August 2019 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.3.5] OOM-purge the DNS cache one part at a time
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 37aae23945c45c459091b38699130a14466d33ef Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri May 17 10:03:41 2019 -0400 OOM-purge the DNS cache one part at a time Previously we purged it in 1-hour increments -- but one-hour is the maximum TTL for the cache! Now we do it in 25%-TTL increments. Fixes bug 29617; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. --- changes/ticket29617 | 4 ++++ src/feature/relay/dns.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket29617 b/changes/ticket29617 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4d50ea962 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket29617 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (out-of-memory handler): + - When purging the DNS cache because of an out-of-memory condition, + try purging just the older entries at first. Previously, we would + purge the whole thing. Fixes bug 29617; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/relay/dns.c b/src/feature/relay/dns.c index d3660c47e..cc9f4cf49 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/dns.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/dns.c @@ -2130,7 +2130,8 @@ dns_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes) current_size -= bytes_removed; total_bytes_removed += bytes_removed; - time_inc += 3600; /* Increase time_inc by 1 hour. */ + /* Increase time_inc by a reasonable fraction. */ + time_inc += (MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 4); } while (total_bytes_removed < min_remove_bytes); return total_bytes_removed;

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Fix a memory leak on failure to create keys directory.
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 85ff6f9114eb2d492d88ed55d01a69f7bafb10be Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 11 18:18:14 2019 -0400 Fix a memory leak on failure to create keys directory. Fixes bug 30148, which is also CID 1437429 and CID 1437454. Bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha, when separate key directories became a thing. --- changes/bug30148 | 4 ++++ src/or/routerkeys.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug30148 b/changes/bug30148 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7d0257e3f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug30148 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (memory leak): + - Avoid a minor memory leak that could occur on relays when + creating a keys directory failed. Fixes bug 30148; bugfix on + 0.3.3.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c index 43460da8c..dd19d28d0 100644 --- a/src/or/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) /* Check/Create the key directory */ if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0) - return -1; + goto err; char *fname; if (options->master_key_fname) { @@ -1403,4 +1403,3 @@ routerkeys_free_all(void) rsa_ed_crosscert = NULL; // redundant rsa_ed_crosscert_len = 0; } -

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Use a tor_abort_() wrapper in our util_bug.h macros
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 802ac8ad618a0674c26bb973a2277e07b20f8c7b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Apr 15 14:16:23 2019 -0400 Use a tor_abort_() wrapper in our util_bug.h macros Previously, our use of abort() would break anywhere that we didn't include stdlib.h. This was especially troublesome in case where tor_assert_nonfatal() was used with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL, since that one seldom gets tested. As an alternative, we could have just made this header include stdlib.h. But that seems bloaty. Fixes bug 30189; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha. --- changes/bug30189 | 4 ++++ src/lib/log/util_bug.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ src/lib/log/util_bug.h | 8 +++++--- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug30189 b/changes/bug30189 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f8c932a5f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug30189 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compilation, unusual configuration): + - Avoid failures when building with ALL_BUGS_ARE_FAILED due to + missing declarations of abort(), and prevent other such failures + in the future. Fixes bug 30189; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/lib/log/util_bug.c b/src/lib/log/util_bug.c index f42d2d2ab..c65a91ae9 100644 --- a/src/lib/log/util_bug.c +++ b/src/lib/log/util_bug.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "lib/string/printf.h" #include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS static void (*failed_assertion_cb)(void) = NULL; @@ -120,6 +121,19 @@ tor_bug_occurred_(const char *fname, unsigned int line, #endif } +/** + * Call the abort() function to kill the current process with a fatal + * error. + * + * (This is a separate function so that we declare it in util_bug.h without + * including stdlib in all the users of util_bug.h) + **/ +void +tor_abort_(void) +{ + abort(); +} + #ifdef _WIN32 /** Take a filename and return a pointer to its final element. This * function is called on __FILE__ to fix a MSVC nit where __FILE__ diff --git a/src/lib/log/util_bug.h b/src/lib/log/util_bug.h index 18d40bbf3..2a4d68127 100644 --- a/src/lib/log/util_bug.h +++ b/src/lib/log/util_bug.h @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ if (ASSERT_PREDICT_LIKELY_(expr)) { \ } else { \ tor_assertion_failed_(SHORT_FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, #expr); \ - abort(); \ + tor_abort_(); \ } STMT_END #endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) && defined(DISABLE_ASSERTS_IN_UNIT_TESTS) */ @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ STMT_BEGIN { \ tor_assertion_failed_(SHORT_FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, \ "line should be unreached"); \ - abort(); \ + tor_abort_(); \ } STMT_END /* Non-fatal bug assertions. The "unreached" variants mean "this line should @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ #define BUG(cond) \ (ASSERT_PREDICT_UNLIKELY_(cond) ? \ (tor_assertion_failed_(SHORT_FILE__,__LINE__,__func__,"!("#cond")"), \ - abort(), 1) \ + tor_abort_(), 1) \ : 0) #elif defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) && defined(DISABLE_ASSERTS_IN_UNIT_TESTS) #define tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached() STMT_NIL @@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ void tor_bug_occurred_(const char *fname, unsigned int line, const char *func, const char *expr, int once); +void tor_abort_(void) ATTR_NORETURN; + #ifdef _WIN32 #define SHORT_FILE__ (tor_fix_source_file(__FILE__)) const char *tor_fix_source_file(const char *fname);

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Prevent double free on huge files with 32 bit.
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 9ce0bdd22636a332399d65f280915e899a24b69b Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> Date: Sun Mar 31 12:27:55 2019 +0200 Prevent double free on huge files with 32 bit. The function compat_getdelim_ is used for tor_getline if tor is compiled on a system that lacks getline and getdelim. These systems should be very rare, considering that getdelim is POSIX. If this system is further a 32 bit architecture, it is possible to trigger a double free with huge files. If bufsiz has been already increased to 2 GB, the next chunk would be 4 GB in size, which wraps around to 0 due to 32 bit limitations. A realloc(*buf, 0) could be imagined as "free(*buf); return malloc(0);" which therefore could return NULL. The code in question considers that an error, but will keep the value of *buf pointing to already freed memory. The caller of tor_getline() would free the pointer again, therefore leading to a double free. This code can only be triggered in dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths with a huge measured bandwith list file on a system that actually allows to reach 2 GB of space through realloc. It is not possible to trigger this on Linux with glibc or other major *BSD systems even on unit tests, because these systems cannot reach so much memory due to memory fragmentation. This patch is effectively based on the penetration test report of cure53 for curl available at https://cure53.de/pentest-report_curl.pdf and explained under section "CRL-01-007 Double-free in aprintf() via unsafe size_t multiplication (Medium)". --- src/ext/getdelim.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/ext/getdelim.c b/src/ext/getdelim.c index 8254103ff..1c29baffd 100644 --- a/src/ext/getdelim.c +++ b/src/ext/getdelim.c @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ compat_getdelim_(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, int delimiter, FILE *fp) char *nbuf; size_t nbufsiz = *bufsiz * 2; ssize_t d = ptr - *buf; - if ((nbuf = raw_realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL) + if (nbufsiz < *bufsiz || + (nbuf = raw_realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL) return -1; *buf = nbuf; *bufsiz = nbufsiz;

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Do not warn about compatible OpenSSL upgrades
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 8c4e68438dd680b6b36f9b337b12d098b08db9d8 Author: Bernhard M. Wiedemann <bwiedemann(a)suse.de> Date: Mon Apr 15 13:57:24 2019 +0200 Do not warn about compatible OpenSSL upgrades When releasing OpenSSL patch-level maintenance updates, we do not want to rebuild binaries using it. And since they guarantee ABI stability, we do not have to. Without this patch, warning messages were produced that confused users: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1129411 Fixes bug 30190; bugfix on 0.2.4.2-alpha commit 7607ad2bec Signed-off-by: Bernhard M. Wiedemann <bwiedemann(a)suse.de> --- changes/bug30190 | 3 +++ src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug30190 b/changes/bug30190 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2352c3b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug30190 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (lib): + do not log a warning for OpenSSL versions that should be compatible + Fixes bug 30190; bugfix on 0.2.4.2-alpha diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c index 60e4ea795..c97815f9a 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c @@ -213,6 +213,14 @@ crypto_openssl_early_init(void) !strcmp(version_str, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) { log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "OpenSSL version matches version from headers " "(%lx: %s).", version_num, version_str); + } else if ((version_num & 0xffff0000) == + (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0xffff0000)) { + log_notice(LD_CRYPTO, + "We compiled with OpenSSL %lx: %s and we " + "are running with OpenSSL %lx: %s. " + "These two versions should be binary compatible.", + (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT, + version_num, version_str); } else { log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "OpenSSL version from headers does not match the " "version we're running with. If you get weird crashes, that "

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Move bandwidth-file-headers line to appear in the correct vote section
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 0ab4dc7ef7c6468c1d0d87a7cbc834217214f16b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Apr 29 13:43:50 2019 -0400 Move bandwidth-file-headers line to appear in the correct vote section Fixes bug 30316; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. --- changes/bug30316 | 4 ++++ src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug30316 b/changes/bug30316 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3e396318a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug30316 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (directory authority): + - Move the "bandwidth-file-headers" line in directory authority votes + so that it conforms to dir-spec.txt. Fixes bug 30316; bugfix on + 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c index 5e426b0f8..af8b3dc20 100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c @@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key, "known-flags %s\n" "flag-thresholds %s\n" "params %s\n" + "%s" /* bandwidth file headers */ "dir-source %s %s %s %s %d %d\n" "contact %s\n" "%s" /* shared randomness information */ - "%s" /* bandwidth file headers */ , v3_ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE ? "vote" : "opinion", methods, @@ -338,13 +338,12 @@ format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key, flags, flag_thresholds, params, + bw_headers_line ? bw_headers_line : "", voter->nickname, fingerprint, voter->address, fmt_addr32(addr), voter->dir_port, voter->or_port, voter->contact, shared_random_vote_str ? - shared_random_vote_str : "", - bw_headers_line ? - bw_headers_line : ""); + shared_random_vote_str : ""); tor_free(params); tor_free(flags);

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Make --list-modules imply --hush
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 0c451b31d2694c96ec20145e3b0e9b22cd54819d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 14 19:55:35 2019 -0400 Make --list-modules imply --hush --- src/app/main/main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/src/app/main/main.c b/src/app/main/main.c index c45c87d8d..67f2181cd 100644 --- a/src/app/main/main.c +++ b/src/app/main/main.c @@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ tor_init(int argc, char *argv[]) if (!strcmp(cl->key, "--version") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--digests") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--list-torrc-options") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--library-versions") || + !strcmp(cl->key, "--list-modules") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--hash-password") || !strcmp(cl->key, "-h") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--help")) { if (quiet < 1)

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs: Add changes file for #30454
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 9f52b875184098aef91bfdebcfd272a60b3b879e Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 9 13:23:14 2019 -0400 hs: Add changes file for #30454 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket30454 | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket30454 b/changes/ticket30454 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..77c45d0fe --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket30454 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + o Major bugfixes (hidden service v3): + - An intro point could try to send an INTRODUCE_ACK with a status code + that it wasn't able to encode leading to a hard assert() of the relay. + Fortunately, that specific code path can not be reached thus this issue + can't be triggered. We've consolidated the ABI values into trunnel now. + Fixes bug 30454; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + - HSv3 client will now be able to properly handle unknown status code from + a INTRODUCE_ACK cell (nack) even if they do not know it. The NACK + behavior will stay the same. This will allow us to extend status code if + we want in the future without breaking the normal client behavior.

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs: Get rid of duplicate hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit dcc1d8d15bf11ca1c4e2760bbc47d5fa3df3814d Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 9 13:01:15 2019 -0400 hs: Get rid of duplicate hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t This enum was the exact same as hs_intro_ack_status_t that was removed at the previous commit. It was used client side when parsing the INTRODUCE_ACK cell. Now, the entire code dealing with the INTRODUCE_ACK cell (both sending and receiving) have been modified to all use the same ABI defined in the trunnel introduce1 file. Finally, the client will default to the normal behavior when receiving an unknown NACK status code which is to note down that we've failed and re-extend to the next intro point. This way, unknown status code won't trigger a different behavior client side. Part of #30454. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_cell.c | 4 ++-- src/or/hs_cell.h | 8 -------- src/or/hs_client.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_cell.c b/src/or/hs_cell.c index 03273a44f..ba80653a7 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cell.c +++ b/src/or/hs_cell.c @@ -881,9 +881,9 @@ hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len) * do a special case. */ if (payload_len <= 1) { if (payload_len == 0) { - ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS; + ret = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; } else { - ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE; + ret = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID; } goto end; } diff --git a/src/or/hs_cell.h b/src/or/hs_cell.h index 958dde4ff..ed4af3c5a 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cell.h +++ b/src/or/hs_cell.h @@ -16,14 +16,6 @@ * 3.2.2 of the specification). Below this value, the cell must be padded. */ #define HS_CELL_INTRODUCE1_MIN_SIZE 246 -/* Status code of an INTRODUCE_ACK cell. */ -typedef enum { - HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS = 0x0000, /* Cell relayed to service. */ - HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE = 0x0001, /* Service ID not recognized */ - HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT = 0x0002, /* Bad message format */ - HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY = 0x0003, /* Can't relay cell to service */ -} hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t; - /* Onion key type found in the INTRODUCE1 cell. */ typedef enum { HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR = 1, diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index 8ecefc120..7d44952e4 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ #include "router.h" #include "routerset.h" +#include "trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h" + /* Return a human-readable string for the client fetch status code. */ static const char * fetch_status_to_string(hs_client_fetch_status_t status) @@ -1018,23 +1020,21 @@ handle_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, status = hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(payload, payload_len); switch (status) { - case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS: + case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS: ret = 0; handle_introduce_ack_success(circ); goto end; - case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE: - case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT: - case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY: + case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID: + case TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT: + /* It is possible that the intro point can send us an unknown status code + * for the NACK that we do not know about like a new code for instance. + * Just fallthrough so we can note down the NACK and re-extend. */ + default: handle_introduce_ack_bad(circ, status); /* We are going to see if we have to close the circuits (IP and RP) or we * can re-extend to a new intro point. */ ret = close_or_reextend_intro_circ(circ); break; - default: - log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unknown INTRODUCE_ACK status code %u from %s", - status, - safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit))); - break; } end:

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs: Define INTRODUCE_ACK status code in trunnel
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 590d97bc1065bdb93c70695c91de9c548ef802af Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 9 12:55:52 2019 -0400 hs: Define INTRODUCE_ACK status code in trunnel Remove the hs_intro_ack_status_t enum and move the value into trunnel. Only use these values from now on in the intro point code. Interestingly enough, the client side also re-define these values in hs_cell.h with the hs_cell_introd_ack_status_t enum. Next commit will fix that and force to use the trunnel ABI. Part of #30454 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 16 ++++++++-------- src/or/hs_intropoint.h | 7 ------- src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c | 13 +++++++------ src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h | 3 +++ src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel | 9 ++++++++- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c index e0ab27bd3..472e4afe9 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ hs_intro_received_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, * Return 0 on success else a negative value on error which will close the * circuit. */ static int -send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, hs_intro_ack_status_t status) +send_introduce_ack_cell(or_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t status) { int ret = -1; uint8_t *encoded_cell = NULL; @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, int ret = -1; or_circuit_t *service_circ; trn_cell_introduce1_t *parsed_cell; - hs_intro_ack_status_t status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; + uint16_t status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; tor_assert(client_circ); tor_assert(request); @@ -448,14 +448,14 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, "Rejecting %s INTRODUCE1 cell. Responding with NACK.", cell_size == -1 ? "invalid" : "truncated"); /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has a bad format. */ - status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; + status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; goto send_ack; } /* Once parsed validate the cell format. */ if (validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(parsed_cell) < 0) { /* Inform client that the INTRODUCE1 has bad format. */ - status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; + status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; goto send_ack; } @@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, "Responding with NACK.", safe_str(b64_key), client_circ->p_circ_id); /* Inform the client that we don't know the requested service ID. */ - status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID; + status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID; goto send_ack; } } @@ -485,12 +485,12 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to the service."); /* Inform the client that we can't relay the cell. Use the unknown ID * status code since it means that we do not know the service. */ - status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID; + status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID; goto send_ack; } /* Success! Send an INTRODUCE_ACK success status onto the client circuit. */ - status = HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; + status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS; ret = 0; send_ack: @@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ handle_introduce1(or_circuit_t *client_circ, const uint8_t *request, /* Circuit has been closed on failure of transmission. */ goto done; } - if (status != HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + if (status != TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS) { /* We just sent a NACK that is a non success status code so close the * circuit because it's not useful to keep it open. Remember, a client can * only send one INTRODUCE1 cell on a circuit. */ diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h index 014f9339a..1c2cc564a 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.h +++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.h @@ -19,13 +19,6 @@ typedef enum { HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519 = 0x02, } hs_intro_auth_key_type_t; -/* INTRODUCE_ACK status code. */ -typedef enum { - HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x0000, - HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID = 0x0001, - HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT = 0x0002, -} hs_intro_ack_status_t; - /* Object containing introduction point common data between the service and * the client side. */ typedef struct hs_intropoint_t { diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c index 358b355cd..b93add64c 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c @@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_new(void) trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(trn_cell_introduce_ack_t)); if (NULL == val) return NULL; + val->status = TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT; return val; } @@ -550,7 +551,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_get_status(const trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *inp) int trn_cell_introduce_ack_set_status(trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *inp, uint16_t val) { - if (! ((val == 0 || val == 1 || val == 2))) { + if (! ((val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT || val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS || val == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID))) { TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); return -1; } @@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_check(const trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj) return "Object was NULL"; if (obj->trunnel_error_code_) return "A set function failed on this object"; - if (! (obj->status == 0 || obj->status == 1 || obj->status == 2)) + if (! (obj->status == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT || obj->status == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS || obj->status == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID)) return "Integer out of bounds"; { const char *msg; @@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_encoded_len(const trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj) return -1; - /* Length of u16 status IN [0, 1, 2] */ + /* Length of u16 status IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID] */ result += 2; /* Length of struct trn_cell_extension extensions */ @@ -638,7 +639,7 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const trn_cel trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); #endif - /* Encode u16 status IN [0, 1, 2] */ + /* Encode u16 status IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID] */ trunnel_assert(written <= avail); if (avail - written < 2) goto truncated; @@ -687,11 +688,11 @@ trn_cell_introduce_ack_parse_into(trn_cell_introduce_ack_t *obj, const uint8_t * ssize_t result = 0; (void)result; - /* Parse u16 status IN [0, 1, 2] */ + /* Parse u16 status IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS, TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID] */ CHECK_REMAINING(2, truncated); obj->status = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr)); remaining -= 2; ptr += 2; - if (! (obj->status == 0 || obj->status == 1 || obj->status == 2)) + if (! (obj->status == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT || obj->status == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS || obj->status == TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID)) goto fail; /* Parse struct trn_cell_extension extensions */ diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h index fa218adc6..1bec014b6 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ struct trn_cell_extension_st; struct link_specifier_st; #define TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN 20 #define TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN 20 +#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS 0 +#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID 1 +#define TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT 2 #if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_TRN_CELL_INTRODUCE1) struct trn_cell_introduce1_st { uint8_t legacy_key_id[TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN]; diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel index 574382b16..6d924058f 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel @@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ extern struct link_specifier; const TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN = 20; const TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN = 20; +/* Introduce ACK status code. */ +const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x0000; +const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID = 0x0001; +const TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT = 0x0002; + /* INTRODUCE1 payload. See details in section 3.2.1. */ struct trn_cell_introduce1 { /* Always zeroed. MUST be checked explicitly by the caller. */ @@ -32,7 +37,9 @@ struct trn_cell_introduce1 { /* INTRODUCE_ACK payload. See details in section 3.2.2. */ struct trn_cell_introduce_ack { /* Status of introduction. */ - u16 status IN [0x0000, 0x0001, 0x0002]; + u16 status IN [TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_SUCCESS, + TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_UNKNOWN_ID, + TRUNNEL_HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_BAD_FORMAT]; /* Extension(s). Reserved fields. */ struct trn_cell_extension extensions;

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