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[tor/master] Slight improvements to DH coverage.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit d88656ec066f9fe856230f95ff76bf97f31ed46e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 14:15:00 2016 -0400 Slight improvements to DH coverage. --- src/common/crypto.c | 9 +++++++++ src/test/test_crypto.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 37477c5..71cab24 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2269,10 +2269,13 @@ crypto_dh_new(int dh_type) return res; err: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * This error condition is only reached when an allocation fails */ crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "creating DH object"); if (res->dh) DH_free(res->dh); /* frees p and g too */ tor_free(res); return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } /** Return a copy of <b>dh</b>, sharing its internal state. */ @@ -2304,10 +2307,15 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) { again: if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * To test this we would need some way to tell openssl to break DH. */ crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key"); return -1; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * If this happens, then openssl's DH implementation is busted. */ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" "the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again."); /* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */ @@ -2315,6 +2323,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) BN_clear_free(dh->dh->priv_key); dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL; goto again; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } return 0; } diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 1437652..e89b94e 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static void test_crypto_dh(void *arg) { crypto_dh_t *dh1 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); + crypto_dh_t *dh1_dup = NULL; crypto_dh_t *dh2 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); char p1[DH_BYTES]; char p2[DH_BYTES]; @@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES); memset(p2, 0, DH_BYTES); tt_mem_op(p1,OP_EQ, p2, DH_BYTES); + + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, 6)); /* too short */ + tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES)); tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH_BYTES); tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh2, p2, DH_BYTES)); @@ -54,6 +58,12 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_int_op(s1len,OP_EQ, s2len); tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); + + /* test dh_dup; make sure it works the same. */ + dh1_dup = crypto_dh_dup(dh1); + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); + { /* XXXX Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught, * Check 0, 1, N-1, >= N, etc. @@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) done: crypto_dh_free(dh1); crypto_dh_free(dh2); + crypto_dh_free(dh1_dup); } static void

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[tor/master] Cover all our DH code, and/or mark it unreachable.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 365d0fcc6db6a628c0ff118f2d5b03cebdcd4734 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 4 09:43:47 2016 -0400 Cover all our DH code, and/or mark it unreachable. --- src/common/crypto.c | 15 ++++++++++----- src/test/test_crypto.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 24a9590..9551435 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2165,9 +2165,14 @@ crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void) int r; /* If the space is occupied, free the previous TLS DH prime */ - if (dh_param_p_tls) { + if (BUG(dh_param_p_tls)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * + * We shouldn't be calling this twice. + */ BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); dh_param_p_tls = NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } tls_prime = BN_new(); @@ -2199,8 +2204,8 @@ init_dh_param(void) { BIGNUM *circuit_dh_prime; int r; - if (dh_param_p && dh_param_g) - return; + if (BUG(dh_param_p && dh_param_g)) + return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE This function isn't supposed to be called twice. circuit_dh_prime = BN_new(); tor_assert(circuit_dh_prime); @@ -2366,8 +2371,8 @@ tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn) tor_assert(bn); x = BN_new(); tor_assert(x); - if (!dh_param_p) - init_dh_param(); + if (BUG(!dh_param_p)) + init_dh_param(); //LCOV_EXCL_LINE we already checked whether we did this. BN_set_word(x, 1); if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) { log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2."); diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index dd9a376..e981eac 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_int_op(s1len,OP_EQ, s2len); tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); - /* test dh_dup; make sure it works the same. */ dh1_dup = crypto_dh_dup(dh1); s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); @@ -132,6 +131,19 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); } + { + /* provoke an error in the openssl DH_compute_key function; make sure we + * survive. */ + tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES)); + + crypto_dh_free(dh2); + dh2= crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); /* no private key set */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2, + p1, DH_BYTES, + s1, 50); + tt_int_op(s1len, OP_EQ, -1); + } + done: crypto_dh_free(dh1); crypto_dh_free(dh2);

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[tor/master] At long last, unit tests for degenerate DH public keys.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 94b34d1be6f20c967736ba858d6e765fd369c4e8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 3 17:08:56 2016 -0400 At long last, unit tests for degenerate DH public keys. Apparently, we detect and reject them correctly. Aren't you glad? --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index e89b94e..dd9a376 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -65,9 +65,71 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg) tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len); { - /* XXXX Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught, - * Check 0, 1, N-1, >= N, etc. - */ + /* Now fabricate some bad values and make sure they get caught. */ + + /* 1 and 0 should both fail. */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x01", 1, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x00", 1, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES); /* 0 with padding. */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 1; /* 1 with padding*/ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + /* 2 is okay, though weird. */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x02", 1, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(50, OP_EQ, s1len); + + const char P[] = + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" + "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" + "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9" + "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6" + "49286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"; + + /* p-1, p, and so on are not okay. */ + base16_decode(p1, sizeof(p1), P, strlen(P)); + + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xFE; /* p-1 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xFD; /* p-2 works fine */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(50, OP_EQ, s1len); + + const char P_plus_one[] = + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" + "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" + "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9" + "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6" + "49286651ECE653820000000000000000"; + + base16_decode(p1, sizeof(p1), P_plus_one, strlen(P_plus_one)); + + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0x01; /* p+2 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xff; /* p+256 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); + + memset(p1, 0xff, sizeof(DH_BYTES)), /* 2^1024-1 */ + s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50); + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len); } done:

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[tor/master] Refactor digest allocation backend code
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit b688945dfbc8b0a27f510db259ec7c1aaa4bfb34 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 4 09:53:10 2016 -0400 Refactor digest allocation backend code I'm doing this to simplify crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix, and make it better covered by our tests. --- src/common/crypto.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 9551435..8fdcfc1 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -1786,16 +1786,46 @@ crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(digest_algorithm_t alg) #undef STRUCT_FIELD_SIZE } +/** + * Internal function: create and return a new digest object for 'algorithm'. + * Does not typecheck the algorithm. + */ +static crypto_digest_t * +crypto_digest_new_internal(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) +{ + crypto_digest_t *r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(algorithm)); + r->algorithm = algorithm; + + switch (algorithm) + { + case DIGEST_SHA1: + SHA1_Init(&r->d.sha1); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA256: + SHA256_Init(&r->d.sha2); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA512: + SHA512_Init(&r->d.sha512); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA3_256: + keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 256); + break; + case DIGEST_SHA3_512: + keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 512); + break; + default: + tor_assert_unreached(); + } + + return r; +} + /** Allocate and return a new digest object to compute SHA1 digests. */ crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest_new(void) { - crypto_digest_t *r; - r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(DIGEST_SHA1)); - SHA1_Init(&r->d.sha1); - r->algorithm = DIGEST_SHA1; - return r; + return crypto_digest_new_internal(DIGEST_SHA1); } /** Allocate and return a new digest object to compute 256-bit digests @@ -1803,15 +1833,8 @@ crypto_digest_new(void) crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest256_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) { - crypto_digest_t *r; tor_assert(algorithm == DIGEST_SHA256 || algorithm == DIGEST_SHA3_256); - r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(algorithm)); - if (algorithm == DIGEST_SHA256) - SHA256_Init(&r->d.sha2); - else - keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 256); - r->algorithm = algorithm; - return r; + return crypto_digest_new_internal(algorithm); } /** Allocate and return a new digest object to compute 512-bit digests @@ -1819,15 +1842,8 @@ crypto_digest256_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) crypto_digest_t * crypto_digest512_new(digest_algorithm_t algorithm) { - crypto_digest_t *r; tor_assert(algorithm == DIGEST_SHA512 || algorithm == DIGEST_SHA3_512); - r = tor_malloc(crypto_digest_alloc_bytes(algorithm)); - if (algorithm == DIGEST_SHA512) - SHA512_Init(&r->d.sha512); - else - keccak_digest_init(&r->d.sha3, 512); - r->algorithm = algorithm; - return r; + return crypto_digest_new_internal(algorithm); } /** Deallocate a digest object. @@ -1977,27 +1993,7 @@ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(char *digest_out, size_t len_out, const char *append, digest_algorithm_t alg) { - crypto_digest_t *d = NULL; - switch (alg) { - case DIGEST_SHA1: - d = crypto_digest_new(); - break; - case DIGEST_SHA256: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ - case DIGEST_SHA3_256: - d = crypto_digest256_new(alg); - break; - case DIGEST_SHA512: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ - case DIGEST_SHA3_512: - d = crypto_digest512_new(alg); - break; - default: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called with unknown algorithm %d", alg); - /* If fragile_assert is not enabled, wipe output and return - * without running any calculations */ - memwipe(digest_out, 0xff, len_out); - tor_fragile_assert(); - goto free; - } + crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest_new_internal(alg); if (prepend) crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, prepend, strlen(prepend)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lst, const char *, cp, @@ -2005,8 +2001,6 @@ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(char *digest_out, size_t len_out, if (append) crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, append, strlen(append)); crypto_digest_get_digest(d, digest_out, len_out); - - free: crypto_digest_free(d); }

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[tor/master] Mark even more crypto lines (the fragile_assert ones) as unreachable
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 62c5a1fa45efcb52eb3ce9d0cce04e31490a5468 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 4 09:59:24 2016 -0400 Mark even more crypto lines (the fragile_assert ones) as unreachable --- src/common/crypto.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 8fdcfc1..fb5dd06 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -938,6 +938,10 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) new_key = RSAPublicKey_dup(env->key); } if (!new_key) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * + * We can't cause RSA*Key_dup() to fail, so we can't really test this. + */ log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Unable to duplicate a %s key: openssl failed.", privatekey?"private":"public"); crypto_log_errors(LOG_ERR, @@ -945,6 +949,7 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) "Duplicating a public key"); tor_fragile_assert(); return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } return crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(new_key); @@ -1695,8 +1700,10 @@ crypto_digest_algorithm_get_name(digest_algorithm_t alg) case DIGEST_SHA3_512: return "sha3-512"; default: + // LCOV_EXCL_START tor_fragile_assert(); return "??unknown_digest??"; + // LCOV_EXCL_STOP } } @@ -1886,8 +1893,10 @@ crypto_digest_add_bytes(crypto_digest_t *digest, const char *data, keccak_digest_update(&digest->d.sha3, (const uint8_t *)data, len); break; default: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ tor_fragile_assert(); break; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } } @@ -1929,10 +1938,10 @@ crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, //LCOV_EXCL_START case DIGEST_SHA3_256: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ case DIGEST_SHA3_512: - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handling unexpected algorithm %d", digest->algorithm); - tor_assert(0); /* This is fatal, because it should never happen. */ default: - tor_assert(0); /* Unreachable. */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handling unexpected algorithm %d", digest->algorithm); + /* This is fatal, because it should never happen. */ + tor_assert_unreached(); break; //LCOV_EXCL_STOP }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'crypto_unit_tests_v2_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 060e0d0a7510564bf86a79612c219b0205028e9d Merge: 7bc9d1e 62c5a1f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 16 08:26:11 2016 -0400 Merge branch 'crypto_unit_tests_v2_squashed' changes/bug18956 | 5 + src/common/crypto.c | 159 ++++++++----- src/common/crypto.h | 1 + src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 9 +- src/common/crypto_ed25519.c | 9 +- src/common/crypto_pwbox.c | 28 ++- src/common/crypto_s2k.c | 2 +- src/test/test_crypto.c | 525 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/test/test_ntor_cl.c | 5 +- 9 files changed, 663 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)

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[torspec/master] document when we added 15588
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 79ed432e5e3edddd6163f169303d83b58b641b70 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 16 08:02:25 2016 -0400 document when we added 15588 --- control-spec.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index abab1d7..a10e202 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ S: 250 OK [ADD_ONION was added in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha.] - [ClientAuth was added in Tor 0.x.x.x.] + [ClientAuth was added in Tor 0.2.9.1-alpha.] 3.28. DEL_ONION

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[tor-browser-bundle/master] Bug 18904: Mac OS meek-http-helper profile not updated
by gk＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 495885feb51d7f1faf6d4c0dc3dd8f47e9f1caa7 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Thu May 12 13:59:23 2016 -0400 Bug 18904: Mac OS meek-http-helper profile not updated When DATA_OUTSIDE_APP_DIR=1, add a meek-template-sha256sum.txt file to the meek-http-helper browser profile template. The meek-client-torbrowser program uses this file to automatically detect changes to the profile, e.g., after Tor Browser is updated. --- gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-bundle.yml | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-bundle.yml b/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-bundle.yml index ff17520..1d200b5 100644 --- a/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-bundle.yml +++ b/gitian/descriptors/mac/gitian-bundle.yml @@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ script: | cat ~/build/torrc-defaults-appendix-mac >> $TORCONFIGPATH/torrc-defaults cat ~/build/bridge_prefs.js >> $EXTOVERRIDESPATH cat ~/build/meek-http-helper-user.js >> $MEEKPROFILEPATH/user.js + if [ "z$DATA_OUTSIDE_APP_DIR" = "z1" ]; then + # Create the meek-template-sha256sum.txt file by generating a list + # of hashes (one for each file within the meek-http-helper profile) and + # and then generating one final hash from the contents of the list. + sha256sum `find $MEEKPROFILEPATH -type f | sort` | sha256sum | sed -e 's/ *-$//' > $MEEKPROFILEPATH/meek-template-sha256sum.txt + fi fi # If not building a multi-lingual package, suppress the language prompt. if [ "z$MULTI_LINGUAL" != "z1" ]; then

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[torbutton/master] Bug 18743: Pref to hide 'Sign in to Sync' button in hamburger menu
by gk＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit d127873b498fb83e4f608b82a8d382df25183dd3 Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Apr 25 23:03:17 2016 -0700 Bug 18743: Pref to hide 'Sign in to Sync' button in hamburger menu --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js | 1 + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index a8a4ce6..a293c44 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -236,6 +236,9 @@ var torbutton_unique_pref_observer = case "extensions.torbutton.restrict_thirdparty": torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs(); break; + case "extensions.torbutton.hide_sync_ui": + torbutton_update_sync_ui(); + break; case "gfx.font_rendering.opentype_svg.enabled": case "javascript.options.ion.content": case "javascript.options.typeinference": @@ -625,6 +628,7 @@ function torbutton_init() { torbutton_update_toolbutton(mode); torbutton_update_statusbar(mode); torbutton_notify_if_update_needed(); + torbutton_update_sync_ui(); createTorCircuitDisplay(m_tb_control_host, m_tb_control_port, m_tb_control_pass, "extensions.torbutton.display_circuit"); @@ -3566,4 +3570,16 @@ function torbutton_is_homepage_url(aURI) return (urls.indexOf(aURI.spec) >= 0); } +// Check if "extensions.torbutton.hide_sync_ui" is enabled, and if so, +// hide the "Sign in to Sync" button on the hamburger menu. +function torbutton_update_sync_ui() +{ + try { + document.getElementById("PanelUI-footer-fxa").style.display = + getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.hide_sync_ui") ? "none" : ""; + } catch (e) { + torbutton_log(5, 'Error updating the Sync UI: ' + e); + } +} + //vim:set ts=4 diff --git a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js index 548f4ed..c958ec4 100644 --- a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js +++ b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ pref("extensions.torbutton.display_panel",true); pref("extensions.torbutton.panel_style",'text'); pref("extensions.torbutton(a)torproject.org.description", "chrome://torbutton/locale/torbutton.properties"); pref("extensions.torbutton.updateNeeded", false); +pref("extensions.torbutton.hide_sync_ui", true); // proxy prefs pref("extensions.torbutton.settings_method",'recommended');

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1] fixup! Bug 12827: Create preference to disable SVG.
by gk＠torproject.org 16 May '16

16 May '16

commit 7ffe3230d2b6020394803784c140765e7c8e4b76 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue May 10 16:57:17 2016 -0400 fixup! Bug 12827: Create preference to disable SVG. When SVGs are disabled, do no load SVG images within the Page Info Media tab (bug 18770). --- image/ImageFactory.cpp | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/image/ImageFactory.cpp b/image/ImageFactory.cpp index 9298d74..ec20c78 100644 --- a/image/ImageFactory.cpp +++ b/image/ImageFactory.cpp @@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ ImageFactory::CreateImage(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel(do_QueryInterface(aRequest)); isBlocked = !NS_SVGEnabledForChannel(channel); if (!isBlocked && channel && !NS_SVGEnabledForChannel(nullptr)) { - // Special case for favicons: block this image load if SVGs are - // disallowed from content and if this image load originated from the + // This SVG was not blocked based on the channel but SVGs are + // disallowed from content. Check some special cases. + + // For favicons, block this SVG image load if it originated from the // favicon xul:image node within a tab. nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo; nsresult rv = channel->GetLoadInfo(getter_AddRefs(loadInfo)); @@ -111,6 +113,17 @@ ImageFactory::CreateImage(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsAutoString anonid; elem->GetAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("anonid"), anonid); isBlocked = anonid.EqualsLiteral("tab-icon-image"); + + if (!isBlocked) { + // For the Page Info "Media" tab, block this SVG image load if + // it originated from a node within a chrome document that has + // an id of "thepreviewimage". + if (nsContentUtils::IsChromeDoc(node->OwnerDoc())) { + nsAutoString loadingID; + elem->GetId(loadingID); + isBlocked = loadingID.EqualsLiteral("thepreviewimage"); + } + } } } }

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