromised, but it's better to increase your +probability of having no compromised circuits at the expense of also +increasing the proportion of your circuits that will be compromised +if any of them are. This is because compromising a fraction of a +user's circuits—sometimes even just one—can be enough to compromise +a user's anonymity. For users who have good guard nodes, the +situation is much better, and for users with bad guard nodes the +situation is not much worse than before. + + +\subsubsection{Avoiding duplicate node families in the same circuit} As mentioned above, if the first and last node in a circuit are controlled by an adversary, they can use traffic correlation attacks

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r25886: {website} Adding Compass project Project idea by gsathya to refactor c (website/trunk/getinvolved/en)
by Damian Johnson 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

Author: atagar Date: 2012-11-14 05:44:16 +0000 (Wed, 14 Nov 2012) New Revision: 25886 Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml Log: Adding Compass project Project idea by gsathya to refactor compass. Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-13 19:30:28 UTC (rev 25885) +++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2012-11-14 05:44:16 UTC (rev 25886) @@ -675,6 +675,11 @@ aggregates the Tor relays based on various attributes. + + Project Ideas: + <a href="#compassRefactoring">Compass Refactoring</a> + + <a id="project-weather"></a> <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Weather">Weather</a> (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a @@ -1145,6 +1150,32 @@ </ol> </li> + <a id="compassRefactoring"></a> + <li> + Compass Refactoring + + Priority: Medium + + Effort Level: Medium + + Skill Level: Medium + + Likely Mentors: gsathya, karsten + + Compass was first designed to be a cli app and then hacked into a web app. + The codebase needs to be refactored such that the main processing code is + separated from the display functions(probably into separate files) and made + modular so that adding more features (<a + href="https://trac.torproject.org/6612">#6612</a>) is easy. For example, the + main processing logic could be in compass.py, whereas print_groups() and other + display related functions could be part of a separate cli.py; web.py would also + have to modified to make use of this new modular code. Bonus points for adding + features to compass(<a href="https://trac.torproject.org/6619">#6619</a>, <a + href="https://trac.torproject.org/6612">#6612</a>, <a + href="https://trac.torproject.org/6728">#6728</a>). + + </li> + <!-- <a id="stemPathsupport"></a> <li>

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[tor-design-2012/master] Revise introduction lightly.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit c5ca54edcc25ff6761fcf45b07f06f4e0861d911 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 00:26:13 2012 -0500 Revise introduction lightly. --- todo | 9 +++++- tor-design-2012.tex | 74 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index af508bf..489ae86 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ ITEMS: o guard nodes o Bridges, censorship resistance, and pluggable transports - Changes and complexities in our path selection algorithms + - Bandwidth authorities + - Path selection rules o stream isolation . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls @@ -30,9 +32,9 @@ ITEMS: o torbutton o tor browser bundle - . Revise the abstract and introduction [nick] + o Revise the abstract and introduction [nick] o Abstract - - Introduction + o Introduction . Revise design goals and assumptions [steven] o Revise tor-design up to "opening and closing streams" [nick] @@ -40,6 +42,9 @@ ITEMS: o Revise hidden services section [nick] o Revise "other design decisions" [nick] + + + CAN DO AFTER SPONSOR DEADLINE: - Revise related work [steven] - Revise "attacks and defenses" [steven] diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 035bf0d..bb856e7 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -60,20 +60,11 @@ Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\ nickm(a)freehaven.net \and Paul Syverson \\ Naval Research Lab \\ syverson(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil} -% -% TOPICS TO ADD, NOT NOTED BELOW: -% - everything from the 'top changes in Tor' posts. -% - node reliability testing -% - path selection rules. -% - Stream isolation -% -% What else? -% - NM - \maketitle \thispagestyle{empty} \begin{abstract} +THIS IS A DRAFT. IT IS NOT FINISHED. We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the earlier design by adding @@ -103,6 +94,9 @@ anonymous communication. \section{Overview} \label{sec:intro} +THIS IS A DRAFT. IT IS NOT FINISHED. IT IS BASED ON THE 2004 PAPER, +WITH PARTIAL UPDATES. + Onion Routing is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize TCP-based applications like web browsing, secure shell, and instant messaging. Clients choose a path through the @@ -120,16 +114,11 @@ proof-of-concept that ran on a single machine. Even this simple deployment processed connections from over sixty thousand distinct IP addresses from all over the world at a rate of about fifty thousand per day. -% TODO: Describe more of Tor's history here. -NM Here we describe Tor, a protocol for asynchronous, -loosely federated onion routers that provides the following +loosely federated onion routers. Tor provides +provides the following improvements over the old Onion Routing design: -% TODO: Perhaps we should drop the entire enumeration of how Tor differs -% from old Onion Routing; we could instead rattle off a list of ways Tor has -% changed since 2004, or instead discuss major features of the design as a -% whole. - NM - \textbf{Perfect forward secrecy:} In the original Onion Routing design, a single hostile node could record traffic and later compromise successive nodes in the circuit and force them to @@ -163,17 +152,12 @@ ORs~\cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98}. Tradeoffs between padding protection and cost were discussed, and \emph{traffic shaping} algorithms were theorized~\cite{or-pet00} to provide good security without expensive padding, but no concrete padding -scheme was suggested. Recent research~\cite{econymics} and +scheme was suggested. As of our first writing, research~\cite{econymics} and deployment experience~\cite{freedom21-security} suggest that this level of resource use is not practical or economical; and even full link padding is still -vulnerable~\cite{defensive-dropping}. Thus, until we have a -proven and convenient design for traffic shaping or low-latency -mixing that improves anonymity against a realistic adversary, we -leave these strategies out. -% We still don't have a solution for the above. Our related work -% section should summarize what we have learned in the meantime. We -% *have* had good outcomes from work that tried to -NM +vulnerable~\cite{defensive-dropping}. This has not changed since +our first publication, though we remain hopeful. \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} Onion Routing originally built a separate circuit for each application-level @@ -193,8 +177,6 @@ exit the circuit from the middle---possibly frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit. (It also allows for long-range padding if future research shows this to be worthwhile.) -% This is still a notable feature of Tor, but we don't use it for -% anything. -NM \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches @@ -203,9 +185,8 @@ inter-node control communication and global views of traffic. Tor's decentralized congestion control uses end-to-end acks to maintain anonymity while allowing nodes at the edges of the network to detect congestion or flooding and send less data -until the congestion subsides. -% We've been working on this some; we have found that our current approach -% doesn't work so well. -NM +until the congestion subsides. This is an area of active +experimentation and research. \textbf{Directory authorities:} The earlier Onion Routing design planned to flood state information through the @@ -234,7 +215,7 @@ traffic and look for corresponding corrupted traffic at the network edges~\cite{minion-design}. Tor hampers these attacks by verifying data integrity before it leaves the network. % Our approach here is a little broken; we're working on better. We should -% acknowledge the problems. -NM +% acknowledge the problems. Not in this section though. -NM \textbf{Rendezvous points and hidden services:} Tor provides an integrated mechanism for responder anonymity via @@ -246,22 +227,6 @@ path went down or rotated its keys. In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. -Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS -kernel patches or network stack support. This prevents us from -anonymizing non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our -portability and deployability. - -We have implemented all of the above features, including -rendezvous points. Our source code is available under a free -license, and Tor is not covered by the patent that affected -distribution and use of earlier versions of Onion Routing. We -have deployed a wide-area alpha network to test the design, to -get more experience with usability and users, and to provide a -research platform for experimentation. As of this writing, the -network stands at 32 nodes spread over two continents. -% The above figure is wrong; the above paragraph doesn't summarize our status -% well -NM - \textbf{Censorship resistance:} A growing number of Tor users require not only anonymous communications but also censorship resistance. Tor circumvents attempts to block access to the @@ -283,7 +248,20 @@ socket -- the ``control port''. Special-purpose controllers have also been developed by researchers to analyse Tor and prototype modifications. Additional resistance against protocol fingerprinting, for the purposes of censorship resistance, may -be provided by an external ``pluggable transport'' obfuscator. +be provided by an external ``pluggable transport'' obfuscator. + +% More features here. -NM + +Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS +kernel patches or network stack support. This prevents us from +anonymizing non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our +portability and deployability. + +Tor has been operational since 2003. Our source code is available +under a free license, and Tor is not covered by the patent that +affected distribution and use of earlier versions of Onion Routing. +As of this writing, the Tor network stands at about 3000 +nodes. We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe our goals and assumptions in

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[translation/tails-persistence-setup_completed] Update translations for tails-persistence-setup_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit a6b40f82cafab8b37fc1dcc759b776a8c6b93797 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 04:45:56 2012 +0000 Update translations for tails-persistence-setup_completed --- zh_CN/zh_CN.po | 318 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/zh_CN/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f792314 --- /dev/null +++ b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE. +# Copyright (C) YEAR Tails developers +# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package. +# +# Translators: +msgid "" +msgstr "" +"Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" +"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-10-29 19:33+0100\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-14 04:30+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: xtoaster <zhazhenzhong(a)gmail.com>\n" +"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" +"MIME-Version: 1.0\n" +"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" +"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n" +"Language: zh_CN\n" +"Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0;\n" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:48 +msgid "Personal Data" +msgstr "个人数据" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:50 +msgid "Keep files stored in the `Persistent' directory" +msgstr "文件保存至'Persistent'目录" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:58 +msgid "GnuPG" +msgstr "GnuPG" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:60 +msgid "GnuPG keyrings and configuration" +msgstr "GnuPG 钥匙环与配置" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:68 +msgid "SSH Client" +msgstr "SSH 客户端" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:70 +msgid "SSH keys, configuration and known hosts" +msgstr "SSH 密钥，配置及已知服务器" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:78 +msgid "Pidgin" +msgstr "Pidgin" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:80 +msgid "Pidgin profiles and OTR keyring" +msgstr "Pidgin 配置文件及 OTR 钥匙环" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:88 +msgid "Claws Mail" +msgstr "Claws Mail" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:90 +msgid "Claws Mail profiles and locally stored email" +msgstr "Claws Mail 配置文件及存放于本地的邮件" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:98 +msgid "GNOME Keyring" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:100 +msgid "Secrets stored by GNOME Keyring" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环中的私钥" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:108 +msgid "Network Connections" +msgstr "网络连接" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:110 +msgid "Configuration of network devices and connections" +msgstr "配置网络设备和连接" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:118 +msgid "APT Packages" +msgstr "APT 软件包" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:120 +msgid "Packages downloaded by APT" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:128 +msgid "APT Lists" +msgstr "APT 列表" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:130 +msgid "Lists downloaded by APT" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包列表" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:138 +msgid "Dotfiles" +msgstr ".用户配置文件" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:140 +msgid "" +"Symlink into $HOME every file or directory found in the `dotfiles' directory" +msgstr "连入 $HOME 的符号链接，'.'开头目录中的所有文件和文件夹" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:259 +msgid "" +"The device Tails is running from cannot be found. Maybe you used the `toram'" +" option?" +msgstr "Tail 启动时的运行设备已无法找到。可能您使用了'toram'拷贝至内存选项？" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:284 +msgid "'Unparseable partition path.'" +msgstr "'分区路径解析失败。'" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:298 +msgid "Setup Tails persistent volume" +msgstr "设置 Tails 持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:442 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s already has a persistent volume." +msgstr "设备 %s 中已经存在持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:450 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s has not enough unallocated space." +msgstr "设置 %s 空闲空间不足。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:458 ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:472 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s has no persistent volume." +msgstr "设备 %s 中不存在持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:464 +msgid "" +"Cannot delete the persistent volume while in use. You should restart Tails " +"without persistence." +msgstr "持久卷使用中，无法删除。您需要以 Live 模式重启 Tails 。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:483 +msgid "Persistence volume is not unlocked." +msgstr "持久卷未锁定。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:488 +msgid "Persistence volume is not mounted." +msgstr "持久卷未挂载。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:493 +msgid "Persistence volume is not readable. Permissions or ownership problems?" +msgstr "从持久卷中读取失败。文件权限或文件所有者有误？" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:498 +msgid "Persistence volume is not writable. Maybe it was mounted read-only?" +msgstr "向持久卷中写入失败。可能已以只读模式挂载？" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:507 +#, perl-format +msgid "Tails is running from non-USB device %s." +msgstr "Tails 正运行于非 USB 设备 %s。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:513 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s is optical." +msgstr "设备 %s 为光盘设备。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:520 +#, perl-format +msgid "Device %s was not created using Tails USB installer." +msgstr "设备 %s 是不 Tails USB 安装程序生成的。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:554 +msgid "Error" +msgstr "错误" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:861 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Finished" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 完成" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:864 +msgid "" +"Any changes you have made will only take effect after restarting Tails.\n" +"\n" +"You may now close this application." +msgstr "您所做的任何更改在 Tails 重启后才能生效。\n\n您现在可以关闭本程序了。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:54 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume creation" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 创建持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:57 +msgid "Choose a passphrase to protect the persistent volume" +msgstr "输入一个密码来保护您的持久卷" + +#. TRANSLATORS: size, device vendor, device model +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:61 +#, perl-format +msgid "" +"A %s persistent volume will be created on the %s %s device. Data on " +"this device will be stored in an encrypted form protected by a passphrase." +msgstr "系统将创建一个 %s 的持久卷保存于 %s %s 设备上。此卷中的数据将加密存储与此设备上并受密码保护。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:66 +msgid "Create" +msgstr "创建" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:110 +msgid "" +"Beware! Using persistence has consequences that must be well " +"understood. Tails can't help you if you use it wrong! See <a " +"href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails" +" documentation about persistence</a> to learn more." +msgstr "注意！ 使用持久卷的影响您必须了解。如果您错误使用，Tails 也无法帮助您。更多信息参加 <a href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails 关于持久存储的文档</a> to learn more。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:144 +msgid "Passphrase:" +msgstr "密码:" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:154 +msgid "Verify Passphrase:" +msgstr "再次输入密码:" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:167 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:231 +msgid "Passphrase can't be empty" +msgstr "密码不能为空" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:222 +msgid "Passphrases do not match" +msgstr "密码不一致" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:262 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:189 +msgid "Failed" +msgstr "失败" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:269 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:84 +msgid "Correcting attributes on Tails system partition." +msgstr "正在校正 Tail 系统分区的属性。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:272 +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:87 +msgid "The attributes of the Tails system partition will be corrected." +msgstr "即将校正 Tails 系统分区属性。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:280 +msgid "Mounting Tails persistence partition." +msgstr "正在挂载 Tails 持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:283 +msgid "The Tails persistence partition will be mounted." +msgstr "即将挂载 Tails 持久卷。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:304 +msgid "Creating..." +msgstr "正在创建..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:307 +msgid "Creating the persistent volume..." +msgstr "正在创建持久卷..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:60 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume configuration" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 配置持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:63 +msgid "Specify the files that will be saved in the persistent volume" +msgstr "设置要保存于持久卷中的文件" + +#. TRANSLATORS: partition, size, device vendor, device model +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:67 +#, perl-format +msgid "" +"The selected files will be stored in the encrypted partition %s (%s), on the" +" %s %s device." +msgstr "所选文件将被保存于加密分区 %s (%s)中，分区位于设备 %s %s 上。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:73 +msgid "Save" +msgstr "保存" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:135 +msgid "Make custom directory persistent (absolute path):" +msgstr "设置自定义目录为持久(绝对路径):" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:141 +msgid "Destination:" +msgstr "目的地:" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:204 +msgid "Saving..." +msgstr "正在保存..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:207 +msgid "Saving persistence configuration..." +msgstr "正在保存持久存储配置..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:41 +msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume deletion" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 删除持久卷" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:44 +msgid "Your persistent data will be deleted." +msgstr "您的存储于持久卷中的数据将被删除。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:48 +#, perl-format +msgid "" +"The persistent volume %s (%s), on the %s %s device, will be deleted." +msgstr "持久卷 %s (%s) 将被删除，此卷位于设备 %s %s 上。" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:54 +msgid "Delete" +msgstr "删除" + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:99 +msgid "Deleting..." +msgstr "正在删除..." + +#: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:102 +msgid "Deleting the persistent volume..." +msgstr "正在删除持久卷..."

1 0

[translation/tails-persistence-setup] Update translations for tails-persistence-setup
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 1080eddec105acdbafbe3bac843df153d31cef15 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 14 04:45:54 2012 +0000 Update translations for tails-persistence-setup --- zh_CN/zh_CN.po | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/zh_CN/zh_CN.po b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po index 97c6d63..f792314 100644 --- a/zh_CN/zh_CN.po +++ b/zh_CN/zh_CN.po @@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor\n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-10-03 16:16+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-10-03 17:39+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-10-29 19:33+0100\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2012-11-14 04:30+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: xtoaster <zhazhenzhong(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL(a)li.org>\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -19,173 +19,173 @@ msgstr "" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:48 msgid "Personal Data" -msgstr "" +msgstr "个人数据" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:50 msgid "Keep files stored in the `Persistent' directory" -msgstr "" +msgstr "文件保存至'Persistent'目录" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:58 msgid "GnuPG" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GnuPG" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:60 msgid "GnuPG keyrings and configuration" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GnuPG 钥匙环与配置" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:68 msgid "SSH Client" -msgstr "" +msgstr "SSH 客户端" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:70 msgid "SSH keys, configuration and known hosts" -msgstr "" +msgstr "SSH 密钥，配置及已知服务器" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:78 msgid "Pidgin" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Pidgin" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:80 msgid "Pidgin profiles and OTR keyring" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Pidgin 配置文件及 OTR 钥匙环" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:88 msgid "Claws Mail" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Claws Mail" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:90 msgid "Claws Mail profiles and locally stored email" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Claws Mail 配置文件及存放于本地的邮件" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:98 msgid "GNOME Keyring" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:100 msgid "Secrets stored by GNOME Keyring" -msgstr "" +msgstr "GNOME 钥匙环中的私钥" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:108 msgid "Network Connections" -msgstr "" +msgstr "网络连接" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:110 msgid "Configuration of network devices and connections" -msgstr "" +msgstr "配置网络设备和连接" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:118 msgid "APT Packages" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 软件包" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:120 msgid "Packages downloaded by APT" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:128 msgid "APT Lists" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 列表" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:130 msgid "Lists downloaded by APT" -msgstr "" +msgstr "APT 下载的软件包列表" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:138 msgid "Dotfiles" -msgstr "" +msgstr ".用户配置文件" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Configuration/Presets.pm:140 msgid "" "Symlink into $HOME every file or directory found in the `dotfiles' directory" -msgstr "" +msgstr "连入 $HOME 的符号链接，'.'开头目录中的所有文件和文件夹" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:259 msgid "" "The device Tails is running from cannot be found. Maybe you used the `toram'" " option?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tail 启动时的运行设备已无法找到。可能您使用了'toram'拷贝至内存选项？" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:284 msgid "'Unparseable partition path.'" -msgstr "" +msgstr "'分区路径解析失败。'" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:298 msgid "Setup Tails persistent volume" -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置 Tails 持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:442 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s already has a persistent volume." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 中已经存在持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:450 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s has not enough unallocated space." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置 %s 空闲空间不足。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:458 ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:472 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s has no persistent volume." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 中不存在持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:464 msgid "" "Cannot delete the persistent volume while in use. You should restart Tails " "without persistence." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷使用中，无法删除。您需要以 Live 模式重启 Tails 。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:483 msgid "Persistence volume is not unlocked." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷未锁定。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:488 msgid "Persistence volume is not mounted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷未挂载。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:493 msgid "Persistence volume is not readable. Permissions or ownership problems?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "从持久卷中读取失败。文件权限或文件所有者有误？" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:498 msgid "Persistence volume is not writable. Maybe it was mounted read-only?" -msgstr "" +msgstr "向持久卷中写入失败。可能已以只读模式挂载？" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:507 #, perl-format msgid "Tails is running from non-USB device %s." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tails 正运行于非 USB 设备 %s。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:513 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s is optical." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 为光盘设备。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:520 #, perl-format msgid "Device %s was not created using Tails USB installer." -msgstr "" +msgstr "设备 %s 是不 Tails USB 安装程序生成的。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:554 msgid "Error" -msgstr "" +msgstr "错误" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:861 msgid "Persistence wizard - Finished" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 完成" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Setup.pm:864 msgid "" "Any changes you have made will only take effect after restarting Tails.\n" "\n" "You may now close this application." -msgstr "" +msgstr "您所做的任何更改在 Tails 重启后才能生效。\n\n您现在可以关闭本程序了。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:54 msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume creation" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 创建持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:57 msgid "Choose a passphrase to protect the persistent volume" -msgstr "" +msgstr "输入一个密码来保护您的持久卷" #. TRANSLATORS: size, device vendor, device model #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:61 @@ -193,11 +193,11 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "A %s persistent volume will be created on the %s %s device. Data on " "this device will be stored in an encrypted form protected by a passphrase." -msgstr "" +msgstr "系统将创建一个 %s 的持久卷保存于 %s %s 设备上。此卷中的数据将加密存储与此设备上并受密码保护。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:66 msgid "Create" -msgstr "" +msgstr "创建" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:110 msgid "" @@ -205,63 +205,63 @@ msgid "" "understood. Tails can't help you if you use it wrong! See <a " "href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails" " documentation about persistence</a> to learn more." -msgstr "" +msgstr "注意！ 使用持久卷的影响您必须了解。如果您错误使用，Tails 也无法帮助您。更多信息参加 <a href='file:///usr/share/doc/tails/website/doc/first_steps/persistence.en.html'>Tails 关于持久存储的文档</a> to learn more。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:144 msgid "Passphrase:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "密码:" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:154 msgid "Verify Passphrase:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "再次输入密码:" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:167 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:231 msgid "Passphrase can't be empty" -msgstr "" +msgstr "密码不能为空" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:222 msgid "Passphrases do not match" -msgstr "" +msgstr "密码不一致" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:262 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:189 msgid "Failed" -msgstr "" +msgstr "失败" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:269 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:84 msgid "Correcting attributes on Tails system partition." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在校正 Tail 系统分区的属性。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:272 #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:87 msgid "The attributes of the Tails system partition will be corrected." -msgstr "" +msgstr "即将校正 Tails 系统分区属性。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:280 msgid "Mounting Tails persistence partition." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在挂载 Tails 持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:283 msgid "The Tails persistence partition will be mounted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "即将挂载 Tails 持久卷。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:304 msgid "Creating..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在创建..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Bootstrap.pm:307 msgid "Creating the persistent volume..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在创建持久卷..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:60 msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume configuration" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 配置持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:63 msgid "Specify the files that will be saved in the persistent volume" -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置要保存于持久卷中的文件" #. TRANSLATORS: partition, size, device vendor, device model #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:67 @@ -269,50 +269,50 @@ msgstr "" msgid "" "The selected files will be stored in the encrypted partition %s (%s), on the" " %s %s device." -msgstr "" +msgstr "所选文件将被保存于加密分区 %s (%s)中，分区位于设备 %s %s 上。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:73 msgid "Save" -msgstr "" +msgstr "保存" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:135 msgid "Make custom directory persistent (absolute path):" -msgstr "" +msgstr "设置自定义目录为持久(绝对路径):" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:141 msgid "Destination:" -msgstr "" +msgstr "目的地:" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:204 msgid "Saving..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在保存..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Configure.pm:207 msgid "Saving persistence configuration..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在保存持久存储配置..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:41 msgid "Persistence wizard - Persistent volume deletion" -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久存储向导 - 删除持久卷" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:44 msgid "Your persistent data will be deleted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "您的存储于持久卷中的数据将被删除。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:48 #, perl-format msgid "" "The persistent volume %s (%s), on the %s %s device, will be deleted." -msgstr "" +msgstr "持久卷 %s (%s) 将被删除，此卷位于设备 %s %s 上。" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:54 msgid "Delete" -msgstr "" +msgstr "删除" #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:99 msgid "Deleting..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在删除..." #: ../lib/Tails/Persistence/Step/Delete.pm:102 msgid "Deleting the persistent volume..." -msgstr "" +msgstr "正在删除持久卷..."

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[tor-design-2012/master] Revise "other design decisions" section
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Nov '12

14 Nov '12

commit 69b010d08f259daaebd3f7360db9882612f19b4f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Nov 13 23:02:11 2012 -0500 Revise "other design decisions" section --- todo | 5 +++-- tor-design-2012.tex | 48 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/todo b/todo index ac44c7f..af508bf 100644 --- a/todo +++ b/todo @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ LEGEND: o Done . Partially done ? Do we really need to do this? + X Abandoned: we don't need to do this. ITEMS: @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ ITEMS: o stream isolation . Integrate content from the third blog post [steven] o link protocol tls - ? rise and fall of .exit + X rise and fall of .exit . controller protocol o torbutton o tor browser bundle @@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ ITEMS: o Revise tor-design up to "opening and closing streams" [nick] . Revise tor-design "opening and closing streams" onward [steven] o Revise hidden services section [nick] - . Revise "other design decisions" [nick] + o Revise "other design decisions" [nick] CAN DO AFTER SPONSOR DEADLINE: - Revise related work [steven] diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex index 2f48cbb..035bf0d 100644 --- a/tor-design-2012.tex +++ b/tor-design-2012.tex @@ -1452,7 +1452,8 @@ others. First of all, there are several CPU-consuming denial-of-service attacks wherein an attacker can force an OR to perform expensive -cryptographic operations. For example, an attacker can fake the +cryptographic operations at little cost to the attacker. +For example, an attacker can fake the start of a TLS handshake, forcing the OR to carry out its (comparatively expensive) half of the handshake at no real computational cost to the attacker. @@ -1470,8 +1471,6 @@ symmetric cryptography operations that keep cells flowing. This rate limiting could, however, allow an attacker to slow down other users when they build new circuits. -% What about link-to-link rate limiting? - The Tor network itself can be exploited as a DoS amplifier, because for every relay cell sent into an OP, a cell is generated at each hop on the circuit. An adversary could create @@ -1494,9 +1493,6 @@ requests and so cannot generate a path of longer than 8 hops. This does not however prevent an adversary tunneling Tor over Tor, and connecting from an exit node back to the Tor network. -% Mention long-path defense -NM -% Believed done -SJM - Adversaries can also attack the Tor network's hosts and network links. Disrupting a single circuit or link breaks all streams passing along that part of the circuit. Users similarly lose @@ -1510,19 +1506,22 @@ require more buffering at the network edges, however, and the performance and anonymity implications from this extra complexity still require investigation. -% Mention asymmetries in protocols, where a little effort from an attacker -% can make Tor do more calculation. That's bad. -NM - -\subsection{Exit policies and abuse} +In general, deliberate denial of service attacks have not yet had a +noticeable impact on the Tor network in the wild. While we are +aware to the possibility, and looking for more ways to mitigate +possible DoS attack vectors, we are currently more concerned with +circumstances under which misbehaving nodes accidentally ``attack'' +part of the network. For example, our decision to have the +directory authorities act both as the initial contact point for +clients to get directory information has led to clients placing +excessive load on those authorities during times when they couldn't +find pieces of directory information. + +\subsection{Exit policies, node history, and abuse} \label{subsec:exitpolicies} -% This whole section's introduction should get rewritten based on our -% experiences with the network. -NM - -% The thing with exit policies isn't so much (as we phrase it) a "mitigate -% abuse" thing. It's about allowing servers who can't tolerate *any* abuse -% to contribute to the network. Our thinking was kinda muddled there. -NM -Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor +The prospect of exit abuse limits the number of users willing to run +Tor nodes. Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by implicating @@ -1531,17 +1530,8 @@ use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or webservers) can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate at the exit OR. -We stress that Tor does not enable any new class of -abuse. Spammers and other attackers already have access to -thousands of misconfigured systems worldwide, and the Tor -network is far from the easiest way to launch attacks. But -because the onion routers can be mistaken for the originators of -the abuse, and the volunteers who run them may not want to deal -with the hassle of explaining anonymity networks to irate -administrators, we must block or limit abuse through the Tor -network. - -To mitigate abuse issues, each onion router's \emph{exit policy} +To enable volunteers to run nodes without having to necessarily +worry about these abuse issues, each onion router's \emph{exit policy} describes to which external addresses and ports the router will connect. On one end of the spectrum are \emph{open exit} nodes that will connect anywhere. On the other end are @@ -1551,7 +1541,7 @@ local host or network. A private exit can allow a client to connect to a given host or network more securely---an external adversary cannot eavesdrop traffic between the private exit and the final destination, and so is less sure of Alice's -destination and activities. Most onion routers in the current +destination and activities. Many onion routers in the current network function as \emph{restricted exits} that permit connections to the world at large, but prevent access to certain abuse-prone addresses and services such as SMTP. The OR might

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