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[tor/release-0.2.2] Look at the right errno when sending reason for connect() failure
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit 6a5b94de6c51478ca638ec03c40a6d3c27f2d674 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 16:14:42 2011 -0400 Look at the right errno when sending reason for connect() failure In afe414 (tor-0.1.0.1-rc~173), when we moved to connection_edge_end_errno(), we used it in handling errors from connection_connect(). That's not so good, since by the time connection_connect() returns, the socket is no longer set, and we're supposed to be looking at the socket_errno return value from connection_connect() instead. So do what we should've done, and look at the socket_errno value that we get from connection_connect(). --- changes/connect_err_reporting | 6 ++++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/connect_err_reporting b/changes/connect_err_reporting new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61a46b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/connect_err_reporting @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Be more careful about reporting the correct error from a failed + connect() operation. Under some circumstances, it was possible to + look at an incorrect value for errno when sending the end reason. + Bugfix on Tor-0.1.0.1-rc. + diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 82b7139..c75c06b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2823,13 +2823,13 @@ connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *edge_conn) log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to try connecting"); switch (connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port, &socket_error)) { - case -1: - /* XXX022 use socket_error below rather than trying to piece things - * together from the current errno, which may have been clobbered. */ - connection_edge_end_errno(edge_conn); + case -1: { + int reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(socket_error); + connection_edge_end(edge_conn, reason); circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn); connection_free(conn); return; + } case 0: conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Fix some 'impossible' overflow bugs in byte counting
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit dddd333a80ee2e9bb731cb3c127ace3741d49673 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 16:45:25 2011 -0400 Fix some 'impossible' overflow bugs in byte counting The first was genuinely impossible, I think: it could only happen when the amount we read differed from the amount we wanted to read by more than INT_MAX. The second is just very unlikely: it would give incorrect results to the controller if you somehow wrote or read more than 4GB on one edge conn in one second. That one is a bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta. --- changes/count_overflow | 5 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/count_overflow b/changes/count_overflow new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f302ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/count_overflow @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Correctly handle an "impossible" overflow cases in connection + byte counting, where we write or read more than 4GB on an edge + connection in single second. Bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta. + diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 7fa6cd9..084237d 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn); static int connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn); static int connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn); static int connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn); -static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, +static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, int *socket_error); static int connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial); static void client_check_address_changed(int sock); @@ -2338,7 +2338,7 @@ connection_bucket_should_increase(int bucket, or_connection_t *conn) static int connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn) { - int max_to_read=-1, try_to_read; + ssize_t max_to_read=-1, try_to_read; size_t before, n_read = 0; int socket_error = 0; @@ -2456,7 +2456,8 @@ connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn) * Return -1 if we want to break conn, else return 0. */ static int -connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error) +connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, + int *socket_error) { int result; ssize_t at_most = *max_to_read; @@ -2574,15 +2575,19 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error) n_read = (size_t) result; } - if (n_read > 0) { /* change *max_to_read */ - /*XXXX022 check for overflow*/ - *max_to_read = (int)(at_most - n_read); - } + if (n_read > 0) { + /* change *max_to_read */ + *max_to_read = at_most - n_read; - if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { - edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); - /*XXXX022 check for overflow*/ - edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read; + /* Update edge_conn->n_read */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + /* Check for overflow: */ + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_read > n_read)) + edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read; + else + edge_conn->n_read = UINT32_MAX; + } } connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written); @@ -2781,10 +2786,13 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) n_written = (size_t) result; } - if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + if (n_written && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); - /*XXXX022 check for overflow.*/ - edge_conn->n_written += (int)n_written; + /* Check for overflow: */ + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_written > n_written)) + edge_conn->n_written += n_written; + else + edge_conn->n_written = UINT32_MAX; } connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Clarify some documentation and comments wrt resetting OR token buckets
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit d38030381b04263f76ce7f8ed2d6ceefc4ce363f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 17:21:16 2011 -0400 Clarify some documentation and comments wrt resetting OR token buckets --- src/or/connection_or.c | 6 +++++- src/or/networkstatus.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index ff863fd..4b932ec 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -353,6 +353,9 @@ connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest) * per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's * not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then * check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'. + * + * If reset is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just + * clip the bucket if it happens to be too full. */ static void connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset, @@ -392,7 +395,8 @@ connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset, } /** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed. - * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets. */ + * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make + * sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */ void connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns, or_options_t *options) { diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index 18cb477..4f6fe15 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -1747,7 +1747,8 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus, routerstatus_list_update_named_server_map(); cell_ewma_set_scale_factor(options, current_consensus); - /* XXX022 where is the right place to put this call? */ + /* XXXX023 this call might be unnecessary here: can changing the + * current consensus really alter our view of any OR's rate limits? */ connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options); circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(&circ_times, current_consensus);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Add XXX023s for our timestamp_dirty abuse.
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit f3b89c114112987b74bb0632cfe47a3a17859adb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 17:49:44 2011 -0400 Add XXX023s for our timestamp_dirty abuse. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 3 +++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 ++ src/or/or.h | 10 ++++++++-- src/or/relay.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index b4f5f45..521c21e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1023,6 +1023,7 @@ circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void) * This is useful for letting the user change pseudonyms, so new * streams will not be linkable to old streams. */ +/* XXX023 this is a bad name for what this function does */ void circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void) { @@ -1033,6 +1034,8 @@ circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void) if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && !circ->marked_for_close && circ->timestamp_dirty) + /* XXXX023 This is a screwed-up way to say "This is too dirty + * for new circuits. */ circ->timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness; } } diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index c75c06b..af0cfbe 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ connection_ap_expire_beginning(void) /* kludge to make us not try this circuit again, yet to allow * current streams on it to survive if they can: make it * unattractive to use for new streams */ + /* XXXX023 this is a kludgy way to do this. */ tor_assert(circ->timestamp_dirty); circ->timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness; /* give our stream another 'cutoff' seconds to try */ @@ -2164,6 +2165,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(edge_connection_t *ap_conn) ap_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ); if (ap_conn->stream_id==0) { connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL); + /*XXXX022 _close_ the circuit because it's full? That sounds dumb. */ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT); return -1; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 124892c..e44c626 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2127,8 +2127,14 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { char *n_conn_onionskin; time_t timestamp_created; /**< When was this circuit created? */ - time_t timestamp_dirty; /**< When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the - * circuit is clean. */ + /** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean. + * + * XXXX023 Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward + * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new + * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it. + * That's a kludge we should fix. + */ + time_t timestamp_dirty; struct timeval highres_created; /**< When exactly was the circuit created? */ uint16_t marked_for_close; /**< Should we close this circuit at the end of diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 076b46b..807cb3d 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -791,6 +791,8 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( < MAX_RESOLVE_FAILURES) { /* We haven't retried too many times; reattach the connection. */ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP,circ); + /* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */ + /* XXXX023 this is a kludgy way to do this. */ tor_assert(circ->_base.timestamp_dirty); circ->_base.timestamp_dirty -= get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Remove workaround code for bug539
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit 550749555cd57a1f82fe6c08e866ae14456ed439 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 25 17:11:04 2011 -0400 Remove workaround code for bug539 We fixed bug 539 (where directories would say "503" but send data anyway) back in 0.2.0.16-alpha/0.1.2.19. Because most directory versions were affected, we added workaround to make sure that we examined the contents of 503-replies to make sure there wasn't any data for them to find. But now that such routers are nonexistent, we can remove this code. (Even if somebody fired up an 0.1.2.19 directory cache today, it would still be fine to ignore data in its erroneous 503 replies.) --- changes/bug539_removal | 6 ++++++ src/or/directory.c | 33 +++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug539_removal b/changes/bug539_removal new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dbff43d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug539_removal @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Removed code + - Removed workaround code to handle directory responses from + servers that had bug 539 (they would send HTTP status 503 + responses _and_ send a body too). Since only server versions + before 0.2.0.16-alpha/0.1.2.19 were affected, there is no longer + reason to keep the workaround in place. diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 1347c8b..8f33a60 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -1539,26 +1539,19 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) (void) skewed; /* skewed isn't used yet. */ if (status_code == 503) { - if (body_len < 16) { - routerstatus_t *rs; - trusted_dir_server_t *ds; - log_info(LD_DIR,"Received http status code %d (%s) from server " - "'%s:%d'. I'll try again soon.", - status_code, escaped(reason), conn->_base.address, - conn->_base.port); - if ((rs = router_get_consensus_status_by_id(conn->identity_digest))) - rs->last_dir_503_at = now; - if ((ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(conn->identity_digest))) - ds->fake_status.last_dir_503_at = now; + routerstatus_t *rs; + trusted_dir_server_t *ds; + log_info(LD_DIR,"Received http status code %d (%s) from server " + "'%s:%d'. I'll try again soon.", + status_code, escaped(reason), conn->_base.address, + conn->_base.port); + if ((rs = router_get_consensus_status_by_id(conn->identity_digest))) + rs->last_dir_503_at = now; + if ((ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(conn->identity_digest))) + ds->fake_status.last_dir_503_at = now; - tor_free(body); tor_free(headers); tor_free(reason); - return -1; - } - /* XXXX022 Remove this once every server with bug 539 is obsolete. */ - log_info(LD_DIR, "Server at '%s:%d' sent us a 503 response, but included " - "a body anyway. We'll pretend it gave us a 200.", - conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port); - status_code = 200; + tor_free(body); tor_free(headers); tor_free(reason); + return -1; } plausible = body_is_plausible(body, body_len, conn->_base.purpose);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Revert "Simplest fix to bug2402: do not include SVN versions"
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit 671318c3a84657acc8b97cf59871489065264ece Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 10:47:25 2011 -0500 Revert "Simplest fix to bug2402: do not include SVN versions" This reverts commit a1073ee956021ead19d30c2151510dbaced416a8. Apparently, we totally misunderstood how the debian packages were using microrevisions. Better fix that! --- changes/bug2402 | 4 ---- src/or/config.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2402 b/changes/bug2402 deleted file mode 100644 index f16f677..0000000 --- a/changes/bug2402 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (build) - - Do not include Git version tags as though they were SVN tags when - generating a tarball from inside a repository that has switched between - branches. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 209a92d..8397b23 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -827,7 +827,16 @@ static char *_version = NULL; const char * get_version(void) { - return VERSION; + if (_version == NULL) { + if (strlen(tor_svn_revision)) { + size_t len = strlen(VERSION)+strlen(tor_svn_revision)+8; + _version = tor_malloc(len); + tor_snprintf(_version, len, "%s (r%s)", VERSION, tor_svn_revision); + } else { + _version = tor_strdup(VERSION); + } + } + return _version; } /** Release additional memory allocated in options

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[tor/release-0.2.2] retroactively add a changelog entry
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit 645920542684c28d24b70529486210889434bcc9 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 16:43:10 2011 -0400 retroactively add a changelog entry --- ChangeLog | 1 + changes/geoip-apr2011 | 3 --- 2 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 9c9ccc3..70afe71 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.24-alpha - 2011-04-08 - Use computed circuit-build timeouts to decide when to launch parallel introduction circuits for hidden services. (Previously, we would retry after 15 seconds.) + - Update to the April 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. o Packaging fixes: - Create the /var/run/tor directory on startup on OpenSUSE if it is diff --git a/changes/geoip-apr2011 b/changes/geoip-apr2011 deleted file mode 100644 index c38f8ae..0000000 --- a/changes/geoip-apr2011 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the April 1 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. -

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[tor/release-0.2.2] add a blurb for 0.2.2.24-alpha
by arma＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit c111adb5fe757ea9baf9aaca151af7e8cd5e5808 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 16:30:39 2011 -0400 add a blurb for 0.2.2.24-alpha --- ChangeLog | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 8d47e3d..9c9ccc3 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,12 +1,10 @@ -Changes in version 0.2.2.24-alpha - 2011-04-0? +Changes in version 0.2.2.24-alpha - 2011-04-08 + Tor 0.2.2.24-alpha fixes a variety of bugs, including a big bug that + prevented Tor clients from effectively using "multihomed" bridges, + that is, bridges that listen on multiple ports or IP addresses so users + can continue to use some of their addresses even if others get blocked. + o Major bugfixes: - - Directory authorities now use data collected from their own - uptime observations when choosing whether to assign the HSDir flag - to relays, instead of trusting the uptime value the relay reports in - its descriptor. This change helps prevent an attack where a small - set of nodes with frequently-changing identity keys can blackhole - a hidden service. (Only authorities need upgrade; others will be - fine once they do.) Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709. - Fix a bug where bridge users who configure the non-canonical address of a bridge automatically switch to its canonical address. If a bridge listens at more than one address, it should be @@ -18,6 +16,13 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.24-alpha - 2011-04-0? to use bridge A if it's still reachable. While this behavior is a feature if your goal is connectivity, in some scenarios it's a dangerous bug. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.1-alpha; fixes bug 2511. + - Directory authorities now use data collected from their own + uptime observations when choosing whether to assign the HSDir flag + to relays, instead of trusting the uptime value the relay reports in + its descriptor. This change helps prevent an attack where a small + set of nodes with frequently-changing identity keys can blackhole + a hidden service. (Only authorities need upgrade; others will be + fine once they do.) Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709. o Minor bugfixes: - When we restart our relay, we might get a successful connection

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[tor/master] Free circuits_for_buffer_stats on shutdown
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit 403b6cfdedee7ebc8fe0b5d1c187e8ae3611aec1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 7 14:59:28 2011 -0400 Free circuits_for_buffer_stats on shutdown --- src/or/rephist.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 74e156f..9b7eefe 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2545,5 +2545,11 @@ rep_hist_free_all(void) tor_free(exit_streams); built_last_stability_doc_at = 0; predicted_ports_free(); + if (circuits_for_buffer_stats) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(circuits_for_buffer_stats, circ_buffer_stats_t *, s, + tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(circuits_for_buffer_stats); + circuits_for_buffer_stats = NULL; + } }

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[tor/master] Fix up some cell-queue stats issues in rephist.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 Apr '11

08 Apr '11

commit 71fb2af62c0a60fee94f984b782531a5d492b055 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 7 14:56:50 2011 -0400 Fix up some cell-queue stats issues in rephist.c - Document the structure and variables. - Make circuits_for_buffer_stats into a static variable. - Don't die horribly if interval_length is 0. - Remove the unused local_circ_id field. - Reorder the fields of circ_buffer_stats_t for cleaner alignment layout. --- src/or/rephist.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index e56ce9e..74e156f 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2330,14 +2330,19 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_init(time_t now) start_of_buffer_stats_interval = now; } +/** Statistics from a single circuit. Collected when the circuit closes, or + * when we flush statistics to disk. */ typedef struct circ_buffer_stats_t { - uint32_t processed_cells; + /** Average number of cells in the circuit's queue */ double mean_num_cells_in_queue; + /** Average time a cell waits in the queue. */ double mean_time_cells_in_queue; - uint32_t local_circ_id; + /** Total number of cells sent over this circuit */ + uint32_t processed_cells; } circ_buffer_stats_t; -smartlist_t *circuits_for_buffer_stats = NULL; +/** List of circ_buffer_stats_t. */ +static smartlist_t *circuits_for_buffer_stats = NULL; /** Remember cell statistics for circuit circ at time * end_of_interval and reset cell counters in case the circuit @@ -2361,6 +2366,8 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_add_circ(circuit_t *circ, time_t end_of_interval) circ->timestamp_created.tv_sec : start_of_buffer_stats_interval; interval_length = (int) (end_of_interval - start_of_interval); + if (interval_length <= 0) + return; stat = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circ_buffer_stats_t)); stat->processed_cells = orcirc->processed_cells; /* 1000.0 for s -> ms; 2.0 because of app-ward and exit-ward queues */

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