August 2019 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1080' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 654769bcec3e98bea5e3ac48b2aabffcbe55375e Merge: 1ba2bd359 c8c2e2b8f Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 9 14:05:26 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1080' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug30781 | 4 ++++ src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Modify "Protect buffers against INT_MAX datalen overflows." for 0.2.9
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 37bd7fa50d0901a87084b71299cc8c8786cd1cd8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 9 13:14:28 2019 -0400 Modify "Protect buffers against INT_MAX datalen overflows." for 0.2.9 --- src/or/buffers.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 394ba0ccb..b36e4ab50 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -394,10 +394,6 @@ buf_free(buf_t *buf) { if (!buf) return; - if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX || buf_in->datalen >= INT_MAX)) - return; - if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX - buf_in->datalen)) - return; buf_clear(buf); buf->magic = 0xdeadbeef; @@ -2067,4 +2063,3 @@ assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf) tor_assert(buf->datalen == total); } } -

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/958' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 6205810f8ed93c15f3f7be7fbb98d1cad15ae29c Merge: d4184fca3 dfdd87764 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 9 13:50:59 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/958' into maint-0.3.5

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/920' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit e3ba9b7a78d1c31b3b319021b983465a60864901 Merge: 519556ef2 c24928dd8 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 9 14:00:01 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/920' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug30041 | 5 +++++ src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 4 ++++ src/lib/container/buffers.c | 11 +++++++++-- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --cc src/core/mainloop/connection.c index 7b8dc7f36,000000000..a6c9029da mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c @@@ -1,5491 -1,0 +1,5495 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file connection.c + * \brief General high-level functions to handle reading and writing + * on connections. + * + * Each connection (ideally) represents a TLS connection, a TCP socket, a unix + * socket, or a UDP socket on which reads and writes can occur. (But see + * connection_edge.c for cases where connections can also represent streams + * that do not have a corresponding socket.) + * + * The module implements the abstract type, connection_t. The subtypes are: + * <ul> + * <li>listener_connection_t, implemented here in connection.c + * <li>dir_connection_t, implemented in directory.c + * <li>or_connection_t, implemented in connection_or.c + * <li>edge_connection_t, implemented in connection_edge.c, along with + * its subtype(s): + * <ul><li>entry_connection_t, also implemented in connection_edge.c + * </ul> + * <li>control_connection_t, implemented in control.c + * </ul> + * + * The base type implemented in this module is responsible for basic + * rate limiting, flow control, and marshalling bytes onto and off of the + * network (either directly or via TLS). + * + * Connections are registered with the main loop with connection_add(). As + * they become able to read or write register the fact with the event main + * loop by calling connection_watch_events(), connection_start_reading(), or + * connection_start_writing(). When they no longer want to read or write, + * they call connection_stop_reading() or connection_stop_writing(). + * + * To queue data to be written on a connection, call + * connection_buf_add(). When data arrives, the + * connection_process_inbuf() callback is invoked, which dispatches to a + * type-specific function (such as connection_edge_process_inbuf() for + * example). Connection types that need notice of when data has been written + * receive notification via connection_flushed_some() and + * connection_finished_flushing(). These functions all delegate to + * type-specific implementations. + * + * Additionally, beyond the core of connection_t, this module also implements: + * <ul> + * <li>Listeners, which wait for incoming sockets and launch connections + * <li>Outgoing SOCKS proxy support + * <li>Outgoing HTTP proxy support + * <li>An out-of-sockets handler for dealing with socket exhaustion + * </ul> + **/ + +#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "feature/client/bridges.h" +#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/tls/buffers_tls.h" +#include "lib/err/backtrace.h" + +/* + * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing + * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t). + */ +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" +#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" +#include "core/or/channel.h" +#include "core/or/channeltls.h" +#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/connection_edge.h" +#include "core/or/connection_or.h" +#include "core/or/dos.h" +#include "core/or/policies.h" +#include "core/or/reasons.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "core/proto/proto_http.h" +#include "core/proto/proto_socks.h" +#include "feature/client/dnsserv.h" +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" +#include "feature/client/transports.h" +#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" +#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h" +#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" +#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" +#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h" +#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" +#include "feature/relay/dns.h" +#include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h" +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" +#include "feature/rend/rendclient.h" +#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h" +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h" + +#include "lib/sandbox/sandbox.h" +#include "lib/net/buffers_net.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" +#include "lib/compress/compress.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include <pwd.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include <unistd.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include <sys/stat.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/un.h> +#endif + +#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" +#include "feature/control/control_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/listener_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" +#include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" + +/** + * On Windows and Linux we cannot reliably bind() a socket to an + * address and port if: 1) There's already a socket bound to wildcard + * address (0.0.0.0 or ::) with the same port; 2) We try to bind() + * to wildcard address and there's another socket bound to a + * specific address and the same port. + * + * To address this problem on these two platforms we implement a + * routine that: + * 1) Checks if first attempt to bind() a new socket failed with + * EADDRINUSE. + * 2) If so, it will close the appropriate old listener connection and + * 3) Attempts bind()'ing the new listener socket again. + * + * Just to be safe, we are enabling listener rebind code on all platforms, + * to account for unexpected cases where it may be needed. + */ +#define ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND + +static connection_t *connection_listener_new( + const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, + socklen_t listensocklen, int type, + const char *address, + const port_cfg_t *portcfg, + int *addr_in_use); +static connection_t *connection_listener_new_for_port( + const port_cfg_t *port, + int *defer, int *addr_in_use); +static void connection_init(time_t now, connection_t *conn, int type, + int socket_family); +static int connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type); +static int connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn); +static int connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn); +static int connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn); +static int connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn); +static int connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, + ssize_t *max_to_read, + int *socket_error); +static int connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial); +static void client_check_address_changed(tor_socket_t sock); +static void set_constrained_socket_buffers(tor_socket_t sock, int size); + +static const char *connection_proxy_state_to_string(int state); +static int connection_read_https_proxy_response(connection_t *conn); +static void connection_send_socks5_connect(connection_t *conn); +static const char *proxy_type_to_string(int proxy_type); +static int get_proxy_type(void); +const tor_addr_t *conn_get_outbound_address(sa_family_t family, + const or_options_t *options, unsigned int conn_type); +static void reenable_blocked_connection_init(const or_options_t *options); +static void reenable_blocked_connection_schedule(void); + +/** The last addresses that our network interface seemed to have been + * binding to. We use this as one way to detect when our IP changes. + * + * XXXX+ We should really use the entire list of interfaces here. + **/ +static tor_addr_t *last_interface_ipv4 = NULL; +/* DOCDOC last_interface_ipv6 */ +static tor_addr_t *last_interface_ipv6 = NULL; +/** A list of tor_addr_t for addresses we've used in outgoing connections. + * Used to detect IP address changes. */ +static smartlist_t *outgoing_addrs = NULL; + +#define CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE \ + case CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER + +/**************************************************************/ + +/** Convert a connection_t* to an listener_connection_t*; assert if the cast + * is invalid. */ +listener_connection_t * +TO_LISTENER_CONN(connection_t *c) +{ + tor_assert(c->magic == LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + return DOWNCAST(listener_connection_t, c); +} + +size_t +connection_get_inbuf_len(connection_t *conn) +{ + return conn->inbuf ? buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) : 0; +} + +size_t +connection_get_outbuf_len(connection_t *conn) +{ + return conn->outbuf ? buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) : 0; +} + +/** + * Return the human-readable name for the connection type type + */ +const char * +conn_type_to_string(int type) +{ + static char buf[64]; + switch (type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER: return "OR listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_OR: return "OR"; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: return "Exit"; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: return "Socks listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER: + return "Transparent pf/netfilter listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER: return "Transparent natd listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER: return "DNS listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: return "Socks"; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER: return "Directory listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: return "Directory"; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: return "Control listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: return "Control"; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: return "Extended OR"; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER: return "Extended OR listener"; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER: return "HTTP tunnel listener"; + default: + log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown connection type %d", type); + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "unknown [%d]", type); + return buf; + } +} + +/** + * Return the human-readable name for the connection state state + * for the connection type type + */ +const char * +conn_state_to_string(int type, int state) +{ + static char buf[96]; + switch (type) { + CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE: + if (state == LISTENER_STATE_READY) + return "ready"; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + switch (state) { + case OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING: return "connect()ing"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING: return "handshaking (proxy)"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: return "handshaking (TLS)"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING: + return "renegotiating (TLS, v2 handshake)"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + return "waiting for renegotiation or V3 handshake"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + return "handshaking (Tor, v2 handshake)"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + return "handshaking (Tor, v3 handshake)"; + case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open"; + } + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + switch (state) { + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE: + return "waiting for authentication type"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE: + return "waiting for client nonce"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH: + return "waiting for client hash"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING: return "flushing final OKAY"; + } + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + switch (state) { + case EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING: return "waiting for dest info"; + case EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING: return "connecting"; + case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open"; + case EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED: return "resolve failed"; + } + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + switch (state) { + case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT: return "waiting for socks info"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT: return "waiting for natd dest info"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT: return "waiting for rendezvous desc"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT: return "waiting for controller"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT: return "waiting for circuit"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT: return "waiting for connect response"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT: return "waiting for resolve response"; + case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open"; + } + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + switch (state) { + case DIR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING: return "connecting"; + case DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING: return "client sending"; + case DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_READING: return "client reading"; + case DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_FINISHED: return "client finished"; + case DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT: return "waiting for command"; + case DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_WRITING: return "writing"; + } + break; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + switch (state) { + case CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open (protocol v1)"; + case CONTROL_CONN_STATE_NEEDAUTH: + return "waiting for authentication (protocol v1)"; + } + break; + } + + log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown connection state %d (type %d)", state, type); + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "unknown state [%d] on unknown [%s] connection", + state, conn_type_to_string(type)); + return buf; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new dir_connection_t, initialized as by + * connection_init(). */ +dir_connection_t * +dir_connection_new(int socket_family) +{ + dir_connection_t *dir_conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(dir_connection_t)); + connection_init(time(NULL), TO_CONN(dir_conn), CONN_TYPE_DIR, socket_family); + return dir_conn; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new or_connection_t, initialized as by + * connection_init(). + * + * Initialize active_circuit_pqueue. + * + * Set active_circuit_pqueue_last_recalibrated to current cell_ewma tick. + */ +or_connection_t * +or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family) +{ + or_connection_t *or_conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_connection_t)); + time_t now = time(NULL); + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_OR || type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); + connection_init(now, TO_CONN(or_conn), type, socket_family); + + connection_or_set_canonical(or_conn, 0); + + if (type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR) + connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_conn); + + return or_conn; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new entry_connection_t, initialized as by + * connection_init(). + * + * Allocate space to store the socks_request. + */ +entry_connection_t * +entry_connection_new(int type, int socket_family) +{ + entry_connection_t *entry_conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_connection_t)); + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_AP); + connection_init(time(NULL), ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn), type, socket_family); + entry_conn->socks_request = socks_request_new(); + /* If this is coming from a listener, we'll set it up based on the listener + * in a little while. Otherwise, we're doing this as a linked connection + * of some kind, and we should set it up here based on the socket family */ + if (socket_family == AF_INET) + entry_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1; + else if (socket_family == AF_INET6) + entry_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1; + return entry_conn; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new edge_connection_t, initialized as by + * connection_init(). */ +edge_connection_t * +edge_connection_new(int type, int socket_family) +{ + edge_connection_t *edge_conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(edge_connection_t)); + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT); + connection_init(time(NULL), TO_CONN(edge_conn), type, socket_family); + return edge_conn; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new control_connection_t, initialized as by + * connection_init(). */ +control_connection_t * +control_connection_new(int socket_family) +{ + control_connection_t *control_conn = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(control_connection_t)); + connection_init(time(NULL), + TO_CONN(control_conn), CONN_TYPE_CONTROL, socket_family); + return control_conn; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new listener_connection_t, initialized as by + * connection_init(). */ +listener_connection_t * +listener_connection_new(int type, int socket_family) +{ + listener_connection_t *listener_conn = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(listener_connection_t)); + connection_init(time(NULL), TO_CONN(listener_conn), type, socket_family); + return listener_conn; +} + +/** Allocate, initialize, and return a new connection_t subtype of type + * to make or receive connections of address family socket_family. The + * type should be one of the CONN_TYPE_* constants. */ +connection_t * +connection_new(int type, int socket_family) +{ + switch (type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return TO_CONN(or_connection_new(type, socket_family)); + + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + return TO_CONN(edge_connection_new(type, socket_family)); + + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + return ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_connection_new(type, socket_family)); + + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + return TO_CONN(dir_connection_new(socket_family)); + + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + return TO_CONN(control_connection_new(socket_family)); + + CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE: + return TO_CONN(listener_connection_new(type, socket_family)); + + default: { + connection_t *conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(connection_t)); + connection_init(time(NULL), conn, type, socket_family); + return conn; + } + } +} + +/** Initializes conn. (you must call connection_add() to link it into the main + * array). + * + * Set conn-\>magic to the correct value. + * + * Set conn-\>type to type. Set conn-\>s and conn-\>conn_array_index to + * -1 to signify they are not yet assigned. + * + * Initialize conn's timestamps to now. + */ +static void +connection_init(time_t now, connection_t *conn, int type, int socket_family) +{ + static uint64_t n_connections_allocated = 1; + + switch (type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + conn->magic = OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + conn->magic = EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + conn->magic = ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + conn->magic = DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + conn->magic = CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE: + conn->magic = LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + default: + conn->magic = BASE_CONNECTION_MAGIC; + break; + } + + conn->s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; /* give it a default of 'not used' */ + conn->conn_array_index = -1; /* also default to 'not used' */ + conn->global_identifier = n_connections_allocated++; + + conn->type = type; + conn->socket_family = socket_family; + if (!connection_is_listener(conn)) { + /* listeners never use their buf */ + conn->inbuf = buf_new(); + conn->outbuf = buf_new(); + } + + conn->timestamp_created = now; + conn->timestamp_last_read_allowed = now; + conn->timestamp_last_write_allowed = now; +} + +/** Create a link between conn_a and conn_b. */ +void +connection_link_connections(connection_t *conn_a, connection_t *conn_b) +{ + tor_assert(! SOCKET_OK(conn_a->s)); + tor_assert(! SOCKET_OK(conn_b->s)); + + conn_a->linked = 1; + conn_b->linked = 1; + conn_a->linked_conn = conn_b; + conn_b->linked_conn = conn_a; +} + +/** Return true iff the provided connection listener type supports AF_UNIX + * sockets. */ +int +conn_listener_type_supports_af_unix(int type) +{ + /* For now only control ports or SOCKS ports can be Unix domain sockets + * and listeners at the same time */ + switch (type) { + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: + case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/** Deallocate memory used by conn. Deallocate its buffers if + * necessary, close its socket if necessary, and mark the directory as dirty + * if conn is an OR or OP connection. + */ +STATIC void +connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn) +{ + void *mem; + size_t memlen; + if (!conn) + return; + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + tor_assert(conn->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + memlen = sizeof(or_connection_t); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + tor_assert(conn->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn); + memlen = sizeof(entry_connection_t); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + tor_assert(conn->magic == EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + memlen = sizeof(edge_connection_t); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + tor_assert(conn->magic == DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = TO_DIR_CONN(conn); + memlen = sizeof(dir_connection_t); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + tor_assert(conn->magic == CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn); + memlen = sizeof(control_connection_t); + break; + CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE: + tor_assert(conn->magic == LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = TO_LISTENER_CONN(conn); + memlen = sizeof(listener_connection_t); + break; + default: + tor_assert(conn->magic == BASE_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + mem = conn; + memlen = sizeof(connection_t); + break; + } + + if (conn->linked) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Freeing linked %s connection [%s] with %d " + "bytes on inbuf, %d on outbuf.", + conn_type_to_string(conn->type), + conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state), + (int)connection_get_inbuf_len(conn), + (int)connection_get_outbuf_len(conn)); + } + + if (!connection_is_listener(conn)) { + buf_free(conn->inbuf); + buf_free(conn->outbuf); + } else { + if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + /* For now only control and SOCKS ports can be Unix domain sockets + * and listeners at the same time */ + tor_assert(conn_listener_type_supports_af_unix(conn->type)); + + if (unlink(conn->address) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not unlink %s: %s", conn->address, + strerror(errno)); + } + } + } + + tor_free(conn->address); + + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + if (or_conn->tls) { + if (! SOCKET_OK(conn->s)) { + /* The socket has been closed by somebody else; we must tell the + * TLS object not to close it. */ + tor_tls_release_socket(or_conn->tls); + } else { + /* The tor_tls_free() call below will close the socket; we must tell + * the code below not to close it a second time. */ + tor_release_socket_ownership(conn->s); + conn->s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + } + tor_tls_free(or_conn->tls); + or_conn->tls = NULL; + } + or_handshake_state_free(or_conn->handshake_state); + or_conn->handshake_state = NULL; + tor_free(or_conn->nickname); + if (or_conn->chan) { + /* Owww, this shouldn't happen, but... */ + channel_t *base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan); + tor_assert(base_chan); + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "Freeing orconn at %p, saw channel %p with ID " + "%"PRIu64 " left un-NULLed", + or_conn, base_chan, + base_chan->global_identifier); + if (!CHANNEL_FINISHED(base_chan)) { + channel_close_for_error(base_chan); + } + + or_conn->chan->conn = NULL; + or_conn->chan = NULL; + } + } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + entry_connection_t *entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn); + tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); + tor_free(entry_conn->original_dest_address); + if (entry_conn->socks_request) + socks_request_free(entry_conn->socks_request); + if (entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data) { + buf_free(entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data); + } + if (entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data) { + buf_free(entry_conn->sending_optimistic_data); + } + } + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + rend_data_free(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data); + hs_ident_edge_conn_free(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident); + } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) { + control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn); + tor_free(control_conn->safecookie_client_hash); + tor_free(control_conn->incoming_cmd); + if (control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services, char *, cp, { + memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); + tor_free(cp); + }); + smartlist_free(control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services); + } + } + + /* Probably already freed by connection_free. */ + tor_event_free(conn->read_event); + tor_event_free(conn->write_event); + conn->read_event = conn->write_event = NULL; + + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR) { + dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn); + tor_free(dir_conn->requested_resource); + + tor_compress_free(dir_conn->compress_state); + if (dir_conn->spool) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(dir_conn->spool, spooled_resource_t *, spooled, + spooled_resource_free(spooled)); + smartlist_free(dir_conn->spool); + } + + rend_data_free(dir_conn->rend_data); + hs_ident_dir_conn_free(dir_conn->hs_ident); + if (dir_conn->guard_state) { + /* Cancel before freeing, if it's still there. */ + entry_guard_cancel(&dir_conn->guard_state); + } + circuit_guard_state_free(dir_conn->guard_state); + } + + if (SOCKET_OK(conn->s)) { + log_debug(LD_NET,"closing fd %d.",(int)conn->s); + tor_close_socket(conn->s); + conn->s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + } + + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR && + !tor_digest_is_zero(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->identity_digest)) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "called on OR conn with non-zeroed identity_digest"); + connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR) { + connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + tor_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_conn_id); + tor_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash); + tor_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_transport); + } + + memwipe(mem, 0xCC, memlen); /* poison memory */ + tor_free(mem); +} + +/** Make sure conn isn't in any of the global conn lists; then free it. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_free_,(connection_t *conn)) +{ + if (!conn) + return; + tor_assert(!connection_is_on_closeable_list(conn)); + tor_assert(!connection_in_array(conn)); + if (BUG(conn->linked_conn)) { + conn->linked_conn->linked_conn = NULL; + if (! conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close && + conn->linked_conn->reading_from_linked_conn) + connection_start_reading(conn->linked_conn); + conn->linked_conn = NULL; + } + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { + if (!tor_digest_is_zero(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->identity_digest)) { + connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + } + } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) { + connection_control_closed(TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn)); + } +#if 1 + /* DEBUGGING */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), + "connection_free"); + } +#endif /* 1 */ + + /* Notify the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem that an OR client + * connection has been closed. And only do that if we track it. */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + dos_close_client_conn(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + } + + connection_unregister_events(conn); + connection_free_minimal(conn); +} + +/** + * Called when we're about to finally unlink and free a connection: + * perform necessary accounting and cleanup + * - Directory conns that failed to fetch a rendezvous descriptor + * need to inform pending rendezvous streams. + * - OR conns need to call rep_hist_note_*() to record status. + * - AP conns need to send a socks reject if necessary. + * - Exit conns need to call connection_dns_remove() if necessary. + * - AP and Exit conns need to send an end cell if they can. + * - DNS conns need to fail any resolves that are pending on them. + * - OR and edge connections need to be unlinked from circuits. + */ +void +connection_about_to_close_connection(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn->marked_for_close); + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + connection_dir_about_to_close(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + connection_or_about_to_close(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + connection_ap_about_to_close(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + connection_exit_about_to_close(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + break; + } +} + +/** Return true iff connection_close_immediate() has been called on this + * connection. */ +#define CONN_IS_CLOSED(c) \ + ((c)->linked ? ((c)->linked_conn_is_closed) : (! SOCKET_OK(c->s))) + +/** Close the underlying socket for conn, so we don't try to + * flush it. Must be used in conjunction with (right before) + * connection_mark_for_close(). + */ +void +connection_close_immediate(connection_t *conn) +{ + assert_connection_ok(conn,0); + if (CONN_IS_CLOSED(conn)) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"Attempt to close already-closed connection."); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return; + } + if (conn->outbuf_flushlen) { + log_info(LD_NET,"fd %d, type %s, state %s, %d bytes on outbuf.", + (int)conn->s, conn_type_to_string(conn->type), + conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state), + (int)conn->outbuf_flushlen); + } + + connection_unregister_events(conn); + + /* Prevent the event from getting unblocked. */ + conn->read_blocked_on_bw = 0; + conn->write_blocked_on_bw = 0; + + if (SOCKET_OK(conn->s)) + tor_close_socket(conn->s); + conn->s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + if (conn->linked) + conn->linked_conn_is_closed = 1; + if (conn->outbuf) + buf_clear(conn->outbuf); + conn->outbuf_flushlen = 0; +} + +/** Mark conn to be closed next time we loop through + * conn_close_if_marked() in main.c. */ +void +connection_mark_for_close_(connection_t *conn, int line, const char *file) +{ + assert_connection_ok(conn,0); + tor_assert(line); + tor_assert(line < 1<<16); /* marked_for_close can only fit a uint16_t. */ + tor_assert(file); + + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + /* + * An or_connection should have been closed through one of the channel- + * aware functions in connection_or.c. We'll assume this is an error + * close and do that, and log a bug warning. + */ + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL | LD_BUG, + "Something tried to close an or_connection_t without going " + "through channels at %s:%d", + file, line); + connection_or_close_for_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0); + } else { + /* Pass it down to the real function */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal_(conn, line, file); + } +} + +/** Mark conn to be closed next time we loop through + * conn_close_if_marked() in main.c; the _internal version bypasses the + * CONN_TYPE_OR checks; this should be called when you either are sure that + * if this is an or_connection_t the controlling channel has been notified + * (e.g. with connection_or_notify_error()), or you actually are the + * connection_or_close_for_error() or connection_or_close_normally() function. + * For all other cases, use connection_mark_and_flush() instead, which + * checks for or_connection_t properly, instead. See below. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_mark_for_close_internal_, (connection_t *conn, + int line, const char *file)) +{ + assert_connection_ok(conn,0); + tor_assert(line); + tor_assert(line < 1<<16); /* marked_for_close can only fit a uint16_t. */ + tor_assert(file); + + if (conn->marked_for_close) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Duplicate call to connection_mark_for_close at %s:%d" + " (first at %s:%d)", file, line, conn->marked_for_close_file, + conn->marked_for_close); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return; + } + + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + /* + * Bad news if this happens without telling the controlling channel; do + * this so we can find things that call this wrongly when the asserts hit. + */ + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Calling connection_mark_for_close_internal_() on an OR conn " + "at %s:%d", + file, line); + } + + conn->marked_for_close = line; + conn->marked_for_close_file = file; + add_connection_to_closeable_list(conn); + + /* in case we're going to be held-open-til-flushed, reset + * the number of seconds since last successful write, so + * we get our whole 15 seconds */ + conn->timestamp_last_write_allowed = time(NULL); +} + +/** Find each connection that has hold_open_until_flushed set to + * 1 but hasn't written in the past 15 seconds, and set + * hold_open_until_flushed to 0. This means it will get cleaned + * up in the next loop through close_if_marked() in main.c. + */ +void +connection_expire_held_open(void) +{ + time_t now; + smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); + + now = time(NULL); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) { + /* If we've been holding the connection open, but we haven't written + * for 15 seconds... + */ + if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) { + tor_assert(conn->marked_for_close); + if (now - conn->timestamp_last_write_allowed >= 15) { + int severity; + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT || + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && + conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER)) + severity = LOG_INFO; + else + severity = LOG_NOTICE; + log_fn(severity, LD_NET, + "Giving up on marked_for_close conn that's been flushing " + "for 15s (fd %d, type %s, state %s).", + (int)conn->s, conn_type_to_string(conn->type), + conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state)); + conn->hold_open_until_flushed = 0; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); +} + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) || defined(RUNNING_DOXYGEN) +/** Create an AF_UNIX listenaddr struct. + * listenaddress provides the path to the Unix socket. + * + * Eventually listenaddress will also optionally contain user, group, + * and file permissions for the new socket. But not yet. XXX + * Also, since we do not create the socket here the information doesn't help + * here. + * + * If not NULL readable_address will contain a copy of the path part of + * listenaddress. + * + * The listenaddr struct has to be freed by the caller. + */ +static struct sockaddr_un * +create_unix_sockaddr(const char *listenaddress, char **readable_address, + socklen_t *len_out) +{ + struct sockaddr_un *sockaddr = NULL; + + sockaddr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); + sockaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + if (strlcpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) + >= sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unix socket path '%s' is too long to fit.", + escaped(listenaddress)); + tor_free(sockaddr); + return NULL; + } + + if (readable_address) + *readable_address = tor_strdup(listenaddress); + + *len_out = sizeof(struct sockaddr_un); + return sockaddr; +} +#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) || defined(RUNNING_DOXYGEN)) */ +static struct sockaddr * +create_unix_sockaddr(const char *listenaddress, char **readable_address, + socklen_t *len_out) +{ + (void)listenaddress; + (void)readable_address; + log_fn(LOG_ERR, LD_BUG, + "Unix domain sockets not supported, yet we tried to create one."); + *len_out = 0; + tor_fragile_assert(); + return NULL; +} +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) || defined(RUNNING_DOXYGEN) */ + +/** Warn that an accept or a connect has failed because we're running out of + * TCP sockets we can use on current system. Rate-limit these warnings so + * that we don't spam the log. */ +static void +warn_too_many_conns(void) +{ +#define WARN_TOO_MANY_CONNS_INTERVAL (6*60*60) + static ratelim_t last_warned = RATELIM_INIT(WARN_TOO_MANY_CONNS_INTERVAL); + char *m; + if ((m = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, approx_time()))) { + int n_conns = get_n_open_sockets(); + log_warn(LD_NET,"Failing because we have %d connections already. Please " + "read doc/TUNING for guidance.%s", n_conns, m); + tor_free(m); + control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, "TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS CURRENT=%d", + n_conns); + } +} + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + +#define UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET 0 +#define UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET 1 + +/** Check if the purpose isn't one of the ones we know what to do with */ + +static int +is_valid_unix_socket_purpose(int purpose) +{ + int valid = 0; + + switch (purpose) { + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET: + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET: + valid = 1; + break; + } + + return valid; +} + +/** Return a string description of a unix socket purpose */ +static const char * +unix_socket_purpose_to_string(int purpose) +{ + const char *s = "unknown-purpose socket"; + + switch (purpose) { + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET: + s = "control socket"; + break; + case UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET: + s = "SOCKS socket"; + break; + } + + return s; +} + +/** Check whether we should be willing to open an AF_UNIX socket in + * path. Return 0 if we should go ahead and -1 if we shouldn't. */ +static int +check_location_for_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, const char *path, + int purpose, const port_cfg_t *port) +{ + int r = -1; + char *p = NULL; + + tor_assert(is_valid_unix_socket_purpose(purpose)); + + p = tor_strdup(path); + cpd_check_t flags = CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY; + if (get_parent_directory(p)<0 || p[0] != '/') { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Bad unix socket address '%s'. Tor does not support " + "relative paths for unix sockets.", path); + goto done; + } + + if (port->is_world_writable) { + /* World-writable sockets can go anywhere. */ + r = 0; + goto done; + } + + if (port->is_group_writable) { + flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; + } + + if (port->relax_dirmode_check) { + flags |= CPD_RELAX_DIRMODE_CHECK; + } + + if (check_private_dir(p, flags, options->User) < 0) { + char *escpath, *escdir; + escpath = esc_for_log(path); + escdir = esc_for_log(p); + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Before Tor can create a %s in %s, the directory " + "%s needs to exist, and to be accessible only by the user%s " + "account that is running Tor. (On some Unix systems, anybody " + "who can list a socket can connect to it, so Tor is being " + "careful.)", + unix_socket_purpose_to_string(purpose), escpath, escdir, + port->is_group_writable ? " and group" : ""); + tor_free(escpath); + tor_free(escdir); + goto done; + } + + r = 0; + done: + tor_free(p); + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */ + +/** Tell the TCP stack that it shouldn't wait for a long time after + * sock has closed before reusing its port. Return 0 on success, + * -1 on failure. */ +static int +make_socket_reuseable(tor_socket_t sock) +{ +#ifdef _WIN32 + (void) sock; + return 0; +#else + int one=1; + + /* REUSEADDR on normal places means you can rebind to the port + * right after somebody else has let it go. But REUSEADDR on win32 + * means you can bind to the port _even when somebody else + * already has it bound_. So, don't do that on Win32. */ + if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void*) &one, + (socklen_t)sizeof(one)) == -1) { + return -1; + } + return 0; +#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */ +} + +#ifdef _WIN32 +/** Tell the Windows TCP stack to prevent other applications from receiving + * traffic from tor's open ports. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ +static int +make_win32_socket_exclusive(tor_socket_t sock) +{ +#ifdef SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE + int one=1; + + /* Any socket that sets REUSEADDR on win32 can bind to a port _even when + * somebody else already has it bound_, and _even if the original socket + * didn't set REUSEADDR_. Use EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE to prevent this port-stealing + * on win32. */ + if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE, (void*) &one, + (socklen_t)sizeof(one))) { + return -1; + } + return 0; +#else /* !(defined(SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE)) */ + (void) sock; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE) */ +} +#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */ + +/** Max backlog to pass to listen. We start at */ +static int listen_limit = INT_MAX; + +/* Listen on fd with appropriate backlog. Return as for listen. */ +static int +tor_listen(tor_socket_t fd) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = listen(fd, listen_limit)) < 0) { + if (listen_limit == SOMAXCONN) + return r; + if ((r = listen(fd, SOMAXCONN)) == 0) { + listen_limit = SOMAXCONN; + log_warn(LD_NET, "Setting listen backlog to INT_MAX connections " + "didn't work, but SOMAXCONN did. Lowering backlog limit."); + } + } + return r; +} + +/** Bind a new non-blocking socket listening to the socket described + * by listensockaddr. + * + * address is only used for logging purposes and to add the information + * to the conn. + * + * Set addr_in_use to true in case socket binding fails with + * EADDRINUSE. + */ +static connection_t * +connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, + socklen_t socklen, + int type, const char *address, + const port_cfg_t *port_cfg, + int *addr_in_use) +{ + listener_connection_t *lis_conn; + connection_t *conn = NULL; + tor_socket_t s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; /* the socket we're going to make */ + or_options_t const *options = get_options(); + (void) options; /* Windows doesn't use this. */ +#if defined(HAVE_PWD_H) && defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) + const struct passwd *pw = NULL; +#endif + uint16_t usePort = 0, gotPort = 0; + int start_reading = 0; + static int global_next_session_group = SESSION_GROUP_FIRST_AUTO; + tor_addr_t addr; + int exhaustion = 0; + + if (addr_in_use) + *addr_in_use = 0; + + if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET || + listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6) { + int is_stream = (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); + if (is_stream) + start_reading = 1; + + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, listensockaddr, &usePort); + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); + + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), + is_stream ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, + is_stream ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); + if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e)) { + warn_too_many_conns(); + /* + * We'll call the OOS handler at the error exit, so set the + * exhaustion flag for it. + */ + exhaustion = 1; + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Socket creation failed: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + } + goto err; + } + + if (make_socket_reuseable(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(errno)); + } + +#ifdef _WIN32 + if (make_win32_socket_exclusive(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE flag on %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(errno)); + } +#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */ + +#if defined(USE_TRANSPARENT) && defined(IP_TRANSPARENT) + if (options->TransProxyType_parsed == TPT_TPROXY && + type == CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER) { + int one = 1; + if (setsockopt(s, SOL_IP, IP_TRANSPARENT, (void*)&one, + (socklen_t)sizeof(one)) < 0) { + const char *extra = ""; + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (e == EPERM) + extra = "TransTPROXY requires root privileges or similar" + " capabilities."; + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting IP_TRANSPARENT flag: %s.%s", + tor_socket_strerror(e), extra); + } + } +#endif /* defined(USE_TRANSPARENT) && defined(IP_TRANSPARENT) */ + +#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY + if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_INET6) { + int one = 1; + /* We need to set IPV6_V6ONLY so that this socket can't get used for + * IPv4 connections. */ + if (setsockopt(s,IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, + (void*)&one, (socklen_t)sizeof(one)) < 0) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting IPV6_V6ONLY flag: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + /* Keep going; probably not harmful. */ + } + } +#endif /* defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) */ + + if (bind(s,listensockaddr,socklen) < 0) { + const char *helpfulhint = ""; + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e)) { + helpfulhint = ". Is Tor already running?"; + if (addr_in_use) + *addr_in_use = 1; + } + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not bind to %s:%u: %s%s", address, usePort, + tor_socket_strerror(e), helpfulhint); + goto err; + } + + if (is_stream) { + if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; + } + } + + if (usePort != 0) { + gotPort = usePort; + } else { + tor_addr_t addr2; + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + socklen_t ss_len=sizeof(ss); + if (getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &ss_len)<0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() couldn't learn address for %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + gotPort = 0; + } + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr2, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &gotPort); + } +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + /* + * AF_UNIX generic setup stuff + */ + } else if (listensockaddr->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { + /* We want to start reading for both AF_UNIX cases */ + start_reading = 1; + + tor_assert(conn_listener_type_supports_af_unix(type)); + + if (check_location_for_unix_socket(options, address, + (type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) ? + UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_CONTROL_SOCKET : + UNIX_SOCKET_PURPOSE_SOCKS_SOCKET, port_cfg) < 0) { + goto err; + } + + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), address); + + tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr); + + if (unlink(address) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not unlink %s: %s", address, + strerror(errno)); + goto err; + } + + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e)) { + warn_too_many_conns(); + /* + * We'll call the OOS handler at the error exit, so set the + * exhaustion flag for it. + */ + exhaustion = 1; + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET,"Socket creation failed: %s.", strerror(e)); + } + goto err; + } + + if (bind(s, listensockaddr, + (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) == -1) { + log_warn(LD_NET,"Bind to %s failed: %s.", address, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H + if (options->User) { + pw = tor_getpwnam(options->User); + struct stat st; + if (pw == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_NET,"Unable to chown() %s socket: user %s not found.", + address, options->User); + goto err; + } else if (fstat(s, &st) == 0 && + st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid && st.st_gid == pw->pw_gid) { + /* No change needed */ + } else if (chown(sandbox_intern_string(address), + pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET,"Unable to chown() %s socket: %s.", + address, strerror(errno)); + goto err; + } + } +#endif /* defined(HAVE_PWD_H) */ + + { + unsigned mode; + const char *status; + struct stat st; + if (port_cfg->is_world_writable) { + mode = 0666; + status = "world-writable"; + } else if (port_cfg->is_group_writable) { + mode = 0660; + status = "group-writable"; + } else { + mode = 0600; + status = "private"; + } + /* We need to use chmod; fchmod doesn't work on sockets on all + * platforms. */ + if (fstat(s, &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & 0777) == mode) { + /* no change needed */ + } else if (chmod(sandbox_intern_string(address), mode) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s %s.", address, status); + goto err; + } + } + + if (listen(s, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s: %s", address, + tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); + goto err; + } +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */ + } else { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Got unexpected address family %d.", + listensockaddr->sa_family); + tor_assert(0); + } + + lis_conn = listener_connection_new(type, listensockaddr->sa_family); + conn = TO_CONN(lis_conn); + conn->socket_family = listensockaddr->sa_family; + conn->s = s; + s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; /* Prevent double-close */ + conn->address = tor_strdup(address); + conn->port = gotPort; + tor_addr_copy(&conn->addr, &addr); + + memcpy(&lis_conn->entry_cfg, &port_cfg->entry_cfg, sizeof(entry_port_cfg_t)); + + if (port_cfg->entry_cfg.isolation_flags) { + lis_conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags = port_cfg->entry_cfg.isolation_flags; + if (port_cfg->entry_cfg.session_group >= 0) { + lis_conn->entry_cfg.session_group = port_cfg->entry_cfg.session_group; + } else { + /* This can wrap after around INT_MAX listeners are opened. But I don't + * believe that matters, since you would need to open a ridiculous + * number of listeners while keeping the early ones open before you ever + * hit this. An OR with a dozen ports open, for example, would have to + * close and re-open its listeners every second for 4 years nonstop. + */ + lis_conn->entry_cfg.session_group = global_next_session_group--; + } + } + + if (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) { + lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1; + lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1; + lis_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 0; + } + + if (connection_add(conn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */ + log_warn(LD_NET,"connection_add for listener failed. Giving up."); + goto err; + } + + log_fn(usePort==gotPort ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_NOTICE, LD_NET, + "%s listening on port %u.", + conn_type_to_string(type), gotPort); + + conn->state = LISTENER_STATE_READY; + if (start_reading) { + connection_start_reading(conn); + } else { + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); + dnsserv_configure_listener(conn); + } + + /* + * Normal exit; call the OOS handler since connection count just changed; + * the exhaustion flag will always be zero here though. + */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0); + + if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opened %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), conn->address); + } else { + log_notice(LD_NET, "Opened %s on %s", + conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, gotPort)); + } + return conn; + + err: + if (SOCKET_OK(s)) + tor_close_socket(s); + if (conn) + connection_free(conn); + + /* Call the OOS handler, indicate if we saw an exhaustion-related error */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), exhaustion); + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Create a new listener connection for a given port. In case we + * for a reason that is not an error condition, set defer + * to true. If we cannot bind listening socket because address is already + * in use, set addr_in_use to true. + */ +static connection_t * +connection_listener_new_for_port(const port_cfg_t *port, + int *defer, int *addr_in_use) +{ + connection_t *conn; + struct sockaddr *listensockaddr; + socklen_t listensocklen = 0; + char *address=NULL; + int real_port = port->port == CFG_AUTO_PORT ? 0 : port->port; + tor_assert(real_port <= UINT16_MAX); + + if (defer) + *defer = 0; + + if (port->server_cfg.no_listen) { + if (defer) + *defer = 1; + return NULL; + } + +#ifndef _WIN32 + /* We don't need to be root to create a UNIX socket, so defer until after + * setuid. */ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (port->is_unix_addr && !geteuid() && (options->User) && + strcmp(options->User, "root")) { + if (defer) + *defer = 1; + return NULL; + } +#endif /* !defined(_WIN32) */ + + if (port->is_unix_addr) { + listensockaddr = (struct sockaddr *) + create_unix_sockaddr(port->unix_addr, + &address, &listensocklen); + } else { + listensockaddr = tor_malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + listensocklen = tor_addr_to_sockaddr(&port->addr, + real_port, + listensockaddr, + sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&port->addr); + } + + if (listensockaddr) { + conn = connection_listener_new(listensockaddr, listensocklen, + port->type, address, port, + addr_in_use); + tor_free(listensockaddr); + tor_free(address); + } else { + conn = NULL; + } + + return conn; +} + +/** Do basic sanity checking on a newly received socket. Return 0 + * if it looks ok, else return -1. + * + * Notably, some TCP stacks can erroneously have accept() return successfully + * with socklen 0, when the client sends an RST before the accept call (as + * nmap does). We want to detect that, and not go on with the connection. + */ +static int +check_sockaddr(const struct sockaddr *sa, int len, int level) +{ + int ok = 1; + + if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) { + struct sockaddr_in *sin=(struct sockaddr_in*)sa; + if (len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { + log_fn(level, LD_NET, "Length of address not as expected: %d vs %d", + len,(int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + ok = 0; + } + if (sin->sin_addr.s_addr == 0 || sin->sin_port == 0) { + log_fn(level, LD_NET, + "Address for new connection has address/port equal to zero."); + ok = 0; + } + } else if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6=(struct sockaddr_in6*)sa; + if (len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) { + log_fn(level, LD_NET, "Length of address not as expected: %d vs %d", + len,(int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)); + ok = 0; + } + if (tor_mem_is_zero((void*)sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16) || + sin6->sin6_port == 0) { + log_fn(level, LD_NET, + "Address for new connection has address/port equal to zero."); + ok = 0; + } + } else if (sa->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { + ok = 1; + } else { + ok = 0; + } + return ok ? 0 : -1; +} + +/** Check whether the socket family from an accepted socket got is the + * same as the one that listener is waiting for. If it isn't, log + * a useful message and return -1. Else return 0. + * + * This is annoying, but can apparently happen on some Darwins. */ +static int +check_sockaddr_family_match(sa_family_t got, connection_t *listener) +{ + if (got != listener->socket_family) { + log_info(LD_BUG, "A listener connection returned a socket with a " + "mismatched family. %s for addr_family %d gave us a socket " + "with address family %d. Dropping.", + conn_type_to_string(listener->type), + (int)listener->socket_family, + (int)got); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/** The listener connection conn told poll() it wanted to read. + * Call accept() on conn-\>s, and add the new connection if necessary. + */ +static int +connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) +{ + tor_socket_t news; /* the new socket */ + connection_t *newconn = 0; + /* information about the remote peer when connecting to other routers */ + struct sockaddr_storage addrbuf; + struct sockaddr *remote = (struct sockaddr*)&addrbuf; + /* length of the remote address. Must be whatever accept() needs. */ + socklen_t remotelen = (socklen_t)sizeof(addrbuf); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + tor_assert((size_t)remotelen >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + memset(&addrbuf, 0, sizeof(addrbuf)); + + news = tor_accept_socket_nonblocking(conn->s,remote,&remotelen); + if (!SOCKET_OK(news)) { /* accept() error */ + int e = tor_socket_errno(conn->s); + if (ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e)) { + /* + * they hung up before we could accept(). that's fine. + * + * give the OOS handler a chance to run though + */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0); + return 0; + } else if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e)) { + warn_too_many_conns(); + /* Exhaustion; tell the OOS handler */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 1); + return 0; + } + /* else there was a real error. */ + log_warn(LD_NET,"accept() failed: %s. Closing listener.", + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + /* Tell the OOS handler about this too */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0); + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_NET, + "Connection accepted on socket %d (child of fd %d).", + (int)news,(int)conn->s); + + /* We accepted a new conn; run OOS handler */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0); + + if (make_socket_reuseable(news) < 0) { + if (tor_socket_errno(news) == EINVAL) { + /* This can happen on OSX if we get a badly timed shutdown. */ + log_debug(LD_NET, "make_socket_reuseable returned EINVAL"); + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on %s: %s", + conn_type_to_string(new_type), + tor_socket_strerror(errno)); + } + tor_close_socket(news); + return 0; + } + + if (options->ConstrainedSockets) + set_constrained_socket_buffers(news, (int)options->ConstrainedSockSize); + + if (check_sockaddr_family_match(remote->sa_family, conn) < 0) { + tor_close_socket(news); + return 0; + } + + if (conn->socket_family == AF_INET || conn->socket_family == AF_INET6 || + (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP)) { + tor_addr_t addr; + uint16_t port; + if (check_sockaddr(remote, remotelen, LOG_INFO)<0) { + log_info(LD_NET, + "accept() returned a strange address; closing connection."); + tor_close_socket(news); + return 0; + } + + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, remote, &port); + + /* process entrance policies here, before we even create the connection */ + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + /* check sockspolicy to see if we should accept it */ + if (socks_policy_permits_address(&addr) == 0) { + log_notice(LD_APP, + "Denying socks connection from untrusted address %s.", + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); + tor_close_socket(news); + return 0; + } + } + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_DIR) { + /* check dirpolicy to see if we should accept it */ + if (dir_policy_permits_address(&addr) == 0) { + log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Denying dir connection from address %s.", + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); + tor_close_socket(news); + return 0; + } + } + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + /* Assess with the connection DoS mitigation subsystem if this address + * can open a new connection. */ + if (dos_conn_addr_get_defense_type(&addr) == DOS_CONN_DEFENSE_CLOSE) { + tor_close_socket(news); + return 0; + } + } + + newconn = connection_new(new_type, conn->socket_family); + newconn->s = news; + + /* remember the remote address */ + tor_addr_copy(&newconn->addr, &addr); + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + newconn->port = 0; + newconn->address = tor_strdup(conn->address); + } else { + newconn->port = port; + newconn->address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&addr); + } + + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family != AF_UNIX) { + log_info(LD_NET, "New SOCKS connection opened from %s.", + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); + } + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { + log_info(LD_NET, "New SOCKS AF_UNIX connection opened"); + } + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) { + log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "New control connection opened from %s.", + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); + } + + } else if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP) { + tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + tor_assert(new_type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL); + log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "New control connection opened."); + + newconn = connection_new(new_type, conn->socket_family); + newconn->s = news; + + /* remember the remote address -- do we have anything sane to put here? */ + tor_addr_make_unspec(&newconn->addr); + newconn->port = 1; + newconn->address = tor_strdup(conn->address); + } else { + tor_assert(0); + }; + + if (connection_add(newconn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */ + connection_free(newconn); + return 0; /* no need to tear down the parent */ + } + + if (connection_init_accepted_conn(newconn, TO_LISTENER_CONN(conn)) < 0) { + if (! newconn->marked_for_close) + connection_mark_for_close(newconn); + return 0; + } + return 0; +} + +/** Initialize states for newly accepted connection conn. + * + * If conn is an OR, start the TLS handshake. + * + * If conn is a transparent AP, get its original destination + * and place it in circuit_wait. + * + * The listener parameter is only used for AP connections. + */ +int +connection_init_accepted_conn(connection_t *conn, + const listener_connection_t *listener) +{ + int rv; + + connection_start_reading(conn); + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + /* Initiate Extended ORPort authentication. */ + return connection_ext_or_start_auth(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + control_event_or_conn_status(TO_OR_CONN(conn), OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0); + rv = connection_tls_start_handshake(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 1); + if (rv < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0); + } + return rv; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + memcpy(&TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->entry_cfg, &listener->entry_cfg, + sizeof(entry_port_cfg_t)); + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->nym_epoch = get_signewnym_epoch(); + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->listener_type = listener->base_.type; + + switch (TO_CONN(listener)->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: + conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT; + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->socks_prefer_no_auth = + listener->entry_cfg.socks_prefer_no_auth; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER: + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->is_transparent_ap = 1; + /* XXXX028 -- is this correct still, with the addition of + * pending_entry_connections ? */ + conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT; + return connection_ap_process_transparent(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER: + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->is_transparent_ap = 1; + conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER: + conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_HTTP_CONNECT_WAIT; + } + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + conn->purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER; + conn->state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + conn->state = CONTROL_CONN_STATE_NEEDAUTH; + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/** Take conn, make a nonblocking socket; try to connect to + * sa, binding to bindaddr if sa is not localhost. If fail, return -1 and if + * applicable put your best guess about errno into *socket_error. + * If connected return 1, if EAGAIN return 0. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int, +connection_connect_sockaddr,(connection_t *conn, + const struct sockaddr *sa, + socklen_t sa_len, + const struct sockaddr *bindaddr, + socklen_t bindaddr_len, + int *socket_error)) +{ + tor_socket_t s; + int inprogress = 0; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(sa); + tor_assert(socket_error); + + if (net_is_completely_disabled()) { + /* We should never even try to connect anyplace if the network is + * completely shut off. + * + * (We don't check net_is_disabled() here, since we still sometimes + * want to open connections when we're in soft hibernation.) + */ + static ratelim_t disablenet_violated = RATELIM_INIT(30*60); + *socket_error = SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH); + log_fn_ratelim(&disablenet_violated, LOG_WARN, LD_BUG, + "Tried to open a socket with DisableNetwork set."); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return -1; + } + + const int protocol_family = sa->sa_family; + const int proto = (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6 || + sa->sa_family == AF_INET) ? IPPROTO_TCP : 0; + + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(protocol_family, SOCK_STREAM, proto); + if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { + /* + * Early OOS handler calls; it matters if it's an exhaustion-related + * error or not. + */ + *socket_error = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE_LIMIT(*socket_error)) { + warn_too_many_conns(); + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 1); + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET,"Error creating network socket: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(*socket_error)); + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0); + } + return -1; + } + + if (make_socket_reuseable(s) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting SO_REUSEADDR flag on new connection: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(errno)); + } + + /* + * We've got the socket open; give the OOS handler a chance to check + * against configured maximum socket number, but tell it no exhaustion + * failure. + */ + connection_check_oos(get_n_open_sockets(), 0); + + if (bindaddr && bind(s, bindaddr, bindaddr_len) < 0) { + *socket_error = tor_socket_errno(s); + log_warn(LD_NET,"Error binding network socket: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(*socket_error)); + tor_close_socket(s); + return -1; + } + + tor_assert(options); + if (options->ConstrainedSockets) + set_constrained_socket_buffers(s, (int)options->ConstrainedSockSize); + + if (connect(s, sa, sa_len) < 0) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(s); + if (!ERRNO_IS_CONN_EINPROGRESS(e)) { + /* yuck. kill it. */ + *socket_error = e; + log_info(LD_NET, + "connect() to socket failed: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + tor_close_socket(s); + return -1; + } else { + inprogress = 1; + } + } + + /* it succeeded. we're connected. */ + log_fn(inprogress ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_INFO, LD_NET, + "Connection to socket %s (sock "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT").", + inprogress ? "in progress" : "established", s); + conn->s = s; + if (connection_add_connecting(conn) < 0) { + /* no space, forget it */ + *socket_error = SOCK_ERRNO(ENOBUFS); + return -1; + } + + return inprogress ? 0 : 1; +} + +/* Log a message if connection attempt is made when IPv4 or IPv6 is disabled. + * Log a less severe message if we couldn't conform to ClientPreferIPv6ORPort + * or ClientPreferIPv6ORPort. */ +static void +connection_connect_log_client_use_ip_version(const connection_t *conn) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* Only clients care about ClientUseIPv4/6, bail out early on servers, and + * on connections we don't care about */ + if (server_mode(options) || !conn || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT) { + return; + } + + /* We're only prepared to log OR and DIR connections here */ + if (conn->type != CONN_TYPE_OR && conn->type != CONN_TYPE_DIR) { + return; + } + + const int must_ipv4 = !fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options); + const int must_ipv6 = (options->ClientUseIPv4 == 0); + const int pref_ipv6 = (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR + ? fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(options) + : fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport(options)); + tor_addr_t real_addr; + tor_addr_make_null(&real_addr, AF_UNSPEC); + + /* OR conns keep the original address in real_addr, as addr gets overwritten + * with the descriptor address */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + const or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN((connection_t *)conn); + tor_addr_copy(&real_addr, &or_conn->real_addr); + } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR) { + tor_addr_copy(&real_addr, &conn->addr); + } + + /* Check if we broke a mandatory address family restriction */ + if ((must_ipv4 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET6) + || (must_ipv6 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET)) { + static int logged_backtrace = 0; + log_info(LD_BUG, "Outgoing %s connection to %s violated ClientUseIPv%s 0.", + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR ? "OR" : "Dir", + fmt_addr(&real_addr), + options->ClientUseIPv4 == 0 ? "4" : "6"); + if (!logged_backtrace) { + log_backtrace(LOG_INFO, LD_BUG, "Address came from"); + logged_backtrace = 1; + } + } + + /* Bridges are allowed to break IPv4/IPv6 ORPort preferences to connect to + * the node's configured address when ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is auto */ + if (options->UseBridges && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR + && options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort == -1) { + return; + } + + /* Check if we couldn't satisfy an address family preference */ + if ((!pref_ipv6 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET6) + || (pref_ipv6 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET)) { + log_info(LD_NET, "Outgoing connection to %s doesn't satisfy " + "ClientPreferIPv6%sPort %d, with ClientUseIPv4 %d, and " + "fascist_firewall_use_ipv6 %d (ClientUseIPv6 %d and UseBridges " + "%d).", + fmt_addr(&real_addr), + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR ? "OR" : "Dir", + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR ? options->ClientPreferIPv6ORPort + : options->ClientPreferIPv6DirPort, + options->ClientUseIPv4, fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options), + options->ClientUseIPv6, options->UseBridges); + } +} + +/** Retrieve the outbound address depending on the protocol (IPv4 or IPv6) + * and the connection type (relay, exit, ...) + * Return a socket address or NULL in case nothing is configured. + **/ +const tor_addr_t * +conn_get_outbound_address(sa_family_t family, + const or_options_t *options, unsigned int conn_type) +{ + const tor_addr_t *ext_addr = NULL; + + int fam_index; + switch (family) { + case AF_INET: + fam_index = 0; + break; + case AF_INET6: + fam_index = 1; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + + // If an exit connection, use the exit address (if present) + if (conn_type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT) { + if (!tor_addr_is_null( + &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT][fam_index])) { + ext_addr = &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT] + [fam_index]; + } else if (!tor_addr_is_null( + &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR] + [fam_index])) { + ext_addr = &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR] + [fam_index]; + } + } else { // All non-exit connections + if (!tor_addr_is_null( + &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR][fam_index])) { + ext_addr = &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR] + [fam_index]; + } else if (!tor_addr_is_null( + &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR] + [fam_index])) { + ext_addr = &options->OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR] + [fam_index]; + } + } + return ext_addr; +} + +/** Take conn, make a nonblocking socket; try to connect to + * addr:port (port arrives in *host order*). If fail, return -1 and if + * applicable put your best guess about errno into *socket_error. + * Else assign s to conn-\>s: if connected return 1, if EAGAIN return 0. + * + * addr:port can be different to conn->addr:conn->port if connecting through + * a proxy. + * + * address is used to make the logs useful. + * + * On success, add conn to the list of polled connections. + */ +int +connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, + const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, int *socket_error) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage addrbuf; + struct sockaddr_storage bind_addr_ss; + struct sockaddr *bind_addr = NULL; + struct sockaddr *dest_addr; + int dest_addr_len, bind_addr_len = 0; + + /* Log if we didn't stick to ClientUseIPv4/6 or ClientPreferIPv6OR/DirPort + */ + connection_connect_log_client_use_ip_version(conn); + + if (!tor_addr_is_loopback(addr)) { + const tor_addr_t *ext_addr = NULL; + ext_addr = conn_get_outbound_address(tor_addr_family(addr), get_options(), + conn->type); + if (ext_addr) { + memset(&bind_addr_ss, 0, sizeof(bind_addr_ss)); + bind_addr_len = tor_addr_to_sockaddr(ext_addr, 0, + (struct sockaddr *) &bind_addr_ss, + sizeof(bind_addr_ss)); + if (bind_addr_len == 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "Error converting OutboundBindAddress %s into sockaddr. " + "Ignoring.", fmt_and_decorate_addr(ext_addr)); + } else { + bind_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr_ss; + } + } + } + + memset(&addrbuf,0,sizeof(addrbuf)); + dest_addr = (struct sockaddr*) &addrbuf; + dest_addr_len = tor_addr_to_sockaddr(addr, port, dest_addr, sizeof(addrbuf)); + tor_assert(dest_addr_len > 0); + + log_debug(LD_NET, "Connecting to %s:%u.", + escaped_safe_str_client(address), port); + + return connection_connect_sockaddr(conn, dest_addr, dest_addr_len, + bind_addr, bind_addr_len, socket_error); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + +/** Take conn, make a nonblocking socket; try to connect to + * an AF_UNIX socket at socket_path. If fail, return -1 and if applicable + * put your best guess about errno into *socket_error. Else assign s + * to conn-\>s: if connected return 1, if EAGAIN return 0. + * + * On success, add conn to the list of polled connections. + */ +int +connection_connect_unix(connection_t *conn, const char *socket_path, + int *socket_error) +{ + struct sockaddr_un dest_addr; + + tor_assert(socket_path); + + /* Check that we'll be able to fit it into dest_addr later */ + if (strlen(socket_path) + 1 > sizeof(dest_addr.sun_path)) { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "Path %s is too long for an AF_UNIX socket\n", + escaped_safe_str_client(socket_path)); + *socket_error = SOCK_ERRNO(ENAMETOOLONG); + return -1; + } + + memset(&dest_addr, 0, sizeof(dest_addr)); + dest_addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(dest_addr.sun_path, socket_path, sizeof(dest_addr.sun_path)); + + log_debug(LD_NET, + "Connecting to AF_UNIX socket at %s.", + escaped_safe_str_client(socket_path)); + + return connection_connect_sockaddr(conn, + (struct sockaddr *)&dest_addr, sizeof(dest_addr), + NULL, 0, socket_error); +} + +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */ + +/** Convert state number to string representation for logging purposes. + */ +static const char * +connection_proxy_state_to_string(int state) +{ + static const char *unknown = "???"; + static const char *states[] = { + "PROXY_NONE", + "PROXY_INFANT", + "PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK", + "PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK", + "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE", + "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929", + "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK", + "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK", + "PROXY_CONNECTED", + }; + + if (state < PROXY_NONE || state > PROXY_CONNECTED) + return unknown; + + return states[state]; +} + +/** Returns the global proxy type used by tor. Use this function for + * logging or high-level purposes, don't use it to fill the + * proxy_type field of or_connection_t; use the actual proxy + * protocol instead.*/ +static int +get_proxy_type(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (options->ClientTransportPlugin) + return PROXY_PLUGGABLE; + else if (options->HTTPSProxy) + return PROXY_CONNECT; + else if (options->Socks4Proxy) + return PROXY_SOCKS4; + else if (options->Socks5Proxy) + return PROXY_SOCKS5; + else + return PROXY_NONE; +} + +/* One byte for the version, one for the command, two for the + port, and four for the addr... and, one more for the + username NUL: */ +#define SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE (1 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 1) + +/** Write a proxy request of type (socks4, socks5, https) to conn + * for conn->addr:conn->port, authenticating with the auth details given + * in the configuration (if available). SOCKS 5 and HTTP CONNECT proxies + * support authentication. + * + * Returns -1 if conn->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol, and + * 0 otherwise. + * + * Use connection_read_proxy_handshake() to complete the handshake. + */ +int +connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) +{ + const or_options_t *options; + + tor_assert(conn); + + options = get_options(); + + switch (type) { + case PROXY_CONNECT: { + char buf[1024]; + char *base64_authenticator=NULL; + const char *authenticator = options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; + + /* Send HTTP CONNECT and authentication (if available) in + * one request */ + + if (authenticator) { + base64_authenticator = alloc_http_authenticator(authenticator); + if (!base64_authenticator) + log_warn(LD_OR, "Encoding https authenticator failed"); + } + + if (base64_authenticator) { + const char *addrport = fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Host: %s\r\n" + "Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s\r\n\r\n", + addrport, + addrport, + base64_authenticator); + tor_free(base64_authenticator); + } else { + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", + fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)); + } + + connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), conn); + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK; + break; + } + + case PROXY_SOCKS4: { + unsigned char *buf; + uint16_t portn; + uint32_t ip4addr; + size_t buf_size = 0; + char *socks_args_string = NULL; + + /* Send a SOCKS4 connect request */ + + if (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) != AF_INET) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "SOCKS4 client is incompatible with IPv6"); + return -1; + } + + { /* If we are here because we are trying to connect to a + pluggable transport proxy, check if we have any SOCKS + arguments to transmit. If we do, compress all arguments to + a single string in 'socks_args_string': */ + + if (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) { + socks_args_string = + pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + if (socks_args_string) + log_debug(LD_NET, "Sending out '%s' as our SOCKS argument string.", + socks_args_string); + } + } + + { /* Figure out the buffer size we need for the SOCKS message: */ + + buf_size = SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE; + + /* If we have a SOCKS argument string, consider its size when + calculating the buffer size: */ + if (socks_args_string) + buf_size += strlen(socks_args_string); + } + + buf = tor_malloc_zero(buf_size); + + ip4addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->addr); + portn = htons(conn->port); + + buf[0] = 4; /* version */ + buf[1] = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; /* command */ + memcpy(buf + 2, &portn, 2); /* port */ + memcpy(buf + 4, &ip4addr, 4); /* addr */ + + /* Next packet field is the userid. If we have pluggable + transport SOCKS arguments, we have to embed them + there. Otherwise, we use an empty userid. */ + if (socks_args_string) { /* place the SOCKS args string: */ + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0); + tor_assert(buf_size >= + SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE + strlen(socks_args_string)); + strlcpy((char *)buf + 8, socks_args_string, buf_size - 8); + tor_free(socks_args_string); + } else { + buf[8] = 0; /* no userid */ + } + + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, buf_size, conn); + tor_free(buf); + + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK; + break; + } + + case PROXY_SOCKS5: { + unsigned char buf[4]; /* fields: vers, num methods, method list */ + + /* Send a SOCKS5 greeting (connect request must wait) */ + + buf[0] = 5; /* version */ + + /* We have to use SOCKS5 authentication, if we have a + Socks5ProxyUsername or if we want to pass arguments to our + pluggable transport proxy: */ + if ((options->Socks5ProxyUsername) || + (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE && + (get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)))) { + /* number of auth methods */ + buf[1] = 2; + buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ + buf[3] = 0x02; /* rfc1929 Username/Passwd auth */ + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929; + } else { + buf[1] = 1; + buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE; + } + + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, 2 + buf[1], conn); + break; + } + + default: + log_err(LD_BUG, "Invalid proxy protocol, %d", type); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return -1; + } + + log_debug(LD_NET, "set state %s", + connection_proxy_state_to_string(conn->proxy_state)); + + return 0; +} + +/** Read conn's inbuf. If the http response from the proxy is all + * here, make sure it's good news, then return 1. If it's bad news, + * return -1. Else return 0 and hope for better luck next time. + */ +static int +connection_read_https_proxy_response(connection_t *conn) +{ + char *headers; + char *reason=NULL; + int status_code; + time_t date_header; + + switch (fetch_from_buf_http(conn->inbuf, + &headers, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE, + NULL, NULL, 10000, 0)) { + case -1: /* overflow */ + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Your https proxy sent back an oversized response. Closing."); + return -1; + case 0: + log_info(LD_NET,"https proxy response not all here yet. Waiting."); + return 0; + /* case 1, fall through */ + } + + if (parse_http_response(headers, &status_code, &date_header, + NULL, &reason) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "Unparseable headers from proxy (connecting to '%s'). Closing.", + conn->address); + tor_free(headers); + return -1; + } + tor_free(headers); + if (!reason) reason = tor_strdup("[no reason given]"); + + if (status_code == 200) { + log_info(LD_NET, + "HTTPS connect to '%s' successful! (200 %s) Starting TLS.", + conn->address, escaped(reason)); + tor_free(reason); + return 1; + } + /* else, bad news on the status code */ + switch (status_code) { + case 403: + log_warn(LD_NET, + "The https proxy refused to allow connection to %s " + "(status code %d, %s). Closing.", + conn->address, status_code, escaped(reason)); + break; + default: + log_warn(LD_NET, + "The https proxy sent back an unexpected status code %d (%s). " + "Closing.", + status_code, escaped(reason)); + break; + } + tor_free(reason); + return -1; +} + +/** Send SOCKS5 CONNECT command to conn, copying conn->addr + * and conn->port into the request. + */ +static void +connection_send_socks5_connect(connection_t *conn) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + size_t reqsize = 6; + uint16_t port = htons(conn->port); + + buf[0] = 5; /* version */ + buf[1] = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; /* command */ + buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */ + + if (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) == AF_INET) { + uint32_t addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->addr); + + buf[3] = 1; + reqsize += 4; + memcpy(buf + 4, &addr, 4); + memcpy(buf + 8, &port, 2); + } else { /* AF_INET6 */ + buf[3] = 4; + reqsize += 16; + memcpy(buf + 4, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&conn->addr), 16); + memcpy(buf + 20, &port, 2); + } + + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); + + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK; +} + +/** Wrapper around fetch_from_buf_socks_client: see that functions + * for documentation of its behavior. */ +static int +connection_fetch_from_buf_socks_client(connection_t *conn, + int state, char **reason) +{ + return fetch_from_buf_socks_client(conn->inbuf, state, reason); +} + +/** Call this from connection_*_process_inbuf() to advance the proxy + * handshake. + * + * No matter what proxy protocol is used, if this function returns 1, the + * handshake is complete, and the data remaining on inbuf may contain the + * start of the communication with the requested server. + * + * Returns 0 if the current buffer contains an incomplete response, and -1 + * on error. + */ +int +connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn) +{ + int ret = 0; + char *reason = NULL; + + log_debug(LD_NET, "enter state %s", + connection_proxy_state_to_string(conn->proxy_state)); + + switch (conn->proxy_state) { + case PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + ret = connection_read_https_proxy_response(conn); + if (ret == 1) + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_CONNECTED; + break; + + case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + ret = connection_fetch_from_buf_socks_client(conn, + conn->proxy_state, + &reason); + if (ret == 1) + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_CONNECTED; + break; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE: + ret = connection_fetch_from_buf_socks_client(conn, + conn->proxy_state, + &reason); + /* no auth needed, do connect */ + if (ret == 1) { + connection_send_socks5_connect(conn); + ret = 0; + } + break; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929: + ret = connection_fetch_from_buf_socks_client(conn, + conn->proxy_state, + &reason); + + /* send auth if needed, otherwise do connect */ + if (ret == 1) { + connection_send_socks5_connect(conn); + ret = 0; + } else if (ret == 2) { + unsigned char buf[1024]; + size_t reqsize, usize, psize; + const char *user, *pass; + char *socks_args_string = NULL; + + if (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) { + socks_args_string = + pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + if (!socks_args_string) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not create SOCKS args string."); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + log_debug(LD_NET, "SOCKS5 arguments: %s", socks_args_string); + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0); + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL); + + if (strlen(socks_args_string) > MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE) { + user = socks_args_string; + usize = MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE; + pass = socks_args_string + MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE; + psize = strlen(socks_args_string) - MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE; + } else { + user = socks_args_string; + usize = strlen(socks_args_string); + pass = "\0"; + psize = 1; + } + } else if (get_options()->Socks5ProxyUsername) { + user = get_options()->Socks5ProxyUsername; + pass = get_options()->Socks5ProxyPassword; + tor_assert(user && pass); + usize = strlen(user); + psize = strlen(pass); + } else { + log_err(LD_BUG, "We entered %s for no reason!", __func__); + tor_fragile_assert(); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + /* Username and password lengths should have been checked + above and during torrc parsing. */ + tor_assert(usize <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE && + psize <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE); + reqsize = 3 + usize + psize; + + buf[0] = 1; /* negotiation version */ + buf[1] = usize; + memcpy(buf + 2, user, usize); + buf[2 + usize] = psize; + memcpy(buf + 3 + usize, pass, psize); + + if (socks_args_string) + tor_free(socks_args_string); + + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); + + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK; + ret = 0; + } + break; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK: + ret = connection_fetch_from_buf_socks_client(conn, + conn->proxy_state, + &reason); + /* send the connect request */ + if (ret == 1) { + connection_send_socks5_connect(conn); + ret = 0; + } + break; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK: + ret = connection_fetch_from_buf_socks_client(conn, + conn->proxy_state, + &reason); + if (ret == 1) + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_CONNECTED; + break; + + default: + log_err(LD_BUG, "Invalid proxy_state for reading, %d", + conn->proxy_state); + tor_fragile_assert(); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + log_debug(LD_NET, "leaving state %s", + connection_proxy_state_to_string(conn->proxy_state)); + + if (ret < 0) { + if (reason) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Proxy Client: unable to connect to %s:%d (%s)", + conn->address, conn->port, escaped(reason)); + tor_free(reason); + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Proxy Client: unable to connect to %s:%d", + conn->address, conn->port); + } + } else if (ret == 1) { + log_info(LD_NET, "Proxy Client: connection to %s:%d successful", + conn->address, conn->port); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** Given a list of listener connections in old_conns, and list of + * port_cfg_t entries in ports, open a new listener for every port in + * ports that does not already have a listener in old_conns. + * + * Remove from old_conns every connection that has a corresponding + * entry in ports. Add to new_conns new every connection we + * launch. If we may need to perform socket rebind when creating new + * listener that replaces old one, create a listener_replacement_t + * struct for affected pair and add it to replacements. + * + * If control_listeners_only is true, then we only open control + * listeners, and we do not remove any noncontrol listeners from + * old_conns. + * + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + **/ +static int +retry_listener_ports(smartlist_t *old_conns, + const smartlist_t *ports, + smartlist_t *new_conns, + smartlist_t *replacements, + int control_listeners_only) +{ +#ifndef ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND + (void)replacements; +#endif + + smartlist_t *launch = smartlist_new(); + int r = 0; + + if (control_listeners_only) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(ports, port_cfg_t *, p, { + if (p->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) + smartlist_add(launch, p); + }); + } else { + smartlist_add_all(launch, ports); + } + + /* Iterate through old_conns, comparing it to launch: remove from both lists + * each pair of elements that corresponds to the same port. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(old_conns, connection_t *, conn) { + const port_cfg_t *found_port = NULL; + + /* Okay, so this is a listener. Is it configured? */ + /* That is, is it either: 1) exact match - address and port + * pair match exactly between old listener and new port; or 2) + * wildcard match - port matches exactly, but *one* of the + * addresses is wildcard (0.0.0.0 or ::)? + */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(launch, const port_cfg_t *, wanted) { + if (conn->type != wanted->type) + continue; + if ((conn->socket_family != AF_UNIX && wanted->is_unix_addr) || + (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && ! wanted->is_unix_addr)) + continue; + + if (wanted->server_cfg.no_listen) + continue; /* We don't want to open a listener for this one */ + + if (wanted->is_unix_addr) { + if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX && + !strcmp(wanted->unix_addr, conn->address)) { + found_port = wanted; + break; + } + } else { + /* Numeric values of old and new port match exactly. */ + const int port_matches_exact = (wanted->port == conn->port); + /* Ports match semantically - either their specific values + match exactly, or new port is 'auto'. + */ + const int port_matches = (wanted->port == CFG_AUTO_PORT || + port_matches_exact); + + if (port_matches && tor_addr_eq(&wanted->addr, &conn->addr)) { + found_port = wanted; + break; + } +#ifdef ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND + /* Rebinding may be needed if all of the following are true: + * 1) Address family is the same in old and new listeners. + * 2) Port number matches exactly (numeric value is the same). + * 3) *One* of listeners (either old one or new one) has a + * wildcard IP address (0.0.0.0 or [::]). + * + * These are the exact conditions for a first bind() syscall + * to fail with EADDRINUSE. + */ + const int may_need_rebind = + tor_addr_family(&wanted->addr) == tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) && + port_matches_exact && bool_neq(tor_addr_is_null(&wanted->addr), + tor_addr_is_null(&conn->addr)); + if (replacements && may_need_rebind) { + listener_replacement_t *replacement = + tor_malloc(sizeof(listener_replacement_t)); + + replacement->old_conn = conn; + replacement->new_port = wanted; + smartlist_add(replacements, replacement); + + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(launch, wanted); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(old_conns, conn); + break; + } +#endif + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(wanted); + + if (found_port) { + /* This listener is already running; we don't need to launch it. */ + //log_debug(LD_NET, "Already have %s on %s:%d", + // conn_type_to_string(found_port->type), conn->address, conn->port); + smartlist_remove(launch, found_port); + /* And we can remove the connection from old_conns too. */ + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(old_conns, conn); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); + + /* Now open all the listeners that are configured but not opened. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(launch, const port_cfg_t *, port) { + int skip = 0; + connection_t *conn = connection_listener_new_for_port(port, &skip, NULL); + + if (conn && new_conns) + smartlist_add(new_conns, conn); + else if (!skip) + r = -1; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(port); + + smartlist_free(launch); + + return r; +} + +/** Launch listeners for each port you should have open. Only launch + * listeners who are not already open, and only close listeners we no longer + * want. + * + * Add all new connections to new_conns. + * + * If close_all_noncontrol is true, then we only open control + * listeners, and we close all other listeners. + */ +int +retry_all_listeners(smartlist_t *new_conns, int close_all_noncontrol) +{ + smartlist_t *listeners = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_t *replacements = smartlist_new(); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + int retval = 0; + const uint16_t old_or_port = router_get_advertised_or_port(options); + const uint16_t old_or_port_ipv6 = + router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options,AF_INET6); + const uint16_t old_dir_port = router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_connection_array(), connection_t *, conn) { + if (connection_is_listener(conn) && !conn->marked_for_close) + smartlist_add(listeners, conn); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); + + if (retry_listener_ports(listeners, + get_configured_ports(), + new_conns, + replacements, + close_all_noncontrol) < 0) + retval = -1; + +#ifdef ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(replacements, listener_replacement_t *, r) { + int addr_in_use = 0; + int skip = 0; + + tor_assert(r->new_port); + tor_assert(r->old_conn); + + connection_t *new_conn = + connection_listener_new_for_port(r->new_port, &skip, &addr_in_use); + connection_t *old_conn = r->old_conn; + + if (skip) + continue; + + connection_close_immediate(old_conn); + connection_mark_for_close(old_conn); + + if (addr_in_use) { + new_conn = connection_listener_new_for_port(r->new_port, + &skip, &addr_in_use); + } + + tor_assert(new_conn); + + smartlist_add(new_conns, new_conn); + + log_notice(LD_NET, "Closed no-longer-configured %s on %s:%d " + "(replaced by %s:%d)", + conn_type_to_string(old_conn->type), old_conn->address, + old_conn->port, new_conn->address, new_conn->port); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(r); +#endif + + /* Any members that were still in 'listeners' don't correspond to + * any configured port. Kill 'em. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(listeners, connection_t *, conn) { + log_notice(LD_NET, "Closing no-longer-configured %s on %s:%d", + conn_type_to_string(conn->type), conn->address, conn->port); + connection_close_immediate(conn); + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); + + smartlist_free(listeners); + /* Cleanup any remaining listener replacement. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(replacements, listener_replacement_t *, r, tor_free(r)); + smartlist_free(replacements); + + if (old_or_port != router_get_advertised_or_port(options) || + old_or_port_ipv6 != router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options, + AF_INET6) || + old_dir_port != router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0)) { + /* Our chosen ORPort or DirPort is not what it used to be: the + * descriptor we had (if any) should be regenerated. (We won't + * automatically notice this because of changes in the option, + * since the value could be "auto".) */ + mark_my_descriptor_dirty("Chosen Or/DirPort changed"); + } + + return retval; +} + +/** Mark every listener of type other than CONTROL_LISTENER to be closed. */ +void +connection_mark_all_noncontrol_listeners(void) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_connection_array(), connection_t *, conn) { + if (conn->marked_for_close) + continue; + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) + continue; + if (connection_is_listener(conn)) + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); +} + +/** Mark every external connection not used for controllers for close. */ +void +connection_mark_all_noncontrol_connections(void) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_connection_array(), connection_t *, conn) { + if (conn->marked_for_close) + continue; + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + connection_mark_unattached_ap(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), + END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + { + or_connection_t *orconn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + if (orconn->chan) { + connection_or_close_normally(orconn, 0); + } else { + /* + * There should have been one, but mark for close and hope + * for the best.. + */ + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } + } + break; + default: + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); +} + +/** Return 1 if we should apply rate limiting to conn, and 0 + * otherwise. + * Right now this just checks if it's an internal IP address or an + * internal connection. We also should, but don't, check if the connection + * uses pluggable transports, since we should then limit it even if it + * comes from an internal IP address. */ +static int +connection_is_rate_limited(connection_t *conn) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (conn->linked) + return 0; /* Internal connection */ + else if (! options->CountPrivateBandwidth && + (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) == AF_UNSPEC || /* no address */ + tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) == AF_UNIX || /* no address */ + tor_addr_is_internal(&conn->addr, 0))) + return 0; /* Internal address */ + else + return 1; +} + +/** When was either global write bucket last empty? If this was recent, then + * we're probably low on bandwidth, and we should be stingy with our bandwidth + * usage. */ +static time_t write_buckets_last_empty_at = -100; + +/** How many seconds of no active local circuits will make the + * connection revert to the "relayed" bandwidth class? */ +#define CLIENT_IDLE_TIME_FOR_PRIORITY 30 + +/** Return 1 if conn should use tokens from the "relayed" + * bandwidth rates, else 0. Currently, only OR conns with bandwidth + * class 1, and directory conns that are serving data out, count. + */ +static int +connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(connection_t *conn, time_t now) +{ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR && + connection_or_client_used(TO_OR_CONN(conn)) + + CLIENT_IDLE_TIME_FOR_PRIORITY < now) + return 1; + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** Helper function to decide how many bytes out of global_bucket + * we're willing to use for this transaction. base is the size + * of a cell on the network; priority says whether we should + * write many of them or just a few; and conn_bucket (if + * non-negative) provides an upper limit for our answer. */ +static ssize_t +connection_bucket_get_share(int base, int priority, + ssize_t global_bucket_val, ssize_t conn_bucket) +{ + ssize_t at_most; + ssize_t num_bytes_high = (priority ? 32 : 16) * base; + ssize_t num_bytes_low = (priority ? 4 : 2) * base; + + /* Do a rudimentary limiting so one circuit can't hog a connection. + * Pick at most 32 cells, at least 4 cells if possible, and if we're in + * the middle pick 1/8 of the available bandwidth. */ + at_most = global_bucket_val / 8; + at_most -= (at_most % base); /* round down */ + if (at_most > num_bytes_high) /* 16 KB, or 8 KB for low-priority */ + at_most = num_bytes_high; + else if (at_most < num_bytes_low) /* 2 KB, or 1 KB for low-priority */ + at_most = num_bytes_low; + + if (at_most > global_bucket_val) + at_most = global_bucket_val; + + if (conn_bucket >= 0 && at_most > conn_bucket) + at_most = conn_bucket; + + if (at_most < 0) + return 0; + return at_most; +} + +/** How many bytes at most can we read onto this connection? */ +static ssize_t +connection_bucket_read_limit(connection_t *conn, time_t now) +{ + int base = RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE; + int priority = conn->type != CONN_TYPE_DIR; + ssize_t conn_bucket = -1; + size_t global_bucket_val = token_bucket_rw_get_read(&global_bucket); + + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) + conn_bucket = token_bucket_rw_get_read(&or_conn->bucket); + base = get_cell_network_size(or_conn->wide_circ_ids); + } + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) { + /* be willing to read on local conns even if our buckets are empty */ + return conn_bucket>=0 ? conn_bucket : 1<<14; + } + + if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, now)) { + size_t relayed = token_bucket_rw_get_read(&global_relayed_bucket); + global_bucket_val = MIN(global_bucket_val, relayed); + } + + return connection_bucket_get_share(base, priority, + global_bucket_val, conn_bucket); +} + +/** How many bytes at most can we write onto this connection? */ +ssize_t +connection_bucket_write_limit(connection_t *conn, time_t now) +{ + int base = RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE; + int priority = conn->type != CONN_TYPE_DIR; + size_t conn_bucket = conn->outbuf_flushlen; + size_t global_bucket_val = token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_bucket); + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) { + /* be willing to write to local conns even if our buckets are empty */ + return conn->outbuf_flushlen; + } + + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { + /* use the per-conn write limit if it's lower */ + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) + conn_bucket = MIN(conn_bucket, + token_bucket_rw_get_write(&or_conn->bucket)); + base = get_cell_network_size(or_conn->wide_circ_ids); + } + + if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, now)) { + size_t relayed = token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_relayed_bucket); + global_bucket_val = MIN(global_bucket_val, relayed); + } + + return connection_bucket_get_share(base, priority, + global_bucket_val, conn_bucket); +} + +/** Return 1 if the global write buckets are low enough that we + * shouldn't send attempt bytes of low-priority directory stuff + * out to conn. Else return 0. + + * Priority was 1 for v1 requests (directories and running-routers), + * and 2 for v2 requests and later (statuses and descriptors). + * + * There are a lot of parameters we could use here: + * - global_relayed_write_bucket. Low is bad. + * - global_write_bucket. Low is bad. + * - bandwidthrate. Low is bad. + * - bandwidthburst. Not a big factor? + * - attempt. High is bad. + * - total bytes queued on outbufs. High is bad. But I'm wary of + * using this, since a few slow-flushing queues will pump up the + * number without meaning what we meant to mean. What we really + * mean is "total directory bytes added to outbufs recently", but + * that's harder to quantify and harder to keep track of. + */ +int +global_write_bucket_low(connection_t *conn, size_t attempt, int priority) +{ + size_t smaller_bucket = + MIN(token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_bucket), + token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_relayed_bucket)); + if (authdir_mode(get_options()) && priority>1) + return 0; /* there's always room to answer v2 if we're an auth dir */ + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return 0; /* local conns don't get limited */ + + if (smaller_bucket < attempt) + return 1; /* not enough space no matter the priority */ + + { + const time_t diff = approx_time() - write_buckets_last_empty_at; + if (diff <= 1) + return 1; /* we're already hitting our limits, no more please */ + } + + if (priority == 1) { /* old-style v1 query */ + /* Could we handle *two* of these requests within the next two seconds? */ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + size_t can_write = (size_t) (smaller_bucket + + 2*(options->RelayBandwidthRate ? options->RelayBandwidthRate : + options->BandwidthRate)); + if (can_write < 2*attempt) + return 1; + } else { /* v2 query */ + /* no further constraints yet */ + } + return 0; +} + +/** When did we last tell the accounting subsystem about transmitted + * bandwidth? */ +static time_t last_recorded_accounting_at = 0; + +/** Helper: adjusts our bandwidth history and informs the controller as + * appropriate, given that we have just read num_read bytes and written + * num_written bytes on conn. */ +static void +record_num_bytes_transferred_impl(connection_t *conn, + time_t now, size_t num_read, size_t num_written) +{ + /* Count bytes of answering direct and tunneled directory requests */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER) { + if (num_read > 0) + rep_hist_note_dir_bytes_read(num_read, now); + if (num_written > 0) + rep_hist_note_dir_bytes_written(num_written, now); + } + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return; /* local IPs are free */ + + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) + rep_hist_note_or_conn_bytes(conn->global_identifier, num_read, + num_written, now); + + if (num_read > 0) { + rep_hist_note_bytes_read(num_read, now); + } + if (num_written > 0) { + rep_hist_note_bytes_written(num_written, now); + } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT) + rep_hist_note_exit_bytes(conn->port, num_written, num_read); + + /* Remember these bytes towards statistics. */ + stats_increment_bytes_read_and_written(num_read, num_written); + + /* Remember these bytes towards accounting. */ + if (accounting_is_enabled(get_options())) { + if (now > last_recorded_accounting_at && last_recorded_accounting_at) { + accounting_add_bytes(num_read, num_written, + (int)(now - last_recorded_accounting_at)); + } else { + accounting_add_bytes(num_read, num_written, 0); + } + last_recorded_accounting_at = now; + } +} + +/** We just read num_read and wrote num_written bytes + * onto conn. Decrement buckets appropriately. */ +static void +connection_buckets_decrement(connection_t *conn, time_t now, + size_t num_read, size_t num_written) +{ + if (num_written >= INT_MAX || num_read >= INT_MAX) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Value out of range. num_read=%lu, num_written=%lu, " + "connection type=%s, state=%s", + (unsigned long)num_read, (unsigned long)num_written, + conn_type_to_string(conn->type), + conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state)); + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + if (num_written >= INT_MAX) + num_written = 1; + if (num_read >= INT_MAX) + num_read = 1; + } + + record_num_bytes_transferred_impl(conn, now, num_read, num_written); + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return; /* local IPs are free */ + + unsigned flags = 0; + if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, now)) { + flags = token_bucket_rw_dec(&global_relayed_bucket, num_read, num_written); + } + flags |= token_bucket_rw_dec(&global_bucket, num_read, num_written); + + if (flags & TB_WRITE) { + write_buckets_last_empty_at = now; + } + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + token_bucket_rw_dec(&or_conn->bucket, num_read, num_written); + } +} + +/** + * Mark conn as needing to stop reading because bandwidth has been + * exhausted. If is_global_bw, it is closing because global bandwidth + * limit has been exhausted. Otherwise, it is closing because its own + * bandwidth limit has been exhausted. + */ +void +connection_read_bw_exhausted(connection_t *conn, bool is_global_bw) +{ + (void)is_global_bw; + conn->read_blocked_on_bw = 1; + connection_stop_reading(conn); + reenable_blocked_connection_schedule(); +} + +/** + * Mark conn as needing to stop reading because write bandwidth has + * been exhausted. If is_global_bw, it is closing because global + * bandwidth limit has been exhausted. Otherwise, it is closing because its + * own bandwidth limit has been exhausted. +*/ +void +connection_write_bw_exhausted(connection_t *conn, bool is_global_bw) +{ + (void)is_global_bw; + conn->write_blocked_on_bw = 1; + connection_stop_writing(conn); + reenable_blocked_connection_schedule(); +} + +/** If we have exhausted our global buckets, or the buckets for conn, + * stop reading. */ +void +connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(connection_t *conn) +{ + const char *reason; + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return; /* Always okay. */ + + int is_global = 1; + + if (token_bucket_rw_get_read(&global_bucket) <= 0) { + reason = "global read bucket exhausted. Pausing."; + } else if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, approx_time()) && + token_bucket_rw_get_read(&global_relayed_bucket) <= 0) { + reason = "global relayed read bucket exhausted. Pausing."; + } else if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && + conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN && + token_bucket_rw_get_read(&TO_OR_CONN(conn)->bucket) <= 0) { + reason = "connection read bucket exhausted. Pausing."; + is_global = false; + } else + return; /* all good, no need to stop it */ + + LOG_FN_CONN(conn, (LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET, "%s", reason)); + connection_read_bw_exhausted(conn, is_global); +} + +/** If we have exhausted our global buckets, or the buckets for conn, + * stop writing. */ +void +connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(connection_t *conn) +{ + const char *reason; + + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return; /* Always okay. */ + + bool is_global = true; + if (token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_bucket) <= 0) { + reason = "global write bucket exhausted. Pausing."; + } else if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, approx_time()) && + token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_relayed_bucket) <= 0) { + reason = "global relayed write bucket exhausted. Pausing."; + } else if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && + conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN && + token_bucket_rw_get_write(&TO_OR_CONN(conn)->bucket) <= 0) { + reason = "connection write bucket exhausted. Pausing."; + is_global = false; + } else + return; /* all good, no need to stop it */ + + LOG_FN_CONN(conn, (LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET, "%s", reason)); + connection_write_bw_exhausted(conn, is_global); +} + +/** Initialize the global buckets to the values configured in the + * options */ +void +connection_bucket_init(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const uint32_t now_ts = monotime_coarse_get_stamp(); + token_bucket_rw_init(&global_bucket, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthRate, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthBurst, + now_ts); + if (options->RelayBandwidthRate) { + token_bucket_rw_init(&global_relayed_bucket, + (int32_t)options->RelayBandwidthRate, + (int32_t)options->RelayBandwidthBurst, + now_ts); + } else { + token_bucket_rw_init(&global_relayed_bucket, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthRate, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthBurst, + now_ts); + } + + reenable_blocked_connection_init(options); +} + +/** Update the global connection bucket settings to a new value. */ +void +connection_bucket_adjust(const or_options_t *options) +{ + token_bucket_rw_adjust(&global_bucket, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthRate, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthBurst); + if (options->RelayBandwidthRate) { + token_bucket_rw_adjust(&global_relayed_bucket, + (int32_t)options->RelayBandwidthRate, + (int32_t)options->RelayBandwidthBurst); + } else { + token_bucket_rw_adjust(&global_relayed_bucket, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthRate, + (int32_t)options->BandwidthBurst); + } +} + +/** + * Cached value of the last coarse-timestamp when we refilled the + * global buckets. + */ +static uint32_t last_refilled_global_buckets_ts=0; +/** + * Refill the token buckets for a single connection conn, and the + * global token buckets as appropriate. Requires that now_ts is + * the time in coarse timestamp units. + */ +static void +connection_bucket_refill_single(connection_t *conn, uint32_t now_ts) +{ + /* Note that we only check for equality here: the underlying + * token bucket functions can handle moving backwards in time if they + * need to. */ + if (now_ts != last_refilled_global_buckets_ts) { + token_bucket_rw_refill(&global_bucket, now_ts); + token_bucket_rw_refill(&global_relayed_bucket, now_ts); + last_refilled_global_buckets_ts = now_ts; + } + + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + token_bucket_rw_refill(&or_conn->bucket, now_ts); + } +} + +/** + * Event to re-enable all connections that were previously blocked on read or + * write. + */ +static mainloop_event_t *reenable_blocked_connections_ev = NULL; + +/** True iff reenable_blocked_connections_ev is currently scheduled. */ +static int reenable_blocked_connections_is_scheduled = 0; + +/** Delay after which to run reenable_blocked_connections_ev. */ +static struct timeval reenable_blocked_connections_delay; + +/** + * Re-enable all connections that were previously blocked on read or write. + * This event is scheduled after enough time has elapsed to be sure + * that the buckets will refill when the connections have something to do. + */ +static void +reenable_blocked_connections_cb(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *arg) +{ + (void)ev; + (void)arg; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_connection_array(), connection_t *, conn) { + if (conn->read_blocked_on_bw == 1) { + connection_start_reading(conn); + conn->read_blocked_on_bw = 0; + } + if (conn->write_blocked_on_bw == 1) { + connection_start_writing(conn); + conn->write_blocked_on_bw = 0; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); + + reenable_blocked_connections_is_scheduled = 0; +} + +/** + * Initialize the mainloop event that we use to wake up connections that + * find themselves blocked on bandwidth. + */ +static void +reenable_blocked_connection_init(const or_options_t *options) +{ + if (! reenable_blocked_connections_ev) { + reenable_blocked_connections_ev = + mainloop_event_new(reenable_blocked_connections_cb, NULL); + reenable_blocked_connections_is_scheduled = 0; + } + time_t sec = options->TokenBucketRefillInterval / 1000; + int msec = (options->TokenBucketRefillInterval % 1000); + reenable_blocked_connections_delay.tv_sec = sec; + reenable_blocked_connections_delay.tv_usec = msec * 1000; +} + +/** + * Called when we have blocked a connection for being low on bandwidth: + * schedule an event to reenable such connections, if it is not already + * scheduled. + */ +static void +reenable_blocked_connection_schedule(void) +{ + if (reenable_blocked_connections_is_scheduled) + return; + if (BUG(reenable_blocked_connections_ev == NULL)) { + reenable_blocked_connection_init(get_options()); + } + mainloop_event_schedule(reenable_blocked_connections_ev, + &reenable_blocked_connections_delay); + reenable_blocked_connections_is_scheduled = 1; +} + +/** Read bytes from conn-\>s and process them. + * + * It calls connection_buf_read_from_socket() to bring in any new bytes, + * and then calls connection_process_inbuf() to process them. + * + * Mark the connection and return -1 if you want to close it, else + * return 0. + */ +static int +connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn) +{ + ssize_t max_to_read=-1, try_to_read; + size_t before, n_read = 0; + int socket_error = 0; + + if (conn->marked_for_close) + return 0; /* do nothing */ + + conn->timestamp_last_read_allowed = approx_time(); + + connection_bucket_refill_single(conn, monotime_coarse_get_stamp()); + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER: + return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_OR); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER: + return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); + case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: + case CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER: + case CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER: + case CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER: + return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_AP); + case CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER: + return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_DIR); + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: + return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_CONTROL); + case CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER: + /* This should never happen; eventdns.c handles the reads here. */ + tor_fragile_assert(); + return 0; + } + + loop_again: + try_to_read = max_to_read; + tor_assert(!conn->marked_for_close); + + before = buf_datalen(conn->inbuf); + if (connection_buf_read_from_socket(conn, &max_to_read, &socket_error) < 0) { + /* There's a read error; kill the connection.*/ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), + socket_error != 0 ? + errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error) : + END_OR_CONN_REASON_CONNRESET, + socket_error != 0 ? + tor_socket_strerror(socket_error) : + "(unknown, errno was 0)"); + } + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + connection_edge_end_errno(edge_conn); + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP && TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request) { + /* broken, don't send a socks reply back */ + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->has_finished = 1; + } + } + connection_close_immediate(conn); /* Don't flush; connection is dead. */ + /* + * This can bypass normal channel checking since we did + * connection_or_notify_error() above. + */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal(conn); + return -1; + } + n_read += buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) - before; + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn) && try_to_read != max_to_read) { + /* instruct it not to try to package partial cells. */ + if (connection_process_inbuf(conn, 0) < 0) { + return -1; + } + if (!conn->marked_for_close && + connection_is_reading(conn) && + !conn->inbuf_reached_eof && + max_to_read > 0) + goto loop_again; /* try reading again, in case more is here now */ + } + /* one last try, packaging partial cells and all. */ + if (!conn->marked_for_close && + connection_process_inbuf(conn, 1) < 0) { + return -1; + } + if (conn->linked_conn) { + /* The other side's handle_write() will never actually get called, so + * we need to invoke the appropriate callbacks ourself. */ + connection_t *linked = conn->linked_conn; + + if (n_read) { + /* Probably a no-op, since linked conns typically don't count for + * bandwidth rate limiting. But do it anyway so we can keep stats + * accurately. Note that since we read the bytes from conn, and + * we're writing the bytes onto the linked connection, we count + * these as written bytes. */ + connection_buckets_decrement(linked, approx_time(), 0, n_read); + + if (connection_flushed_some(linked) < 0) + connection_mark_for_close(linked); + if (!connection_wants_to_flush(linked)) + connection_finished_flushing(linked); + } + + if (!buf_datalen(linked->outbuf) && conn->active_on_link) + connection_stop_reading_from_linked_conn(conn); + } + /* If we hit the EOF, call connection_reached_eof(). */ + if (!conn->marked_for_close && + conn->inbuf_reached_eof && + connection_reached_eof(conn) < 0) { + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* DOCDOC connection_handle_read */ +int +connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn) +{ + int res; + update_current_time(time(NULL)); + res = connection_handle_read_impl(conn); + return res; +} + +/** Pull in new bytes from conn-\>s or conn-\>linked_conn onto conn-\>inbuf, + * either directly or via TLS. Reduce the token buckets by the number of bytes + * read. + * + * If *max_to_read is -1, then decide it ourselves, else go with the + * value passed to us. When returning, if it's changed, subtract the + * number of bytes we read from *max_to_read. + * + * Return -1 if we want to break conn, else return 0. + */ +static int +connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, + int *socket_error) +{ + int result; + ssize_t at_most = *max_to_read; + size_t slack_in_buf, more_to_read; + size_t n_read = 0, n_written = 0; + + if (at_most == -1) { /* we need to initialize it */ + /* how many bytes are we allowed to read? */ + at_most = connection_bucket_read_limit(conn, approx_time()); + } + + slack_in_buf = buf_slack(conn->inbuf); + again: + if ((size_t)at_most > slack_in_buf && slack_in_buf >= 1024) { + more_to_read = at_most - slack_in_buf; + at_most = slack_in_buf; + } else { + more_to_read = 0; + } + + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && + conn->state > OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING) { + int pending; + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + size_t initial_size; + if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING || + conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING) { + /* continue handshaking even if global token bucket is empty */ + return connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_conn); + } + + log_debug(LD_NET, + "%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %ld (%d pending in tls object)." + " at_most %ld.", + (int)conn->s,(long)buf_datalen(conn->inbuf), + tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(or_conn->tls), (long)at_most); + + initial_size = buf_datalen(conn->inbuf); + /* else open, or closing */ + result = buf_read_from_tls(conn->inbuf, or_conn->tls, at_most); + if (TOR_TLS_IS_ERROR(result) || result == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) + or_conn->tls_error = result; + else + or_conn->tls_error = 0; + + switch (result) { + case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: + case TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO: + log_debug(LD_NET,"TLS connection closed %son read. Closing. " + "(Nickname %s, address %s)", + result == TOR_TLS_CLOSE ? "cleanly " : "", + or_conn->nickname ? or_conn->nickname : "not set", + conn->address); + return result; + CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY_NONIO: + log_debug(LD_NET,"tls error [%s]. breaking (nickname %s, address %s).", + tor_tls_err_to_string(result), + or_conn->nickname ? or_conn->nickname : "not set", + conn->address); + return result; + case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE: + connection_start_writing(conn); + return 0; + case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: + if (conn->in_connection_handle_write) { + /* We've been invoked from connection_handle_write, because we're + * waiting for a TLS renegotiation, the renegotiation started, and + * SSL_read returned WANTWRITE. But now SSL_read is saying WANTREAD + * again. Stop waiting for write events now, or else we'll + * busy-loop until data arrives for us to read. + * XXX: remove this when v2 handshakes support is dropped. */ + connection_stop_writing(conn); + if (!connection_is_reading(conn)) + connection_start_reading(conn); + } + /* we're already reading, one hopes */ + break; + case TOR_TLS_DONE: /* no data read, so nothing to process */ + break; /* so we call bucket_decrement below */ + default: + break; + } + pending = tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(or_conn->tls); + if (pending) { + /* If we have any pending bytes, we read them now. This *can* + * take us over our read allotment, but really we shouldn't be + * believing that SSL bytes are the same as TCP bytes anyway. */ + int r2 = buf_read_from_tls(conn->inbuf, or_conn->tls, pending); + if (BUG(r2<0)) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "apparently, reading pending bytes can fail."); + return -1; + } + } + result = (int)(buf_datalen(conn->inbuf)-initial_size); + tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(or_conn->tls, &n_read, &n_written); + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "After TLS read of %d: %ld read, %ld written", + result, (long)n_read, (long)n_written); + } else if (conn->linked) { + if (conn->linked_conn) { + result = buf_move_to_buf(conn->inbuf, conn->linked_conn->outbuf, + &conn->linked_conn->outbuf_flushlen); ++ if (BUG(result<0)) { ++ log_warn(LD_BUG, "reading from linked connection buffer failed."); ++ return -1; ++ } + } else { + result = 0; + } + //log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Moved %d bytes on an internal link!", result); + /* If the other side has disappeared, or if it's been marked for close and + * we flushed its outbuf, then we should set our inbuf_reached_eof. */ + if (!conn->linked_conn || + (conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close && + buf_datalen(conn->linked_conn->outbuf) == 0)) + conn->inbuf_reached_eof = 1; + + n_read = (size_t) result; + } else { + /* !connection_speaks_cells, !conn->linked_conn. */ + int reached_eof = 0; + CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, + result = buf_read_from_socket(conn->inbuf, conn->s, + at_most, + &reached_eof, + socket_error)); + if (reached_eof) + conn->inbuf_reached_eof = 1; + +// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"read_to_buf returned %d.",read_result); + + if (result < 0) + return -1; + n_read = (size_t) result; + } + + if (n_read > 0) { + /* change *max_to_read */ + *max_to_read = at_most - n_read; + + /* Update edge_conn->n_read */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + + /* Check for overflow: */ + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_read > n_read)) + edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read; + else + edge_conn->n_read = UINT32_MAX; + } + + /* If CONN_BW events are enabled, update conn->n_read_conn_bw for + * OR/DIR/EXIT connections, checking for overflow. */ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableConnBwEvent && + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT)) { + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - conn->n_read_conn_bw > n_read)) + conn->n_read_conn_bw += (int)n_read; + else + conn->n_read_conn_bw = UINT32_MAX; + } + } + + connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written); + + if (more_to_read && result == at_most) { + slack_in_buf = buf_slack(conn->inbuf); + at_most = more_to_read; + goto again; + } + + /* Call even if result is 0, since the global read bucket may + * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to + * know to stop reading. */ + connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn); + if (n_written > 0 && connection_is_writing(conn)) + connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(conn); + + return 0; +} + +/** A pass-through to fetch_from_buf. */ +int +connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn) +{ + return buf_get_bytes(conn->inbuf, string, len); +} + +/** As buf_get_line(), but read from a connection's input buffer. */ +int +connection_buf_get_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, + size_t *data_len) +{ + return buf_get_line(conn->inbuf, data, data_len); +} + +/** As fetch_from_buf_http, but fetches from a connection's input buffer_t as + * appropriate. */ +int +connection_fetch_from_buf_http(connection_t *conn, + char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, + char **body_out, size_t *body_used, + size_t max_bodylen, int force_complete) +{ + return fetch_from_buf_http(conn->inbuf, headers_out, max_headerlen, + body_out, body_used, max_bodylen, force_complete); +} + +/** Return conn-\>outbuf_flushlen: how many bytes conn wants to flush + * from its outbuf. */ +int +connection_wants_to_flush(connection_t *conn) +{ + return conn->outbuf_flushlen > 0; +} + +/** Are there too many bytes on edge connection conn's outbuf to + * send back a relay-level sendme yet? Return 1 if so, 0 if not. Used by + * connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(). + */ +int +connection_outbuf_too_full(connection_t *conn) +{ + return (conn->outbuf_flushlen > 10*CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); +} + +/** + * On Windows Vista and Windows 7, tune the send buffer size according to a + * hint from the OS. + * + * This should help fix slow upload rates. + */ +static void +update_send_buffer_size(tor_socket_t sock) +{ +#ifdef _WIN32 + /* We only do this on Vista and 7, because earlier versions of Windows + * don't have the SIO_IDEAL_SEND_BACKLOG_QUERY functionality, and on + * later versions it isn't necessary. */ + static int isVistaOr7 = -1; + if (isVistaOr7 == -1) { + isVistaOr7 = 0; + OSVERSIONINFO osvi = { 0 }; + osvi.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(OSVERSIONINFO); + GetVersionEx(&osvi); + if (osvi.dwMajorVersion == 6 && osvi.dwMinorVersion < 2) + isVistaOr7 = 1; + } + if (!isVistaOr7) + return; + if (get_options()->ConstrainedSockets) + return; + ULONG isb = 0; + DWORD bytesReturned = 0; + if (!WSAIoctl(sock, SIO_IDEAL_SEND_BACKLOG_QUERY, NULL, 0, + &isb, sizeof(isb), &bytesReturned, NULL, NULL)) { + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (const char*)&isb, sizeof(isb)); + } +#else + (void) sock; +#endif +} + +/** Try to flush more bytes onto conn-\>s. + * + * This function is called in connection_handle_write(), which gets + * called from conn_write_callback() in main.c when libevent tells us + * that conn wants to write. + * + * Update conn-\>timestamp_last_write_allowed to now, and call flush_buf + * or flush_buf_tls appropriately. If it succeeds and there are no more + * more bytes on conn-\>outbuf, then call connection_finished_flushing + * on it too. + * + * If force, then write as many bytes as possible, ignoring bandwidth + * limits. (Used for flushing messages to controller connections on fatal + * errors.) + * + * Mark the connection and return -1 if you want to close it, else + * return 0. + */ +static int +connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) +{ + int e; + socklen_t len=(socklen_t)sizeof(e); + int result; + ssize_t max_to_write; + time_t now = approx_time(); + size_t n_read = 0, n_written = 0; + int dont_stop_writing = 0; + + tor_assert(!connection_is_listener(conn)); + + if (conn->marked_for_close || !SOCKET_OK(conn->s)) + return 0; /* do nothing */ + + if (conn->in_flushed_some) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "called recursively from inside conn->in_flushed_some"); + return 0; + } + + conn->timestamp_last_write_allowed = now; + + connection_bucket_refill_single(conn, monotime_coarse_get_stamp()); + + /* Sometimes, "writable" means "connected". */ + if (connection_state_is_connecting(conn)) { + if (getsockopt(conn->s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void*)&e, &len) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "getsockopt() syscall failed"); + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + or_connection_t *orconn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + connection_or_close_for_error(orconn, 0); + } else { + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + connection_edge_end_errno(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + } + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } + return -1; + } + if (e) { + /* some sort of error, but maybe just inprogress still */ + if (!ERRNO_IS_CONN_EINPROGRESS(e)) { + log_info(LD_NET,"in-progress connect failed. Removing. (%s)", + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) + connection_edge_end_errno(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) + connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), + errno_to_orconn_end_reason(e), + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + + connection_close_immediate(conn); + /* + * This can bypass normal channel checking since we did + * connection_or_notify_error() above. + */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal(conn); + return -1; + } else { + return 0; /* no change, see if next time is better */ + } + } + /* The connection is successful. */ + if (connection_finished_connecting(conn)<0) + return -1; + } + + max_to_write = force ? (ssize_t)conn->outbuf_flushlen + : connection_bucket_write_limit(conn, now); + + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && + conn->state > OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + size_t initial_size; + if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING || + conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING) { + connection_stop_writing(conn); + if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_conn) < 0) { + /* Don't flush; connection is dead. */ + connection_or_notify_error(or_conn, + END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC, + "TLS error in connection_tls_" + "continue_handshake()"); + connection_close_immediate(conn); + /* + * This can bypass normal channel checking since we did + * connection_or_notify_error() above. + */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal(conn); + return -1; + } + return 0; + } else if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING) { + return connection_handle_read(conn); + } + + /* else open, or closing */ + initial_size = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf); + result = buf_flush_to_tls(conn->outbuf, or_conn->tls, + max_to_write, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); + + if (result >= 0) + update_send_buffer_size(conn->s); + + /* If we just flushed the last bytes, tell the channel on the + * or_conn to check if it needs to geoip_change_dirreq_state() */ + /* XXXX move this to flushed_some or finished_flushing -NM */ + if (buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) == 0 && or_conn->chan) + channel_notify_flushed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)); + + switch (result) { + CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY: + case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: + log_info(LD_NET, result != TOR_TLS_CLOSE ? + "tls error. breaking.":"TLS connection closed on flush"); + /* Don't flush; connection is dead. */ + connection_or_notify_error(or_conn, + END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC, + result != TOR_TLS_CLOSE ? + "TLS error in during flush" : + "TLS closed during flush"); + connection_close_immediate(conn); + /* + * This can bypass normal channel checking since we did + * connection_or_notify_error() above. + */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal(conn); + return -1; + case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE: + log_debug(LD_NET,"wanted write."); + /* we're already writing */ + dont_stop_writing = 1; + break; + case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: + /* Make sure to avoid a loop if the receive buckets are empty. */ + log_debug(LD_NET,"wanted read."); + if (!connection_is_reading(conn)) { + connection_write_bw_exhausted(conn, true); + /* we'll start reading again when we get more tokens in our + * read bucket; then we'll start writing again too. + */ + } + /* else no problem, we're already reading */ + return 0; + /* case TOR_TLS_DONE: + * for TOR_TLS_DONE, fall through to check if the flushlen + * is empty, so we can stop writing. + */ + } + + tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(or_conn->tls, &n_read, &n_written); + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "After TLS write of %d: %ld read, %ld written", + result, (long)n_read, (long)n_written); + or_conn->bytes_xmitted += result; + or_conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls += n_written; + /* So we notice bytes were written even on error */ + /* XXXX This cast is safe since we can never write INT_MAX bytes in a + * single set of TLS operations. But it looks kinda ugly. If we refactor + * the *_buf_tls functions, we should make them return ssize_t or size_t + * or something. */ + result = (int)(initial_size-buf_datalen(conn->outbuf)); + } else { + CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, + result = buf_flush_to_socket(conn->outbuf, conn->s, + max_to_write, &conn->outbuf_flushlen)); + if (result < 0) { + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) + connection_edge_end_errno(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + /* writing failed; we couldn't send a SOCKS reply if we wanted to */ + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->has_finished = 1; + } + + connection_close_immediate(conn); /* Don't flush; connection is dead. */ + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + return -1; + } + update_send_buffer_size(conn->s); + n_written = (size_t) result; + } + + if (n_written && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + + /* Check for overflow: */ + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_written > n_written)) + edge_conn->n_written += (int)n_written; + else + edge_conn->n_written = UINT32_MAX; + } + + /* If CONN_BW events are enabled, update conn->n_written_conn_bw for + * OR/DIR/EXIT connections, checking for overflow. */ + if (n_written && get_options()->TestingEnableConnBwEvent && + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT)) { + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - conn->n_written_conn_bw > n_written)) + conn->n_written_conn_bw += (int)n_written; + else + conn->n_written_conn_bw = UINT32_MAX; + } + + connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written); + + if (result > 0) { + /* If we wrote any bytes from our buffer, then call the appropriate + * functions. */ + if (connection_flushed_some(conn) < 0) { + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { + connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), + END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC, + "Got error back from " + "connection_flushed_some()"); + } + + /* + * This can bypass normal channel checking since we did + * connection_or_notify_error() above. + */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal(conn); + } + } + + if (!connection_wants_to_flush(conn) && + !dont_stop_writing) { /* it's done flushing */ + if (connection_finished_flushing(conn) < 0) { + /* already marked */ + return -1; + } + return 0; + } + + /* Call even if result is 0, since the global write bucket may + * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to + * know to stop writing. */ + connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(conn); + if (n_read > 0 && connection_is_reading(conn)) + connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn); + + return 0; +} + +/* DOCDOC connection_handle_write */ +int +connection_handle_write(connection_t *conn, int force) +{ + int res; + update_current_time(time(NULL)); + /* connection_handle_write_impl() might call connection_handle_read() + * if we're in the middle of a v2 handshake, in which case it needs this + * flag set. */ + conn->in_connection_handle_write = 1; + res = connection_handle_write_impl(conn, force); + conn->in_connection_handle_write = 0; + return res; +} + +/** + * Try to flush data that's waiting for a write on conn. Return + * -1 on failure, 0 on success. + * + * Don't use this function for regular writing; the buffers + * system should be good enough at scheduling writes there. Instead, this + * function is for cases when we're about to exit or something and we want + * to report it right away. + */ +int +connection_flush(connection_t *conn) +{ + return connection_handle_write(conn, 1); +} + +/** Helper for connection_write_to_buf_impl and connection_write_buf_to_buf: + * + * Return true iff it is okay to queue bytes on conn's outbuf for + * writing. + */ +static int +connection_may_write_to_buf(connection_t *conn) +{ + /* if it's marked for close, only allow write if we mean to flush it */ + if (conn->marked_for_close && !conn->hold_open_until_flushed) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/** Helper for connection_write_to_buf_impl and connection_write_buf_to_buf: + * + * Called when an attempt to add bytes on conn's outbuf has failed; + * mark the connection and warn as appropriate. + */ +static void +connection_write_to_buf_failed(connection_t *conn) +{ + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + /* if it failed, it means we have our package/delivery windows set + wrong compared to our max outbuf size. close the whole circuit. */ + log_warn(LD_NET, + "write_to_buf failed. Closing circuit (fd %d).", (int)conn->s); + circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)), + END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); + } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + or_connection_t *orconn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + log_warn(LD_NET, + "write_to_buf failed on an orconn; notifying of error " + "(fd %d)", (int)(conn->s)); + connection_or_close_for_error(orconn, 0); + } else { + log_warn(LD_NET, + "write_to_buf failed. Closing connection (fd %d).", + (int)conn->s); + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + } +} + +/** Helper for connection_write_to_buf_impl and connection_write_buf_to_buf: + * + * Called when an attempt to add bytes on conn's outbuf has succeeded: + * record the number of bytes added. + */ +static void +connection_write_to_buf_commit(connection_t *conn, size_t len) +{ + /* If we receive optimistic data in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING + * state, we don't want to try to write it right away, since + * conn->write_event won't be set yet. Otherwise, write data from + * this conn as the socket is available. */ + if (conn->write_event) { + connection_start_writing(conn); + } + conn->outbuf_flushlen += len; +} + +/** Append len bytes of string onto conn's + * outbuf, and ask it to start writing. + * + * If zlib is nonzero, this is a directory connection that should get + * its contents compressed or decompressed as they're written. If zlib is + * negative, this is the last data to be compressed, and the connection's zlib + * state should be flushed. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_write_to_buf_impl_,(const char *string, size_t len, + connection_t *conn, int zlib)) +{ + /* XXXX This function really needs to return -1 on failure. */ + int r; + if (!len && !(zlib<0)) + return; + + if (!connection_may_write_to_buf(conn)) + return; + + size_t written; + + if (zlib) { + size_t old_datalen = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf); + dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn); + int done = zlib < 0; + CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = buf_add_compress(conn->outbuf, + dir_conn->compress_state, + string, len, done)); + written = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) - old_datalen; + } else { + CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, r = buf_add(conn->outbuf, string, len)); + written = len; + } + if (r < 0) { + connection_write_to_buf_failed(conn); + return; + } + connection_write_to_buf_commit(conn, written); +} + +void +connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len, + dir_connection_t *conn, int done) +{ + connection_write_to_buf_impl_(string, len, TO_CONN(conn), done ? -1 : 1); +} + +/** + * Add all bytes from buf to conn's outbuf, draining them + * from buf. (If the connection is marked and will soon be closed, + * nothing is drained.) + */ +void +connection_buf_add_buf(connection_t *conn, buf_t *buf) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(buf); + size_t len = buf_datalen(buf); + if (len == 0) + return; + + if (!connection_may_write_to_buf(conn)) + return; + + buf_move_all(conn->outbuf, buf); + connection_write_to_buf_commit(conn, len); +} + +#define CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE(var, test) \ + STMT_BEGIN \ + smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); \ + smartlist_t *ret_conns = smartlist_new(); \ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, var) { \ + if (var && (test) && !var->marked_for_close) \ + smartlist_add(ret_conns, var); \ + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(var); \ + return ret_conns; \ + STMT_END + +/* Return a list of connections that aren't close and matches the given type + * and state. The returned list can be empty and must be freed using + * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have ownership of the objects in the + * list so it must not free them nor reference them as they can disappear. */ +smartlist_t * +connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state) +{ + CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE(conn, (conn->type == type && conn->state == state)); +} + +/* Return a list of connections that aren't close and matches the given type + * and purpose. The returned list can be empty and must be freed using + * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have ownership of the objects in the + * list so it must not free them nor reference them as they can disappear. */ +smartlist_t * +connection_list_by_type_purpose(int type, int purpose) +{ + CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE(conn, + (conn->type == type && conn->purpose == purpose)); +} + +/** Return a connection_t * from get_connection_array() that satisfies test on + * var, and that is not marked for close. */ +#define CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(var, test) \ + STMT_BEGIN \ + smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); \ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, var, \ + { \ + if (var && (test) && !var->marked_for_close) \ + return var; \ + }); \ + return NULL; \ + STMT_END + +/** Return a connection with given type, address, port, and purpose; + * or NULL if no such connection exists (or if all such connections are marked + * for close). */ +MOCK_IMPL(connection_t *, +connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose,(int type, + const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + int purpose)) +{ + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, + (conn->type == type && + tor_addr_eq(&conn->addr, addr) && + conn->port == port && + conn->purpose == purpose)); +} + +/** Return the stream with id id if it is not already marked for + * close. + */ +connection_t * +connection_get_by_global_id(uint64_t id) +{ + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, conn->global_identifier == id); +} + +/** Return a connection of type type that is not marked for close. + */ +connection_t * +connection_get_by_type(int type) +{ + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, conn->type == type); +} + +/** Return a connection of type type that is in state state, + * and that is not marked for close. + */ +connection_t * +connection_get_by_type_state(int type, int state) +{ + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, conn->type == type && conn->state == state); +} + +/** Return a connection of type type that has rendquery equal + * to rendquery, and that is not marked for close. If state + * is non-zero, conn must be of that state too. + */ +connection_t * +connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(int type, int state, + const char *rendquery) +{ + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_DIR || + type == CONN_TYPE_AP || type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT); + tor_assert(rendquery); + + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, + (conn->type == type && + (!state || state == conn->state)) && + ( + (type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && + TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data && + !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery, + rend_data_get_address(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data))) + || + (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn) && + TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data && + !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery, + rend_data_get_address(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data))) + )); +} + +/** Return a new smartlist of dir_connection_t * from get_connection_array() + * that satisfy conn_test on connection_t *conn_var, and dirconn_test on + * dir_connection_t *dirconn_var. conn_var must be of CONN_TYPE_DIR and not + * marked for close to be included in the list. */ +#define DIR_CONN_LIST_TEMPLATE(conn_var, conn_test, \ + dirconn_var, dirconn_test) \ + STMT_BEGIN \ + smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); \ + smartlist_t *dir_conns = smartlist_new(); \ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn_var) { \ + if (conn_var && (conn_test) \ + && conn_var->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR \ + && !conn_var->marked_for_close) { \ + dir_connection_t *dirconn_var = TO_DIR_CONN(conn_var); \ + if (dirconn_var && (dirconn_test)) { \ + smartlist_add(dir_conns, dirconn_var); \ + } \ + } \ + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn_var); \ + return dir_conns; \ + STMT_END + +/** Return a list of directory connections that are fetching the item + * described by purpose/resource. If there are none, + * return an empty list. This list must be freed using smartlist_free, + * but the pointers in it must not be freed. + * Note that this list should not be cached, as the pointers in it can be + * freed if their connections close. */ +smartlist_t * +connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource( + int purpose, + const char *resource) +{ + DIR_CONN_LIST_TEMPLATE(conn, + conn->purpose == purpose, + dirconn, + 0 == strcmp_opt(resource, + dirconn->requested_resource)); +} + +/** Return a list of directory connections that are fetching the item + * described by purpose/resource/state. If there are + * none, return an empty list. This list must be freed using smartlist_free, + * but the pointers in it must not be freed. + * Note that this list should not be cached, as the pointers in it can be + * freed if their connections close. */ +smartlist_t * +connection_dir_list_by_purpose_resource_and_state( + int purpose, + const char *resource, + int state) +{ + DIR_CONN_LIST_TEMPLATE(conn, + conn->purpose == purpose && conn->state == state, + dirconn, + 0 == strcmp_opt(resource, + dirconn->requested_resource)); +} + +#undef DIR_CONN_LIST_TEMPLATE + +/** Return an arbitrary active OR connection that isn't this_conn. + * + * We use this to guess if we should tell the controller that we + * didn't manage to connect to any of our bridges. */ +static connection_t * +connection_get_another_active_or_conn(const or_connection_t *this_conn) +{ + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, + conn != TO_CONN(this_conn) && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR); +} + +/** Return 1 if there are any active OR connections apart from + * this_conn. + * + * We use this to guess if we should tell the controller that we + * didn't manage to connect to any of our bridges. */ +int +any_other_active_or_conns(const or_connection_t *this_conn) +{ + connection_t *conn = connection_get_another_active_or_conn(this_conn); + if (conn != NULL) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "%s: Found an OR connection: %s", + __func__, conn->address); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#undef CONN_GET_TEMPLATE + +/** Return 1 if conn is a listener conn, else return 0. */ +int +connection_is_listener(connection_t *conn) +{ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** Return 1 if conn is in state "open" and is not marked + * for close, else return 0. + */ +int +connection_state_is_open(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + if (conn->marked_for_close) + return 0; + + if ((conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR && conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) || + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR) || + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN) || + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT && conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN) || + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL && + conn->state == CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/** Return 1 if conn is in 'connecting' state, else return 0. */ +int +connection_state_is_connecting(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + if (conn->marked_for_close) + return 0; + switch (conn->type) + { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + return conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + return conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + return conn->state == DIR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Allocates a base64'ed authenticator for use in http or https + * auth, based on the input string authenticator. Returns it + * if success, else returns NULL. */ +char * +alloc_http_authenticator(const char *authenticator) +{ + /* an authenticator in Basic authentication + * is just the string "username:password" */ + const size_t authenticator_length = strlen(authenticator); + const size_t base64_authenticator_length = + base64_encode_size(authenticator_length, 0) + 1; + char *base64_authenticator = tor_malloc(base64_authenticator_length); + if (base64_encode(base64_authenticator, base64_authenticator_length, + authenticator, authenticator_length, 0) < 0) { + tor_free(base64_authenticator); /* free and set to null */ + } + return base64_authenticator; +} + +/** Given a socket handle, check whether the local address (sockname) of the + * socket is one that we've connected from before. If so, double-check + * whether our address has changed and we need to generate keys. If we do, + * call init_keys(). + */ +static void +client_check_address_changed(tor_socket_t sock) +{ + tor_addr_t out_addr, iface_addr; + tor_addr_t **last_interface_ip_ptr; + sa_family_t family; + + if (!outgoing_addrs) + outgoing_addrs = smartlist_new(); + + if (tor_addr_from_getsockname(&out_addr, sock) < 0) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(sock); + log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() to check for address change failed: %s", + tor_socket_strerror(e)); + return; + } + family = tor_addr_family(&out_addr); + + if (family == AF_INET) + last_interface_ip_ptr = &last_interface_ipv4; + else if (family == AF_INET6) + last_interface_ip_ptr = &last_interface_ipv6; + else + return; + + if (! *last_interface_ip_ptr) { + tor_addr_t *a = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_addr_t)); + if (get_interface_address6(LOG_INFO, family, a)==0) { + *last_interface_ip_ptr = a; + } else { + tor_free(a); + } + } + + /* If we've used this address previously, we're okay. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(outgoing_addrs, const tor_addr_t *, a_ptr, + if (tor_addr_eq(a_ptr, &out_addr)) + return; + ); + + /* Uh-oh. We haven't connected from this address before. Has the interface + * address changed? */ + if (get_interface_address6(LOG_INFO, family, &iface_addr)<0) + return; + + if (tor_addr_eq(&iface_addr, *last_interface_ip_ptr)) { + /* Nope, it hasn't changed. Add this address to the list. */ + smartlist_add(outgoing_addrs, tor_memdup(&out_addr, sizeof(tor_addr_t))); + } else { + /* The interface changed. We're a client, so we need to regenerate our + * keys. First, reset the state. */ + log_notice(LD_NET, "Our IP address has changed. Rotating keys..."); + tor_addr_copy(*last_interface_ip_ptr, &iface_addr); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(outgoing_addrs, tor_addr_t*, a_ptr, tor_free(a_ptr)); + smartlist_clear(outgoing_addrs); + smartlist_add(outgoing_addrs, tor_memdup(&out_addr, sizeof(tor_addr_t))); + /* We'll need to resolve ourselves again. */ + reset_last_resolved_addr(); + /* Okay, now change our keys. */ + ip_address_changed(1); + } +} + +/** Some systems have limited system buffers for recv and xmit on + * sockets allocated in a virtual server or similar environment. For a Tor + * server this can produce the "Error creating network socket: No buffer + * space available" error once all available TCP buffer space is consumed. + * This method will attempt to constrain the buffers allocated for the socket + * to the desired size to stay below system TCP buffer limits. + */ +static void +set_constrained_socket_buffers(tor_socket_t sock, int size) +{ + void *sz = (void*)&size; + socklen_t sz_sz = (socklen_t) sizeof(size); + if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, sz, sz_sz) < 0) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(sock); + log_warn(LD_NET, "setsockopt() to constrain send " + "buffer to %d bytes failed: %s", size, tor_socket_strerror(e)); + } + if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, sz, sz_sz) < 0) { + int e = tor_socket_errno(sock); + log_warn(LD_NET, "setsockopt() to constrain recv " + "buffer to %d bytes failed: %s", size, tor_socket_strerror(e)); + } +} + +/** Process new bytes that have arrived on conn-\>inbuf. + * + * This function just passes conn to the connection-specific + * connection_*_process_inbuf() function. It also passes in + * package_partial if wanted. + */ +static int +connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + return connection_or_process_inbuf(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + return connection_edge_process_inbuf(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), + package_partial); + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + return connection_dir_process_inbuf(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + return connection_control_process_inbuf(TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn)); + default: + log_err(LD_BUG,"got unexpected conn type %d.", conn->type); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return -1; + } +} + +/** Called whenever we've written data on a connection. */ +static int +connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn) +{ + int r = 0; + tor_assert(!conn->in_flushed_some); + conn->in_flushed_some = 1; + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && + conn->state == DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_WRITING) { + r = connection_dirserv_flushed_some(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); + } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + r = connection_or_flushed_some(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + } else if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + r = connection_edge_flushed_some(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + } + conn->in_flushed_some = 0; + return r; +} + +/** We just finished flushing bytes to the appropriately low network layer, + * and there are no more bytes remaining in conn-\>outbuf or + * conn-\>tls to be flushed. + * + * This function just passes conn to the connection-specific + * connection_*_finished_flushing() function. + */ +static int +connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + /* If the connection is closed, don't try to do anything more here. */ + if (CONN_IS_CLOSED(conn)) + return 0; + +// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"entered. Socket %u.", conn->s); + + connection_stop_writing(conn); + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + return connection_or_finished_flushing(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + return connection_edge_finished_flushing(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + return connection_dir_finished_flushing(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + return connection_control_finished_flushing(TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn)); + default: + log_err(LD_BUG,"got unexpected conn type %d.", conn->type); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return -1; + } +} + +/** Called when our attempt to connect() to another server has just + * succeeded. + * + * This function just passes conn to the connection-specific + * connection_*_finished_connecting() function. + */ +static int +connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + if (!server_mode(get_options())) { + /* See whether getsockname() says our address changed. We need to do this + * now that the connection has finished, because getsockname() on Windows + * won't work until then. */ + client_check_address_changed(conn->s); + } + + switch (conn->type) + { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + return connection_or_finished_connecting(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + return connection_edge_finished_connecting(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + return connection_dir_finished_connecting(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); + default: + log_err(LD_BUG,"got unexpected conn type %d.", conn->type); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return -1; + } +} + +/** Callback: invoked when a connection reaches an EOF event. */ +static int +connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn) +{ + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return connection_or_reached_eof(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + return connection_edge_reached_eof(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + return connection_dir_reached_eof(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + return connection_control_reached_eof(TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn)); + default: + log_err(LD_BUG,"got unexpected conn type %d.", conn->type); + tor_fragile_assert(); + return -1; + } +} + +/** Comparator for the two-orconn case in OOS victim sort */ +static int +oos_victim_comparator_for_orconns(or_connection_t *a, or_connection_t *b) +{ + int a_circs, b_circs; + /* Fewer circuits == higher priority for OOS kill, sort earlier */ + + a_circs = connection_or_get_num_circuits(a); + b_circs = connection_or_get_num_circuits(b); + + if (a_circs < b_circs) return 1; + else if (a_circs > b_circs) return -1; + else return 0; +} + +/** Sort comparator for OOS victims; better targets sort before worse + * ones. */ +static int +oos_victim_comparator(const void **a_v, const void **b_v) +{ + connection_t *a = NULL, *b = NULL; + + /* Get connection pointers out */ + + a = (connection_t *)(*a_v); + b = (connection_t *)(*b_v); + + tor_assert(a != NULL); + tor_assert(b != NULL); + + /* + * We always prefer orconns as victims currently; we won't even see + * these non-orconn cases, but if we do, sort them after orconns. + */ + if (a->type == CONN_TYPE_OR && b->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + return oos_victim_comparator_for_orconns(TO_OR_CONN(a), TO_OR_CONN(b)); + } else { + /* + * One isn't an orconn; if one is, it goes first. We currently have no + * opinions about cases where neither is an orconn. + */ + if (a->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) return -1; + else if (b->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) return 1; + else return 0; + } +} + +/** Pick n victim connections for the OOS handler and return them in a + * smartlist. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC smartlist_t *, +pick_oos_victims, (int n)) +{ + smartlist_t *eligible = NULL, *victims = NULL; + smartlist_t *conns; + int conn_counts_by_type[CONN_TYPE_MAX_ + 1], i; + + /* + * Big damn assumption (someone improve this someday!): + * + * Socket exhaustion normally happens on high-volume relays, and so + * most of the connections involved are orconns. We should pick victims + * by assembling a list of all orconns, and sorting them in order of + * how much 'damage' by some metric we'd be doing by dropping them. + * + * If we move on from orconns, we should probably think about incoming + * directory connections next, or exit connections. Things we should + * probably never kill are controller connections and listeners. + * + * This function will count how many connections of different types + * exist and log it for purposes of gathering data on typical OOS + * situations to guide future improvements. + */ + + /* First, get the connection array */ + conns = get_connection_array(); + /* + * Iterate it and pick out eligible connection types, and log some stats + * along the way. + */ + eligible = smartlist_new(); + memset(conn_counts_by_type, 0, sizeof(conn_counts_by_type)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, c) { + /* Bump the counter */ + tor_assert(c->type <= CONN_TYPE_MAX_); + ++(conn_counts_by_type[c->type]); + + /* Skip anything without a socket we can free */ + if (!(SOCKET_OK(c->s))) { + continue; + } + + /* Skip anything we would count as moribund */ + if (connection_is_moribund(c)) { + continue; + } + + switch (c->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + /* We've got an orconn, it's eligible to be OOSed */ + smartlist_add(eligible, c); + break; + default: + /* We don't know what to do with it, ignore it */ + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c); + + /* Log some stats */ + if (smartlist_len(conns) > 0) { + /* At least one counter must be non-zero */ + log_info(LD_NET, "Some stats on conn types seen during OOS follow"); + for (i = CONN_TYPE_MIN_; i <= CONN_TYPE_MAX_; ++i) { + /* Did we see any? */ + if (conn_counts_by_type[i] > 0) { + log_info(LD_NET, "%s: %d conns", + conn_type_to_string(i), + conn_counts_by_type[i]); + } + } + log_info(LD_NET, "Done with OOS conn type stats"); + } + + /* Did we find more eligible targets than we want to kill? */ + if (smartlist_len(eligible) > n) { + /* Sort the list in order of target preference */ + smartlist_sort(eligible, oos_victim_comparator); + /* Pick first n as victims */ + victims = smartlist_new(); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + smartlist_add(victims, smartlist_get(eligible, i)); + } + /* Free the original list */ + smartlist_free(eligible); + } else { + /* No, we can just call them all victims */ + victims = eligible; + } + + return victims; +} + +/** Kill a list of connections for the OOS handler. */ +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void, +kill_conn_list_for_oos, (smartlist_t *conns)) +{ + if (!conns) return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, c) { + /* Make sure the channel layer gets told about orconns */ + if (c->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + connection_or_close_for_error(TO_OR_CONN(c), 1); + } else { + connection_mark_for_close(c); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c); + + log_notice(LD_NET, + "OOS handler marked %d connections", + smartlist_len(conns)); +} + +/** Check if a connection is on the way out so the OOS handler doesn't try + * to kill more than it needs. */ +int +connection_is_moribund(connection_t *conn) +{ + if (conn != NULL && + (conn->conn_array_index < 0 || + conn->marked_for_close)) { + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +/** Out-of-Sockets handler; n_socks is the current number of open + * sockets, and failed is non-zero if a socket exhaustion related + * error immediately preceded this call. This is where to do + * circuit-killing heuristics as needed. + */ +void +connection_check_oos(int n_socks, int failed) +{ + int target_n_socks = 0, moribund_socks, socks_to_kill; + smartlist_t *conns; + + /* Early exit: is OOS checking disabled? */ + if (get_options()->DisableOOSCheck) { + return; + } + + /* Sanity-check args */ + tor_assert(n_socks >= 0); + + /* + * Make some log noise; keep it at debug level since this gets a chance + * to run on every connection attempt. + */ + log_debug(LD_NET, + "Running the OOS handler (%d open sockets, %s)", + n_socks, (failed != 0) ? "exhaustion seen" : "no exhaustion"); + + /* + * Check if we're really handling an OOS condition, and if so decide how + * many sockets we want to get down to. Be sure we check if the threshold + * is distinct from zero first; it's possible for this to be called a few + * times before we've finished reading the config. + */ + if (n_socks >= get_options()->ConnLimit_high_thresh && + get_options()->ConnLimit_high_thresh != 0 && + get_options()->ConnLimit_ != 0) { + /* Try to get down to the low threshold */ + target_n_socks = get_options()->ConnLimit_low_thresh; + log_notice(LD_NET, + "Current number of sockets %d is greater than configured " + "limit %d; OOS handler trying to get down to %d", + n_socks, get_options()->ConnLimit_high_thresh, + target_n_socks); + } else if (failed) { + /* + * If we're not at the limit but we hit a socket exhaustion error, try to + * drop some (but not as aggressively as ConnLimit_low_threshold, which is + * 3/4 of ConnLimit_) + */ + target_n_socks = (n_socks * 9) / 10; + log_notice(LD_NET, + "We saw socket exhaustion at %d open sockets; OOS handler " + "trying to get down to %d", + n_socks, target_n_socks); + } + + if (target_n_socks > 0) { + /* + * It's an OOS! + * + * Count moribund sockets; it's be important that anything we decide + * to get rid of here but don't immediately close get counted as moribund + * on subsequent invocations so we don't try to kill too many things if + * connection_check_oos() gets called multiple times. + */ + moribund_socks = connection_count_moribund(); + + if (moribund_socks < n_socks - target_n_socks) { + socks_to_kill = n_socks - target_n_socks - moribund_socks; + + conns = pick_oos_victims(socks_to_kill); + if (conns) { + kill_conn_list_for_oos(conns); + log_notice(LD_NET, + "OOS handler killed %d conns", smartlist_len(conns)); + smartlist_free(conns); + } else { + log_notice(LD_NET, "OOS handler failed to pick any victim conns"); + } + } else { + log_notice(LD_NET, + "Not killing any sockets for OOS because there are %d " + "already moribund, and we only want to eliminate %d", + moribund_socks, n_socks - target_n_socks); + } + } +} + +/** Log how many bytes are used by buffers of different kinds and sizes. */ +void +connection_dump_buffer_mem_stats(int severity) +{ + uint64_t used_by_type[CONN_TYPE_MAX_+1]; + uint64_t alloc_by_type[CONN_TYPE_MAX_+1]; + int n_conns_by_type[CONN_TYPE_MAX_+1]; + uint64_t total_alloc = 0; + uint64_t total_used = 0; + int i; + smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); + + memset(used_by_type, 0, sizeof(used_by_type)); + memset(alloc_by_type, 0, sizeof(alloc_by_type)); + memset(n_conns_by_type, 0, sizeof(n_conns_by_type)); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, c) { + int tp = c->type; + ++n_conns_by_type[tp]; + if (c->inbuf) { + used_by_type[tp] += buf_datalen(c->inbuf); + alloc_by_type[tp] += buf_allocation(c->inbuf); + } + if (c->outbuf) { + used_by_type[tp] += buf_datalen(c->outbuf); + alloc_by_type[tp] += buf_allocation(c->outbuf); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c); + for (i=0; i <= CONN_TYPE_MAX_; ++i) { + total_used += used_by_type[i]; + total_alloc += alloc_by_type[i]; + } + + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + "In buffers for %d connections: %"PRIu64" used/%"PRIu64" allocated", + smartlist_len(conns), + (total_used), (total_alloc)); + for (i=CONN_TYPE_MIN_; i <= CONN_TYPE_MAX_; ++i) { + if (!n_conns_by_type[i]) + continue; + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, + " For %d %s connections: %"PRIu64" used/%"PRIu64" allocated", + n_conns_by_type[i], conn_type_to_string(i), + (used_by_type[i]), (alloc_by_type[i])); + } +} + +/** Verify that connection conn has all of its invariants + * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. + */ +void +assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now) +{ + (void) now; /* XXXX unused. */ + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->type >= CONN_TYPE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->type <= CONN_TYPE_MAX_); + + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + tor_assert(conn->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + tor_assert(conn->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + tor_assert(conn->magic == EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + tor_assert(conn->magic == DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + tor_assert(conn->magic == CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE: + tor_assert(conn->magic == LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + default: + tor_assert(conn->magic == BASE_CONNECTION_MAGIC); + break; + } + + if (conn->linked_conn) { + tor_assert(conn->linked_conn->linked_conn == conn); + tor_assert(conn->linked); + } + if (conn->linked) + tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(conn->s)); + + if (conn->outbuf_flushlen > 0) { + /* With optimistic data, we may have queued data in + * EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING while the conn is not yet marked to writing. + * */ + tor_assert((conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT && + conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) || + connection_is_writing(conn) || + conn->write_blocked_on_bw || + (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn) && + TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->edge_blocked_on_circ)); + } + + if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) + tor_assert(conn->marked_for_close); + + /* XXXX check: read_blocked_on_bw, write_blocked_on_bw, s, conn_array_index, + * marked_for_close. */ + + /* buffers */ + if (conn->inbuf) + buf_assert_ok(conn->inbuf); + if (conn->outbuf) + buf_assert_ok(conn->outbuf); + + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + /* tor_assert(conn->bandwidth > 0); */ + /* the above isn't necessarily true: if we just did a TLS + * handshake but we didn't recognize the other peer, or it + * gave a bad cert/etc, then we won't have assigned bandwidth, + * yet it will be open. -RD + */ +// tor_assert(conn->read_bucket >= 0); + } +// tor_assert(conn->addr && conn->port); + tor_assert(conn->address); + if (conn->state > OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING) + tor_assert(or_conn->tls); + } + + if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) { + /* XXX unchecked: package window, deliver window. */ + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { + entry_connection_t *entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn); + if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional || entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries) + tor_assert(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); + + tor_assert(entry_conn->socks_request); + if (conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + tor_assert(entry_conn->socks_request->has_finished); + if (!conn->marked_for_close) { + tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn)->cpath_layer); + assert_cpath_layer_ok(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn)->cpath_layer); + } + } + } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT) { + tor_assert(conn->purpose == EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT || + conn->purpose == EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE); + } + } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR) { + } else { + /* Purpose is only used for dir and exit types currently */ + tor_assert(!conn->purpose); + } + + switch (conn->type) + { + CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE: + tor_assert(conn->state == LISTENER_STATE_READY); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + tor_assert(conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + tor_assert(conn->state >= EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + tor_assert(conn->state >= EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= EXIT_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + tor_assert(conn->purpose >= EXIT_PURPOSE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->purpose <= EXIT_PURPOSE_MAX_); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_AP: + tor_assert(conn->state >= AP_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= AP_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + tor_assert(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + tor_assert(conn->state >= DIR_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= DIR_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + tor_assert(conn->purpose >= DIR_PURPOSE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->purpose <= DIR_PURPOSE_MAX_); + break; + case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: + tor_assert(conn->state >= CONTROL_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= CONTROL_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + break; + default: + tor_assert(0); + } +} + +/** Fills addr and port with the details of the global + * proxy server we are using. + * conn contains the connection we are using the proxy for. + * + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, + const connection_t *conn) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* Client Transport Plugins can use another proxy, but that should be hidden + * from the rest of tor (as the plugin is responsible for dealing with the + * proxy), check it first, then check the rest of the proxy types to allow + * the config to have unused ClientTransportPlugin entries. + */ + if (options->ClientTransportPlugin) { + const transport_t *transport = NULL; + int r; + r = get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port, &transport); + if (r<0) + return -1; + if (transport) { /* transport found */ + tor_addr_copy(addr, &transport->addr); + *port = transport->port; + *proxy_type = transport->socks_version; + return 0; + } + + /* Unused ClientTransportPlugin. */ + } + + if (options->HTTPSProxy) { + tor_addr_copy(addr, &options->HTTPSProxyAddr); + *port = options->HTTPSProxyPort; + *proxy_type = PROXY_CONNECT; + return 0; + } else if (options->Socks4Proxy) { + tor_addr_copy(addr, &options->Socks4ProxyAddr); + *port = options->Socks4ProxyPort; + *proxy_type = PROXY_SOCKS4; + return 0; + } else if (options->Socks5Proxy) { + tor_addr_copy(addr, &options->Socks5ProxyAddr); + *port = options->Socks5ProxyPort; + *proxy_type = PROXY_SOCKS5; + return 0; + } + + tor_addr_make_unspec(addr); + *port = 0; + *proxy_type = PROXY_NONE; + return 0; +} + +/** Log a failed connection to a proxy server. + * conn is the connection we use the proxy server for. */ +void +log_failed_proxy_connection(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_addr_t proxy_addr; + uint16_t proxy_port; + int proxy_type; + + if (get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, conn) != 0) + return; /* if we have no proxy set up, leave this function. */ + + log_warn(LD_NET, + "The connection to the %s proxy server at %s just failed. " + "Make sure that the proxy server is up and running.", + proxy_type_to_string(proxy_type), + fmt_addrport(&proxy_addr, proxy_port)); +} + +/** Return string representation of proxy_type. */ +static const char * +proxy_type_to_string(int proxy_type) +{ + switch (proxy_type) { + case PROXY_CONNECT: return "HTTP"; + case PROXY_SOCKS4: return "SOCKS4"; + case PROXY_SOCKS5: return "SOCKS5"; + case PROXY_PLUGGABLE: return "pluggable transports SOCKS"; + case PROXY_NONE: return "NULL"; + default: tor_assert(0); + } + return NULL; /*Unreached*/ +} + +/** Call connection_free_minimal() on every connection in our array, and + * release all storage held by connection.c. + * + * Don't do the checks in connection_free(), because they will + * fail. + */ +void +connection_free_all(void) +{ + smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); + + /* We don't want to log any messages to controllers. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn, + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) + TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn)->event_mask = 0); + + control_update_global_event_mask(); + + /* Unlink everything from the identity map. */ + connection_or_clear_identity_map(); + connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(); + + /* Clear out our list of broken connections */ + clear_broken_connection_map(0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn, + connection_free_minimal(conn)); + + if (outgoing_addrs) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(outgoing_addrs, tor_addr_t *, addr, tor_free(addr)); + smartlist_free(outgoing_addrs); + outgoing_addrs = NULL; + } + + tor_free(last_interface_ipv4); + tor_free(last_interface_ipv6); + last_recorded_accounting_at = 0; + + mainloop_event_free(reenable_blocked_connections_ev); + reenable_blocked_connections_is_scheduled = 0; + memset(&reenable_blocked_connections_delay, 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); +} + +/** Log a warning, and possibly emit a control event, that received came + * at a skewed time. trusted indicates that the source was one + * that we had more faith in and therefore the warning level should have higher + * severity. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(void, +clock_skew_warning, (const connection_t *conn, long apparent_skew, int trusted, + log_domain_mask_t domain, const char *received, + const char *source)) +{ + char dbuf[64]; + char *ext_source = NULL, *warn = NULL; + format_time_interval(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), apparent_skew); + if (conn) + tor_asprintf(&ext_source, "%s:%s:%d", source, conn->address, conn->port); + else + ext_source = tor_strdup(source); + log_fn(trusted ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO, domain, + "Received %s with skewed time (%s): " + "It seems that our clock is %s by %s, or that theirs is %s%s. " + "Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time, " + "timezone, and date settings.", received, ext_source, + apparent_skew > 0 ? "ahead" : "behind", dbuf, + apparent_skew > 0 ? "behind" : "ahead", + (!conn || trusted) ? "" : ", or they are sending us the wrong time"); + if (trusted) { + control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, "CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=%s", + apparent_skew, ext_source); + tor_asprintf(&warn, "Clock skew %ld in %s from %s", apparent_skew, + received, source); + control_event_bootstrap_problem(warn, "CLOCK_SKEW", conn, 1); + } + tor_free(warn); + tor_free(ext_source); +} diff --cc src/lib/container/buffers.c index bda424504,000000000..67887f2f3 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/lib/container/buffers.c +++ b/src/lib/container/buffers.c @@@ -1,925 -1,0 +1,932 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file buffers.c + * \brief Implements a generic buffer interface. + * + * A buf_t is a (fairly) opaque byte-oriented FIFO that can read to or flush + * from memory, sockets, file descriptors, TLS connections, or another buf_t. + * Buffers are implemented as linked lists of memory chunks. + * + * All socket-backed and TLS-based connection_t objects have a pair of + * buffers: one for incoming data, and one for outcoming data. These are fed + * and drained from functions in connection.c, trigged by events that are + * monitored in main.c. + * + * This module only handles the buffer implementation itself. To use a buffer + * with the network, a compressor, or a TLS connection, see the other buffer_* + * modules. + **/ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE +#include "orconfig.h" +#include <stddef.h> +#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/cc/torint.h" +#include "lib/log/log.h" +#include "lib/log/util_bug.h" +#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" +#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h" +#include "lib/string/printf.h" +#include "lib/time/compat_time.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include <unistd.h> +#endif + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +//#define PARANOIA + +#ifdef PARANOIA +/** Helper: If PARANOIA is defined, assert that the buffer in local variable + * buf is well-formed. */ +#define check() STMT_BEGIN buf_assert_ok(buf); STMT_END +#else +#define check() STMT_NIL +#endif /* defined(PARANOIA) */ + +/* Implementation notes: + * + * After flirting with memmove, and dallying with ring-buffers, we're finally + * getting up to speed with the 1970s and implementing buffers as a linked + * list of small chunks. Each buffer has such a list; data is removed from + * the head of the list, and added at the tail. The list is singly linked, + * and the buffer keeps a pointer to the head and the tail. + * + * Every chunk, except the tail, contains at least one byte of data. Data in + * each chunk is contiguous. + * + * When you need to treat the first N characters on a buffer as a contiguous + * string, use the buf_pullup function to make them so. Don't do this more + * than necessary. + * + * The major free Unix kernels have handled buffers like this since, like, + * forever. + */ + +/* Chunk manipulation functions */ + +#define CHUNK_HEADER_LEN offsetof(chunk_t, mem[0]) + +/* We leave this many NUL bytes at the end of the buffer. */ +#ifdef DISABLE_MEMORY_SENTINELS +#define SENTINEL_LEN 0 +#else +#define SENTINEL_LEN 4 +#endif + +/* Header size plus NUL bytes at the end */ +#define CHUNK_OVERHEAD (CHUNK_HEADER_LEN + SENTINEL_LEN) + +/** Return the number of bytes needed to allocate a chunk to hold + * memlen bytes. */ +#define CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen) (CHUNK_OVERHEAD + (memlen)) +/** Return the number of usable bytes in a chunk allocated with + * malloc(memlen). */ +#define CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(memlen) ((memlen) - CHUNK_OVERHEAD) + +#define DEBUG_SENTINEL + +#if defined(DEBUG_SENTINEL) && !defined(DISABLE_MEMORY_SENTINELS) +#define DBG_S(s) s +#else +#define DBG_S(s) (void)0 +#endif + +#ifdef DISABLE_MEMORY_SENTINELS +#define CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, alloclen) STMT_NIL +#else +#define CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, alloclen) do { \ + uint8_t *a = (uint8_t*) &(chunk)->mem[(chunk)->memlen]; \ + DBG_S(uint8_t *b = &((uint8_t*)(chunk))[(alloclen)-SENTINEL_LEN]); \ + DBG_S(tor_assert(a == b)); \ + memset(a,0,SENTINEL_LEN); \ + } while (0) +#endif /* defined(DISABLE_MEMORY_SENTINELS) */ + +/** Move all bytes stored in chunk to the front of chunk->mem, + * to free up space at the end. */ +static inline void +chunk_repack(chunk_t *chunk) +{ + if (chunk->datalen && chunk->data != &chunk->mem[0]) { + memmove(chunk->mem, chunk->data, chunk->datalen); + } + chunk->data = &chunk->mem[0]; +} + +/** Keep track of total size of allocated chunks for consistency asserts */ +static size_t total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks = 0; +static void +buf_chunk_free_unchecked(chunk_t *chunk) +{ + if (!chunk) + return; +#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC + tor_assert(CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen) == chunk->DBG_alloc); +#endif + tor_assert(total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks >= + CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen)); + total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks -= CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen); + tor_free(chunk); +} +static inline chunk_t * +chunk_new_with_alloc_size(size_t alloc) +{ + chunk_t *ch; + ch = tor_malloc(alloc); + ch->next = NULL; + ch->datalen = 0; +#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC + ch->DBG_alloc = alloc; +#endif + ch->memlen = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(alloc); + total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += alloc; + ch->data = &ch->mem[0]; + CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(ch, alloc); + return ch; +} + +/** Expand chunk until it can hold sz bytes, and return a + * new pointer to chunk. Old pointers are no longer valid. */ +static inline chunk_t * +chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz) +{ + off_t offset; + const size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen; + const size_t orig_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig); + const size_t new_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz); + tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen); + offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem; + chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, new_alloc); + chunk->memlen = sz; + chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset; +#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC + tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == orig_alloc); + chunk->DBG_alloc = new_alloc; +#endif + total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += new_alloc - orig_alloc; + CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, new_alloc); + return chunk; +} + +/** Every chunk should take up at least this many bytes. */ +#define MIN_CHUNK_ALLOC 256 +/** No chunk should take up more than this many bytes. */ +#define MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC 65536 + +/** Return the allocation size we'd like to use to hold target + * bytes. */ +size_t +buf_preferred_chunk_size(size_t target) +{ + tor_assert(target <= SIZE_T_CEILING - CHUNK_OVERHEAD); + if (CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(target) >= MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC) + return CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(target); + size_t sz = MIN_CHUNK_ALLOC; + while (CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(sz) < target) { + sz <<= 1; + } + return sz; +} + +/** Collapse data from the first N chunks from buf into buf->head, + * growing it as necessary, until buf->head has the first bytes bytes + * of data from the buffer, or until buf->head has all the data in buf. + * + * Set *head_out to point to the first byte of available data, and + * *len_out to the number of bytes of data available at + * *head_out. Note that *len_out may be more or less than + * bytes, depending on the number of bytes available. + */ +void +buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes, const char **head_out, size_t *len_out) +{ + chunk_t *dest, *src; + size_t capacity; + if (!buf->head) { + *head_out = NULL; + *len_out = 0; + return; + } + + check(); + if (buf->datalen < bytes) + bytes = buf->datalen; + + capacity = bytes; + if (buf->head->datalen >= bytes) { + *head_out = buf->head->data; + *len_out = buf->head->datalen; + return; + } + + if (buf->head->memlen >= capacity) { + /* We don't need to grow the first chunk, but we might need to repack it.*/ + size_t needed = capacity - buf->head->datalen; + if (CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->head) < needed) + chunk_repack(buf->head); + tor_assert(CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->head) >= needed); + } else { + chunk_t *newhead; + size_t newsize; + /* We need to grow the chunk. */ + chunk_repack(buf->head); + newsize = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(buf_preferred_chunk_size(capacity)); + newhead = chunk_grow(buf->head, newsize); + tor_assert(newhead->memlen >= capacity); + if (newhead != buf->head) { + if (buf->tail == buf->head) + buf->tail = newhead; + buf->head = newhead; + } + } + + dest = buf->head; + while (dest->datalen < bytes) { + size_t n = bytes - dest->datalen; + src = dest->next; + tor_assert(src); + if (n >= src->datalen) { + memcpy(CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(dest), src->data, src->datalen); + dest->datalen += src->datalen; + dest->next = src->next; + if (buf->tail == src) + buf->tail = dest; + buf_chunk_free_unchecked(src); + } else { + memcpy(CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(dest), src->data, n); + dest->datalen += n; + src->data += n; + src->datalen -= n; + tor_assert(dest->datalen == bytes); + } + } + + check(); + *head_out = buf->head->data; + *len_out = buf->head->datalen; +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* Write sz bytes from cp into a newly allocated buffer buf. + * Returns NULL when passed a NULL cp or zero sz. + * Asserts on failure: only for use in unit tests. + * buf must be freed using buf_free(). */ +buf_t * +buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz) +{ + /* Validate arguments */ - if (!cp || sz <= 0) { ++ if (!cp || sz <= 0 || sz >= INT_MAX) { + return NULL; + } + + tor_assert(sz < SSIZE_T_CEILING); + + /* Allocate a buffer */ + buf_t *buf = buf_new_with_capacity(sz); + tor_assert(buf); + buf_assert_ok(buf); + tor_assert(!buf->head); + + /* Allocate a chunk that is sz bytes long */ + buf->head = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz)); + buf->tail = buf->head; + tor_assert(buf->head); + buf_assert_ok(buf); + tor_assert(buf_allocation(buf) >= sz); + + /* Copy the data and size the buffers */ + tor_assert(sz <= buf_slack(buf)); + tor_assert(sz <= CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->head)); + memcpy(&buf->head->mem[0], cp, sz); + buf->datalen = sz; + buf->head->datalen = sz; + buf->head->data = &buf->head->mem[0]; + buf_assert_ok(buf); + + /* Make sure everything is large enough */ + tor_assert(buf_allocation(buf) >= sz); + tor_assert(buf_allocation(buf) >= buf_datalen(buf) + buf_slack(buf)); + /* Does the buffer implementation allocate more than the requested size? + * (for example, by rounding up). If so, these checks will fail. */ + tor_assert(buf_datalen(buf) == sz); + tor_assert(buf_slack(buf) == 0); + + return buf; +} +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +/** Remove the first n bytes from buf. */ +void +buf_drain(buf_t *buf, size_t n) +{ + tor_assert(buf->datalen >= n); + while (n) { + tor_assert(buf->head); + if (buf->head->datalen > n) { + buf->head->datalen -= n; + buf->head->data += n; + buf->datalen -= n; + return; + } else { + chunk_t *victim = buf->head; + n -= victim->datalen; + buf->datalen -= victim->datalen; + buf->head = victim->next; + if (buf->tail == victim) + buf->tail = NULL; + buf_chunk_free_unchecked(victim); + } + } + check(); +} + +/** Create and return a new buf with default chunk capacity size. + */ +buf_t * +buf_new_with_capacity(size_t size) +{ + buf_t *b = buf_new(); + b->default_chunk_size = buf_preferred_chunk_size(size); + return b; +} + +/** Allocate and return a new buffer with default capacity. */ +buf_t * +buf_new(void) +{ + buf_t *buf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(buf_t)); + buf->magic = BUFFER_MAGIC; + buf->default_chunk_size = 4096; + return buf; +} + +size_t +buf_get_default_chunk_size(const buf_t *buf) +{ + return buf->default_chunk_size; +} + +/** Remove all data from buf. */ +void +buf_clear(buf_t *buf) +{ + chunk_t *chunk, *next; + buf->datalen = 0; + for (chunk = buf->head; chunk; chunk = next) { + next = chunk->next; + buf_chunk_free_unchecked(chunk); + } + buf->head = buf->tail = NULL; +} + +/** Return the number of bytes stored in buf */ +MOCK_IMPL(size_t, +buf_datalen, (const buf_t *buf)) +{ + return buf->datalen; +} + +/** Return the total length of all chunks used in buf. */ +size_t +buf_allocation(const buf_t *buf) +{ + size_t total = 0; + const chunk_t *chunk; + for (chunk = buf->head; chunk; chunk = chunk->next) { + total += CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen); + } + return total; +} + +/** Return the number of bytes that can be added to buf without + * performing any additional allocation. */ +size_t +buf_slack(const buf_t *buf) +{ + if (!buf->tail) + return 0; + else + return CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail); +} + +/** Release storage held by buf. */ +void +buf_free_(buf_t *buf) +{ + if (!buf) + return; + + buf_clear(buf); + buf->magic = 0xdeadbeef; + tor_free(buf); +} + +/** Return a new copy of in_chunk */ +static chunk_t * +chunk_copy(const chunk_t *in_chunk) +{ + chunk_t *newch = tor_memdup(in_chunk, CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(in_chunk->memlen)); + total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(in_chunk->memlen); +#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC + newch->DBG_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(in_chunk->memlen); +#endif + newch->next = NULL; + if (in_chunk->data) { + off_t offset = in_chunk->data - in_chunk->mem; + newch->data = newch->mem + offset; + } + return newch; +} + +/** Return a new copy of buf */ +buf_t * +buf_copy(const buf_t *buf) +{ + chunk_t *ch; + buf_t *out = buf_new(); + out->default_chunk_size = buf->default_chunk_size; + for (ch = buf->head; ch; ch = ch->next) { + chunk_t *newch = chunk_copy(ch); + if (out->tail) { + out->tail->next = newch; + out->tail = newch; + } else { + out->head = out->tail = newch; + } + } + out->datalen = buf->datalen; + return out; +} + +/** Append a new chunk with enough capacity to hold capacity bytes to + * the tail of buf. If capped, don't allocate a chunk bigger + * than MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC. */ +chunk_t * +buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity, int capped) +{ + chunk_t *chunk; + + if (CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(capacity) < buf->default_chunk_size) { + chunk = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(buf->default_chunk_size); + } else if (capped && CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(capacity) > MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC) { + chunk = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC); + } else { + chunk = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(buf_preferred_chunk_size(capacity)); + } + + chunk->inserted_time = monotime_coarse_get_stamp(); + + if (buf->tail) { + tor_assert(buf->head); + buf->tail->next = chunk; + buf->tail = chunk; + } else { + tor_assert(!buf->head); + buf->head = buf->tail = chunk; + } + check(); + return chunk; +} + +/** Return the age of the oldest chunk in the buffer buf, in + * timestamp units. Requires the current monotonic timestamp as its + * input now. + */ +uint32_t +buf_get_oldest_chunk_timestamp(const buf_t *buf, uint32_t now) +{ + if (buf->head) { + return now - buf->head->inserted_time; + } else { + return 0; + } +} + +size_t +buf_get_total_allocation(void) +{ + return total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks; +} + +/** Append string_len bytes from string to the end of + * buf. + * + * Return the new length of the buffer on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +buf_add(buf_t *buf, const char *string, size_t string_len) +{ + if (!string_len) + return (int)buf->datalen; + check(); + + if (BUG(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX)) + return -1; + if (BUG(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX - string_len)) + return -1; + + while (string_len) { + size_t copy; + if (!buf->tail || !CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail)) + buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf, string_len, 1); + + copy = CHUNK_REMAINING_CAPACITY(buf->tail); + if (copy > string_len) + copy = string_len; + memcpy(CHUNK_WRITE_PTR(buf->tail), string, copy); + string_len -= copy; + string += copy; + buf->datalen += copy; + buf->tail->datalen += copy; + } + + check(); + tor_assert(buf->datalen < INT_MAX); + return (int)buf->datalen; +} + +/** Add a nul-terminated string to buf, not including the + * terminating NUL. */ +void +buf_add_string(buf_t *buf, const char *string) +{ + buf_add(buf, string, strlen(string)); +} + +/** As tor_snprintf, but write the results into a buf_t */ +void +buf_add_printf(buf_t *buf, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap,format); + buf_add_vprintf(buf, format, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +/** As tor_vsnprintf, but write the results into a buf_t. */ +void +buf_add_vprintf(buf_t *buf, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + /* XXXX Faster implementations are easy enough, but let's optimize later */ + char *tmp; + tor_vasprintf(&tmp, format, args); + buf_add(buf, tmp, strlen(tmp)); + tor_free(tmp); +} + +/** Return a heap-allocated string containing the contents of buf, plus + * a NUL byte. If sz_out is provided, set *sz_out to the length + * of the returned string, not including the terminating NUL. */ +char * +buf_extract(buf_t *buf, size_t *sz_out) +{ + tor_assert(buf); + + size_t sz = buf_datalen(buf); + char *result; + result = tor_malloc(sz+1); + buf_peek(buf, result, sz); + result[sz] = 0; + if (sz_out) + *sz_out = sz; + return result; +} + +/** Helper: copy the first string_len bytes from buf + * onto string. + */ +void +buf_peek(const buf_t *buf, char *string, size_t string_len) +{ + chunk_t *chunk; + + tor_assert(string); + /* make sure we don't ask for too much */ + tor_assert(string_len <= buf->datalen); + /* buf_assert_ok(buf); */ + + chunk = buf->head; + while (string_len) { + size_t copy = string_len; + tor_assert(chunk); + if (chunk->datalen < copy) + copy = chunk->datalen; + memcpy(string, chunk->data, copy); + string_len -= copy; + string += copy; + chunk = chunk->next; + } +} + +/** Remove string_len bytes from the front of buf, and store + * them into string. Return the new buffer size. string_len + * must be \<= the number of bytes on the buffer. + */ +int +buf_get_bytes(buf_t *buf, char *string, size_t string_len) +{ + /* There must be string_len bytes in buf; write them onto string, + * then memmove buf back (that is, remove them from buf). + * + * Return the number of bytes still on the buffer. */ + + check(); + buf_peek(buf, string, string_len); + buf_drain(buf, string_len); + check(); + tor_assert(buf->datalen < INT_MAX); + return (int)buf->datalen; +} + +/** Move up to *buf_flushlen bytes from buf_in to + * buf_out, and modify *buf_flushlen appropriately. + * Return the number of bytes actually copied. + */ +int +buf_move_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen) +{ + /* We can do way better here, but this doesn't turn up in any profiles. */ + char b[4096]; + size_t cp, len; + - if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX)) ++ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX || *buf_flushlen >= INT_MAX)) + return -1; + if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX - *buf_flushlen)) + return -1; + + len = *buf_flushlen; + if (len > buf_in->datalen) + len = buf_in->datalen; + + cp = len; /* Remember the number of bytes we intend to copy. */ + tor_assert(cp < INT_MAX); + while (len) { + /* This isn't the most efficient implementation one could imagine, since + * it does two copies instead of 1, but I kinda doubt that this will be + * critical path. */ + size_t n = len > sizeof(b) ? sizeof(b) : len; + buf_get_bytes(buf_in, b, n); + buf_add(buf_out, b, n); + len -= n; + } + *buf_flushlen -= cp; + return (int)cp; +} + +/** Moves all data from buf_in to buf_out, without copying. + */ +void +buf_move_all(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in) +{ + tor_assert(buf_out); + if (!buf_in) + return; ++ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX || buf_in->datalen >= INT_MAX)) ++ return; ++ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX - buf_in->datalen)) ++ return; + + if (buf_out->head == NULL) { + buf_out->head = buf_in->head; + buf_out->tail = buf_in->tail; + } else { + buf_out->tail->next = buf_in->head; + buf_out->tail = buf_in->tail; + } + + buf_out->datalen += buf_in->datalen; + buf_in->head = buf_in->tail = NULL; + buf_in->datalen = 0; +} + +/** Internal structure: represents a position in a buffer. */ +typedef struct buf_pos_t { + const chunk_t *chunk; /**< Which chunk are we pointing to? */ + int pos;/**< Which character inside the chunk's data are we pointing to? */ + size_t chunk_pos; /**< Total length of all previous chunks. */ +} buf_pos_t; + +/** Initialize out to point to the first character of buf.*/ +static void +buf_pos_init(const buf_t *buf, buf_pos_t *out) +{ + out->chunk = buf->head; + out->pos = 0; + out->chunk_pos = 0; +} + +/** Advance out to the first appearance of ch at the current + * position of out, or later. Return -1 if no instances are found; + * otherwise returns the absolute position of the character. */ +static off_t +buf_find_pos_of_char(char ch, buf_pos_t *out) +{ + const chunk_t *chunk; + int pos; + tor_assert(out); + if (out->chunk) { + if (out->chunk->datalen) { + tor_assert(out->pos < (off_t)out->chunk->datalen); + } else { + tor_assert(out->pos == 0); + } + } + pos = out->pos; + for (chunk = out->chunk; chunk; chunk = chunk->next) { + char *cp = memchr(chunk->data+pos, ch, chunk->datalen - pos); + if (cp) { + out->chunk = chunk; + tor_assert(cp - chunk->data < INT_MAX); + out->pos = (int)(cp - chunk->data); + return out->chunk_pos + out->pos; + } else { + out->chunk_pos += chunk->datalen; + pos = 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +/** Advance pos by a single character, if there are any more characters + * in the buffer. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ +static inline int +buf_pos_inc(buf_pos_t *pos) +{ ++ tor_assert(pos->pos < INT_MAX - 1); + ++pos->pos; + if (pos->pos == (off_t)pos->chunk->datalen) { + if (!pos->chunk->next) + return -1; + pos->chunk_pos += pos->chunk->datalen; + pos->chunk = pos->chunk->next; + pos->pos = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +/** Return true iff the n-character string in s appears + * (verbatim) at pos. */ +static int +buf_matches_at_pos(const buf_pos_t *pos, const char *s, size_t n) +{ + buf_pos_t p; + if (!n) + return 1; + + memcpy(&p, pos, sizeof(p)); + + while (1) { + char ch = p.chunk->data[p.pos]; + if (ch != *s) + return 0; + ++s; + /* If we're out of characters that don't match, we match. Check this + * _before_ we test incrementing pos, in case we're at the end of the + * string. */ + if (--n == 0) + return 1; + if (buf_pos_inc(&p)<0) + return 0; + } +} + +/** Return the first position in buf at which the n-character + * string s occurs, or -1 if it does not occur. */ +int +buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) +{ + buf_pos_t pos; + buf_pos_init(buf, &pos); + while (buf_find_pos_of_char(*s, &pos) >= 0) { + if (buf_matches_at_pos(&pos, s, n)) { + tor_assert(pos.chunk_pos + pos.pos < INT_MAX); + return (int)(pos.chunk_pos + pos.pos); + } else { + if (buf_pos_inc(&pos)<0) + return -1; + } + } + return -1; +} + +/** Return 1 iff buf starts with cmd. cmd must be a null + * terminated string, of no more than PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX bytes. */ +int +buf_peek_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd) +{ + char tmp[PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX]; + size_t clen = strlen(cmd); + if (clen == 0) + return 1; + if (BUG(clen > sizeof(tmp))) + return 0; + if (buf->datalen < clen) + return 0; + buf_peek(buf, tmp, clen); + return fast_memeq(tmp, cmd, clen); +} + +/** Return the index within buf at which ch first appears, + * or -1 if ch does not appear on buf. */ +static off_t +buf_find_offset_of_char(buf_t *buf, char ch) +{ + chunk_t *chunk; + off_t offset = 0; ++ tor_assert(buf->datalen < INT_MAX); + for (chunk = buf->head; chunk; chunk = chunk->next) { + char *cp = memchr(chunk->data, ch, chunk->datalen); + if (cp) + return offset + (cp - chunk->data); + else + offset += chunk->datalen; + } + return -1; +} + +/** Try to read a single LF-terminated line from buf, and write it + * (including the LF), NUL-terminated, into the *data_len byte buffer + * at data_out. Set *data_len to the number of bytes in the + * line, not counting the terminating NUL. Return 1 if we read a whole line, + * return 0 if we don't have a whole line yet, and return -1 if the line + * length exceeds *data_len. + */ +int +buf_get_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len) +{ + size_t sz; + off_t offset; + + if (!buf->head) + return 0; + + offset = buf_find_offset_of_char(buf, '\n'); + if (offset < 0) + return 0; + sz = (size_t) offset; + if (sz+2 > *data_len) { + *data_len = sz + 2; + return -1; + } + buf_get_bytes(buf, data_out, sz+1); + data_out[sz+1] = '\0'; + *data_len = sz+1; + return 1; +} + +/** Set *output to contain a copy of the data in *input */ +int +buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output, + const buf_t *input) +{ + if (*output) + buf_free(*output); + *output = buf_copy(input); + return 0; +} + +/** Log an error and exit if buf is corrupted. + */ +void +buf_assert_ok(buf_t *buf) +{ + tor_assert(buf); + tor_assert(buf->magic == BUFFER_MAGIC); + + if (! buf->head) { + tor_assert(!buf->tail); + tor_assert(buf->datalen == 0); + } else { + chunk_t *ch; + size_t total = 0; + tor_assert(buf->tail); + for (ch = buf->head; ch; ch = ch->next) { + total += ch->datalen; + tor_assert(ch->datalen <= ch->memlen); ++ tor_assert(ch->datalen < INT_MAX); + tor_assert(ch->data >= &ch->mem[0]); + tor_assert(ch->data <= &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen); + if (ch->data == &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ + static int warned = 0; + if (! warned) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Invariant violation in buf.c related to #15083"); + warned = 1; + } + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + } + tor_assert(ch->data+ch->datalen <= &ch->mem[0] + ch->memlen); + if (!ch->next) + tor_assert(ch == buf->tail); + } + tor_assert(buf->datalen == total); + } +}

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Fix #28525 changes file that is breaking CI.
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit c35aded00a19f26f3124584e7d0f561cf579efec Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Mar 12 20:11:51 2019 +0200 Fix #28525 changes file that is breaking CI. --- changes/bug28525 | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug28525 b/changes/bug28525 index 392a9265e..988ffb219 100644 --- a/changes/bug28525 +++ b/changes/bug28525 @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (address selection): + o Minor features (address selection): - Make Tor aware of the RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT) IP range, which is the subnet 100.64.0.0/10. This is deployed by many ISPs as an alternative to RFC 1918 that does not break existing internal networks. This patch fixes security issues caused by RFC 6518 by blocking control ports on these addresses and warns users if client ports or ExtORPorts are listening on - a RFC 6598 address. Fixes bug 28525; bugfix on 0.4.1.1-alpha. Patch by - Neel Chauhan. + a RFC 6598 address. Closes ticket 28525. Patch by Neel Chauhan.

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1078' into maint-0.2.9
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 254c1bac453fdb7d3e29a5cde9757542990a6989 Merge: e07d08a16 ba83c1e5c Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Aug 10 07:21:56 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1078' into maint-0.2.9 changes/bug30781 | 4 ++++ src/or/routerparse.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Merge branch 'bug30781_034' into bug30781_035
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit c8c2e2b8fcc4d99adce600da8210a5e9ae653daf Merge: e5deb2bbc dc8e3cd5c Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 6 09:55:44 2019 +1000 Merge branch 'bug30781_034' into bug30781_035 Moved fix from src/or/routerparse.c to src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c. changes/bug30781 | 4 ++++ src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --cc src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c index a81930263,000000000..e44fbf77f mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c +++ b/src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c @@@ -1,1242 -1,0 +1,1245 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file routerparse.c + * \brief Code to parse and validate router descriptors, consenus directories, + * and similar objects. + * + * The objects parsed by this module use a common text-based metaformat, + * documented in dir-spec.txt in torspec.git. This module is itself divided + * into two major kinds of function: code to handle the metaformat, and code + * to convert from particular instances of the metaformat into the + * objects that Tor uses. + * + * The generic parsing code works by calling a table-based tokenizer on the + * input string. Each token corresponds to a single line with a token, plus + * optional arguments on that line, plus an optional base-64 encoded object + * after that line. Each token has a definition in a table of token_rule_t + * entries that describes how many arguments it can take, whether it takes an + * object, how many times it may appear, whether it must appear first, and so + * on. + * + * The tokenizer function tokenize_string() converts its string input into a + * smartlist full of instances of directory_token_t, according to a provided + * table of token_rule_t. + * + * The generic parts of this module additionally include functions for + * finding the start and end of signed information inside a signed object, and + * computing the digest that will be signed. + * + * There are also functions for saving objects to disk that have caused + * parsing to fail. + * + * The specific parts of this module describe conversions between + * particular lists of directory_token_t and particular objects. The + * kinds of objects that can be parsed here are: + * <ul> + * <li>router descriptors (managed from routerlist.c) + * <li>extra-info documents (managed from routerlist.c) + * <li>microdescriptors (managed from microdesc.c) + * <li>vote and consensus networkstatus documents, and the routerstatus_t + * objects that they comprise (managed from networkstatus.c) + * <li>detached-signature objects used by authorities for gathering + * signatures on the networkstatus consensus (managed from dirvote.c) + * <li>authority key certificates (managed from routerlist.c) + * <li>hidden service descriptors (managed from rendcommon.c and rendcache.c) + * </ul> + **/ + +#define EXPOSE_ROUTERDESC_TOKEN_TABLE + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "core/or/policies.h" +#include "core/or/versions.h" +#include "feature/dirparse/parsecommon.h" +#include "feature/dirparse/policy_parse.h" +#include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h" +#include "feature/dirparse/sigcommon.h" +#include "feature/dirparse/unparseable.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" +#include "feature/relay/router.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" +#include "lib/memarea/memarea.h" +#include "lib/sandbox/sandbox.h" + +#include "core/or/addr_policy_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist_st.h" + +/****************************************************************************/ + +/** List of tokens recognized in router descriptors */ +const token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = { + T0N("reject", K_REJECT, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("accept", K_ACCEPT, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("reject6", K_REJECT6, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("accept6", K_ACCEPT6, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T1_START( "router", K_ROUTER, GE(5), NO_OBJ ), + T01("ipv6-policy", K_IPV6_POLICY, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ), + T1( "signing-key", K_SIGNING_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024 ), + T1( "onion-key", K_ONION_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024 ), + T01("ntor-onion-key", K_ONION_KEY_NTOR, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T1_END( "router-signature", K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T1( "published", K_PUBLISHED, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("uptime", K_UPTIME, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("fingerprint", K_FINGERPRINT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("hibernating", K_HIBERNATING, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("platform", K_PLATFORM, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("proto", K_PROTO, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("contact", K_CONTACT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("read-history", K_READ_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("extra-info-digest", K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("hidden-service-dir", K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("identity-ed25519", K_IDENTITY_ED25519, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T01("master-key-ed25519", K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("router-sig-ed25519", K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("onion-key-crosscert", K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T01("ntor-onion-key-crosscert", K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, + EQ(1), NEED_OBJ ), + + T01("allow-single-hop-exits",K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + + T01("family", K_FAMILY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("caches-extra-info", K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("or-address", K_OR_ADDRESS, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + + T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ), + T1( "bandwidth", K_BANDWIDTH, GE(3), NO_OBJ ), + A01("@purpose", A_PURPOSE, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("tunnelled-dir-server",K_DIR_TUNNELLED, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + + END_OF_TABLE +}; + +/** List of tokens recognized in extra-info documents. */ +static token_rule_t extrainfo_token_table[] = { + T1_END( "router-signature", K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T1( "published", K_PUBLISHED, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("identity-ed25519", K_IDENTITY_ED25519, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T01("router-sig-ed25519", K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ), + T01("read-history", K_READ_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-stats-end", K_DIRREQ_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v2-ips", K_DIRREQ_V2_IPS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v3-ips", K_DIRREQ_V3_IPS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v2-reqs", K_DIRREQ_V2_REQS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v3-reqs", K_DIRREQ_V3_REQS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v2-share", K_DIRREQ_V2_SHARE, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v3-share", K_DIRREQ_V3_SHARE, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v2-resp", K_DIRREQ_V2_RESP, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v3-resp", K_DIRREQ_V3_RESP, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v2-direct-dl", K_DIRREQ_V2_DIR, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v3-direct-dl", K_DIRREQ_V3_DIR, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v2-tunneled-dl", K_DIRREQ_V2_TUN, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("dirreq-v3-tunneled-dl", K_DIRREQ_V3_TUN, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("entry-stats-end", K_ENTRY_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("entry-ips", K_ENTRY_IPS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("cell-stats-end", K_CELL_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("cell-processed-cells", K_CELL_PROCESSED, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("cell-queued-cells", K_CELL_QUEUED, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("cell-time-in-queue", K_CELL_TIME, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("cell-circuits-per-decile", K_CELL_CIRCS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("exit-stats-end", K_EXIT_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("exit-kibibytes-written", K_EXIT_WRITTEN, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("exit-kibibytes-read", K_EXIT_READ, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("exit-streams-opened", K_EXIT_OPENED, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + + T1_START( "extra-info", K_EXTRA_INFO, GE(2), NO_OBJ ), + + END_OF_TABLE +}; + +#undef T + +/* static function prototypes */ +static int router_add_exit_policy(routerinfo_t *router,directory_token_t *tok); +static smartlist_t *find_all_exitpolicy(smartlist_t *s); + +/** Set digest to the SHA-1 digest of the hash of the first router in + * s. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +router_get_router_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest) +{ + return router_get_hash_impl(s, s_len, digest, + "router ","\nrouter-signature", '\n', + DIGEST_SHA1); +} + +/** Set digest to the SHA-1 digest of the hash of the s_len-byte + * extrainfo string at s. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ +int +router_get_extrainfo_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest) +{ + return router_get_hash_impl(s, s_len, digest, "extra-info", + "\nrouter-signature",'\n', DIGEST_SHA1); +} + +/** Helper: move *s_ptr ahead to the next router, the next extra-info, + * or to the first of the annotations proceeding the next router or + * extra-info---whichever comes first. Set is_extrainfo_out to true if + * we found an extrainfo, or false if found a router. Do not scan beyond + * eos. Return -1 if we found nothing; 0 if we found something. */ +static int +find_start_of_next_router_or_extrainfo(const char **s_ptr, + const char *eos, + int *is_extrainfo_out) +{ + const char *annotations = NULL; + const char *s = *s_ptr; + + s = eat_whitespace_eos(s, eos); + + while (s < eos-32) { /* 32 gives enough room for a the first keyword. */ + /* We're at the start of a line. */ + tor_assert(*s != '\n'); + + if (*s == '@' && !annotations) { + annotations = s; + } else if (*s == 'r' && !strcmpstart(s, "router ")) { + *s_ptr = annotations ? annotations : s; + *is_extrainfo_out = 0; + return 0; + } else if (*s == 'e' && !strcmpstart(s, "extra-info ")) { + *s_ptr = annotations ? annotations : s; + *is_extrainfo_out = 1; + return 0; + } + + if (!(s = memchr(s+1, '\n', eos-(s+1)))) + break; + s = eat_whitespace_eos(s, eos); + } + return -1; +} + +/** Given a string *s containing a concatenated sequence of router + * descriptors (or extra-info documents if want_extrainfo is set), + * parses them and stores the result in dest. All routers are marked + * running and valid. Advances *s to a point immediately following the last + * router entry. Ignore any trailing router entries that are not complete. + * + * If saved_location isn't SAVED_IN_CACHE, make a local copy of each + * descriptor in the signed_descriptor_body field of each routerinfo_t. If it + * isn't SAVED_NOWHERE, remember the offset of each descriptor. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Adds a digest to + * invalid_digests_out for every entry that was unparseable or + * invalid. (This may cause duplicate entries.) + */ +int +router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos, + smartlist_t *dest, + saved_location_t saved_location, + int want_extrainfo, + int allow_annotations, + const char *prepend_annotations, + smartlist_t *invalid_digests_out) +{ + routerinfo_t *router; + extrainfo_t *extrainfo; + signed_descriptor_t *signed_desc = NULL; + void *elt; + const char *end, *start; + int have_extrainfo; + + tor_assert(s); + tor_assert(*s); + tor_assert(dest); + + start = *s; + if (!eos) + eos = *s + strlen(*s); + + tor_assert(eos >= *s); + + while (1) { + char raw_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + int have_raw_digest = 0; + int dl_again = 0; + if (find_start_of_next_router_or_extrainfo(s, eos, &have_extrainfo) < 0) + break; + + end = tor_memstr(*s, eos-*s, "\nrouter-signature"); + if (end) + end = tor_memstr(end, eos-end, "\n-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"); + if (end) + end += strlen("\n-----END SIGNATURE-----\n"); + + if (!end) + break; + + elt = NULL; + + if (have_extrainfo && want_extrainfo) { + routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist(); + have_raw_digest = router_get_extrainfo_hash(*s, end-*s, raw_digest) == 0; + extrainfo = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end, + saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE, + rl->identity_map, &dl_again); + if (extrainfo) { + signed_desc = &extrainfo->cache_info; + elt = extrainfo; + } + } else if (!have_extrainfo && !want_extrainfo) { + have_raw_digest = router_get_router_hash(*s, end-*s, raw_digest) == 0; + router = router_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end, + saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE, + allow_annotations, + prepend_annotations, &dl_again); + if (router) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Read router '%s', purpose '%s'", + router_describe(router), + router_purpose_to_string(router->purpose)); + signed_desc = &router->cache_info; + elt = router; + } + } + if (! elt && ! dl_again && have_raw_digest && invalid_digests_out) { + smartlist_add(invalid_digests_out, tor_memdup(raw_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + if (!elt) { + *s = end; + continue; + } + if (saved_location != SAVED_NOWHERE) { + tor_assert(signed_desc); + signed_desc->saved_location = saved_location; + signed_desc->saved_offset = *s - start; + } + *s = end; + smartlist_add(dest, elt); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Try to find an IPv6 OR port in list of directory_token_t's + * with at least one argument (use GE(1) in setup). If found, store + * address and port number to addr_out and + * port_out. Return number of OR ports found. */ +int +find_single_ipv6_orport(const smartlist_t *list, + tor_addr_t *addr_out, + uint16_t *port_out) +{ + int ret = 0; + tor_assert(list != NULL); + tor_assert(addr_out != NULL); + tor_assert(port_out != NULL); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(list, directory_token_t *, t) { + tor_addr_t a; + maskbits_t bits; + uint16_t port_min, port_max; + tor_assert(t->n_args >= 1); + /* XXXX Prop186 the full spec allows much more than this. */ + if (tor_addr_parse_mask_ports(t->args[0], 0, + &a, &bits, &port_min, + &port_max) == AF_INET6 && + bits == 128 && + port_min == port_max) { + /* Okay, this is one we can understand. Use it and ignore + any potential more addresses in list. */ + tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &a); + *port_out = port_min; + ret = 1; + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t); + + return ret; +} + +/** Helper function: reads a single router entry from *s ... + * *end. Mallocs a new router and returns it if all goes well, else + * returns NULL. If cache_copy is true, duplicate the contents of + * s through end into the signed_descriptor_body of the resulting + * routerinfo_t. + * + * If end is NULL, s must be properly NUL-terminated. + * + * If allow_annotations, it's okay to encounter annotations in s + * before the router; if it's false, reject the router if it's annotated. If + * prepend_annotations is set, it should contain some annotations: + * append them to the front of the router before parsing it, and keep them + * around when caching the router. + * + * Only one of allow_annotations and prepend_annotations may be set. + * + * If can_dl_again_out is provided, set *can_dl_again_out to 1 + * if it's okay to try to download a descriptor with this same digest again, + * and 0 if it isn't. (It might not be okay to download it again if part of + * the part covered by the digest is invalid.) + */ +routerinfo_t * +router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, + int cache_copy, int allow_annotations, + const char *prepend_annotations, + int *can_dl_again_out) +{ + routerinfo_t *router = NULL; + char digest[128]; + smartlist_t *tokens = NULL, *exit_policy_tokens = NULL; + directory_token_t *tok; + struct in_addr in; + const char *start_of_annotations, *cp, *s_dup = s; + size_t prepend_len = prepend_annotations ? strlen(prepend_annotations) : 0; + int ok = 1; + memarea_t *area = NULL; + tor_cert_t *ntor_cc_cert = NULL; + /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to + * parse that's covered by the hash. */ + int can_dl_again = 0; + crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL; + + tor_assert(!allow_annotations || !prepend_annotations); + + if (!end) { + end = s + strlen(s); + } + + /* point 'end' to a point immediately after the final newline. */ + while (end > s+2 && *(end-1) == '\n' && *(end-2) == '\n') + --end; + + area = memarea_new(); + tokens = smartlist_new(); + if (prepend_annotations) { + if (tokenize_string(area,prepend_annotations,NULL,tokens, + routerdesc_token_table,TS_NOCHECK)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing router descriptor (annotations)."); + goto err; + } + } + + start_of_annotations = s; + cp = tor_memstr(s, end-s, "\nrouter "); + if (!cp) { + if (end-s < 7 || strcmpstart(s, "router ")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "No router keyword found."); + goto err; + } + } else { + s = cp+1; + } + + if (start_of_annotations != s) { /* We have annotations */ + if (allow_annotations) { + if (tokenize_string(area,start_of_annotations,s,tokens, + routerdesc_token_table,TS_NOCHECK)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing router descriptor (annotations)."); + goto err; + } + } else { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Found unexpected annotations on router descriptor not " + "loaded from disk. Dropping it."); + goto err; + } + } + + if (router_get_router_hash(s, end - s, digest) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't compute router hash."); + goto err; + } + { + int flags = 0; + if (allow_annotations) + flags |= TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK; + if (prepend_annotations) + flags |= TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK|TS_NO_NEW_ANNOTATIONS; + + if (tokenize_string(area,s,end,tokens,routerdesc_token_table, flags)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing router descriptor."); + goto err; + } + } + + if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 2) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Impossibly short router descriptor."); + goto err; + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER); + const int router_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, tok); + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 5); + + router = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t)); + router->cert_expiration_time = TIME_MAX; + router->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1; + router->cache_info.annotations_len = s-start_of_annotations + prepend_len; + router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s; + if (cache_copy) { + size_t len = router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len + + router->cache_info.annotations_len; + char *signed_body = + router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(len+1); + if (prepend_annotations) { + memcpy(signed_body, prepend_annotations, prepend_len); + signed_body += prepend_len; + } + /* This assertion will always succeed. + * len == signed_desc_len + annotations_len + * == end-s + s-start_of_annotations + prepend_len + * == end-start_of_annotations + prepend_len + * We already wrote prepend_len bytes into the buffer; now we're + * writing end-start_of_annotations -NM. */ + tor_assert(signed_body+(end-start_of_annotations) == + router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body+len); + memcpy(signed_body, start_of_annotations, end-start_of_annotations); + router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body[len] = '\0'; + tor_assert(strlen(router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body) == len); + } + memcpy(router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + + router->nickname = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]); + if (!is_legal_nickname(router->nickname)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Router nickname is invalid"); + goto err; + } + if (!tor_inet_aton(tok->args[1], &in)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Router address is not an IP address."); + goto err; + } + router->addr = ntohl(in.s_addr); + + router->or_port = + (uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,65535,&ok,NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid OR port %s", escaped(tok->args[2])); + goto err; + } + router->dir_port = + (uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[4],10,0,65535,&ok,NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid dir port %s", escaped(tok->args[4])); + goto err; + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_BANDWIDTH); + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 3); + router->bandwidthrate = (int) + tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,1,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL); + + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "bandwidthrate %s unreadable or 0. Failing.", + escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + router->bandwidthburst = + (int) tor_parse_long(tok->args[1],10,0,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid bandwidthburst %s", escaped(tok->args[1])); + goto err; + } + router->bandwidthcapacity = (int) + tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid bandwidthcapacity %s", escaped(tok->args[1])); + goto err; + } + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, A_PURPOSE))) { + tor_assert(tok->n_args); + router->purpose = router_purpose_from_string(tok->args[0]); ++ if (router->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN) { ++ goto err; ++ } + } else { + router->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL; + } + router->cache_info.send_unencrypted = + (router->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) ? 1 : 0; + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_UPTIME))) { + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1); + router->uptime = tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,LONG_MAX,&ok,NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid uptime %s", escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + } + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIBERNATING))) { + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1); + router->is_hibernating + = (tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,LONG_MAX,NULL,NULL) != 0); + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_PUBLISHED); + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &router->cache_info.published_on) < 0) + goto err; + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY); + if (!crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(tok->key)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, + "Relay's onion key had invalid exponent."); + goto err; + } + router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(tok->key, &router->onion_pkey, + &router->onion_pkey_len); + crypto_pk_free(tok->key); + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY_NTOR))) { + curve25519_public_key_t k; + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1); + if (curve25519_public_from_base64(&k, tok->args[0]) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bogus ntor-onion-key in routerinfo"); + goto err; + } + router->onion_curve25519_pkey = + tor_memdup(&k, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_SIGNING_KEY); + router->identity_pkey = tok->key; + tok->key = NULL; /* Prevent free */ + if (crypto_pk_get_digest(router->identity_pkey, + router->cache_info.identity_digest)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't calculate key digest"); goto err; + } + + { + directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok, *cc_tap_tok, *cc_ntor_tok, + *master_key_tok; + ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519); + ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519); + master_key_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519); + cc_tap_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT); + cc_ntor_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT); + int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok + + !!cc_tap_tok + !!cc_ntor_tok; + if ((n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 4) || + (n_ed_toks == 4 && !router->onion_curve25519_pkey)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/" + "cross-certification support"); + goto err; + } + if (master_key_tok && !ed_sig_tok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor has ed25519 master key but no " + "certificate"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok) { + tor_assert(ed_cert_tok && cc_tap_tok && cc_ntor_tok); + const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok); + if (ed_cert_token_pos == -1 || router_token_pos == -1 || + (ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos + 1 && + ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos - 1)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on ntor-onion-key-crosscert " + "in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(cc_tap_tok->object_type, "CROSSCERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on onion-key-crosscert " + "in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "0") && + strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad sign bit on ntor-onion-key-crosscert"); + goto err; + } + int ntor_cc_sign_bit = !strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1"); + + uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN]; + const char *signed_start, *signed_end; + tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse( + (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body, + ed_cert_tok->object_size); + if (! cert) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + /* makes sure it gets freed. */ + router->cache_info.signing_key_cert = cert; + + if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING || + ! cert->signing_key_included) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + + if (master_key_tok) { + /* This token is optional, but if it's present, it must match + * the signature in the signing cert, or supplant it. */ + tor_assert(master_key_tok->n_args >= 1); + ed25519_public_key_t pkey; + if (ed25519_public_from_base64(&pkey, master_key_tok->args[0])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't parse ed25519 master key"); + goto err; + } + + if (fast_memneq(&cert->signing_key.pubkey, + pkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 master key does not match " + "key in certificate"); + goto err; + } + } + ntor_cc_cert = tor_cert_parse((const uint8_t*)cc_ntor_tok->object_body, + cc_ntor_tok->object_size); + if (!ntor_cc_cert) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert"); + goto err; + } + if (ntor_cc_cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID || + ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ntor_cc_cert->signed_key, &cert->signing_key)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid contents for ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert"); + goto err; + } + + ed25519_public_key_t ntor_cc_pk; + if (ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ntor_cc_pk, + router->onion_curve25519_pkey, + ntor_cc_sign_bit)<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error converting onion key to ed25519"); + goto err; + } + + if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "router ", + "\nrouter-sig-ed25519", + ' ', LOG_WARN, + &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of descriptor"); + goto err; + } + crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX, + strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX)); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start); + crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256)); + crypto_digest_free(d); + + ed25519_checkable_t check[3]; + int check_ok[3]; + time_t expires = TIME_MAX; + if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL, &expires) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert."); + goto err; + } + if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[1], + ntor_cc_cert, &ntor_cc_pk, &expires) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for ntor_cc_cert."); + goto err; + } + + if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[2].signature, + ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature"); + goto err; + } + check[2].pubkey = &cert->signed_key; + check[2].msg = d256; + check[2].len = DIGEST256_LEN; + + if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 3) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)"); + goto err; + } + + rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey, + router->onion_pkey_len); + if (check_tap_onion_key_crosscert( + (const uint8_t*)cc_tap_tok->object_body, + (int)cc_tap_tok->object_size, + rsa_pubkey, + &cert->signing_key, + (const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect TAP cross-verification"); + goto err; + } + + /* We check this before adding it to the routerlist. */ + router->cert_expiration_time = expires; + } + } + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_FINGERPRINT))) { + /* If there's a fingerprint line, it must match the identity digest. */ + char d[DIGEST_LEN]; + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + tor_strstrip(tok->args[0], " "); + if (base16_decode(d, DIGEST_LEN, + tok->args[0], strlen(tok->args[0])) != DIGEST_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode router fingerprint %s", + escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + if (tor_memneq(d,router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Fingerprint '%s' does not match identity digest.", + tok->args[0]); + goto err; + } + } + + { + const char *version = NULL, *protocols = NULL; + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_PLATFORM))) { + router->platform = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]); + version = tok->args[0]; + } + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_PROTO))) { + router->protocol_list = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]); + protocols = tok->args[0]; + } + + summarize_protover_flags(&router->pv, protocols, version); + } + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_CONTACT))) { + router->contact_info = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]); + } + + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_REJECT6) || + find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ACCEPT6)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting router with reject6/accept6 line: they crash " + "older Tors."); + goto err; + } + { + smartlist_t *or_addresses = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_OR_ADDRESS); + if (or_addresses) { + find_single_ipv6_orport(or_addresses, &router->ipv6_addr, + &router->ipv6_orport); + smartlist_free(or_addresses); + } + } + exit_policy_tokens = find_all_exitpolicy(tokens); + if (!smartlist_len(exit_policy_tokens)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "No exit policy tokens in descriptor."); + goto err; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(exit_policy_tokens, directory_token_t *, t, + if (router_add_exit_policy(router,t)<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Error in exit policy"); + goto err; + }); + policy_expand_private(&router->exit_policy); + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IPV6_POLICY)) && tok->n_args) { + router->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(tok->args[0]); + if (! router->ipv6_exit_policy) { + log_warn(LD_DIR , "Error in ipv6-policy %s", escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + } + + if (policy_is_reject_star(router->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) && + (!router->ipv6_exit_policy || + short_policy_is_reject_star(router->ipv6_exit_policy))) + router->policy_is_reject_star = 1; + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_FAMILY)) && tok->n_args) { + int i; + router->declared_family = smartlist_new(); + for (i=0;i<tok->n_args;++i) { + if (!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(tok->args[i])) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Illegal nickname %s in family line", + escaped(tok->args[i])); + goto err; + } + smartlist_add_strdup(router->declared_family, tok->args[i]); + } + } + + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO)) + router->caches_extra_info = 1; + + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS)) + router->allow_single_hop_exits = 1; + + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST))) { + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1); + if (strlen(tok->args[0]) == HEX_DIGEST_LEN) { + if (base16_decode(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN, + tok->args[0], HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid extra info digest"); + } + } else { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest %s", escaped(tok->args[0])); + } + + if (tok->n_args >= 2) { + if (digest256_from_base64(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256, + tok->args[1]) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest256 %s", + escaped(tok->args[1])); + } + } + } + + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR)) { + router->wants_to_be_hs_dir = 1; + } + + /* This router accepts tunnelled directory requests via begindir if it has + * an open dirport or it included "tunnelled-dir-server". */ + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_TUNNELLED) || router->dir_port > 0) { + router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests = 1; + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE); + + if (!router->or_port) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"or_port unreadable or 0. Failing."); + goto err; + } + + /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */ + can_dl_again = 1; + if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, router->identity_pkey, 0, + "router descriptor") < 0) + goto err; + + if (!router->platform) { + router->platform = tor_strdup("<unknown>"); + } + goto done; + + err: + dump_desc(s_dup, "router descriptor"); + routerinfo_free(router); + router = NULL; + done: + crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey); + tor_cert_free(ntor_cc_cert); + if (tokens) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t)); + smartlist_free(tokens); + } + smartlist_free(exit_policy_tokens); + if (area) { + DUMP_AREA(area, "routerinfo"); + memarea_drop_all(area); + } + if (can_dl_again_out) + *can_dl_again_out = can_dl_again; + return router; +} + +/** Parse a single extrainfo entry from the string s, ending at + * end. (If end is NULL, parse up to the end of s.) If + * cache_copy is true, make a copy of the extra-info document in the + * cache_info fields of the result. If routermap is provided, use it + * as a map from router identity to routerinfo_t when looking up signing keys. + * + * If can_dl_again_out is provided, set *can_dl_again_out to 1 + * if it's okay to try to download an extrainfo with this same digest again, + * and 0 if it isn't. (It might not be okay to download it again if part of + * the part covered by the digest is invalid.) + */ +extrainfo_t * +extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, + int cache_copy, struct digest_ri_map_t *routermap, + int *can_dl_again_out) +{ + extrainfo_t *extrainfo = NULL; + char digest[128]; + smartlist_t *tokens = NULL; + directory_token_t *tok; + crypto_pk_t *key = NULL; + routerinfo_t *router = NULL; + memarea_t *area = NULL; + const char *s_dup = s; + /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to + * parse that's covered by the hash. */ + int can_dl_again = 0; + + if (BUG(s == NULL)) + return NULL; + + if (!end) { + end = s + strlen(s); + } + + /* point 'end' to a point immediately after the final newline. */ + while (end > s+2 && *(end-1) == '\n' && *(end-2) == '\n') + --end; + + if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, end-s, digest) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't compute router hash."); + goto err; + } + tokens = smartlist_new(); + area = memarea_new(); + if (tokenize_string(area,s,end,tokens,extrainfo_token_table,0)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing extra-info document."); + goto err; + } + + if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 2) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Impossibly short extra-info document."); + goto err; + } + + /* XXXX Accept this in position 1 too, and ed identity in position 0. */ + tok = smartlist_get(tokens,0); + if (tok->tp != K_EXTRA_INFO) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Entry does not start with \"extra-info\""); + goto err; + } + + extrainfo = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t)); + extrainfo->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1; + if (cache_copy) + extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_memdup_nulterm(s,end-s); + extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s; + memcpy(extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + crypto_digest256((char*)extrainfo->digest256, s, end-s, DIGEST_SHA256); + + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 2); + if (!is_legal_nickname(tok->args[0])) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Bad nickname %s on \"extra-info\"",escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + strlcpy(extrainfo->nickname, tok->args[0], sizeof(extrainfo->nickname)); + if (strlen(tok->args[1]) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN || + base16_decode(extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN, + tok->args[1], HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid fingerprint %s on \"extra-info\"", + escaped(tok->args[1])); + goto err; + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_PUBLISHED); + if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &extrainfo->cache_info.published_on)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid published time %s on \"extra-info\"", + escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + + { + directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok; + ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519); + ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519); + int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok; + if (n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 2) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/" + "cross-certification support"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok) { + tor_assert(ed_cert_tok); + const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok); + if (ed_cert_token_pos != 1) { + /* Accept this in position 0 XXXX */ + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + + uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN]; + const char *signed_start, *signed_end; + tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse( + (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body, + ed_cert_tok->object_size); + if (! cert) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + /* makes sure it gets freed. */ + extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert = cert; + + if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING || + ! cert->signing_key_included) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + + if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "extra-info ", + "\nrouter-sig-ed25519", + ' ', LOG_WARN, + &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of extrainfo"); + goto err; + } + crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX, + strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX)); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start); + crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256)); + crypto_digest_free(d); + + ed25519_checkable_t check[2]; + int check_ok[2]; + if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert."); + goto err; + } + + if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[1].signature, + ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature"); + goto err; + } + check[1].pubkey = &cert->signed_key; + check[1].msg = d256; + check[1].len = DIGEST256_LEN; + + if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 2) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)"); + goto err; + } + /* We don't check the certificate expiration time: checking that it + * matches the cert in the router descriptor is adequate. */ + } + } + + /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */ + can_dl_again = 1; + + if (routermap && + (router = digestmap_get((digestmap_t*)routermap, + extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest))) { + key = router->identity_pkey; + } + + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE); + if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "SIGNATURE") || + tok->object_size < 128 || tok->object_size > 512) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad object type or length on extra-info signature"); + goto err; + } + + if (key) { + if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, key, 0, + "extra-info") < 0) + goto err; + + if (router) + extrainfo->cache_info.send_unencrypted = + router->cache_info.send_unencrypted; + } else { + extrainfo->pending_sig = tor_memdup(tok->object_body, + tok->object_size); + extrainfo->pending_sig_len = tok->object_size; + } + + goto done; + err: + dump_desc(s_dup, "extra-info descriptor"); + extrainfo_free(extrainfo); + extrainfo = NULL; + done: + if (tokens) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t)); + smartlist_free(tokens); + } + if (area) { + DUMP_AREA(area, "extrainfo"); + memarea_drop_all(area); + } + if (can_dl_again_out) + *can_dl_again_out = can_dl_again; + return extrainfo; +} + +/** Add an exit policy stored in the token tok to the router info in + * router. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ +static int +router_add_exit_policy(routerinfo_t *router, directory_token_t *tok) +{ + addr_policy_t *newe; + /* Use the standard interpretation of accept/reject *, an IPv4 wildcard. */ + newe = router_parse_addr_policy(tok, 0); + if (!newe) + return -1; + if (! router->exit_policy) + router->exit_policy = smartlist_new(); + + /* Ensure that in descriptors, accept/reject fields are followed by + * IPv4 addresses, and accept6/reject6 fields are followed by + * IPv6 addresses. Unlike torrcs, descriptor exit policies do not permit + * accept/reject followed by IPv6. */ + if (((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || tok->tp == K_REJECT6) && + tor_addr_family(&newe->addr) == AF_INET) + || + ((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT || tok->tp == K_REJECT) && + tor_addr_family(&newe->addr) == AF_INET6)) { + /* There's nothing the user can do about other relays' descriptors, + * so we don't provide usage advice here. */ + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Mismatch between field type and address type in exit " + "policy '%s'. Discarding entire router descriptor.", + tok->n_args == 1 ? tok->args[0] : ""); + addr_policy_free(newe); + return -1; + } + + smartlist_add(router->exit_policy, newe); + + return 0; +} + +/** Return a newly allocated smartlist of all accept or reject tokens in + * s. + */ +static smartlist_t * +find_all_exitpolicy(smartlist_t *s) +{ + smartlist_t *out = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s, directory_token_t *, t, + if (t->tp == K_ACCEPT || t->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || + t->tp == K_REJECT || t->tp == K_REJECT6) + smartlist_add(out,t)); + return out; +} + +/** Called on startup; right now we just handle scanning the unparseable + * descriptor dumps, but hang anything else we might need to do in the + * future here as well. + */ +void +routerparse_init(void) +{ + /* + * Check both if the sandbox is active and whether it's configured; no + * point in loading all that if we won't be able to use it after the + * sandbox becomes active. + */ + if (!(sandbox_is_active() || get_options()->Sandbox)) { + dump_desc_init(); + } +} + +/** Clean up all data structures used by routerparse.c at exit */ +void +routerparse_free_all(void) +{ + dump_desc_fifo_cleanup(); +}

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Fix #28525 changes file that is breaking CI.
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 519556ef2cb43b76967ea25372db093d41b6fc4a Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Mar 12 20:11:51 2019 +0200 Fix #28525 changes file that is breaking CI. --- changes/bug28525 | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug28525 b/changes/bug28525 index 392a9265e..988ffb219 100644 --- a/changes/bug28525 +++ b/changes/bug28525 @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (address selection): + o Minor features (address selection): - Make Tor aware of the RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT) IP range, which is the subnet 100.64.0.0/10. This is deployed by many ISPs as an alternative to RFC 1918 that does not break existing internal networks. This patch fixes security issues caused by RFC 6518 by blocking control ports on these addresses and warns users if client ports or ExtORPorts are listening on - a RFC 6598 address. Fixes bug 28525; bugfix on 0.4.1.1-alpha. Patch by - Neel Chauhan. + a RFC 6598 address. Closes ticket 28525. Patch by Neel Chauhan.

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Check return value of buf_move_to_buf for error.
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 0fa95308fe5fcce8842530fcae5a49188856e6ac Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> Date: Sun Mar 31 17:33:11 2019 +0200 Check return value of buf_move_to_buf for error. If the concatenation of connection buffer and the buffer of linked connection exceeds INT_MAX bytes, then buf_move_to_buf returns -1 as an error value. This value is currently casted to size_t (variable n_read) and will erroneously lead to an increasement of variable "max_to_read". This in turn can be used to call connection_buf_read_from_socket to store more data inside the buffer than expected and clogging the connection buffer. If the linked connection buffer was able to overflow INT_MAX, the call of buf_move_to_buf would have previously internally triggered an integer overflow, corrupting the state of the connection buffer. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> --- src/or/connection.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 791fd95c2..4f636eeb8 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3581,6 +3581,10 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, if (conn->linked_conn) { result = move_buf_to_buf(conn->inbuf, conn->linked_conn->outbuf, &conn->linked_conn->outbuf_flushlen); + if (BUG(result<0)) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "reading from linked connection buffer failed."); + return -1; + } } else { result = 0; }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Remove another needless typedef
by teor＠torproject.org 09 Aug '19

09 Aug '19

commit 684b396ce5c0a4d5ea70ec01a22d6d368819c873 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 20 14:34:44 2018 -0400 Remove another needless typedef --- src/or/rephist.h | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rephist.h b/src/or/rephist.h index c464b34f7..d2f6c66df 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.h +++ b/src/or/rephist.h @@ -117,9 +117,7 @@ extern uint32_t rephist_total_num; #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS extern int onion_handshakes_requested[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1]; extern int onion_handshakes_assigned[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1]; -typedef struct bw_array_t bw_array_t; extern bw_array_t *write_array; #endif #endif -

1 0