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[tor/master] Return NULL from extend_info_from_node if the node has no allowed address
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 1401117ff2bc5fc90df51d19c3c0d7abc439c34e Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 22 17:43:24 2016 +1100 Return NULL from extend_info_from_node if the node has no allowed address Modify callers to correctly handle these new NULL returns: * fix assert in onion_extend_cpath * warn and discard circuit in circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch * warn, discard circuit, and tell controller in handle_control_extendcircuit --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ src/or/circuituse.c | 7 ++++++- src/or/control.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index dcb9de3..daf0b2a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2241,9 +2241,11 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (r) { /* If we're a client, use the preferred address rather than the primary address, for potentially connecting to an IPv6 OR - port. */ - info = extend_info_from_node(r, server_mode(get_options()) == 0); - tor_assert(info); + port. Servers always want the primary (IPv4) address. */ + int client = (server_mode(get_options()) == 0); + info = extend_info_from_node(r, client); + /* Clients can fail to find an allowed address */ + tor_assert(info || client); } } else { const node_t *r = @@ -2318,34 +2320,43 @@ extend_info_new(const char *nickname, const char *digest, * <b>for_direct_connect</b> is true, in which case the preferred * address is used instead. May return NULL if there is not enough * info about <b>node</b> to extend to it--for example, if there is no - * routerinfo_t or microdesc_t. + * routerinfo_t or microdesc_t, or if for_direct_connect is true and none of + * the node's addresses are allowed by tor's firewall and IP version config. **/ extend_info_t * extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect) { tor_addr_port_t ap; + int valid_addr = 0; if (node->ri == NULL && (node->rs == NULL || node->md == NULL)) return NULL; - /* Choose a preferred address first, but fall back to an allowed address*/ + /* Choose a preferred address first, but fall back to an allowed address. + * choose_address returns 1 on success, but get_prim_orport returns 0. */ if (for_direct_connect) - fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, &ap); + valid_addr = fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(node, + FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, + 0, &ap); else - node_get_prim_orport(node, &ap); + valid_addr = !node_get_prim_orport(node, &ap); - log_debug(LD_CIRC, "using %s for %s", - fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port), - node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname); + if (valid_addr) + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "using %s for %s", + fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port), + node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname); + else + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Could not choose valid address for %s", + node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname); - if (node->ri) + if (valid_addr && node->ri) return extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname, node->identity, node->ri->onion_pkey, node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey, &ap.addr, ap.port); - else if (node->rs && node->md) + else if (valid_addr && node->rs && node->md) return extend_info_new(node->rs->nickname, node->identity, node->md->onion_pkey, diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index e742a56..4831f2b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2006,8 +2006,13 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, if (r && node_has_descriptor(r)) { /* We might want to connect to an IPv6 bridge for loading descriptors so we use the preferred address rather than - the primary. */ + the primary. */ extend_info = extend_info_from_node(r, conn->want_onehop ? 1 : 0); + if (!extend_info) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Could not make a one-hop connection to %s. " + "Discarding this circuit.", conn->chosen_exit_name); + return -1; + } } else { log_debug(LD_DIR, "considering %d, %s", want_onehop, conn->chosen_exit_name); diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 66182fe..2c0209e 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -2864,12 +2864,26 @@ handle_control_extendcircuit(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, } /* now circ refers to something that is ready to be extended */ + int first_node = zero_circ; SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, const node_t *, node, { - extend_info_t *info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); - tor_assert(info); /* True, since node_has_descriptor(node) == true */ + extend_info_t *info = extend_info_from_node(node, first_node); + if (first_node && !info) { + log_warn(LD_CONTROL, + "controller tried to connect to a node that doesn't have any " + "addresses that are allowed by the firewall configuration; " + "circuit marked for closing."); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED); + connection_write_str_to_buf("551 Couldn't start circuit\r\n", conn); + goto done; + } else { + /* True, since node_has_descriptor(node) == true and we are extending + * to the node's primary address */ + tor_assert(info); + } circuit_append_new_exit(circ, info); extend_info_free(info); + first_node = 0; }); /* now that we've populated the cpath, start extending */

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[tor/master] Automatically use IPv6 when ClientUseIPv4 is 0
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 77a9de0d48e61e6762e65f6099c9a424544eb0ad Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 22 15:10:18 2016 +1100 Automatically use IPv6 when ClientUseIPv4 is 0 Consequential changes to log messages: * it's no longer possible to disable both IPv4 and IPv6, * refactor common string out of remaining log messages --- src/or/config.c | 16 ++++++++-------- src/or/policies.c | 6 ++++-- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 11 +++++++---- src/test/test_policy.c | 16 +++++++++------- 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index caa01d1..b9d9fb2 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3108,20 +3108,20 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, /* We check if Reachable*Addresses blocks all addresses in * parse_reachable_addresses(). */ - if (options->ClientUseIPv4 == 0 && !fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options)) - REJECT("Tor cannot connect to the Internet if ClientUseIPv4 is 0 and " - "ClientUseIPv6 is 0. Please set at least one of these options " - "to 1, or configure bridges."); + +#define WARN_PLEASE_USE_IPV6_LOG_MSG \ + "ClientPreferIPv6%sPort 1 is ignored unless tor is using IPv6. " \ + "Please set ClientUseIPv6 1, ClientUseIPv4 0, or configure bridges." if (!fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options) && options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort == 1) - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 1 is ignored unless " - "ClientUseIPv6 is also 1, or bridges are configured."); + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, WARN_PLEASE_USE_IPV6_LOG_MSG, "OR"); if (!fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options) && options->ClientPreferIPv6DirPort == 1) - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "ClientPreferIPv6DirPort 1 is ignored unless " - "ClientUseIPv6 is also 1, or bridges are configured."); + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, WARN_PLEASE_USE_IPV6_LOG_MSG, "Dir"); + +#undef WARN_PLEASE_USE_IPV6_LOG_MSG if (options->UseBridges && server_mode(options)) diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index 0dc4f96..734558d 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -420,11 +420,13 @@ fascist_firewall_allows_address(const tor_addr_t *addr, } /** Is this client configured to use IPv6? - * Clients use IPv6 if ClientUseIPv6 is 1, or UseBridges is 1. */ int fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(const or_options_t *options) { - return (options->ClientUseIPv6 == 1 || options->UseBridges == 1); + /* Clients use IPv6 if it's set, or they use bridges, or they don't use + * IPv4 */ + return (options->ClientUseIPv6 == 1 || options->UseBridges == 1 + || options->ClientUseIPv4 == 0); } /** Do we prefer to connect to IPv6, ignoring ClientPreferIPv6ORPort and diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index a0208b9..14baa8c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -215,20 +215,23 @@ test_choose_random_entry_one_possible_guard(void *arg) * time, so we can't be sure we get the guard */ tt_assert(chosen_entry); - /* Check that we get the guard if it passes preferred address settings when - * they're auto */ + /* Check that we get a node if it is allowed but not preferred when settings + * are auto */ memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options)); mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1; mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1; chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL); - tt_ptr_op(chosen_entry, OP_EQ, the_guard); + + /* We disable the guard check and the preferred address check at the same + * time, so we can't be sure we get the guard */ + tt_assert(chosen_entry); /* and with IPv6 active */ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1; chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL); - tt_ptr_op(chosen_entry, OP_EQ, the_guard); + tt_assert(chosen_entry); done: memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options)); diff --git a/src/test/test_policy.c b/src/test/test_policy.c index 1daa38e..2e87f13 100644 --- a/src/test/test_policy.c +++ b/src/test/test_policy.c @@ -1310,7 +1310,8 @@ test_policies_fascist_firewall_allows_address(void *arg) tt_assert(fascist_firewall_allows_address(&r_ipv6_addr, port, policy, 0, 0) == 0); - /* Test the function's address matching with everything off */ + /* Test the function's address matching with ClientUseIPv4 0. + * This means "use IPv6" regardless of the other settings. */ memset(&mock_options, 0, sizeof(or_options_t)); mock_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0; mock_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 0; @@ -1319,7 +1320,7 @@ test_policies_fascist_firewall_allows_address(void *arg) tt_assert(fascist_firewall_allows_address(&ipv4_addr, port, policy, 0, 0) == 0); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_allows_address(&ipv6_addr, port, policy, 0, 0) - == 0); + == 1); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_allows_address(&r_ipv4_addr, port, policy, 0, 0) == 0); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_allows_address(&r_ipv6_addr, port, policy, 0, 0) @@ -1596,7 +1597,8 @@ test_policies_fascist_firewall_choose_address(void *arg) FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 1) == &ipv6_dir_ap); - /* Choose an address with everything off */ + /* Choose an address with ClientUseIPv4 0. + * This means "use IPv6" regardless of the other settings. */ memset(&mock_options, 0, sizeof(or_options_t)); mock_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0; mock_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 0; @@ -1604,16 +1606,16 @@ test_policies_fascist_firewall_choose_address(void *arg) tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_or_ap, &ipv6_or_ap, 0, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0) - == NULL); + == &ipv6_or_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_or_ap, &ipv6_or_ap, 0, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 1) - == NULL); + == &ipv6_or_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_dir_ap, &ipv6_dir_ap, 0, FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 0) - == NULL); + == &ipv6_dir_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_dir_ap, &ipv6_dir_ap, 0, FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 1) - == NULL); + == &ipv6_dir_ap); /* Choose from unusual inputs */ memset(&mock_options, 0, sizeof(or_options_t));

1 0

[tor/master] Tor2Web: tell extend_info_from_node intro point connections are direct
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 73fc67bc8906819a42ed44abe33179512f90a883 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 22 18:05:28 2016 +1100 Tor2Web: tell extend_info_from_node intro point connections are direct --- src/or/rendclient.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d9cea53..dc05d6f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -1366,11 +1366,19 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } +#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE + new_extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, options->Tor2webMode); +#else new_extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); +#endif if (!new_extend_info) { + const char *alternate_reason = ""; +#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE + alternate_reason = ", or we cannot connect directly to it"; +#endif log_info(LD_REND, "We don't have a descriptor for the intro-point relay " - "'%s'; trying another.", - extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)); + "'%s'%s; trying another.", + extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info), alternate_reason); smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } else {

1 0

[tor/master] Make bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit c213f277cde00b258b159446f8d975026194c034 Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Feb 3 23:52:39 2016 +1100 Make bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is auto, bridges prefer the configured bridge ORPort address. Otherwise, they use the value of the option. Other clients prefer IPv4 ORPorts if ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is auto. When ClientPreferIPv6DirPort is auto, all clients prefer IPv4 DirPorts. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 12 ++++++------ src/or/entrynodes.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ src/or/nodelist.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- src/or/policies.c | 18 +++++++----------- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 10 ++++++---- src/test/test_policy.c | 25 +++++++++++++++---------- 6 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 87d976b..4c9c53d 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1504,17 +1504,17 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers a directory port with an IPv6 address over one with IPv4, for direct connections, if a given directory server has both. (Tor also prefers an IPv6 DirPort if IPv4Client is set to - 0.) If this option is set to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer IPv6, and - other clients prefer IPv4. Other things may influence the choice. This - option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. (Default: auto) + 0.) If this option is set to auto, clients prefer IPv4. Other things may + influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. + (Default: auto) [[ClientPreferIPv6ORPort]] **ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6 address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. (Tor also prefers an IPv6 ORPort if IPv4Client is set to 0.) If this option is set - to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients prefer IPv4. - Other things may influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the - favor of IPv6. (Default: auto) + to auto, Tor bridge clients prefer the configured bridge address, and + other clients prefer IPv4. Other things may influence the choice. This + option breaks a tie to the favor of IPv6. (Default: auto) [[PathsNeededToBuildCircuits]] **PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__:: Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index d6bef65..a4b9350 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2240,6 +2240,7 @@ rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node) * does so through an address from any source other than node_get_addr(). */ tor_addr_t addr; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (node->ri) { routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri; @@ -2272,9 +2273,15 @@ rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node) } } - /* Mark which address to use based on which bridge_t we got. */ - node->ipv6_preferred = (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6 && - !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)); + if (options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort == -1) { + /* Mark which address to use based on which bridge_t we got. */ + node->ipv6_preferred = (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6 && + !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)); + } else { + /* Mark which address to use based on user preference */ + node->ipv6_preferred = (fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(options) && + !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)); + } /* XXXipv6 we lack support for falling back to another address for the same relay, warn the user */ @@ -2283,10 +2290,13 @@ rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node) node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap); log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Bridge '%s' has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. " - "Will prefer using its %s address (%s).", + "Will prefer using its %s address (%s) based on %s.", ri->nickname, - tor_addr_family(&ap.addr) == AF_INET6 ? "IPv6" : "IPv4", - fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port)); + node->ipv6_preferred ? "IPv6" : "IPv4", + fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port), + options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort == -1 ? + "the configured Bridge address" : + "ClientPreferIPv6ORPort"); } } if (node->rs) { diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index d7cada9..23e9b0e 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -981,10 +981,6 @@ node_has_ipv6_dirport(const node_t *node) * i) the node_t says that it prefers IPv6 * or * ii) the router has no IPv4 OR address. - * or - * iii) our preference is for IPv6 addresses. - * (This extra step is needed in case our preferences have changed since - * node->ipv6_preferred was set at the time the consensus was loaded.) */ int node_ipv6_or_preferred(const node_t *node) @@ -993,10 +989,12 @@ node_ipv6_or_preferred(const node_t *node) tor_addr_port_t ipv4_addr; node_assert_ok(node); + /* XX/teor - node->ipv6_preferred is set from + * fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport() each time the consensus is loaded. + */ if (!fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options)) { return 0; - } else if (node->ipv6_preferred || node_get_prim_orport(node, &ipv4_addr) - || fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(get_options())) { + } else if (node->ipv6_preferred || node_get_prim_orport(node, &ipv4_addr)) { return node_has_ipv6_orport(node); } return 0; @@ -1077,13 +1075,9 @@ node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(const node_t *node, tor_addr_port_t *ap_out) * * We prefer the IPv6 address if the router has an IPv6 address, * and we can use IPv6 addresses, and: - * i) the node_t says that it prefers IPv6 + * i) the router has no IPv4 Dir address. * or - * ii) the router has no IPv4 Dir address. - * or - * iii) our preference is for IPv6 addresses. - * (This extra step is needed in case our preferences have changed since - * node->ipv6_preferred was set at the time the consensus was loaded.) + * ii) our preference is for IPv6 Dir addresses. */ int node_ipv6_dir_preferred(const node_t *node) @@ -1092,9 +1086,13 @@ node_ipv6_dir_preferred(const node_t *node) tor_addr_port_t ipv4_addr; node_assert_ok(node); + /* node->ipv6_preferred is set from fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(), + * so we can't use it to determine DirPort IPv6 preference. + * This means that bridge clients will use IPv4 DirPorts by default. + */ if (!fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options)) { return 0; - } else if (node->ipv6_preferred || node_get_prim_dirport(node, &ipv4_addr) + } else if (node_get_prim_dirport(node, &ipv4_addr) || fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport(get_options())) { return node_has_ipv6_dirport(node); } diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index 734558d..e2cece5 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -458,6 +458,13 @@ fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_impl(const or_options_t *options) int fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(const or_options_t *options) { + /* node->ipv6_preferred is set from fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport() + * each time the consensus is loaded. + * If our preferences change, we will only reset ipv6_preferred on the node + * when the next consensus is loaded. But the consensus is realoded when the + * configuration changes after a HUP. So as long as the result of this + * function only depends on Tor's options, everything should work ok. + */ int pref_ipv6 = fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_impl(options); if (pref_ipv6 >= 0) { @@ -469,11 +476,6 @@ fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(const or_options_t *options) return 1; } - /* For bridge clients, ClientPreferIPv6ORPort auto means "prefer IPv6". */ - if (options->UseBridges && options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort != 0) { - return 1; - } - return 0; } @@ -493,12 +495,6 @@ fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport(const or_options_t *options) return 1; } - /* For bridge clients, ClientPreferIPv6ORPort auto means "prefer IPv6". - * XX/teor - do bridge clients ever use a DirPort? */ - if (options->UseBridges && options->ClientPreferIPv6DirPort != 0) { - return 1; - } - return 0; } diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 14baa8c..fd19db0 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -9,14 +9,16 @@ #include "or.h" #include "test.h" + +#include "config.h" #include "entrynodes.h" -#include "routerparse.h" #include "nodelist.h" -#include "util.h" +#include "policies.h" #include "routerlist.h" +#include "routerparse.h" #include "routerset.h" #include "statefile.h" -#include "config.h" +#include "util.h" #include "test_helpers.h" @@ -826,7 +828,7 @@ test_node_preferred_orport(void *arg) * ClientUseIPv4 is 0 */ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0; mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1; - node.ipv6_preferred = 0; + node.ipv6_preferred = fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(&mocked_options); node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap); tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr)); tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port); diff --git a/src/test/test_policy.c b/src/test/test_policy.c index b4cbfb2..c044d9f 100644 --- a/src/test/test_policy.c +++ b/src/test/test_policy.c @@ -1510,21 +1510,25 @@ test_policies_fascist_firewall_choose_address(void *arg) FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 1) == &ipv4_dir_ap); - /* Auto (Preferring IPv6 for bridge clients) */ + /* Auto: + * - bridge clients prefer the configured bridge OR address, + * - other clients prefer IPv4 OR by default, + * - all clients prefer IPv4 Dir by default. + */ mock_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1; mock_options.ClientPreferIPv6DirPort = -1; tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_or_ap, &ipv6_or_ap, 0, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0) - == &ipv6_or_ap); + == &ipv4_or_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_or_ap, &ipv6_or_ap, 0, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 1) - == &ipv6_or_ap); + == &ipv4_or_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_dir_ap, &ipv6_dir_ap, 0, FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 0) - == &ipv6_dir_ap); + == &ipv4_dir_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_dir_ap, &ipv6_dir_ap, 0, FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 1) - == &ipv6_dir_ap); + == &ipv4_dir_ap); /* Preferring IPv6 */ mock_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 1; @@ -1544,22 +1548,23 @@ test_policies_fascist_firewall_choose_address(void *arg) /* In the default configuration (Auto / IPv6 off), bridge clients should - * still use and prefer IPv6 regardless of ClientUseIPv6. */ + * still use IPv6, and only prefer it for bridges configured with an IPv6 + * address, regardless of ClientUseIPv6. */ mock_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 0; mock_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1; mock_options.ClientPreferIPv6DirPort = -1; tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_or_ap, &ipv6_or_ap, 0, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0) - == &ipv6_or_ap); + == &ipv4_or_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_or_ap, &ipv6_or_ap, 0, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 1) - == &ipv6_or_ap); + == &ipv4_or_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_dir_ap, &ipv6_dir_ap, 0, FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 0) - == &ipv6_dir_ap); + == &ipv4_dir_ap); tt_assert(fascist_firewall_choose_address(&ipv4_dir_ap, &ipv6_dir_ap, 0, FIREWALL_DIR_CONNECTION, 1) - == &ipv6_dir_ap); + == &ipv4_dir_ap); /* Choose an address with IPv4 on */ memset(&mock_options, 0, sizeof(or_options_t));

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/feature17840-v11-merged-v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'feature17840-v11-squashed' into feature17840-v11-merged
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit c4cb4706c9bb1087584c9813b0ca97c261e6fd77 Merge: 42dea56 73fc67b Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 29 07:37:06 2016 +1100 Merge branch 'feature17840-v11-squashed' into feature17840-v11-merged Conflicts: src/or/directory.c src/test/test_routerlist.c Fix minor conflicts. changes/feature17840 | 9 + doc/tor.1.txt | 39 ++- src/common/address.c | 53 ++++ src/common/address.h | 21 ++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 48 ++-- src/or/circuituse.c | 7 +- src/or/config.c | 30 +- src/or/connection.c | 74 ++++- src/or/connection.h | 6 +- src/or/control.c | 18 +- src/or/directory.c | 251 ++++++++++++---- src/or/directory.h | 4 +- src/or/entrynodes.c | 26 +- src/or/nodelist.c | 309 +++++++++++++++----- src/or/nodelist.h | 12 +- src/or/or.h | 29 +- src/or/policies.c | 699 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/policies.h | 54 +++- src/or/rendclient.c | 12 +- src/or/router.c | 31 +- src/or/routerlist.c | 332 ++++++++++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.h | 5 +- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 218 +++++++++++++- src/test/test_policy.c | 531 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_routerlist.c | 73 +++++ 25 files changed, 2576 insertions(+), 315 deletions(-) diff --cc src/test/test_routerlist.c index 090a607,7ec6525..193e3fa --- a/src/test/test_routerlist.c +++ b/src/test/test_routerlist.c @@@ -1,35 -1,12 +1,36 @@@ /* Copyright (c) 2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +#include "orconfig.h" +#include <math.h> +#include <time.h> + +#define DIRVOTE_PRIVATE +#define NETWORKSTATUS_PRIVATE #define ROUTERLIST_PRIVATE +#define TOR_UNIT_TESTING #include "or.h" -#include "routerlist.h" -#include "directory.h" +#include "config.h" + #include "connection.h" +#include "container.h" +#include "directory.h" +#include "dirvote.h" +#include "networkstatus.h" +#include "nodelist.h" +#include "policies.h" +#include "routerlist.h" +#include "routerparse.h" #include "test.h" +#include "test_dir_common.h" + +extern const char AUTHORITY_CERT_1[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_CERT_2[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_2[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_CERT_3[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3[]; + +void construct_consensus(const char **consensus_text_md); /* 4 digests + 3 sep + pre + post + NULL */ static char output[4*BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+3+2+2+1]; @@@ -118,268 -95,84 +119,340 @@@ test_routerlist_launch_descriptor_downl smartlist_free(downloadable); } +void +construct_consensus(const char **consensus_text_md) +{ + networkstatus_t *vote = NULL; + networkstatus_t *v1 = NULL, *v2 = NULL, *v3 = NULL; + networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter = NULL; + authority_cert_t *cert1=NULL, *cert2=NULL, *cert3=NULL; + crypto_pk_t *sign_skey_1=NULL, *sign_skey_2=NULL, *sign_skey_3=NULL; + crypto_pk_t *sign_skey_leg=NULL; + time_t now = time(NULL); + smartlist_t *votes = NULL; + addr_policy_t *pol1 = NULL, *pol2 = NULL, *pol3 = NULL; + int n_vrs; + + tt_assert(!dir_common_authority_pk_init(&cert1, &cert2, &cert3, + &sign_skey_1, &sign_skey_2, + &sign_skey_3)); + sign_skey_leg = pk_generate(4); + + dir_common_construct_vote_1(&vote, cert1, sign_skey_1, + &dir_common_gen_routerstatus_for_v3ns, + &v1, &n_vrs, now, 1); + + tt_assert(v1); + tt_int_op(n_vrs, ==, 4); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(v1->routerstatus_list), ==, 4); + + dir_common_construct_vote_2(&vote, cert2, sign_skey_2, + &dir_common_gen_routerstatus_for_v3ns, + &v2, &n_vrs, now, 1); + + tt_assert(v2); + tt_int_op(n_vrs, ==, 4); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(v2->routerstatus_list), ==, 4); + + dir_common_construct_vote_3(&vote, cert3, sign_skey_3, + &dir_common_gen_routerstatus_for_v3ns, + &v3, &n_vrs, now, 1); + + tt_assert(v3); + tt_int_op(n_vrs, ==, 4); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(v3->routerstatus_list), ==, 4); + + votes = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(votes, v1); + smartlist_add(votes, v2); + smartlist_add(votes, v3); + + *consensus_text_md = networkstatus_compute_consensus(votes, 3, + cert1->identity_key, + sign_skey_1, + "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", + sign_skey_leg, + FLAV_MICRODESC); + + tt_assert(*consensus_text_md); + + done: + if (vote) + tor_free(vote); + if (voter) + tor_free(voter); + if (pol1) + tor_free(pol1); + if (pol2) + tor_free(pol2); + if (pol3) + tor_free(pol3); +} + +static void +test_router_pick_directory_server_impl(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + networkstatus_t *con_md = NULL; + const char *consensus_text_md = NULL; + int flags = PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL|PDS_RETRY_IF_NO_SERVERS; + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + const routerstatus_t *rs = NULL; + options->UseMicrodescriptors = 1; + char *router1_id = NULL, *router2_id = NULL, *router3_id = NULL; + node_t *node_router1 = NULL, *node_router2 = NULL, *node_router3 = NULL; + config_line_t *policy_line = NULL; + time_t now = time(NULL); + int tmp_dirport1, tmp_dirport3; + + (void)arg; + + /* No consensus available, fail early */ + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, (const int) 0, NULL); + tt_assert(rs == NULL); + + construct_consensus(&consensus_text_md); + tt_assert(consensus_text_md); + con_md = networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(consensus_text_md, NULL, + NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS); + tt_assert(con_md); + tt_int_op(con_md->flavor,==, FLAV_MICRODESC); + tt_assert(con_md->routerstatus_list); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(con_md->routerstatus_list), ==, 3); + tt_assert(!networkstatus_set_current_consensus_from_ns(con_md, + "microdesc")); + nodelist_set_consensus(con_md); + nodelist_assert_ok(); + + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + /* We should not fail now we have a consensus and routerstatus_list + * and nodelist are populated. */ + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + + /* Manipulate the nodes so we get the dir server we expect */ + router1_id = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN); + memset(router1_id, TEST_DIR_ROUTER_ID_1, DIGEST_LEN); + router2_id = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN); + memset(router2_id, TEST_DIR_ROUTER_ID_2, DIGEST_LEN); + router3_id = tor_malloc(DIGEST_LEN); + memset(router3_id, TEST_DIR_ROUTER_ID_3, DIGEST_LEN); + + node_router1 = node_get_mutable_by_id(router1_id); + node_router2 = node_get_mutable_by_id(router2_id); + node_router3 = node_get_mutable_by_id(router3_id); + + node_router1->is_possible_guard = 1; + + node_router1->is_running = 0; + node_router3->is_running = 0; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router2_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + rs = NULL; + node_router1->is_running = 1; + node_router3->is_running = 1; + + node_router1->rs->is_v2_dir = 0; + node_router3->rs->is_v2_dir = 0; + tmp_dirport1 = node_router1->rs->dir_port; + tmp_dirport3 = node_router3->rs->dir_port; + node_router1->rs->dir_port = 0; + node_router3->rs->dir_port = 0; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router2_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + rs = NULL; + node_router1->rs->is_v2_dir = 1; + node_router3->rs->is_v2_dir = 1; + node_router1->rs->dir_port = tmp_dirport1; + node_router3->rs->dir_port = tmp_dirport3; + + node_router1->is_valid = 0; + node_router3->is_valid = 0; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router2_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + rs = NULL; + node_router1->is_valid = 1; + node_router3->is_valid = 1; + + flags |= PDS_FOR_GUARD; + node_router1->using_as_guard = 1; + node_router2->using_as_guard = 1; + node_router3->using_as_guard = 1; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs == NULL); + node_router1->using_as_guard = 0; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router1_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + rs = NULL; + node_router2->using_as_guard = 0; + node_router3->using_as_guard = 0; + + /* One not valid, one guard. This should leave one remaining */ + node_router1->is_valid = 0; + node_router2->using_as_guard = 1; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router3_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + rs = NULL; + node_router1->is_valid = 1; + node_router2->using_as_guard = 0; + + /* Manipulate overloaded */ + + node_router2->rs->last_dir_503_at = now; + node_router3->rs->last_dir_503_at = now; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router1_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + node_router2->rs->last_dir_503_at = 0; + node_router3->rs->last_dir_503_at = 0; + + /* Set a Fascist firewall */ + flags &= ! PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL; + policy_line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + policy_line->key = tor_strdup("ReachableORAddresses"); + policy_line->value = tor_strdup("accept *:442, reject *:*"); + options->ReachableORAddresses = policy_line; + policies_parse_from_options(options); + + node_router1->rs->or_port = 444; + node_router2->rs->or_port = 443; + node_router3->rs->or_port = 442; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router3_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + node_router1->rs->or_port = 442; + node_router2->rs->or_port = 443; + node_router3->rs->or_port = 444; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router1_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + + /* Fascist firewall and overloaded */ + node_router1->rs->or_port = 442; + node_router2->rs->or_port = 443; + node_router3->rs->or_port = 442; + node_router3->rs->last_dir_503_at = now; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router1_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + node_router3->rs->last_dir_503_at = 0; + + /* Fascists against OR and Dir */ + policy_line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + policy_line->key = tor_strdup("ReachableAddresses"); + policy_line->value = tor_strdup("accept *:80, reject *:*"); + options->ReachableDirAddresses = policy_line; + policies_parse_from_options(options); + node_router1->rs->or_port = 442; + node_router2->rs->or_port = 441; + node_router3->rs->or_port = 443; + node_router1->rs->dir_port = 80; + node_router2->rs->dir_port = 80; + node_router3->rs->dir_port = 81; + node_router1->rs->last_dir_503_at = now; + rs = router_pick_directory_server_impl(V3_DIRINFO, flags, NULL); + tt_assert(rs != NULL); + tt_assert(tor_memeq(rs->identity_digest, router1_id, DIGEST_LEN)); + node_router1->rs->last_dir_503_at = 0; + + done: + if (router1_id) + tor_free(router1_id); + if (router2_id) + tor_free(router2_id); + if (router3_id) + tor_free(router3_id); + if (options->ReachableORAddresses || + options->ReachableDirAddresses) + policies_free_all(); +} + + connection_t *mocked_connection = NULL; + + /* Mock connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose by returning + * mocked_connection. */ + static connection_t * + mock_connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(int type, + const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, int purpose) + { + (void)type; + (void)addr; + (void)port; + (void)purpose; + + return mocked_connection; + } + + #define TEST_ADDR_STR "127.0.0.1" + #define TEST_DIR_PORT 12345 + + static void + test_routerlist_router_is_already_dir_fetching(void *arg) + { + (void)arg; + tor_addr_port_t test_ap, null_addr_ap, zero_port_ap; + + /* Setup */ + tor_addr_parse(&test_ap.addr, TEST_ADDR_STR); + test_ap.port = TEST_DIR_PORT; + tor_addr_make_null(&null_addr_ap.addr, AF_INET6); + null_addr_ap.port = TEST_DIR_PORT; + tor_addr_parse(&zero_port_ap.addr, TEST_ADDR_STR); + zero_port_ap.port = 0; + MOCK(connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose, + mock_connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose); + + /* Test that we never get 1 from a NULL connection */ + mocked_connection = NULL; + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 1, 1) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 1, 0) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 0, 1) == 0); + /* We always expect 0 in these cases */ + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 0, 0) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(NULL, 1, 1) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&null_addr_ap, 1, 1) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&zero_port_ap, 1, 1) == 0); + + /* Test that we get 1 with a connection in the appropriate circumstances */ + mocked_connection = connection_new(CONN_TYPE_DIR, AF_INET); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 1, 1) == 1); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 1, 0) == 1); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 0, 1) == 1); + + /* Test that we get 0 even with a connection in the appropriate + * circumstances */ + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&test_ap, 0, 0) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(NULL, 1, 1) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&null_addr_ap, 1, 1) == 0); + tt_assert(router_is_already_dir_fetching(&zero_port_ap, 1, 1) == 0); + + done: + /* If a connection is never set up, connection_free chokes on it. */ + buf_free(mocked_connection->inbuf); + buf_free(mocked_connection->outbuf); + tor_free(mocked_connection); + UNMOCK(connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose); + } + + #undef TEST_ADDR_STR + #undef TEST_DIR_PORT + #define NODE(name, flags) \ { #name, test_routerlist_##name, (flags), NULL, NULL } +#define ROUTER(name,flags) \ + { #name, test_router_##name, (flags), NULL, NULL } struct testcase_t routerlist_tests[] = { NODE(initiate_descriptor_downloads, 0), NODE(launch_descriptor_downloads, 0), + NODE(router_is_already_dir_fetching, TT_FORK), + ROUTER(pick_directory_server_impl, TT_FORK), END_OF_TESTCASES };

1 0

[tor/master] Fix a segfault during startup
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 42e131e9acca7c51fb220935deda5dc681004e3f Author: Peter Palfrader <peter(a)palfrader.org> Date: Sat Feb 6 22:17:02 2016 +0100 Fix a segfault during startup If unix socket was configured as listener (such as a ControlSocket or a SocksPort unix socket), and tor was started as root but not configured to switch to another user, tor would segfault while trying to string compare a NULL value. Fixes bug 18261; bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha. Patch by weasel. --- changes/bug18261 | 6 ++++++ src/or/connection.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug18261 b/changes/bug18261 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df4c74f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18261 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features (crypto): + - Fix a segfault during startup: If unix socket was configured as + listener (such as a ControlSocket or a SocksPort unix socket), and + tor was started as root but not configured to switch to another + user, tor would segfault while trying to string compare a NULL + value. Fixes bug 18261; bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha. Patch by weasel. diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 123c33a..efd730f 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -2398,7 +2398,7 @@ retry_listener_ports(smartlist_t *old_conns, /* We don't need to be root to create a UNIX socket, so defer until after * setuid. */ const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (port->is_unix_addr && !geteuid() && strcmp(options->User, "root")) + if (port->is_unix_addr && !geteuid() && (options->User) && strcmp(options->User, "root")) continue; #endif

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[tor/master] Split a long line
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit 7f9ac4957ca8f75a5e72db1c8a967b45d092d125 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:13:02 2016 -0500 Split a long line --- src/or/connection.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index f459a1b..c012018 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -2397,7 +2397,8 @@ retry_listener_ports(smartlist_t *old_conns, /* We don't need to be root to create a UNIX socket, so defer until after * setuid. */ const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (port->is_unix_addr && !geteuid() && (options->User) && strcmp(options->User, "root")) + if (port->is_unix_addr && !geteuid() && (options->User) && + strcmp(options->User, "root")) continue; #endif

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[tor/master] Rename circuit_about_to_free_{terminal -> atexit}
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit cae59b913f7daa154c6b1eb9083d1f582c8d2a1e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:15:12 2016 -0500 Rename circuit_about_to_free_{terminal -> atexit} --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 9b7df75..ade371d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void cpath_ref_decref(crypt_path_reference_t *cpath_ref); //static void circuit_set_rend_token(or_circuit_t *circ, int is_rend_circ, // const uint8_t *token); static void circuit_clear_rend_token(or_circuit_t *circ); -static void circuit_about_to_free_terminal(circuit_t *circ); +static void circuit_about_to_free_atexit(circuit_t *circ); static void circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ); /********* END VARIABLES ************/ @@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ circuit_free_all(void) } } tmp->global_circuitlist_idx = -1; - circuit_about_to_free_terminal(tmp); + circuit_about_to_free_atexit(tmp); circuit_free(tmp); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(lst, tmp); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(tmp); @@ -1752,7 +1752,7 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_, (circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, * do circuitmux_detach_circuit() when appropriate. */ static void -circuit_about_to_free_terminal(circuit_t *circ) +circuit_about_to_free_atexit(circuit_t *circ) { if (circ->n_chan) {

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'weasel/bug18261'
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

commit bc7a5eeeda58c68b3c8434fd66c404aae269dbb0 Merge: c0a6c34 42e131e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 11 12:12:02 2016 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'weasel/bug18261' changes/bug18261 | 6 ++++++ src/or/connection.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

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