July 2020 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.4.4] Fix out-of-bound memory read in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` for NSS.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit b46984e97ec4064ac8178ea9b3bf6985a4f2f632 Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 31 02:33:54 2020 +0000 Fix out-of-bound memory read in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` for NSS. This patch fixes an out-of-bound memory read in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` when Tor is compiled to use Mozilla's NSS instead of OpenSSL. The NSS library stores some length fields in bits instead of bytes, but the comparison function found in `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` needs the length to be encoded in bytes. This means that for a 140-byte, DER-encoded, SubjectPublicKeyInfo struct (with a 1024-bit RSA public key in it), we would ask `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` to compare the first 1120 bytes instead of 140 (140bytes * 8bits = 1120bits). This patch fixes the issue by converting from bits to bytes before calling `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` and convert the `len`-fields back to bits before we leave the function. This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001. See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119 --- changes/bug33119 | 4 ++++ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug33119 b/changes/bug33119 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c976654b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug33119 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major bugfixes (NSS): + - Fix out-of-bound memory access in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` when Tor is + compiled with NSS support. Fixes bug 33119; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. This + issue is also tracked as TROVE-2020-001. diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c index 3c62e98df..f7792e07a 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c @@ -713,23 +713,49 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int, tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert)) { - tor_assert(tls); tor_assert(cert); + tor_assert(cert->cert); + int rv = 0; - CERTCertificate *peercert = SSL_PeerCertificate(tls->ssl); - if (!peercert) + tor_x509_cert_t *peercert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert((tor_tls_t *)tls); + + if (!peercert || !peercert->cert) goto done; - CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *peer_info = &peercert->subjectPublicKeyInfo; + + CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *peer_info = &peercert->cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo; CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *cert_info = &cert->cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo; + + /* NSS stores the `len` field in bits, instead of bytes, for the + * `subjectPublicKey` field in CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo, but + * `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` compares the two bitstrings using a length field + * defined in bytes. + * + * We convert the `len` field from bits to bytes, do our comparison with + * `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()`, and reset the length field from bytes to bits + * again. + * + * See also NSS's own implementation of `SECKEY_CopySubjectPublicKeyInfo()` + * in seckey.c in the NSS source tree. This function also does the conversion + * between bits and bytes. + */ + unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len; + unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len; + + peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (peer_info_orig_len >> 3); + cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (cert_info_orig_len >> 3); + rv = SECOID_CompareAlgorithmID(&peer_info->algorithm, &cert_info->algorithm) == 0 && SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&peer_info->subjectPublicKey, &cert_info->subjectPublicKey); + peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = peer_info_orig_len; + cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = cert_info_orig_len; + done: - if (peercert) - CERT_DestroyCertificate(peercert); + tor_x509_cert_free(peercert); + return rv; }

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[tor/maint-0.4.3] Merge branch 'trove_2020_001_035' into maint-0.3.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 7142f3e435f99e357c7a7b55d4542ac7f6584f47 Merge: 3e08dd9df 7b2d10700 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 9 09:28:36 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'trove_2020_001_035' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug33119 | 4 +++ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/test/test_tortls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 70 ---------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.4.3] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into maint-0.4.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit af08dad6d1b00f1f433787d2712568b07f782729 Merge: c364e0e83 283ce30c5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 9 09:28:53 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into maint-0.4.3 changes/bug33119 | 4 +++ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/test/test_tortls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 70 ---------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Use ((x + 7) >> 3) instead of (x >> 3) when converting from bits to bytes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 7b2d10700fb0844fbe9aa7c030b09467cf173936 Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat May 16 19:18:56 2020 +0000 Use ((x + 7) >> 3) instead of (x >> 3) when converting from bits to bytes. This patch changes our bits-to-bytes conversion logic in the NSS implementation of `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` from using (x >> 3) to ((x + 7) >> 3) since DER bit-strings are allowed to contain a number of bits that is not a multiple of 8. Additionally, we add a comment on why we cannot use the `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro from NSS, as we would potentially apply the bits-to-bytes conversion logic twice, which would lead to an insignificant amount of bytes being compared in `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` and thus turn the logic into being a prefix match instead of a full match. The `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro is defined in NSS as: /* ** Macro to convert der decoded bit string into a decoded octet ** string. All it needs to do is fiddle with the length code. */ #define DER_ConvertBitString(item) \ { \ (item)->len = ((item)->len + 7) >> 3; \ } Thanks to Taylor Yu for spotting this problem. This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001. See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119 --- src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c index f1ef3ef27..1436442e1 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c @@ -742,14 +742,23 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len; const unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len; - peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (peer_info_orig_len >> 3); - cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (cert_info_orig_len >> 3); + /* We convert the length from bits to bytes, but instead of using NSS's + * `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro on both of peer_info->subjectPublicKey and + * cert_info->subjectPublicKey, we have to do the conversion explicitly since + * both of the two subjectPublicKey fields are allowed to point to the same + * memory address. Otherwise, the bits to bytes conversion would potentially + * be applied twice, which would lead to us comparing too few of the bytes + * when we call SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(), which would be catastrophic. + */ + peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = ((peer_info_orig_len + 7) >> 3); + cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = ((cert_info_orig_len + 7) >> 3); rv = SECOID_CompareAlgorithmID(&peer_info->algorithm, &cert_info->algorithm) == 0 && SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&peer_info->subjectPublicKey, &cert_info->subjectPublicKey); + /* Convert from bytes back to bits. */ peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = peer_info_orig_len; cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = cert_info_orig_len;

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[tor/maint-0.4.4] Run `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` Test Suite with both OpenSSL and NSS.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 33e1c2e6fd614f8cb42a6d5758d411d3f8d5411c Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 31 02:28:12 2020 +0000 Run `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` Test Suite with both OpenSSL and NSS. This patch lifts the `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` tests out of the OpenSSL specific TLS test suite and moves it into the generic TLS test suite that is executed for both OpenSSL and NSS. This patch is largely a code movement, but we had to rewrite parts of the test to avoid using OpenSSL specific data-types (such as `X509 *`) and replace it with the generic Tor abstraction type (`tor_x509_cert_impl_t *`). This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001. See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119 --- src/test/test_tortls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 70 ---------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index 11e35be2f..853abc4f9 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -105,6 +105,17 @@ const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; +static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL; +static tor_x509_cert_t * +get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + (void)tls; + if (fixed_x509_cert) + return tor_x509_cert_dup(fixed_x509_cert); + else + return NULL; +} + tor_x509_cert_impl_t * read_cert_from(const char *str) { @@ -513,6 +524,67 @@ test_tortls_verify(void *ignored) crypto_pk_free(k); } +static void +test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + + tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert1 = NULL, + *cert2 = NULL, + *cert3 = NULL, + *cert4 = NULL; + tor_x509_cert_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL, *c4 = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *k1 = NULL, *k2 = NULL, *k3 = NULL; + + k1 = pk_generate(1); + k2 = pk_generate(2); + k3 = pk_generate(3); + + cert1 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k2, "A", "B", 1000); + cert2 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k3, "C", "D", 1000); + cert3 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k2, k3, "C", "D", 1000); + cert4 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k3, k2, "E", "F", 1000); + + tt_assert(cert1 && cert2 && cert3 && cert4); + + c1 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert1); cert1 = NULL; + c2 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert2); cert2 = NULL; + c3 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert3); cert3 = NULL; + c4 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert4); cert4 = NULL; + + tt_assert(c1 && c2 && c3 && c4); + + MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed); + + fixed_x509_cert = NULL; + /* If the peer has no certificate, it shouldn't match anything. */ + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); + fixed_x509_cert = c1; + /* If the peer has a certificate, it should match every cert with the same + * subject key. */ + tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); + tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); + + done: + tor_x509_cert_free(c1); + tor_x509_cert_free(c2); + tor_x509_cert_free(c3); + tor_x509_cert_free(c4); + if (cert1) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert1); + if (cert2) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert2); + if (cert3) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert3); + if (cert4) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert4); + crypto_pk_free(k1); + crypto_pk_free(k2); + crypto_pk_free(k3); + UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert); +} + #define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ { #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL } @@ -533,5 +605,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_tests[] = { LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(bridge_init, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(verify, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c index 73041a871..f039980a2 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c @@ -479,75 +479,6 @@ fake_x509_free(X509 *cert) } #endif -static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL; -static tor_x509_cert_t * -get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - (void)tls; - if (fixed_x509_cert) - return tor_x509_cert_dup(fixed_x509_cert); - else - return NULL; -} - -static void -test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - - X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *cert3 = NULL, *cert4 = NULL; - tor_x509_cert_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL, *c4 = NULL; - crypto_pk_t *k1 = NULL, *k2 = NULL, *k3 = NULL; - - k1 = pk_generate(1); - k2 = pk_generate(2); - k3 = pk_generate(3); - - cert1 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k2, "A", "B", 1000); - cert2 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k3, "C", "D", 1000); - cert3 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k2, k3, "C", "D", 1000); - cert4 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k3, k2, "E", "F", 1000); - - tt_assert(cert1 && cert2 && cert3 && cert4); - - c1 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert1); cert1 = NULL; - c2 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert2); cert2 = NULL; - c3 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert3); cert3 = NULL; - c4 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert4); cert4 = NULL; - - tt_assert(c1 && c2 && c3 && c4); - - MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed); - - fixed_x509_cert = NULL; - /* If the peer has no certificate, it shouldn't match anything. */ - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); - fixed_x509_cert = c1; - /* If the peer has a certificate, it should match every cert with the same - * subject key. */ - tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); - tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); - - done: - tor_x509_cert_free(c1); - tor_x509_cert_free(c2); - tor_x509_cert_free(c3); - tor_x509_cert_free(c4); - if (cert1) X509_free(cert1); - if (cert2) X509_free(cert2); - if (cert3) X509_free(cert3); - if (cert4) X509_free(cert4); - crypto_pk_free(k1); - crypto_pk_free(k2); - crypto_pk_free(k3); - UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert); -} - #ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE static void test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored) @@ -2279,7 +2210,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[] = { INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0), INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0), INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK), INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0),

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[tor/maint-0.4.4] Add constness to length variables in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key`.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 06f1e959c218bfbe0b85bbd0acc59b8f408fbc99 Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat May 16 15:34:37 2020 +0000 Add constness to length variables in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key`. We add constness to `peer_info_orig_len` and `cert_info_orig_len` in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key` to ensure that we don't accidentally alter the variables. This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001. See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119 --- src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c index f7792e07a..f1ef3ef27 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c @@ -739,8 +739,8 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, * in seckey.c in the NSS source tree. This function also does the conversion * between bits and bytes. */ - unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len; - unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len; + const unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len; + const unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len; peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (peer_info_orig_len >> 3); cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (cert_info_orig_len >> 3);

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[tor/maint-0.4.4] Use ((x + 7) >> 3) instead of (x >> 3) when converting from bits to bytes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 7b2d10700fb0844fbe9aa7c030b09467cf173936 Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat May 16 19:18:56 2020 +0000 Use ((x + 7) >> 3) instead of (x >> 3) when converting from bits to bytes. This patch changes our bits-to-bytes conversion logic in the NSS implementation of `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` from using (x >> 3) to ((x + 7) >> 3) since DER bit-strings are allowed to contain a number of bits that is not a multiple of 8. Additionally, we add a comment on why we cannot use the `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro from NSS, as we would potentially apply the bits-to-bytes conversion logic twice, which would lead to an insignificant amount of bytes being compared in `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` and thus turn the logic into being a prefix match instead of a full match. The `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro is defined in NSS as: /* ** Macro to convert der decoded bit string into a decoded octet ** string. All it needs to do is fiddle with the length code. */ #define DER_ConvertBitString(item) \ { \ (item)->len = ((item)->len + 7) >> 3; \ } Thanks to Taylor Yu for spotting this problem. This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001. See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119 --- src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c index f1ef3ef27..1436442e1 100644 --- a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c +++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c @@ -742,14 +742,23 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len; const unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len; - peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (peer_info_orig_len >> 3); - cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (cert_info_orig_len >> 3); + /* We convert the length from bits to bytes, but instead of using NSS's + * `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro on both of peer_info->subjectPublicKey and + * cert_info->subjectPublicKey, we have to do the conversion explicitly since + * both of the two subjectPublicKey fields are allowed to point to the same + * memory address. Otherwise, the bits to bytes conversion would potentially + * be applied twice, which would lead to us comparing too few of the bytes + * when we call SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(), which would be catastrophic. + */ + peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = ((peer_info_orig_len + 7) >> 3); + cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = ((cert_info_orig_len + 7) >> 3); rv = SECOID_CompareAlgorithmID(&peer_info->algorithm, &cert_info->algorithm) == 0 && SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&peer_info->subjectPublicKey, &cert_info->subjectPublicKey); + /* Convert from bytes back to bits. */ peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = peer_info_orig_len; cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = cert_info_orig_len;

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[tor/maint-0.4.4] Merge branch 'trove_2020_001_035' into maint-0.3.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 7142f3e435f99e357c7a7b55d4542ac7f6584f47 Merge: 3e08dd9df 7b2d10700 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 9 09:28:36 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'trove_2020_001_035' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug33119 | 4 +++ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/test/test_tortls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 70 ---------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Run `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` Test Suite with both OpenSSL and NSS.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit 33e1c2e6fd614f8cb42a6d5758d411d3f8d5411c Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 31 02:28:12 2020 +0000 Run `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` Test Suite with both OpenSSL and NSS. This patch lifts the `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` tests out of the OpenSSL specific TLS test suite and moves it into the generic TLS test suite that is executed for both OpenSSL and NSS. This patch is largely a code movement, but we had to rewrite parts of the test to avoid using OpenSSL specific data-types (such as `X509 *`) and replace it with the generic Tor abstraction type (`tor_x509_cert_impl_t *`). This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001. See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119 --- src/test/test_tortls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 70 ---------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index 11e35be2f..853abc4f9 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -105,6 +105,17 @@ const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n" "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; +static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL; +static tor_x509_cert_t * +get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls) +{ + (void)tls; + if (fixed_x509_cert) + return tor_x509_cert_dup(fixed_x509_cert); + else + return NULL; +} + tor_x509_cert_impl_t * read_cert_from(const char *str) { @@ -513,6 +524,67 @@ test_tortls_verify(void *ignored) crypto_pk_free(k); } +static void +test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored) +{ + (void)ignored; + + tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert1 = NULL, + *cert2 = NULL, + *cert3 = NULL, + *cert4 = NULL; + tor_x509_cert_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL, *c4 = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *k1 = NULL, *k2 = NULL, *k3 = NULL; + + k1 = pk_generate(1); + k2 = pk_generate(2); + k3 = pk_generate(3); + + cert1 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k2, "A", "B", 1000); + cert2 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k3, "C", "D", 1000); + cert3 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k2, k3, "C", "D", 1000); + cert4 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k3, k2, "E", "F", 1000); + + tt_assert(cert1 && cert2 && cert3 && cert4); + + c1 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert1); cert1 = NULL; + c2 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert2); cert2 = NULL; + c3 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert3); cert3 = NULL; + c4 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert4); cert4 = NULL; + + tt_assert(c1 && c2 && c3 && c4); + + MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed); + + fixed_x509_cert = NULL; + /* If the peer has no certificate, it shouldn't match anything. */ + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); + fixed_x509_cert = c1; + /* If the peer has a certificate, it should match every cert with the same + * subject key. */ + tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); + tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); + tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); + + done: + tor_x509_cert_free(c1); + tor_x509_cert_free(c2); + tor_x509_cert_free(c3); + tor_x509_cert_free(c4); + if (cert1) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert1); + if (cert2) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert2); + if (cert3) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert3); + if (cert4) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert4); + crypto_pk_free(k1); + crypto_pk_free(k2); + crypto_pk_free(k3); + UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert); +} + #define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \ { #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL } @@ -533,5 +605,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_tests[] = { LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(bridge_init, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(verify, TT_FORK), + LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c index 73041a871..f039980a2 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c @@ -479,75 +479,6 @@ fake_x509_free(X509 *cert) } #endif -static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL; -static tor_x509_cert_t * -get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls) -{ - (void)tls; - if (fixed_x509_cert) - return tor_x509_cert_dup(fixed_x509_cert); - else - return NULL; -} - -static void -test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - - X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *cert3 = NULL, *cert4 = NULL; - tor_x509_cert_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL, *c4 = NULL; - crypto_pk_t *k1 = NULL, *k2 = NULL, *k3 = NULL; - - k1 = pk_generate(1); - k2 = pk_generate(2); - k3 = pk_generate(3); - - cert1 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k2, "A", "B", 1000); - cert2 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k3, "C", "D", 1000); - cert3 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k2, k3, "C", "D", 1000); - cert4 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k3, k2, "E", "F", 1000); - - tt_assert(cert1 && cert2 && cert3 && cert4); - - c1 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert1); cert1 = NULL; - c2 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert2); cert2 = NULL; - c3 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert3); cert3 = NULL; - c4 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert4); cert4 = NULL; - - tt_assert(c1 && c2 && c3 && c4); - - MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed); - - fixed_x509_cert = NULL; - /* If the peer has no certificate, it shouldn't match anything. */ - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); - fixed_x509_cert = c1; - /* If the peer has a certificate, it should match every cert with the same - * subject key. */ - tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1)); - tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3)); - tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4)); - - done: - tor_x509_cert_free(c1); - tor_x509_cert_free(c2); - tor_x509_cert_free(c3); - tor_x509_cert_free(c4); - if (cert1) X509_free(cert1); - if (cert2) X509_free(cert2); - if (cert3) X509_free(cert3); - if (cert4) X509_free(cert4); - crypto_pk_free(k1); - crypto_pk_free(k2); - crypto_pk_free(k3); - UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert); -} - #ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE static void test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored) @@ -2279,7 +2210,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[] = { INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0), INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0), - LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0), INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0), LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK), INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0),

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[tor/maint-0.4.4] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into maint-0.4.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Jul '20

09 Jul '20

commit af08dad6d1b00f1f433787d2712568b07f782729 Merge: c364e0e83 283ce30c5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 9 09:28:53 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into maint-0.4.3 changes/bug33119 | 4 +++ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/test/test_tortls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 70 ---------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

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