March 2020 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] coverity: Silence spurious unreachable warning
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit c862205ba5b9954fe9dbc22a104238a3c04951a8 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 19 17:11:13 2020 +1000 coverity: Silence spurious unreachable warning Closes bug 33641; not in any released version of tor. --- src/test/test_circuitbuild.c | 4 ++++ src/test/test_dir.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c index 8b506011b..10d78abc3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c @@ -115,8 +115,12 @@ test_new_route_len_unhandled_exit(void *arg) (void)arg; #ifdef ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL + /* Coverity (and maybe clang analyser) complain that the code following + * tt_skip() is unconditionally unreachable. */ +#if !defined(__COVERITY__) && !defined(__clang_analyzer__) tt_skip(); #endif +#endif MOCK(count_acceptable_nodes, mock_count_acceptable_nodes); diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c index e6f87dbd3..bf9a04b07 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir.c @@ -4992,8 +4992,12 @@ test_dir_purpose_needs_anonymity_returns_true_by_default(void *arg) (void)arg; #ifdef ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL + /* Coverity (and maybe clang analyser) complain that the code following + * tt_skip() is unconditionally unreachable. */ +#if !defined(__COVERITY__) && !defined(__clang_analyzer__) tt_skip(); #endif +#endif tor_capture_bugs_(1); setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1807/head'
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 4f596b3edfe5bcf4898bfe6007aa8e4677d2ba05 Merge: e8f086055 c862205ba Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 19 08:02:09 2020 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1807/head' src/test/test_circuitbuild.c | 4 ++++ src/test/test_dir.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

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[tor/master] changes: Add changes file for ticket 33458
by asn＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 8bba93376044c0456b76a69ab5f843acd7591959 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 18 10:16:31 2020 -0400 changes: Add changes file for ticket 33458 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket33458 | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket33458 b/changes/ticket33458 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..885c6dc50 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket33458 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfix (onion service v3): + - When cleaning the client descriptor cache, an attempt at closing circuits + for a non decrypted descriptor (lacking client authorization) lead to an + assert(). Fixes bug 33458; bugfix on 0.4.2.1-alpha.

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'tor-github/pr/1792'
by asn＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit e8f08605570ec0ec2dd5c6b224df7a534a7693c3 Merge: e9bb00d8c 8bba93376 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Mar 19 13:43:49 2020 +0200 Merge branch 'tor-github/pr/1792' changes/ticket33458 | 4 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/test/test_hs_client.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] hs-v3: Improve accessor semantic of client cached object
by asn＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 4dbbe47d86d28d45f12ad219e85cd631c8698418 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 10 10:58:51 2020 -0400 hs-v3: Improve accessor semantic of client cached object Add an inline helper function that indicates if the cached object contains a decrypted descriptor or not. The descriptor object is NULL if tor is unable to decrypt it (lacking client authorization) and some actions need to be done only when we have a decrypted object. This improves code semantic. Fixes #33458 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/test/test_hs_client.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c index 9cf408ca3..44cd2505f 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c @@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ static int cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(time_t now, const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *cached_desc); +/** Helper function: Return true iff the cache entry has a decrypted + * descriptor. + * + * A NULL desc object in the entry means that we were not able to decrypt the + * descriptor because we are likely lacking client authorization. It is still + * a valid entry but some operations can't be done without the decrypted + * descriptor thus this function MUST be used to safe guard access to the + * decrypted desc object. */ +static inline bool +entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *entry) +{ + tor_assert(entry); + return (entry->desc != NULL); +} + /********************** Directory HS cache ******************/ /** Directory descriptor cache. Map indexed by blinded key. */ @@ -341,8 +356,23 @@ static digest256map_t *hs_cache_client_intro_state; static size_t cache_get_client_entry_size(const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *entry) { - return sizeof(*entry) + - strlen(entry->encoded_desc) + hs_desc_obj_size(entry->desc); + size_t size = 0; + + if (entry == NULL) { + goto end; + } + size += sizeof(*entry); + + if (entry->encoded_desc) { + size += strlen(entry->encoded_desc); + } + + if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(entry)) { + size += hs_desc_obj_size(entry->desc); + } + + end: + return size; } /** Remove a given descriptor from our cache. */ @@ -659,14 +689,20 @@ cache_store_as_client(hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *client_desc) * client authorization. */ cache_entry = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(client_desc->key.pubkey); if (cache_entry != NULL) { - /* Signalling an undecrypted descriptor. We'll always replace the one we - * have with the new one just fetched. */ - if (cache_entry->desc == NULL) { + /* If the current or the new cache entry don't have a decrypted descriptor + * (missing client authorization), we always replace the current one with + * the new one. Reason is that we can't inspect the revision counter + * within the plaintext data so we blindly replace. */ + if (!entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cache_entry) || + !entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(client_desc)) { remove_v3_desc_as_client(cache_entry); cache_client_desc_free(cache_entry); goto store; } + /* From this point on, we know that the decrypted descriptor is in the + * current entry and new object thus safe to access. */ + /* If we have an entry in our cache that has a revision counter greater * than the one we just fetched, discard the one we fetched. */ if (cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter > @@ -740,11 +776,15 @@ cache_clean_v3_as_client(time_t now) MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key); entry_size = cache_get_client_entry_size(entry); bytes_removed += entry_size; + /* We just removed an old descriptor. We need to close all intro circuits - * so we don't have leftovers that can be selected while lacking a - * descriptor. We leave the rendezvous circuits opened because they could - * be in use. */ - hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(entry->desc); + * if the descriptor is decrypted so we don't have leftovers that can be + * selected while lacking a descriptor. Circuits are selected by intro + * authentication key thus we need the descriptor. We leave the rendezvous + * circuits opened because they could be in use. */ + if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(entry)) { + hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(entry->desc); + } /* Entry is not in the cache anymore, destroy it. */ cache_client_desc_free(entry); /* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in @@ -793,7 +833,7 @@ hs_cache_lookup_as_client(const ed25519_public_key_t *key) tor_assert(key); cached_desc = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(key->pubkey); - if (cached_desc && cached_desc->desc) { + if (cached_desc && entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) { return cached_desc->desc; } @@ -866,7 +906,7 @@ hs_cache_remove_as_client(const ed25519_public_key_t *key) /* If we have a decrypted/decoded descriptor, attempt to close its * introduction circuit(s). We shouldn't have circuit(s) without a * descriptor else it will lead to a failure. */ - if (cached_desc->desc) { + if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) { hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(cached_desc->desc); } /* Remove and free. */ @@ -995,7 +1035,7 @@ hs_cache_client_new_auth_parse(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) } cached_desc = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(service_pk->pubkey); - if (cached_desc == NULL || cached_desc->desc != NULL) { + if (cached_desc == NULL || entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) { /* No entry for that service or the descriptor is already decoded. */ goto end; } diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c index 5f7fe9c40..bff71d264 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_client.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_client.c @@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg) (void) arg; hs_init(); + rend_cache_init(); /* This is needed because of the client cache expiration timestamp is based * on having a consensus. See cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(). */ @@ -989,6 +990,51 @@ test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg) circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING; ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + /* Build a descriptor _without_ client authorization and thus not + * decryptable. Make sure the close circuit code path is not triggered. */ + { + char *desc_encoded = NULL; + uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN]; + curve25519_keypair_t client_kp; + hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL; + + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, curve25519_keypair_generate(&client_kp, 0)); + crypto_rand((char *) descriptor_cookie, sizeof(descriptor_cookie)); + + desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_client_auth(descriptor_cookie, + &client_kp.pubkey, + &service_kp); + tt_assert(desc); + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, descriptor_cookie, + &desc_encoded); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Associate descriptor intro key with the dummy circuit. */ + const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = + smartlist_get(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0); + tt_assert(ip); + ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey); + ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk, + &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key); + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + tt_assert(desc_encoded); + /* Put it in the cache. Should not be decrypted since the client + * authorization creds were not added to the global map. */ + ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(desc_encoded, &service_kp.pubkey); + tor_free(desc_encoded); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_NEED_CLIENT_AUTH); + + /* Clean cache with a future timestamp. It will trigger the clean up and + * attempt to close the circuit but only if the descriptor is decryptable. + * Cache object should be removed and circuit untouched. */ + hs_cache_clean_as_client(mock_ns.valid_after + (60 * 60 * 24)); + tt_assert(!hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey)); + + /* Make sure the circuit still there. */ + tt_assert(circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true)); + /* Get rid of the ident, it will be replaced in the next tests. */ + hs_ident_circuit_free(ocirc->hs_ident); + } + /* Build the first descriptor and cache it. */ { char *encoded;

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[translation/bridgedb] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 79c5e9adfa83fb1eb6f3ed081a1bd973a318f459 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 19 11:15:16 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb --- da/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/da/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/da/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index fe281b544b..57370fd73d 100644 --- a/da/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/da/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2020-03-18 09:23-0700\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-03-19 07:14+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-03-19 10:52+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: scootergrisen\n" "Language-Team: Danish (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/da/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ msgstr "" #: bridgedb/strings.py:152 msgid "Reserved" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Reserveret" #: bridgedb/strings.py:153 #, python-format

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[translation/https_everywhere] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 37ff8b5e9a3f1a7ae71bf6f73ec7860351e05b3c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 19 10:46:05 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=https_everywhere --- fa/https-everywhere.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fa/https-everywhere.dtd b/fa/https-everywhere.dtd index c2903cf4e6..65ee9fae5b 100644 --- a/fa/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/fa/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.cancel.http_once "تنها برای این نشست صفحه نا‌امن باز کن"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.onboarding.intro "وب را رمزگذاری کنید! از امنیت HTTPS بصورت خودکار برای بسیاری از وب‌سایت‌ها استفاده کنید."> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.onboarding.header "HTTPS Everywhere has been updated!"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.onboarding.header "HTTPS Everywhere بروزرسانی شد!"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.onboarding.details_one "بهینه شده با حالت EASE"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.onboarding.details_two "شما اکنون میتوانید از لیست سفید سایت ها برای غیرفعال شدن در HTTPS Everywhere استفاده کنید."> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.onboarding.footer "HTTPS Everywhere یک پروژه ی EFF است.">

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[translation/bridgedb] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 250170e599a1b48c283136517b138c967a8a54e4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 19 10:45:15 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb --- fa/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fa/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/fa/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index b3b60f4a24..a3a1b26c7c 100644 --- a/fa/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/fa/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -19,13 +19,14 @@ # masoudd <relive.mn(a)gmail.com>, 2018 # Setareh <setareh.salehee(a)gmail.com>, 2014 # Seyyed Hossein Darvari <xhdix(a)yahoo.com>, 2020 +# Vox, 2020 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2020-03-18 09:23-0700\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-03-19 07:14+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: magnifico\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-03-19 10:34+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Vox\n" "Language-Team: Persian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/fa/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ msgstr "دریافت پل‌ها!" #: bridgedb/strings.py:130 msgid "Bridge distribution mechanisms" -msgstr "" +msgstr "مکانیزم‌های توزیع Bridge" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "BridgeDB", "HTTPS", and "Moat". #: bridgedb/strings.py:132 @@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ msgid "" "the pseudo-mechanism \"None\". The following list briefly explains how these\n" "mechanisms work and our %sBridgeDB metrics%s visualize how popular each of the\n" "mechanisms is." -msgstr "" +msgstr "BridgeDB از چهار مکانیزم برای توزیع پل‌ها استفاده می‌کند: \"HTTPS\"، \"Moat،\n \"ایمیل\" و \"رزرو\". پل‌هایی که از طریق BridgeDB توزیع نمی‌شوند،\nاز شبه مکانیزم \"None\" استفاده می‌کنند. لیست زیر به صورت خلاصه توضیح می‌دهد\nکه هر کدام از این مکانیزم‌ها چطور کار می‌کنند و %sمعیارهای BridgeDB%s محبوبیت هرکدام\nاز مکانیزم‌ها را نشان می‌دهد." #: bridgedb/strings.py:138 #, python-format @@ -348,7 +349,7 @@ msgid "" "The \"HTTPS\" distribution mechanism hands out bridges over this website. To get\n" "bridges, go to %sbridges.torproject.org%s, select your preferred options, and\n" "solve the subsequent CAPTCHA." -msgstr "" +msgstr "مکانیزم توزیع \"HTTPS\" پل‌ها را از طریق این وبسایت ارائه می‌کند. برای \nدریافت پل‌ها به %sbridges.torproject.org%s رفته، گزینه‌ی مد نظر خود را انتخاب کرده و کد CAPTCHA را حل کنید." #: bridgedb/strings.py:142 #, python-format @@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ msgid "" "your Tor Browser's %sTor settings%s, click on \"request a new bridge\", solve the\n" "subsequent CAPTCHA, and Tor Browser will automatically add your new\n" "bridges." -msgstr "" +msgstr "مکانیزم توزیع \"Moat\" بخشی از مرورگر تور است که به کاربران اجازه می‌دهد\nکه پل‌ها را از داخل تنظیمات مرورگر تور درخواست دهند. برای دریافت پل‌ها به\n%sتنظیمات تور%s مرورگر تور خود رفته، بر روی \"درخواست پل جدید\" کلیک و کد CAPTCHA\nرا حل کنید. مرورگر تور به صورت خودکار پل جدید را\nاضافه خواهد کرد." #: bridgedb/strings.py:148 #, python-format @@ -366,11 +367,11 @@ msgid "" "Users can request bridges from the \"Email\" distribution mechanism by sending an\n" "email to %sbridges(a)torproject.org%s and writing \"get transport obfs4\" in the\n" "email body." -msgstr "" +msgstr "کاربران می‌توانند با مکانیزم توزیع \"ایمیل\" درخواست پل دهند. برای این کار به\n%sbridges(a)torproject.org%s ایمیل داده و به عنوان متن ایمیل عبارت\nget transport obfs4\" را بنویسید." #: bridgedb/strings.py:152 msgid "Reserved" -msgstr "" +msgstr "رزرو شده" #: bridgedb/strings.py:153 #, python-format @@ -381,7 +382,7 @@ msgid "" "bridges. Bridges that are distributed over the \"Reserved\" mechanism may not\n" "see users for a long time. Note that the \"Reserved\" distribution mechanism is\n" "called \"Unallocated\" in %sbridge pool assignment%s files." -msgstr "" +msgstr "BridgeDB شامل تعداد کمی از پل‌هایی است که به صورت خودکار توزیع نمی‌گردند.\nبلکه ما این پل‌ها را برای توزیع دستی رزرو کرده و\nتحویل NGOها و سایر نهادها و افرادی که نیاز به آن دارند\nمی‌دهیم. پل‌هایی که با مکانیزم \"رزرو\" توزیع می‌گردند ممکن است تا\nمدت طولانی استفاده نگردند. در نظر داشته باشید که مکانیز توزیع \"رزرو\" در فایل %sمخزن واگذاری پل%s با نام \"تخصیص نیافته\" شناخته می‌شود." #: bridgedb/strings.py:160 msgid "None"

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[translation/support-portal] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=support-portal
by translation＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit 972d7590be67ca2ed34a4f3b12b832e709925f95 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 19 08:54:31 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=support-portal --- contents+it.po | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/contents+it.po b/contents+it.po index 97cbdc3ced..8cef7b1720 100644 --- a/contents+it.po +++ b/contents+it.po @@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ msgid "" "* Modify the Tor client and relay startup scripts to include `-f " "/path/to/correct/torrc`." msgstr "" -"* Modifica il client Tor e lo scipt di avvio del relè per includere " +"* Modifica il client Tor e lo script di avvio del relè per includere " "`-f/path/to/correct/torrc`." #: https//support.torproject.org/operators/hibernation/ @@ -5254,7 +5254,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Questo specifica la quantità massima di dati che il relè invierà durante un " "periodo di conteggio e la quantità massima di dati che il relè riceverà " -"durante un periodo di conteggio." +"durante tale periodo." #: https//support.torproject.org/operators/limit-total-bandwidth/ #: (content/operators/limit-total-bandwidth/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -5330,9 +5330,9 @@ msgid "" "in each direction, you could set your RelayBandwidthRate to 20*X KBytes." msgstr "" "Dividi semplicemente per 30. Potresti anche considerare la limitazione della" -" velocità per diffondere la tua utilità in più della giornata: se vuoi " -"offrire X GB in ogni direzione, puoi impostare RelayBandwidthRate su 20 * X " -"KBytes." +" velocità per diffondere la tua utilità in più momenti della giornata: se " +"vuoi offrire X GB in ogni direzione, puoi impostare RelayBandwidthRate su " +"20*X KBytes." #: https//support.torproject.org/operators/limit-total-bandwidth/ #: (content/operators/limit-total-bandwidth/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -5445,9 +5445,9 @@ msgid "" "not many clients have rotated their existing guards out to use it as a guard" " yet." msgstr "" -"Dal momento che ora è in protezione, i clienti lo usano meno in altre " -"posizioni, ma non molti clienti hanno ruotato le loro protezioni esistenti " -"per usarlo ancora come protezione di guardia." +"Dal momento che ora è un guard, i client lo usano meno in altre posizioni, " +"ma non molti client hanno ruotato i loro guard attuali per usarlo come nuovo" +" guard." #: https//support.torproject.org/operators/my-relay-got-guard-flag-traffic-dropped/ #: (content/operators/my-relay-got-guard-flag-traffic-dropped/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -5461,7 +5461,7 @@ msgstr "" "post](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay) o in " "[Changing of the Guards: A Framework for Understanding and Improving Entry " "Guard Selection in " -"Tor](https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/wpes12-cogs.pdf). " +"Tor](https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/wpes12-cogs.pdf)." #: https//support.torproject.org/operators/offline-ed25519/ #: (content/operators/offline-ed25519/contents+en.lrquestion.title) @@ -5999,7 +5999,7 @@ msgid "" "That is, when Tor releases memory back to the system, the pieces of memory " "are fragmented so they're hard to reuse." msgstr "" -"Cioè, quando Tor rilascia memoria nel sistema, i frammenti di memoria sono " +"Cioè, quando Tor rilascia memoria nel sistema, i pezzi di memoria sono " "frammentati e quindi più difficili da riutilizzare." #: https//support.torproject.org/operators/relay-memory/

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[metrics-web/master] Add links to BridgeDB's info page.
by karsten＠torproject.org 19 Mar '20

19 Mar '20

commit dfea0c84035f45725035238838cffd816ecbc81d Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Thu Mar 19 08:59:29 2020 +0100 Add links to BridgeDB's info page. Remaining part of #33008. --- src/main/resources/web/templates/rs/details/bridge.html | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/main/resources/web/templates/rs/details/bridge.html b/src/main/resources/web/templates/rs/details/bridge.html index a3a5958..019dadf 100644 --- a/src/main/resources/web/templates/rs/details/bridge.html +++ b/src/main/resources/web/templates/rs/details/bridge.html @@ -81,7 +81,19 @@ <dd><%= relay.get('transports') ? relay.get('transports') : 'none' %></dd> <dt><span class="tip" title="BridgeDB distributor that this bridge is currently assigned to.">Bridge distribution mechanism</span></dt> - <dd><%= relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') ? relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') : 'none' %></dd> + <% if (!relay.get('bridgedb_distributor')) { %> + <dd><a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/info#none">None</a></dd> + <% } else if (relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') === 'unallocated') { %> + <dd><a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/info#reserved">Reserved</a></dd> + <% } else if (relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') === 'https') { %> + <dd><a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/info#https">HTTPS</a></dd> + <% } else if (relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') === 'email') { %> + <dd><a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/info#email">Email</a></dd> + <% } else if (relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') === 'moat') { %> + <dd><a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/info#moat">Moat</a></dd> + <% } else { %> + <dd><a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/info#<%= relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') %>"><%= relay.get('bridgedb_distributor') %></a></dd> + <% } %> </dl> </div>

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