tor-commits September 2020

tor-commits@lists.torproject.org

17 participants
1822 discussions

[torspec/master] Some clarification about measurement cells going over circuits
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 84d9d9661238129a769be8ef1cf61c423fee6df5 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Fri Aug 14 10:15:21 2020 -0400 Some clarification about measurement cells going over circuits --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index 43ecd1a..a041d9d 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ the ciphertext, and verify the corresponding incoming cell matches. ### Pre-Measurement Handshaking/Starting a Measurement -The coordinator connects to the target relay and sends it a MEAS_PARAMS +The coordinator establishes a one-hop circuit with the target relay and sends it a MEAS_PARAMS cell. If the target is unwilling to be measured at this time or if the coordinator didn't use a TLS certificate that the target trusts, it responds with an error cell and closes the connection. Otherwise it @@ -229,11 +229,11 @@ detection subsystem until the measurement ends (successfully or otherwise), at which point the whitelist is cleared. Upon receiving a MEAS_PARAMS_OK from the target, the coordinator will -instruct the measurers to open their TCP connections with the target. If +instruct the measurers to open their circuits (one circuit per connection) with the target. If the coordinator or any measurer receives a MEAS_ERR, it reports the error to the coordinator and considers the measurement a failure. It is also a -failure if any measurer is unable to open at least half of its TCP -connections with the target. +failure if any measurer is unable to open at least half of its circuits +with the target. The payload of MEAS_PARAMS cells [XXX more may need to be added]:

1 0

[torspec/master] Make meas cell contents match current reality and teor's comments
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 437a0a0eaa5a1ced39c55b1602b20ee130191032 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Thu Aug 20 19:57:04 2020 -0400 Make meas cell contents match current reality and teor's comments --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 39 ++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index b46bc79..5c4e1ca 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ Status: Draft # Markdown revision TODO: -- `[ ]` foo - - `[ ]` hyperlink sources - `[ ]` make section numbers work, or don't use them, or ...? - `[.]` do coords need to communicate? No. Specify better in Measurement @@ -234,21 +232,21 @@ with the target. The payload of MEAS_PARAMS cells [XXX more may need to be added]: ``` -- version [1 byte] -- meas_duration [1 byte] -- num_measurers [1 byte] +- meas_duration [2 bytes] [1, 600] +- num_measurers [1 byte] [1, 10] - measurer_info [num_measurers times] - - ipv4_addr [4 bytes] - - num_conns [2 bytes] ``` -version dictates how this MEAS_PARAMS cell shall be parsed. meas_duration +meas_duration is the duration, in seconds, that the actual measurement will last. -num_measurers is how many measurer_info structs follow. For each -measurer, the ipv4_addr it will use when connecting to the target is -provided, as is num_conns, the number of TCP connections that measurer -will open with the target. Future versions of FlashFlow and MEAS_PARAMS +num_measurers is how many link_specifier structs follow containing information +on the measurers that the relay should expect. +Future versions of FlashFlow and MEAS_PARAMS will use TLS certificates instead of IP addresses. +[XXX probably need diff layout to allow upgrade to TLS certs instead of +link_specifier structs. probably using ext-type-length-value like teor +suggests] +[XXX want to specify number of conns to expect from each measurer here?] MEAS_PARAMS_OK has no payload: it's just padding bytes to make the cell PAYLOAD_LEN (509) bytes long. @@ -259,12 +257,12 @@ The payload of MEAS_ECHO cells: - arbitrary bytes [PAYLOAD_LEN bytes] ``` -The payload of MEAS_BG cells: +The payload of MEAS_BG cells [XXX more for extra info? like CPU usage]: ``` -- second [1 byte] -- sent_bg_bytes [4 bytes] -- recv_bg_bytes [4 bytes] +- second [2 byte] [1, 600] +- sent_bg_bytes [4 bytes] [0, 2^32-1] +- recv_bg_bytes [4 bytes] [0, 2^32-1] ``` second is the number of seconds since the measurement began. MEAS_BG @@ -274,11 +272,10 @@ subsequent cell will increment it by one. sent_bg_bytes is the number of background traffic bytes sent in the last second (since the last MEAS_BG cell). recv_bg_bytes is the same but for received bytes. -The payload of MEAS_ERR cells: +The payload of MEAS_ERR cells [XXX need field for more info]: ``` -- err_code [1 byte] -- err_str [possibly zero-len null-terminated string] +- err_code [1 byte] [0, 255] ``` The error code is one of: @@ -288,10 +285,6 @@ The error code is one of: 255 -- OTHER ``` -The error string is optional in all cases. It isn't present if the first -byte of err_str is null, otherwise it is present. It ends at the first -null byte or the end of the cell, whichever comes first. - ### Measurement Mode The relay considers the measurement to have started the moment it

1 0

[torspec/master] Finish response to teor feedback
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 70572f5e2201adf4d4bcf21eb822a76de442ed2c Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Thu Aug 20 20:29:51 2020 -0400 Finish response to teor feedback --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index 5c4e1ca..c9444ac 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -309,10 +309,13 @@ During the measurement the relay targets a ratio of background traffic to measurement traffic as specified by a consensus parameter/torrc option. For a given ratio r, if the relay has handled x cells of measurement traffic recently, Tor then limits itself to y = xr/(1-r) -cells of non-measurement traffic this scheduling round. The target will -enforce that a minimum of 10 Mbit/s of measurement traffic is recorded -since the last background traffic scheduling round to ensure it always -allows some minimum amount of background traffic. +cells of non-measurement traffic this scheduling round. +If x is very small, the relay will perform the calculation s.t. x is the +number of cells required to produce 10 Mbit/s of measurement traffic, thus +ensuring some minimum amount of background traffic is allowed. + +[XXX teor suggests in [4] that the number 10 Mbit/s could be derived more +intelligently. E.g. based on AuthDirFastGuarantee or AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee] ## FlashFlow Components @@ -482,18 +485,17 @@ v3bw.2020-03-01-04-00-00 v3bw.2020-03-01-05-00-00 ``` +[XXX Either FF should auto-delete old ones, logrotate config should be +provided, a script provided, or something to help bwauths not accidentally +fill up their disk] + +[XXX What's the approxmiate disk usage for, say, a few years of these?] + ### FlashFlow Measurer The measurers take commands from the coordinator, connect to target relays with many sockets, send them traffic, and verify the received -traffic is the same as what was sent. Measurers need access to a lot of -internal tor functionality. One strategy is to house as much logic as -possible inside an compile-time-optional control port module that calls -into other parts of tor. Alternatively FlashFlow could link against tor -and call internal tor functions directly. - -[XXX for now I'll assume that an optional little-t tor control port -module housing a lot of this code is the best idea.] +traffic is the same as what was sent. Notable new things that internal tor code will need to do on the measurer (client) side: @@ -586,6 +588,10 @@ The medium term deployment stage begins after FlashFlow has been implemented and relays are starting to update to a version of Tor that supports it. +New link- and relay-subprotocol versions will be used by the relay to indicate +FF support. E.g. at the time of writing, the next relay subprotocol version is +4 [3]. + We plan to host a FlashFlow deployment consisting of a FF coordinator and a single FF measurer on a single 1 Gbit/s machine. Data produced by this deployment will be made available (semi?) publicly, including both @@ -626,6 +632,11 @@ deployment. FF deployments will need to coordinate between themselves to not measure the same relay at the same time, and to handle new relays as they join during the middle of a measurement period (during the day). +The measurement scheduling process shall be non-interactive. All the inputs +(e.g. the shared random value, the identities of the coords, the relays +currently in the network) are publicly known to (at least) the bwauths, thus +each individual bwauth can calculate same multi-coord measurement schedule. + The following is quoted from Section 4.3 of the FlashFlow paper. To measure all relays in the network, the BWAuths periodically @@ -653,6 +664,17 @@ The following is quoted from Section 4.3 of the FlashFlow paper. ensures that old relays will continue to be measured, with new relays given secondary priority in the order they arrive. +[XXX Teor leaves good ideas in his tor-dev@ post [5], +including a good plain language description of what the FF paper quotes says, +and a recommendation on which consensus to use when making a new schedule] + +A problem arises when two relays are hosted on the same machine but measured +at different times: they both will be measured to have the full capacity of +their host. At the very least, the scheduling algo should schedule relays with +the same IP to be measured at the same time. Perhaps better is measuring all +relays in the same MyFamily, same ipv4/24, and/or same ipv6/48 at the same +time. What specifically to do here is left for medium/long term work. + ## Experiments [XXX todo] @@ -697,6 +719,12 @@ The following is quoted from Section 4.3 of the FlashFlow paper. Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), 2017(2), April 2017. [2] Mike Perry: Graph onionperf and consensus information from Rob's experiments https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33076 +[3] tor-spec.txt Section 9.3 "Relay" Subprotocol versioning + https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt#n2132 +[4] Teor's second respose to FlashFlow proposal + https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-April/014251.html +[5] Teor's first respose to FlashFlow proposal + https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-April/014246.html # Appendix A: Save CPU at measurer by not encrypting all MEAS_ECHO cells

1 0

[torspec/master] Make MEAS_ECHO a relay cell command, ...
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 77b5a8093a182c2221f9a833406c8c5be7242bf2 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Fri Aug 14 12:05:12 2020 -0400 Make MEAS_ECHO a relay cell command, ... Move scheme to allow measurers to skip cell *cryption most of the time to an appendix; in the short term measurers will verify all cells. --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 256 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 127 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index cb5ce19..79b33db 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -167,9 +167,9 @@ Default: 45. ### New Cell Types -FlashFlow will introduce a new cell command MEASURE. +FlashFlow will introduce a new cell command MEASUREMENT. -The payload of each MEASURE cell consists of: +The payload of each MEASUREMENT cell consists of: ``` Measure command [1 byte] @@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ The measure commands are: ``` 0 -- MEAS_PARAMS [forward] 1 -- MEAS_PARAMS_OK [backward] -2 -- MEAS_ECHO [forward and backward] 3 -- MEAS_BG [backward] 4 -- MEAS_ERR [forward and backward] ``` @@ -192,25 +191,23 @@ Backward cells are sent from the relay to the measurer/coordinator. MEAS_PARAMS and MEAS_PARAMS_OK are used during the pre-measurement stage to tell the target what to expect and for the relay to positively -acknowledge the message. MEAS_ECHO cells are the measurement traffic; -the measurer generates them, sends them to the target, and the target -echos them back. The target send a MEAS_BG cell once per second to report +acknowledge the message. +The target send a MEAS_BG cell once per second to report the amount of background traffic it is handling. MEAS_ERR cells are used to signal to the other party that there has been some sort of problem and that the measurement should be aborted. These measure commands are described in more detail in the next section. -The only cell that sometimes undergoes cell encryption is MEAS_ECHO; no -other cell ever gets cell encrypted. (All cells are transmitted on a -regular TLS-wrapped OR connection; that encryption still exists.) +FlashFlow also introduces a new relay command, MEAS_ECHO. Relay celsl with +this relay command are the +measurement traffic. The measurer generates and encrypts them, sends them to the target, +the target decrypts them, then it sends them back. A variation where +the measurer skips encryption of MEAS_ECHO cells in most cases is +described in Appendix A, and was found to be necessary in paper prototypes to +save CPU load at the measurer. -The relay "decrypts" MEAS_ECHO cells before sending them back to the -measurer; this mirrors the way relays decrypt/encrypt RELAY_DATA cells -in order to induce realistic cryptographic CPU load. The measurer -usually skips encrypting MEAS_ECHO cells to reduce its own CPU load; -however, to verify the relay is actually correctly decrypting all cells, -the measurer will choose random outgoing cells, encrypt them, remember -the ciphertext, and verify the corresponding incoming cell matches. +MEASUREMENT cells, on the other hand, are not encrypted (beyond the regular +TLS on the connection). ### Pre-Measurement Handshaking/Starting a Measurement @@ -510,7 +507,6 @@ Notable new things that internal tor code will need to do on the measurer (client) side: 1. Open many TLS+TCP connections to the same relay on purpose. -2. Verify echo cells. #### Open many connections @@ -524,123 +520,11 @@ accomplish this will be investigated. On the relay side, these measurer connections do not count towards DoS detection algorithms. -#### Verify echo cells - -A parameter will exist to tell the measurers with what frequency they -shall verify that cells echoed back to them match what was sent. This -parameter does not need to exist outside of the FF deployment (e.g. it -doesn't need to be a consensus parameter). - -The parameter instructs the measurers to check 1 out of every N cells. - -The measurer keeps a count of how many measurement cells it has sent. It -also logically splits its output stream of cells into buckets of size N. -At the start of each bucket (when num_sent % N == 0), the measurer -chooses a random index in the bucket. Upon sending the cell at that -index (num_sent % N == chosen_index), the measurer records the cell. - -The measurer also counts cells that it receives. When it receives a cell -at an index that was recorded, it verifies that the received cell -matches the recorded sent cell. If they match, no special action is -taken. If they don't match, the measurer indicates failure to the -coordinator and target relay and closes all connections, ending the -measurement. - -##### Example - -Consider bucket_size is 1000. For the moment ignore cell encryption. - -We start at idx=0 and pick an idx in [0, 1000) to record, say 640. At -idx=640 we record the cell. At idx=1000 we choose a new idx in [1000, -2000) to record, say 1236. At idx=1236 we record the cell. At idx=2000 -we choose a new idx in [2000, 3000). Etc. - -There's 2000+ cells in flight and the measurer has recorded two items: - -``` -- (640, contents_of_cellA) -- (1236, contents_of_cellB) -``` - -Consider the receive side now. It counts the cells it receives. At -receive idx=640, it checks the received cell matches the saved cell from -before. At receive idx=1236, it again checks the received cell matches. -Etc. - -##### Motivation - -A malicious relay may want to skip decryption of measurement cells to -save CPU cycles and obtain a higher capacity estimate. More generally, -it could generate fake measurement cells locally, ignore the measurement -traffic it is receiving, and flood the measurer with more traffic that -it (the measurer) is even sending. - -The security of echo cell verification is discussed in section 3.3.1. - ## Security In this section we discuss the security of various aspects of FlashFlow and the tor changes it requires. -### Echo Cell Verification: Bucket Size - -A smaller bucket size means more cells are checked and FF is more likely -to detect a malicious target. It also means more bookkeeping overhead -(CPU/RAM). - -An adversary that knows bucket_size and cheats on one item out of every -bucket_size items will have a 1/bucket_size chance of getting caught in -the first bucket. This is the worst case adversary. While cheating on -just a single item per bucket yields very little advantage, cheating on -more items per bucket increases the likelihood the adversary gets -caught. Thus only the worst case is considered here. - -In general, the odds the adversary can successfully cheat in a single -bucket are - -``` -(bucket_size-1)/bucket_size -``` - -Thus the odds the adversary can cheat in X consecutive buckets are - -``` -[(bucket_size-1)/bucket_size]^X -``` - -In our case, X will be highly varied: Slow relays won't see very many -buckets, but fast relays will. The damage to the network a very slow -relay can do by faking being only slightly faster is limited. -Nonetheless, for now we motivate the selection of bucket_size with a -slow relay: - -- Assume a very slow relay of 1 Mbit/s capacity that will cheat 1 cell - in each bucket. Assume a 30 second measurement. -- The relay will handle 1*30 = 30 Mbit of traffic during the - measurement, or 3.75 MB, or 3.75 million bytes. -- Cells are 514 bytes. Approximately (e.g. ignoring TLS) 7300 cells - will be sent/recv over the course of the measurement. -- A bucket_size of 50 results in about 146 buckets over the course of - the 30s measurement. -- Therefore, the odds of the adversary cheating successfully as - (49/50)^(146), or about 5.2%. - -This sounds high, but a relay capable of double the bandwidth (2 Mbit/s) -will have (49/50)^(2*146) or 0.2% odds of success, which is quite low. - -Wanting a <1% chance that a 10 Mbit/s relay can successfully cheat -results in a bucket size of approximately 125: - -- 10*30 = 300 Mbit of traffic during 30s measurement. 37.5 million - bytes. -- 37,500,000 bytes / 514 bytes/cell = ~73,000 cells -- bucket_size of 125 cells means 73,000 / 125 = 584 buckets -- (124/125)^(584) = 0.918% chance of successfully cheating - -Slower relays can cheat more easily but the amount of extra weight they -can obtain is insignificant in absolute terms. Faster relays are -essentially unable to cheat. - ### Weight Inflation Target relays are an active part of the measurement process; they know @@ -822,3 +706,117 @@ The following is quoted from Section 4.3 of the FlashFlow paper. [2] Mike Perry: Graph onionperf and consensus information from Rob's experiments https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33076 +# Appendix A: Save CPU at measurer by not encrypting all MEAS_ECHO cells + +## Verify echo cells + +A parameter will exist to tell the measurers with what frequency they +shall verify that cells echoed back to them match what was sent. This +parameter does not need to exist outside of the FF deployment (e.g. it +doesn't need to be a consensus parameter). + +The parameter instructs the measurers to check 1 out of every N cells. + +The measurer keeps a count of how many measurement cells it has sent. It +also logically splits its output stream of cells into buckets of size N. +At the start of each bucket (when num_sent % N == 0), the measurer +chooses a random index in the bucket. Upon sending the cell at that +index (num_sent % N == chosen_index), the measurer records the cell. + +The measurer also counts cells that it receives. When it receives a cell +at an index that was recorded, it verifies that the received cell +matches the recorded sent cell. If they match, no special action is +taken. If they don't match, the measurer indicates failure to the +coordinator and target relay and closes all connections, ending the +measurement. + +### Example + +Consider bucket_size is 1000. For the moment ignore cell encryption. + +We start at idx=0 and pick an idx in [0, 1000) to record, say 640. At +idx=640 we record the cell. At idx=1000 we choose a new idx in [1000, +2000) to record, say 1236. At idx=1236 we record the cell. At idx=2000 +we choose a new idx in [2000, 3000). Etc. + +There's 2000+ cells in flight and the measurer has recorded two items: + +``` +- (640, contents_of_cellA) +- (1236, contents_of_cellB) +``` + +Consider the receive side now. It counts the cells it receives. At +receive idx=640, it checks the received cell matches the saved cell from +before. At receive idx=1236, it again checks the received cell matches. +Etc. + +### Motivation + +A malicious relay may want to skip decryption of measurement cells to +save CPU cycles and obtain a higher capacity estimate. More generally, +it could generate fake measurement cells locally, ignore the measurement +traffic it is receiving, and flood the measurer with more traffic that +it (the measurer) is even sending. + +The security of echo cell verification is discussed in section 3.3.1. + +### Security + +A smaller bucket size means more cells are checked and FF is more likely +to detect a malicious target. It also means more bookkeeping overhead +(CPU/RAM). + +An adversary that knows bucket_size and cheats on one item out of every +bucket_size items will have a 1/bucket_size chance of getting caught in +the first bucket. This is the worst case adversary. While cheating on +just a single item per bucket yields very little advantage, cheating on +more items per bucket increases the likelihood the adversary gets +caught. Thus only the worst case is considered here. + +In general, the odds the adversary can successfully cheat in a single +bucket are + +``` +(bucket_size-1)/bucket_size +``` + +Thus the odds the adversary can cheat in X consecutive buckets are + +``` +[(bucket_size-1)/bucket_size]^X +``` + +In our case, X will be highly varied: Slow relays won't see very many +buckets, but fast relays will. The damage to the network a very slow +relay can do by faking being only slightly faster is limited. +Nonetheless, for now we motivate the selection of bucket_size with a +slow relay: + +- Assume a very slow relay of 1 Mbit/s capacity that will cheat 1 cell + in each bucket. Assume a 30 second measurement. +- The relay will handle 1*30 = 30 Mbit of traffic during the + measurement, or 3.75 MB, or 3.75 million bytes. +- Cells are 514 bytes. Approximately (e.g. ignoring TLS) 7300 cells + will be sent/recv over the course of the measurement. +- A bucket_size of 50 results in about 146 buckets over the course of + the 30s measurement. +- Therefore, the odds of the adversary cheating successfully as + (49/50)^(146), or about 5.2%. + +This sounds high, but a relay capable of double the bandwidth (2 Mbit/s) +will have (49/50)^(2*146) or 0.2% odds of success, which is quite low. + +Wanting a <1% chance that a 10 Mbit/s relay can successfully cheat +results in a bucket size of approximately 125: + +- 10*30 = 300 Mbit of traffic during 30s measurement. 37.5 million + bytes. +- 37,500,000 bytes / 514 bytes/cell = ~73,000 cells +- bucket_size of 125 cells means 73,000 / 125 = 584 buckets +- (124/125)^(584) = 0.918% chance of successfully cheating + +Slower relays can cheat more easily but the amount of extra weight they +can obtain is insignificant in absolute terms. Faster relays are +essentially unable to cheat. +

1 0

[torspec/master] Fix numbering of meas cell commands
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit cf1a42403ab79ab9843b2f6c2b21ddf4ba888096 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Thu Aug 20 19:46:37 2020 -0400 Fix numbering of meas cell commands --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index 7437973..b46bc79 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ The measure commands are: ``` 0 -- MEAS_PARAMS [forward] 1 -- MEAS_PARAMS_OK [backward] -3 -- MEAS_BG [backward] -4 -- MEAS_ERR [forward and backward] +2 -- MEAS_BG [backward] +3 -- MEAS_ERR [forward and backward] ``` Forward cells are sent from the measurer/coordinator to the relay.

1 0

[torspec/master] Use PAYLOAD_LEN (509) not 514, since cells can be 512 still
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit cfc41dc951b5f44a3faea62b3978f6036cf794c8 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Fri Aug 14 10:22:39 2020 -0400 Use PAYLOAD_LEN (509) not 514, since cells can be 512 still --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index a041d9d..cb5ce19 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -255,12 +255,12 @@ will open with the target. Future versions of FlashFlow and MEAS_PARAMS will use TLS certificates instead of IP addresses. MEAS_PARAMS_OK has no payload: it's just padding bytes to make the cell -514 bytes long. +PAYLOAD_LEN (509) bytes long. The payload of MEAS_ECHO cells: ``` -- arbitrary bytes [max to fill up 514 byte cell] +- arbitrary bytes [PAYLOAD_LEN bytes] ``` The payload of MEAS_BG cells:

1 0

[torspec/master] No length field in FF cells
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 636887f3060d689f24dcd31d7f35c38bd7eb28ac Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Thu Aug 20 19:46:16 2020 -0400 No length field in FF cells --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index 79b33db..7437973 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ The payload of each MEASUREMENT cell consists of: ``` Measure command [1 byte] -Length [2 bytes] -Data [Length-3 bytes] +Data [varied] ``` The measure commands are:

1 0

[torspec/master] Add links for the remaining sources
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 950c64b3cfbd59594571651bb36f0aa5d2df8ee6 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Thu Aug 20 20:37:20 2020 -0400 Add links for the remaining sources --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index 356061e..708ecee 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -6,15 +6,6 @@ Created: 23 April 2020 Status: Draft ``` -# Markdown revision TODO: - -- `[ ]` hyperlink sources -- `[ ]` make section numbers work, or don't use them, or ...? -- `[.]` do coords need to communicate? No. Specify better in Measurement - Scheduling section - - addressed in Intro -- `[x]` MSM --> MEAS - # Introduction FlashFlow is a new distributed bandwidth measurement system for Tor that @@ -711,11 +702,14 @@ time. What specifically to do here is left for medium/long term work. [0] F. Thill. Hidden Service Tracking Detection and Bandwidth Cheating in Tor Anonymity Network. Master’s thesis, Univ. Luxembourg, 2014. + https://www.cryptolux.org/images/b/bc/Tor_Issues_Thesis_Thill_Fabrice.pdf [1] A. Johnson, R. Jansen, N. Hopper, A. Segal, and P. Syverson. PeerFlow: Secure Load Balancing in Tor. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), 2017(2), April 2017. + https://ohmygodel.com/publications/peerflow-popets2017.pdf [2] Mike Perry: Graph onionperf and consensus information from Rob's - experiments https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33076 + experiments + https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33076 [3] tor-spec.txt Section 9.3 "Relay" Subprotocol versioning https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt#n2132 [4] Teor's second respose to FlashFlow proposal

1 0

[torspec/master] redo line breaks on some bad lines, no text change
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 7f0f0aa751c047daca74b8a8f4b8f58f91903554 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Thu Aug 20 20:34:05 2020 -0400 redo line breaks on some bad lines, no text change --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index c9444ac..356061e 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -196,38 +196,37 @@ and that the measurement should be aborted. These measure commands are described in more detail in the next section. FlashFlow also introduces a new relay command, MEAS_ECHO. Relay celsl with -this relay command are the -measurement traffic. The measurer generates and encrypts them, sends them to the target, -the target decrypts them, then it sends them back. A variation where -the measurer skips encryption of MEAS_ECHO cells in most cases is -described in Appendix A, and was found to be necessary in paper prototypes to -save CPU load at the measurer. +this relay command are the measurement traffic. The measurer generates and +encrypts them, sends them to the target, the target decrypts them, then it +sends them back. A variation where the measurer skips encryption of MEAS_ECHO +cells in most cases is described in Appendix A, and was found to be necessary +in paper prototypes to save CPU load at the measurer. MEASUREMENT cells, on the other hand, are not encrypted (beyond the regular TLS on the connection). ### Pre-Measurement Handshaking/Starting a Measurement -The coordinator establishes a one-hop circuit with the target relay and sends it a MEAS_PARAMS -cell. If the target is unwilling to be measured at this time or if the -coordinator didn't use a TLS certificate that the target trusts, it -responds with an error cell and closes the connection. Otherwise it -checks that the parameters of the measurement are acceptable (e.g. the -version is acceptable, the duration isn't too long, etc.). If the -target is happy, it sends a MEAS_PARAMS_OK, otherwise it sends a MEAS_ERR -and closes the connection. +The coordinator establishes a one-hop circuit with the target relay and sends +it a MEAS_PARAMS cell. If the target is unwilling to be measured at this time +or if the coordinator didn't use a TLS certificate that the target trusts, it +responds with an error cell and closes the connection. Otherwise it checks +that the parameters of the measurement are acceptable (e.g. the version is +acceptable, the duration isn't too long, etc.). If the target is happy, it +sends a MEAS_PARAMS_OK, otherwise it sends a MEAS_ERR and closes the +connection. Upon learning the IP addresses of the measurers from the coordinator in the MEAS_PARAMS cell, the target whitelists their IPs in its DoS detection subsystem until the measurement ends (successfully or otherwise), at which point the whitelist is cleared. -Upon receiving a MEAS_PARAMS_OK from the target, the coordinator will -instruct the measurers to open their circuits (one circuit per connection) with the target. If -the coordinator or any measurer receives a MEAS_ERR, it reports the error -to the coordinator and considers the measurement a failure. It is also a -failure if any measurer is unable to open at least half of its circuits -with the target. +Upon receiving a MEAS_PARAMS_OK from the target, the coordinator will instruct +the measurers to open their circuits (one circuit per connection) with the +target. If the coordinator or any measurer receives a MEAS_ERR, it reports the +error to the coordinator and considers the measurement a failure. It is also a +failure if any measurer is unable to open at least half of its circuits with +the target. The payload of MEAS_PARAMS cells [XXX more may need to be added]: @@ -237,12 +236,10 @@ The payload of MEAS_PARAMS cells [XXX more may need to be added]: - measurer_info [num_measurers times] ``` -meas_duration -is the duration, in seconds, that the actual measurement will last. -num_measurers is how many link_specifier structs follow containing information -on the measurers that the relay should expect. -Future versions of FlashFlow and MEAS_PARAMS -will use TLS certificates instead of IP addresses. +meas_duration is the duration, in seconds, that the actual measurement will +last. num_measurers is how many link_specifier structs follow containing +information on the measurers that the relay should expect. Future versions of +FlashFlow and MEAS_PARAMS will use TLS certificates instead of IP addresses. [XXX probably need diff layout to allow upgrade to TLS certs instead of link_specifier structs. probably using ext-type-length-value like teor suggests]

1 0

[torspec/master] Add back section numbers
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Sep '20

17 Sep '20

commit 73f13a0dc02b747d7ee95c6681af6edbdd4f24e1 Author: Matt Traudt <sirmatt(a)ksu.edu> Date: Fri Sep 4 08:21:26 2020 -0400 Add back section numbers --- proposals/316-flashflow.md | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/316-flashflow.md b/proposals/316-flashflow.md index 708ecee..db89cec 100644 --- a/proposals/316-flashflow.md +++ b/proposals/316-flashflow.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Created: 23 April 2020 Status: Draft ``` -# Introduction +# 1. Introduction FlashFlow is a new distributed bandwidth measurement system for Tor that consists of a single authority node ("coordinator") instructing one or @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ It is envisioned that each directory authority that wants to use FlashFlow will run their own FlashFlow deployment consisting of a coordinator that they run and one or more measurers that they trust (e.g. because they run them themselves), similar to how each runs their -own Torflow/sbws. Section 5.2 of this proposal describes long term plans +own Torflow/sbws. Section 5 of this proposal describes long term plans involving multiple FlashFlow deployments. *FlashFlow coordinators do not need to communicate with each other*. @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ After an overview in section 2 of the planned deployment stages, section 3, 4, and 5 discuss the short, medium, and long term deployment plans in more detail. -# Deployment Stages +# 2. Deployment Stages FlashFlow's deployment shall be broken up into three stages. @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ relay capacity than observed bandwidth. Authentication and other FlashFlow features necessary to make it completely ready for full production deployment will be worked on during this long term phase. -# FlashFlow measurement system: Short term +# 3. FlashFlow measurement system: Short term The core measurement mechanics will be implemented in little-t tor, but a separate codebase for the FlashFlow side of the measurement system @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ separate FlashFlow code that also requires some amount of tor changes (essentially: measurer-side and coordinator-side modifications), and third a security discussion. -## Little-T Tor Components +## 3.1 Little-T Tor Components The primary additions/changes that entirely reside within tor on the relay side: @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ relay side: measurers, set a cap on the amount of background traffic it transfers, and report the amount of transferred background traffic. -### Parameters +### 3.1.1 Parameters FlashFlow will require some consensus parameters/torrc options. Each has some default value if nothing is specified; the consensus parameter @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ time, thus it necessarily is larger than the expected actual measurement duration. Possible values are in the range [10, 120] inclusive. Default: 45. -### New Cell Types +### 3.1.2 New Cell Types FlashFlow will introduce a new cell command MEASUREMENT. @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ in paper prototypes to save CPU load at the measurer. MEASUREMENT cells, on the other hand, are not encrypted (beyond the regular TLS on the connection). -### Pre-Measurement Handshaking/Starting a Measurement +### 3.1.3 Pre-Measurement Handshaking/Starting a Measurement The coordinator establishes a one-hop circuit with the target relay and sends it a MEAS_PARAMS cell. If the target is unwilling to be measured at this time @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ The error code is one of: 255 -- OTHER ``` -### Measurement Mode +### 3.1.4 Measurement Mode The relay considers the measurement to have started the moment it receives the first MEAS_ECHO cell from any measurer. At this point, the @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ ensuring some minimum amount of background traffic is allowed. [XXX teor suggests in [4] that the number 10 Mbit/s could be derived more intelligently. E.g. based on AuthDirFastGuarantee or AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee] -## FlashFlow Components +## 3.2 FlashFlow Components The FF coordinator and measurer code will reside in a FlashFlow repository separate from little-t tor. @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ The rest of this section first discusses notable functions of the FlashFlow coordinator, then goes on to discuss FF measurer code that will require supporting tor code. -### FlashFlow Coordinator +### 3.2.1 FlashFlow Coordinator The coordinator is responsible for scheduling measurements, aggregating results, and producing v3bw files. It needs continuous access to new @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ this section: - schedule measurements. - v3bw file generation. -#### Aggregating Results +#### 3.2.1.1 Aggregating Results Every second during a measurement, the measurers send the amount of verified measurement traffic they have received back from the relay. @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ measurement (e.g. 30 times for a 30 second measurement), the coordinator takes the median of the 30 per-second throughputs and records it as the estimated capacity of the target relay. -#### Measurement Schedule +#### 3.2.1.2 Measurement Schedule The short term implementation of measurement scheduling will be simpler than the long term one due to (1) there only being one FlashFlow @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ percentile capacity of the current network. If a relay is not online when it's scheduled to be measured, it doesn't get measured that day. -##### Example +##### 3.2.1.2.1 Example Assume the FF deployment has 1 Gbit/s of measurer capacity. Assume the chosen multiplier m=2. Assume there are only 5 slots in a measurement @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ that order. | | 200 | | 50 ``` -#### Generating V3BW files +#### 3.2.1.3 Generating V3BW files Every hour the FF coordinator produces a v3bw file in which it stores the latest capacity estimate for every relay it has measured in the last @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ fill up their disk] [XXX What's the approxmiate disk usage for, say, a few years of these?] -### FlashFlow Measurer +### 3.2.2 FlashFlow Measurer The measurers take commands from the coordinator, connect to target relays with many sockets, send them traffic, and verify the received @@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ measurer (client) side: 1. Open many TLS+TCP connections to the same relay on purpose. -#### Open many connections +#### 3.2.2.1 Open many connections FlashFlow prototypes needed to "hack in" a flag in the open-a-connection-with-this-relay function call chain that indicated @@ -502,12 +502,12 @@ accomplish this will be investigated. On the relay side, these measurer connections do not count towards DoS detection algorithms. -## Security +## 3.3 Security In this section we discuss the security of various aspects of FlashFlow and the tor changes it requires. -### Weight Inflation +### 3.3.1 Weight Inflation Target relays are an active part of the measurement process; they know they are getting measured. While a relay cannot fake the measurement @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ the measurer (or some party on its behalf) create a regular stream through the relay and measure the throughput on the stream before/during/after the measurement. This can be explored longer term. -### Incomplete Authentication +### 3.3.2 Incomplete Authentication The short term FlashFlow implementation has the relay set two torrc options if they would like to allow themselves to be measured: a flag @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ The adversary could also pretend to be the measurer. Such an adversary could induce measurement failures and inaccuracies. (Note: the whitelist is cleared after the measurement is over.) -# FlashFlow measurement system: Medium term +# 4. FlashFlow measurement system: Medium term The medium term deployment stage begins after FlashFlow has been implemented and relays are starting to update to a version of Tor that @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ v3bw files and intermediate results. Any development changes needed during this time would go through separate proposals. -# FlashFlow measurement system: Long term +# 5. FlashFlow measurement system: Long term In the long term, finishing-touch development work will be done, including adding better authentication and measurement scheduling, and @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ into the Tor ecosystem. Any development changes needed during this time would go through separate proposals. -## Authentication to Target Relay +## 5.1 Authentication to Target Relay Short term deployment already had FlashFlow coordinators using TLS certificates when connecting to relays, but in the long term, directory @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ connecting to relays too. FlashFlow coordinators will update the contents of MEAS_PARAMS cells to contain measurer TLS certificates instead of IP addresses, and relays will update to expect this change. -## Measurement Scheduling +## 5.2 Measurement Scheduling Short term deployment only has one FF deployment running. Long term this may no longer be the case because, for example, more than one directory @@ -663,11 +663,11 @@ the same IP to be measured at the same time. Perhaps better is measuring all relays in the same MyFamily, same ipv4/24, and/or same ipv6/48 at the same time. What specifically to do here is left for medium/long term work. -## Experiments +## 5.3 Experiments [XXX todo] -## Other Changes/Investigations/Ideas +## 5.4 Other Changes/Investigations/Ideas - How can FlashFlow data be used in a way that doesn't lead to poor load balancing given the following items that lead to non-uniform client

1 0

Jump to page:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-commits September 2020