February 2022 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/main] Make N_EWMA a percentage of CWND update rate, capped by a max value.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 43f6f3fd3a85047fc7fc41e6ce8f924d007b98ee Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jan 21 23:00:35 2022 +0000 Make N_EWMA a percentage of CWND update rate, capped by a max value. This proved better in Shadow sims than just a multiple of CWND. --- src/core/or/congestion_control_common.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/congestion_control_common.c b/src/core/or/congestion_control_common.c index 93d3e54fcd..fb56014315 100644 --- a/src/core/or/congestion_control_common.c +++ b/src/core/or/congestion_control_common.c @@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ #define CWND_MAX_DFLT (INT32_MAX) #define BWE_SENDME_MIN_DFLT (5) -#define EWMA_CWND_COUNT_DFLT (2) + +#define N_EWMA_CWND_PCT_DFLT (50) +#define N_EWMA_MAX_DFLT (10) /* BDP algorithms for each congestion control algorithms use the piecewise * estimattor. See section 3.1.4 of proposal 324. */ @@ -98,7 +100,12 @@ static cc_alg_t cc_alg = CC_ALG_DFLT; /** * Number of cwnd worth of sendme acks to smooth RTT and BDP with, * using N_EWMA */ -static uint8_t ewma_cwnd_cnt; +static uint8_t n_ewma_cwnd_pct; + +/** + * Maximum number N for the N-count EWMA averaging of RTT and BDP. + */ +static uint8_t n_ewma_max; /** * Minimum number of sendmes before we begin BDP estimates @@ -174,14 +181,21 @@ congestion_control_new_consensus_params(const networkstatus_t *ns) BWE_SENDME_MIN_MIN, BWE_SENDME_MIN_MAX); -#define EWMA_CWND_COUNT_MIN 1 -#define EWMA_CWND_COUNT_MAX (100) - ewma_cwnd_cnt = - networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cc_ewma_cwnd_cnt", - EWMA_CWND_COUNT_DFLT, - EWMA_CWND_COUNT_MIN, - EWMA_CWND_COUNT_MAX); - +#define N_EWMA_CWND_PCT_MIN 1 +#define N_EWMA_CWND_PCT_MAX (255) + n_ewma_cwnd_pct = + networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cc_ewma_cwnd_pct", + N_EWMA_CWND_PCT_DFLT, + N_EWMA_CWND_PCT_MIN, + N_EWMA_CWND_PCT_MAX); + +#define N_EWMA_MAX_MIN 2 +#define N_EWMA_MAX_MAX (INT32_MAX) + n_ewma_max = + networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cc_ewma_max", + N_EWMA_MAX_DFLT, + N_EWMA_MAX_MIN, + N_EWMA_MAX_MAX); } /** @@ -429,14 +443,19 @@ dequeue_timestamp(smartlist_t *timestamps_u64_usecs) } /** - * Returns the number of sendme acks that will be recieved in the - * current congestion window size, rounded to nearest int. + * Returns the number N of N-count EWMA, for averaging RTT and BDP over + * N SENDME acks. + * + * This N is bracketed between a divisor of the number of acks in a CWND + * and a max value. It is always at least 2. */ static inline uint64_t -sendme_acks_per_cwnd(const congestion_control_t *cc) +n_ewma_count(const congestion_control_t *cc) { - /* We add half a sendme_inc to cwnd to round to the nearest int */ - return ((cc->cwnd + cc->sendme_inc/2)/cc->sendme_inc); + uint64_t ewma_cnt = MIN(CWND_UPDATE_RATE(cc)*n_ewma_cwnd_pct/100, + n_ewma_max); + ewma_cnt = MAX(ewma_cnt, 2); + return ewma_cnt; } /** @@ -815,8 +834,7 @@ congestion_control_update_circuit_rtt(congestion_control_t *cc, return 0; } - ewma_cnt = ewma_cwnd_cnt*sendme_acks_per_cwnd(cc); - ewma_cnt = MAX(ewma_cnt, 2); // Use at least 2 + ewma_cnt = n_ewma_count(cc); cc->ewma_rtt_usec = n_count_ewma(rtt, cc->ewma_rtt_usec, ewma_cnt); @@ -939,7 +957,7 @@ congestion_control_update_circuit_bdp(congestion_control_t *cc, while (smartlist_len(cc->sendme_arrival_timestamps) > bwe_sendme_min && (uint64_t)smartlist_len(cc->sendme_arrival_timestamps) > - sendme_acks_per_cwnd(cc)) { + n_ewma_count(cc)) { (void)dequeue_timestamp(cc->sendme_arrival_timestamps); } int sendme_cnt = smartlist_len(cc->sendme_arrival_timestamps); @@ -966,7 +984,7 @@ congestion_control_update_circuit_bdp(congestion_control_t *cc, /* Calculate BDP_EWMA_COUNT N-EWMA */ cc->bdp[BDP_ALG_SENDME_RATE] = n_count_ewma(sendme_rate_bdp, cc->bdp[BDP_ALG_SENDME_RATE], - ewma_cwnd_cnt*sendme_acks_per_cwnd(cc)); + n_ewma_count(cc)); } }

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[tor/main] Only apply more frequent cwnd updates after slow start.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit d62f9c9d0058ba3bfa8fe226c697abb05a477c5a Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jan 21 23:20:52 2022 +0000 Only apply more frequent cwnd updates after slow start. --- src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h b/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h index 0d6bf0b662..ea80868350 100644 --- a/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h @@ -206,7 +206,8 @@ struct congestion_control_t { * * Congestion control literature recommends only one update of cwnd per * cwnd worth of acks. However, we can also tune this to be more frequent - * by increasing the 'cc_cwnd_inc_rate' consensus parameter. + * by increasing the 'cc_cwnd_inc_rate' consensus parameter. This tuning + * only applies after slow start. * * If this returns 0 due to high cwnd_inc_rate, the calling code will * update every sendme ack. @@ -215,8 +216,13 @@ static inline uint64_t CWND_UPDATE_RATE(const struct congestion_control_t *cc) { /* We add cwnd_inc_rate*sendme_inc/2 to round to nearest integer number * of acks */ - return ((cc->cwnd + cc->cwnd_inc_rate*cc->sendme_inc/2) + + if (cc->in_slow_start) { + return ((cc->cwnd + cc->sendme_inc/2)/cc->sendme_inc); + } else { + return ((cc->cwnd + cc->cwnd_inc_rate*cc->sendme_inc/2) / (cc->cwnd_inc_rate*cc->sendme_inc)); + } } /**

1 0

[tor/main] Exit slow start at the gamma threshold
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 3a3f111b23d6d989dcae5858e2ab597a34f7910b Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jan 23 18:15:12 2022 +0000 Exit slow start at the gamma threshold This improves performance and fairness. --- src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c b/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c index 0ebff17faf..ff825f94cc 100644 --- a/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c +++ b/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c @@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ congestion_control_vegas_process_sendme(congestion_control_t *cc, cc->cwnd = MAX(cc->cwnd + MAX(CWND_INC_SS(cc), 2*cc->sendme_inc), vegas_bdp_mix(cc)); } else { - /* Congestion signal: Fall back to Vegas equilibrium (BDP) */ - cc->cwnd = vegas_bdp_mix(cc); + /* Congestion signal: Set cwnd to gamma threshhold */ + cc->cwnd = vegas_bdp_mix(cc) + cc->vegas_params.gamma; cc->in_slow_start = 0; log_info(LD_CIRC, "CC: TOR_VEGAS exiting slow start"); }

1 0

[tor/main] Add a delta parameter to Vegas.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit a956b20c1d090ee2439f47418a6540d2f95be279 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 1 15:32:08 2022 +0000 Add a delta parameter to Vegas. This allows us to cap the queue use during steady state. In shadow, this reduced instances of long circuit queues at relays. --- src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h | 2 ++ src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h b/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h index ea80868350..2c905772c1 100644 --- a/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/congestion_control_st.h @@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ struct vegas_params_t { uint16_t alpha; /** The queue use above which we decrement cwnd */ uint16_t beta; + /** The queue use at which we cap cwnd in steady state */ + uint16_t delta; /** Weighted average (percent) between cwnd estimator and * piecewise estimator. */ uint8_t bdp_mix_pct; diff --git a/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c b/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c index ff825f94cc..5c62787375 100644 --- a/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c +++ b/src/core/or/congestion_control_vegas.c @@ -29,27 +29,32 @@ #define VEGAS_ALPHA_SBWS_DFLT (2*OUTBUF_CELLS-TLS_RECORD_MAX_CELLS) #define VEGAS_BETA_SBWS_DFLT (2*OUTBUF_CELLS) #define VEGAS_GAMMA_SBWS_DFLT (2*OUTBUF_CELLS) +#define VEGAS_DELTA_SBWS_DFLT (4*OUTBUF_CELLS) /* Exits are three hops, so params are based on 3 outbufs of cells */ #define VEGAS_ALPHA_EXIT_DFLT (3*OUTBUF_CELLS-TLS_RECORD_MAX_CELLS) #define VEGAS_BETA_EXIT_DFLT (3*OUTBUF_CELLS) #define VEGAS_GAMMA_EXIT_DFLT (3*OUTBUF_CELLS) +#define VEGAS_DELTA_EXIT_DFLT (5*OUTBUF_CELLS) /* Onion rends are six hops, so params are based on 6 outbufs of cells */ #define VEGAS_ALPHA_ONION_DFLT (6*OUTBUF_CELLS-TLS_RECORD_MAX_CELLS) #define VEGAS_BETA_ONION_DFLT (6*OUTBUF_CELLS) #define VEGAS_GAMMA_ONION_DFLT (6*OUTBUF_CELLS) +#define VEGAS_DELTA_ONION_DFLT (8*OUTBUF_CELLS) /* Single Onions are three hops, so params are based on 3 outbufs of cells */ #define VEGAS_ALPHA_SOS_DFLT (3*OUTBUF_CELLS-TLS_RECORD_MAX_CELLS) #define VEGAS_BETA_SOS_DFLT (3*OUTBUF_CELLS) #define VEGAS_GAMMA_SOS_DFLT (3*OUTBUF_CELLS) +#define VEGAS_DELTA_SOS_DFLT (5*OUTBUF_CELLS) /* Vanguard Onions are 7 hops (or 8 if both sides use vanguards, but that * should be rare), so params are based on 7 outbufs of cells */ #define VEGAS_ALPHA_VG_DFLT (7*OUTBUF_CELLS-TLS_RECORD_MAX_CELLS) #define VEGAS_BETA_VG_DFLT (7*OUTBUF_CELLS) #define VEGAS_GAMMA_VG_DFLT (7*OUTBUF_CELLS) +#define VEGAS_DELTA_VG_DFLT (9*OUTBUF_CELLS) #define VEGAS_BDP_MIX_PCT 100 @@ -81,48 +86,59 @@ congestion_control_vegas_set_params(congestion_control_t *cc, { tor_assert(cc->cc_alg == CC_ALG_VEGAS); const char *alpha_str = NULL, *beta_str = NULL, *gamma_str = NULL; - int alpha, beta, gamma; + const char *delta_str = NULL; + int alpha, beta, gamma, delta; switch (path) { case CC_PATH_SBWS: alpha_str = "cc_vegas_alpha_sbws"; beta_str = "cc_vegas_beta_sbws"; gamma_str = "cc_vegas_gamma_sbws"; + delta_str = "cc_vegas_delta_sbws"; alpha = VEGAS_ALPHA_SBWS_DFLT; beta = VEGAS_BETA_SBWS_DFLT; gamma = VEGAS_GAMMA_SBWS_DFLT; + delta = VEGAS_DELTA_SBWS_DFLT; break; case CC_PATH_EXIT: alpha_str = "cc_vegas_alpha_exit"; beta_str = "cc_vegas_beta_exit"; gamma_str = "cc_vegas_gamma_exit"; + delta_str = "cc_vegas_delta_exit"; alpha = VEGAS_ALPHA_EXIT_DFLT; beta = VEGAS_BETA_EXIT_DFLT; gamma = VEGAS_GAMMA_EXIT_DFLT; + delta = VEGAS_DELTA_EXIT_DFLT; break; case CC_PATH_ONION: alpha_str = "cc_vegas_alpha_onion"; beta_str = "cc_vegas_beta_onion"; gamma_str = "cc_vegas_gamma_onion"; + delta_str = "cc_vegas_delta_onion"; alpha = VEGAS_ALPHA_ONION_DFLT; beta = VEGAS_BETA_ONION_DFLT; gamma = VEGAS_GAMMA_ONION_DFLT; + delta = VEGAS_DELTA_ONION_DFLT; break; case CC_PATH_ONION_SOS: alpha_str = "cc_vegas_alpha_sos"; beta_str = "cc_vegas_beta_sos"; gamma_str = "cc_vegas_gamma_sos"; + delta_str = "cc_vegas_delta_sos"; alpha = VEGAS_ALPHA_SOS_DFLT; beta = VEGAS_BETA_SOS_DFLT; gamma = VEGAS_GAMMA_SOS_DFLT; + delta = VEGAS_DELTA_SOS_DFLT; break; case CC_PATH_ONION_VG: alpha_str = "cc_vegas_alpha_vg"; beta_str = "cc_vegas_beta_vg"; gamma_str = "cc_vegas_gamma_vg"; + delta_str = "cc_vegas_delta_vg"; alpha = VEGAS_ALPHA_VG_DFLT; beta = VEGAS_BETA_VG_DFLT; gamma = VEGAS_GAMMA_VG_DFLT; + delta = VEGAS_DELTA_VG_DFLT; break; default: tor_assert(0); @@ -147,6 +163,12 @@ congestion_control_vegas_set_params(congestion_control_t *cc, 0, 1000); + cc->vegas_params.delta = + networkstatus_get_param(NULL, delta_str, + delta, + 0, + INT32_MAX); + cc->vegas_params.bdp_mix_pct = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cc_vegas_bdp_mix", VEGAS_BDP_MIX_PCT, @@ -216,7 +238,9 @@ congestion_control_vegas_process_sendme(congestion_control_t *cc, log_info(LD_CIRC, "CC: TOR_VEGAS exiting slow start"); } } else { - if (queue_use > cc->vegas_params.beta || cc->blocked_chan) { + if (queue_use > cc->vegas_params.delta) { + cc->cwnd = vegas_bdp_mix(cc) + cc->vegas_params.delta - CWND_INC(cc); + } else if (queue_use > cc->vegas_params.beta || cc->blocked_chan) { cc->cwnd -= CWND_INC(cc); } else if (queue_use < cc->vegas_params.alpha) { cc->cwnd += CWND_INC(cc);

1 0

[tor/main] Add test for sendme_cell_is_next with sendme_inc of 31
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 8f4bd8730c1df180e0ef2f5e6565c21b37ae593a Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 17 00:26:08 2022 +0000 Add test for sendme_cell_is_next with sendme_inc of 31 --- src/test/test_sendme.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_sendme.c b/src/test/test_sendme.c index 1a046b5c50..ea7ccd0b3c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_sendme.c +++ b/src/test/test_sendme.c @@ -372,6 +372,26 @@ done: ; } +/* Check that circuit_sendme_is_next works with a window of 31 */ +static void +test_sendme_is_next(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(1000, 31), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(970, 31), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(969, 31), OP_EQ, 0); + + /* deliver_window should never get this low, but test anyway */ + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(9, 31), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(8, 31), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(7, 31), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(1, 31), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(0, 31), OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + ; +} + struct testcase_t sendme_tests[] = { { "v1_record_digest", test_v1_record_digest, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, @@ -385,6 +405,7 @@ struct testcase_t sendme_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "package_payload_len", test_package_payload_len, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "sendme_is_next1000", test_sendme_is_next1000, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "sendme_is_next", test_sendme_is_next, 0, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

1 0

[tor/main] Add test for sendme_inc validation.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 01bda6c23f58947ad1e20ea6367a5c260f53dfab Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 17 17:36:46 2022 +0000 Add test for sendme_inc validation. --- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index ecb7da2450..469e3c39f9 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -840,6 +840,44 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg) testing_disable_prefilled_rng(); } +static void +test_validate_sendme(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + /* Test basic operation: factors of 2X in either direction are OK */ + cc_sendme_inc = 31; + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(15)); + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(62)); + + /* Test basic operation: Exceeding 2X fails */ + cc_sendme_inc = 31; + tt_assert(!congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(14)); + tt_assert(!congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(63)); + + /* Test potential overflow conditions */ + cc_sendme_inc = 129; + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(255)); + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(64)); + tt_assert(!congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(63)); + + cc_sendme_inc = 127; + tt_assert(!congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(255)); + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(254)); + + cc_sendme_inc = 255; + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(255)); + tt_assert(congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(127)); + tt_assert(!congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(126)); + + /* Test 0 case */ + cc_sendme_inc = 1; + tt_assert(!congestion_control_validate_sendme_increment(0)); + +done: + ; +} + struct testcase_t hs_descriptor[] = { /* Encoding tests. */ { "cert_encoding", test_cert_encoding, TT_FORK, @@ -860,6 +898,8 @@ struct testcase_t hs_descriptor[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "decode_bad_signature", test_decode_bad_signature, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "validate_sendme", test_validate_sendme, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, /* Misc. */ { "version", test_supported_version, TT_FORK,

1 0

[tor/main] Add changes file
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 933e4b4788982d35414d5ecfe54a94479513b136 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Feb 4 00:46:50 2022 +0000 Add changes file --- changes/ticket40444 | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket40444 b/changes/ticket40444 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62aa281889 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40444 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major features (relay, client, onion services): + - Implement RTT-based congestion control for exits and onion services, + from Proposal 324. Disabled by default. Enabled by the 'cc_alg' + consensus parameter. Closes ticket 40444. +

1 0

[tor/main] Add test for circuit_sendme_cell_is_next() when sendme_inc is 100.
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 5c88bea84c3535ed908d51d2ed2e9beaa58ee607 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 17 00:04:41 2022 +0000 Add test for circuit_sendme_cell_is_next() when sendme_inc is 100. This ensures compatibility with old tor. --- src/core/or/sendme.c | 2 +- src/core/or/sendme.h | 2 ++ src/test/test_sendme.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/sendme.c b/src/core/or/sendme.c index 9acef1cc20..494910049e 100644 --- a/src/core/or/sendme.c +++ b/src/core/or/sendme.c @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ record_cell_digest_on_circ(circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *sendme_digest) * low in the stack when decrypting or encrypting a cell. The window is only * updated once the cell is actually put in the outbuf. */ -static bool +STATIC bool circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(int deliver_window, int sendme_inc) { /* Are we at the limit of the increment and if not, we don't expect next diff --git a/src/core/or/sendme.h b/src/core/or/sendme.h index 2abec91a91..bc1daef23d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/sendme.h +++ b/src/core/or/sendme.h @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ STATIC ssize_t build_cell_payload_v1(const uint8_t *cell_digest, STATIC bool sendme_is_valid(const circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cell_payload, size_t cell_payload_len); +STATIC bool circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(int deliver_window, + int sendme_inc); #endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ diff --git a/src/test/test_sendme.c b/src/test/test_sendme.c index eef65a394e..1a046b5c50 100644 --- a/src/test/test_sendme.c +++ b/src/test/test_sendme.c @@ -348,6 +348,30 @@ test_package_payload_len(void *arg) tor_free(c); } +/* Check that circuit_sendme_is_next works with a window of 1000, + * and a sendme_inc of 100 (old school tor compat) */ +static void +test_sendme_is_next1000(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(1000, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(999, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(901, 100), OP_EQ, 1); + + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(900, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(899, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(801, 100), OP_EQ, 1); + + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(101, 100), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(100, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(99, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(1, 100), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(0, 100), OP_EQ, 0); + +done: + ; +} + struct testcase_t sendme_tests[] = { { "v1_record_digest", test_v1_record_digest, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, @@ -360,6 +384,7 @@ struct testcase_t sendme_tests[] = { { "cell_version_validation", test_cell_version_validation, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "package_payload_len", test_package_payload_len, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "sendme_is_next1000", test_sendme_is_next1000, 0, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

1 0

[tor/main] Add a size argument for the buffer on onion handshake functions
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 358ce9a19d522d1e1cf9a119850e924ca106fec5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 14 14:19:22 2021 -0400 Add a size argument for the buffer on onion handshake functions --- src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h | 4 +++- src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c | 1 + src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 6 ++++-- src/core/or/command.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c index f85ee2c82b..66c21bf655 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c @@ -103,19 +103,23 @@ onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state) /** Perform the first step of a circuit-creation handshake of type type * (one of ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_*): generate the initial "onion skin" in - * onion_skin_out, and store any state information in state_out. + * onion_skin_out with length of up to onion_skin_out_maxlen, + * and store any state information in state_out. * Return -1 on failure, and the length of the onionskin on acceptance. */ int onion_skin_create(int type, const extend_info_t *node, onion_handshake_state_t *state_out, - uint8_t *onion_skin_out) + uint8_t *onion_skin_out, + size_t onion_skin_out_maxlen) { int r = -1; switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: + if (onion_skin_out_maxlen < TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) + return -1; if (!node->onion_key) return -1; @@ -133,7 +137,9 @@ onion_skin_create(int type, r = CREATE_FAST_LEN; break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: - if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node)) + if (onion_skin_out_maxlen < NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN) + return -1; + if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node)) return -1; if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest, &node->curve25519_onion_key, @@ -175,6 +181,7 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len, const server_onion_keys_t *keys, uint8_t *reply_out, + size_t reply_out_maxlen, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len, uint8_t *rend_nonce_out) { @@ -182,6 +189,8 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: + if (reply_out_maxlen < TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) + return -1; if (onionskin_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN) return -1; if (onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake((const char*)onion_skin, @@ -193,6 +202,8 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST: + if (reply_out_maxlen < CREATED_FAST_LEN) + return -1; if (onionskin_len != CREATE_FAST_LEN) return -1; if (fast_server_handshake(onion_skin, reply_out, keys_out, keys_out_len)<0) @@ -201,6 +212,8 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN); break; case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: + if (reply_out_maxlen < NTOR_REPLY_LEN) + return -1; if (onionskin_len < NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN) return -1; { diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h index 68cd465cf7..bf25552b83 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h @@ -25,11 +25,13 @@ void onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state); int onion_skin_create(int type, const extend_info_t *node, onion_handshake_state_t *state_out, - uint8_t *onion_skin_out); + uint8_t *onion_skin_out, + size_t onion_skin_out_maxlen); int onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len, const server_onion_keys_t *keys, uint8_t *reply_out, + size_t reply_out_maxlen, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len, uint8_t *rend_nonce_out); int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type, diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c index 17855b8567..b7b09784fa 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c @@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ cpuworker_onion_handshake_threadfn(void *state_, void *work_) cc->onionskin, cc->handshake_len, onion_keys, cell_out->reply, + sizeof(cell_out->reply), rpl.keys, CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN, rpl.rend_auth_material); if (n < 0) { diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index 31e3868b65..dc8d888c97 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -995,7 +995,8 @@ circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) len = onion_skin_create(cc.handshake_type, circ->cpath->extend_info, &circ->cpath->handshake_state, - cc.onionskin); + cc.onionskin, + sizeof(cc.onionskin)); if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed."); return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; @@ -1142,7 +1143,8 @@ circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, len = onion_skin_create(ec.create_cell.handshake_type, hop->extend_info, &hop->handshake_state, - ec.create_cell.onionskin); + ec.create_cell.onionskin, + sizeof(ec.create_cell.onionskin)); if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed."); return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; diff --git a/src/core/or/command.c b/src/core/or/command.c index 40eb1554c0..5fdd8dd135 100644 --- a/src/core/or/command.c +++ b/src/core/or/command.c @@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) create_cell->handshake_len, NULL, created_cell.reply, + sizeof(created_cell.reply), keys, CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN, rend_circ_nonce); tor_free(create_cell);

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[tor/main] Add an exported struct to onion handshakes for circuits params
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 22 Feb '22

22 Feb '22

commit 244444e8b1ac36bf9148aa656e4eb9e293daa5b4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 14 15:15:30 2021 -0400 Add an exported struct to onion handshakes for circuits params THis will eventually hold the congestion control parameters that we negotiated, plus whatever else is relevant. --- src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c | 7 ++++++- src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h | 14 +++++++++++++- src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c | 7 ++++++- src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 4 ++++ src/core/or/command.c | 7 ++++++- 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c index 66c21bf655..f93c2c8c58 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c @@ -183,9 +183,11 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, uint8_t *reply_out, size_t reply_out_maxlen, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len, - uint8_t *rend_nonce_out) + uint8_t *rend_nonce_out, + circuit_params_t *params_out) { int r = -1; + memset(params_out, 0, sizeof(*params_out)); // TODO: actually set. switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: @@ -262,11 +264,14 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(int type, const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len, uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out, + circuit_params_t *params_out, const char **msg_out) { if (handshake_state->tag != type) return -1; + memset(params_out, 0, sizeof(*params_out)); // TODO: actually set. + switch (type) { case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP: if (reply_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) { diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h index bf25552b83..af8dd1f03f 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h @@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ typedef struct server_onion_keys_t { void onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state); +/** + * Parameters negotiated as part of a circuit handshake. + */ +typedef struct circuit_params_t { + /* placeholder field for congestion control algorithm. Right now this + * is always set to zero */ + int cc_algorithm; + int cc_window; +} circuit_params_t; + int onion_skin_create(int type, const extend_info_t *node, onion_handshake_state_t *state_out, @@ -33,12 +43,14 @@ int onion_skin_server_handshake(int type, uint8_t *reply_out, size_t reply_out_maxlen, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len, - uint8_t *rend_nonce_out); + uint8_t *rend_nonce_out, + circuit_params_t *negotiated_params_out); int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type, const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state, const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len, uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len, uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out, + circuit_params_t *negotiated_params_out, const char **msg_out); server_onion_keys_t *server_onion_keys_new(void); diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c index b7b09784fa..2f6dae36a8 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c @@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ cpuworker_onion_handshake_threadfn(void *state_, void *work_) const create_cell_t *cc = &req.create_cell; created_cell_t *cell_out = &rpl.created_cell; struct timeval tv_start = {0,0}, tv_end; + circuit_params_t params; int n; rpl.timed = req.timed; rpl.started_at = req.started_at; @@ -428,7 +429,8 @@ cpuworker_onion_handshake_threadfn(void *state_, void *work_) cell_out->reply, sizeof(cell_out->reply), rpl.keys, CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN, - rpl.rend_auth_material); + rpl.rend_auth_material, + &params); if (n < 0) { /* failure */ log_debug(LD_OR,"onion_skin_server_handshake failed."); @@ -451,6 +453,9 @@ cpuworker_onion_handshake_threadfn(void *state_, void *work_) } rpl.success = 1; } + + // TODO: pass the parameters back up so we can initialize the cc paremeters. + rpl.magic = CPUWORKER_REPLY_MAGIC; if (req.timed) { struct timeval tv_diff; diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index dc8d888c97..f67fe196e5 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, } tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS); + circuit_params_t params; { const char *msg = NULL; if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->handshake_state.tag, @@ -1249,6 +1250,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, reply->reply, reply->handshake_len, (uint8_t*)keys, sizeof(keys), (uint8_t*)hop->rend_circ_nonce, + &params, &msg) < 0) { if (msg) log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed: %s", msg); @@ -1258,6 +1260,8 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, onion_handshake_state_release(&hop->handshake_state); + // XXXX TODO: use `params` to initialize the congestion control. + if (cpath_init_circuit_crypto(hop, keys, sizeof(keys), 0, 0)<0) { return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } diff --git a/src/core/or/command.c b/src/core/or/command.c index 5fdd8dd135..fd6cebe743 100644 --- a/src/core/or/command.c +++ b/src/core/or/command.c @@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) uint8_t rend_circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN]; int len; created_cell_t created_cell; + circuit_params_t params; memset(&created_cell, 0, sizeof(created_cell)); len = onion_skin_server_handshake(ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST, @@ -369,7 +370,8 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) created_cell.reply, sizeof(created_cell.reply), keys, CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN, - rend_circ_nonce); + rend_circ_nonce, + &params); tor_free(create_cell); if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to generate key material. Closing."); @@ -379,6 +381,9 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) created_cell.cell_type = CELL_CREATED_FAST; created_cell.handshake_len = len; + // TODO: We should in theory look at params here, though it will always + // tell us to use the old-fashioned congestion control. + if (onionskin_answer(circ, &created_cell, (const char *)keys, sizeof(keys), rend_circ_nonce)<0) {

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