August 2019 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.4.0] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1056' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit a92b05392e2e88357b0e2a1c31cfdb7e94406838 Merge: 224825e7e 5cbd71b97 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:51:35 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1056' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug29670 | 4 ++++ src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.0] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1065' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 789fdbed0586aeec5b312195a453c9ddaf8d58be Merge: a92b05392 3c3158f18 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:52:56 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1065' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug22619 | 3 +++ src/app/config/config.c | 2 +- src/test/test_config.c | 12 +++++------- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.0] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into maint-0.4.0
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 20943d00f10af11133d9ece90f1cbed658a21aed Merge: a1d8409ee d253b31ce Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 13:10:05 2019 +1000 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into maint-0.4.0 changes/bug22619 | 3 +++ changes/bug29034 | 5 +++++ changes/bug29670 | 4 ++++ changes/bug29875 | 11 +++++++++++ changes/bug30148 | 4 ++++ changes/bug30190 … [View More]

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[tor/release-0.4.1] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/741' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit a57e168caa21f9798be85adb56af726da7385810 Merge: 5df0b3662 9b7cdd23d Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:36:14 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/741' into maint-0.3.5 doc/tor.1.txt | 13 +++++++------ src/config/torrc.sample.in | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.0] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1077' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit d253b31cec04c35c551618b9b1ffa50ae4426303 Merge: 31fb2bceb a6399da59 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:54:35 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1077' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug29034 | 5 +++++ src/core/or/circuituse.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

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[tor/release-0.4.0] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1039' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 224825e7ee993da72b3027558ba263dae6fcae22 Merge: e5be03949 245dccb77 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:51:00 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1039' into maint-0.3.5 changes/ticket30454 | 10 ++++++++ src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c | 16 +++++++------ src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h | 13 ---------- src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 18 +++++++------- src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c |… [View More]

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[tor/release-0.4.1] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/937' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit ef345ab56d26e51f5d1f1a0b51e55a589465669b Merge: 9be65c440 85ff6f911 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:42:15 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/937' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug30148 | 4 ++++ src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --cc src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c index 876f908d4,000000000..f639fc91e mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.… [View More]c +++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c @@@ -1,740 -1,0 +1,740 @@@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file routerkeys.c + * + * \brief Functions and structures to handle generating and maintaining the + * set of keypairs necessary to be an OR. + * + * The keys handled here now are the Ed25519 keys that Tor relays use to sign + * descriptors, authenticate themselves on links, and identify one another + * uniquely. Other keys are maintained in router.c and rendservice.c. + * + * (TODO: The keys in router.c should go here too.) + */ + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "feature/relay/router.h" +#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h" +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" +#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" + +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" + +#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key" +#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master" + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include <unistd.h> +#endif + +static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL; +static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL; +static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL; +static tor_cert_t *signing_key_cert = NULL; +static tor_cert_t *link_cert_cert = NULL; +static tor_cert_t *auth_key_cert = NULL; + +static uint8_t *rsa_ed_crosscert = NULL; +static size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_len = 0; +static time_t rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration = 0; + +/** + * Running as a server: load, reload, or refresh our ed25519 keys and + * certificates, creating and saving new ones as needed. + * + * Return -1 on failure; 0 on success if the signing key was not replaced; + * and 1 on success if the signing key was replaced. + */ +int +load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) +{ + ed25519_keypair_t *id = NULL; + ed25519_keypair_t *sign = NULL; + ed25519_keypair_t *auth = NULL; + const ed25519_keypair_t *sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL; + const ed25519_keypair_t *use_signing = NULL; + const tor_cert_t *check_signing_cert = NULL; + tor_cert_t *sign_cert = NULL; + tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL; + int signing_key_changed = 0; + + // It is later than 1972, since otherwise there would be no C compilers. + // (Try to diagnose #22466.) + tor_assert_nonfatal(now >= 2 * 365 * 86400); + +#define FAIL(msg) do { \ + log_warn(LD_OR, (msg)); \ + goto err; \ + } while (0) +#define SET_KEY(key, newval) do { \ + if ((key) != (newval)) \ + ed25519_keypair_free(key); \ + key = (newval); \ + } while (0) +#define SET_CERT(cert, newval) do { \ + if ((cert) != (newval)) \ + tor_cert_free(cert); \ + cert = (newval); \ + } while (0) +#define HAPPENS_SOON(when, interval) \ + ((when) < now + (interval)) +#define EXPIRES_SOON(cert, interval) \ + (!(cert) || HAPPENS_SOON((cert)->valid_until, (interval))) + + /* XXXX support encrypted identity keys fully */ + + /* First try to get the signing key to see how it is. */ + { + char *fname = + options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_signing"); + sign = ed_key_init_from_file( + fname, + INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT| + INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT, + LOG_INFO, + NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options); + tor_free(fname); + check_signing_cert = sign_cert; + use_signing = sign; + } + + if (use_signing) { + /* We loaded a signing key with its certificate. */ + if (! master_signing_key) { + /* We didn't know one before! */ + signing_key_changed = 1; + } else if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&use_signing->pubkey, + &master_signing_key->pubkey) || + ! tor_memeq(use_signing->seckey.seckey, + master_signing_key->seckey.seckey, + ED25519_SECKEY_LEN)) { + /* We loaded a different signing key than the one we knew before. */ + signing_key_changed = 1; + } + } + + if (!use_signing && master_signing_key) { + /* We couldn't load a signing key, but we already had one loaded */ + check_signing_cert = signing_key_cert; + use_signing = master_signing_key; + } + + const int offline_master = + options->OfflineMasterKey && options->command != CMD_KEYGEN; + const int need_new_signing_key = + NULL == use_signing || + EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, 0) || + (options->command == CMD_KEYGEN && ! options->change_key_passphrase); + const int want_new_signing_key = + need_new_signing_key || + EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, options->TestingSigningKeySlop); + + /* We can only create a master key if we haven't been told that the + * master key will always be offline. Also, if we have a signing key, + * then we shouldn't make a new master ID key. */ + const int can_make_master_id_key = !offline_master && + NULL == use_signing; + + if (need_new_signing_key) { + log_notice(LD_OR, "It looks like I need to generate and sign a new " + "medium-term signing key, because %s. To do that, I " + "need to load%s the permanent master identity key. " + "If the master identity key was not moved or encrypted " + "with a passphrase, this will be done automatically and " + "no further action is required. Otherwise, provide the " + "necessary data using 'tor --keygen' to do it manually.", + (NULL == use_signing) ? "I don't have one" : + EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, 0) ? "the one I have is expired" : + "you asked me to make one with --keygen", + can_make_master_id_key ? " (or create)" : ""); + } else if (want_new_signing_key && !offline_master) { + log_notice(LD_OR, "It looks like I should try to generate and sign a " + "new medium-term signing key, because the one I have is " + "going to expire soon. To do that, I'm going to have to " + "try to load the permanent master identity key. " + "If the master identity key was not moved or encrypted " + "with a passphrase, this will be done automatically and " + "no further action is required. Otherwise, provide the " + "necessary data using 'tor --keygen' to do it manually."); + } else if (want_new_signing_key) { + log_notice(LD_OR, "It looks like I should try to generate and sign a " + "new medium-term signing key, because the one I have is " + "going to expire soon. But OfflineMasterKey is set, so I " + "won't try to load a permanent master identity key. You " + "will need to use 'tor --keygen' to make a new signing " + "key and certificate."); + } + + { + uint32_t flags = + (INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT| + INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG|INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR); + if (can_make_master_id_key) + flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE; + if (! need_new_signing_key) + flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK; + if (! want_new_signing_key || offline_master) + flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET; + if (offline_master) + flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET; + if (options->command == CMD_KEYGEN) + flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED; + + /* Check/Create the key directory */ + if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0) - return -1; ++ goto err; + + char *fname; + if (options->master_key_fname) { + fname = tor_strdup(options->master_key_fname); + flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME; + } else { + fname = options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_master_id"); + } + id = ed_key_init_from_file( + fname, + flags, + LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, options); + tor_free(fname); + if (!id) { + if (need_new_signing_key) { + if (offline_master) + FAIL("Can't load master identity key; OfflineMasterKey is set."); + else + FAIL("Missing identity key"); + } else { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Master public key was absent; inferring from " + "public key in signing certificate and saving to disk."); + tor_assert(check_signing_cert); + id = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*id)); + memcpy(&id->pubkey, &check_signing_cert->signing_key, + sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + fname = options_get_keydir_fname(options, + "ed25519_master_id_public_key"); + if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&id->pubkey, fname, "type0") < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Error while attempting to write master public key " + "to disk"); + tor_free(fname); + goto err; + } + tor_free(fname); + } + } + if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey))) + sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL; + else + sign_signing_key_with_id = id; + } + + if (master_identity_key && + !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&id->pubkey, &master_identity_key->pubkey)) { + FAIL("Identity key on disk does not match key we loaded earlier!"); + } + + if (need_new_signing_key && NULL == sign_signing_key_with_id) + FAIL("Can't load master key make a new signing key."); + + if (sign_cert) { + if (! sign_cert->signing_key_included) + FAIL("Loaded a signing cert with no key included!"); + if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey)) + FAIL("The signing cert we have was not signed with the master key " + "we loaded!"); + if (tor_cert_checksig(sign_cert, &id->pubkey, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "The signing cert we loaded was not signed " + "correctly: %s!", + tor_cert_describe_signature_status(sign_cert)); + goto err; + } + } + + if (want_new_signing_key && sign_signing_key_with_id) { + uint32_t flags = (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE| + INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE| + INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG| + INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT| + INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT); + char *fname = + options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_signing"); + ed25519_keypair_free(sign); + tor_cert_free(sign_cert); + sign = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, + flags, LOG_WARN, + sign_signing_key_with_id, now, + options->SigningKeyLifetime, + CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options); + tor_free(fname); + if (!sign) + FAIL("Missing signing key"); + use_signing = sign; + signing_key_changed = 1; + + tor_assert(sign_cert->signing_key_included); + tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey)); + tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signed_key, &sign->pubkey)); + } else if (want_new_signing_key) { + static ratelim_t missing_master = RATELIM_INIT(3600); + log_fn_ratelim(&missing_master, LOG_WARN, LD_OR, + "Signing key will expire soon, but I can't load the " + "master key to sign a new one!"); + } + + tor_assert(use_signing); + + /* At this point we no longer need our secret identity key. So wipe + * it, if we loaded it in the first place. */ + memwipe(id->seckey.seckey, 0, sizeof(id->seckey)); + + if (options->command == CMD_KEYGEN) + goto end; + + if (server_mode(options) && + (!rsa_ed_crosscert || + HAPPENS_SOON(rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration, 30*86400))) { + uint8_t *crosscert; + time_t expiration = now+6*30*86400; /* 6 months in the future. */ + ssize_t crosscert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(&id->pubkey, + get_server_identity_key(), + expiration, + &crosscert); + tor_free(rsa_ed_crosscert); + rsa_ed_crosscert_len = crosscert_len; + rsa_ed_crosscert = crosscert; + rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration = expiration; + } + + if (!current_auth_key || + signing_key_changed || + EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop)) { + auth = ed_key_new(use_signing, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, + now, + options->TestingAuthKeyLifetime, + CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, &auth_cert); + + if (!auth) + FAIL("Can't create auth key"); + } + + /* We've generated or loaded everything. Put them in memory. */ + + end: + if (! master_identity_key) { + SET_KEY(master_identity_key, id); + } else { + tor_free(id); + } + if (sign) { + SET_KEY(master_signing_key, sign); + SET_CERT(signing_key_cert, sign_cert); + } + if (auth) { + SET_KEY(current_auth_key, auth); + SET_CERT(auth_key_cert, auth_cert); + } + + return signing_key_changed; + err: + ed25519_keypair_free(id); + ed25519_keypair_free(sign); + ed25519_keypair_free(auth); + tor_cert_free(sign_cert); + tor_cert_free(auth_cert); + return -1; +} + +/** + * Retrieve our currently-in-use Ed25519 link certificate and id certificate, + * and, if they would expire soon (based on the time now, generate new + * certificates (without embedding the public part of the signing key inside). + * If force is true, always generate a new certificate. + * + * The signed_key from the current id->signing certificate will be used to + * sign the new key within newly generated X509 certificate. + * + * Returns -1 upon error. Otherwise, returns 0 upon success (either when the + * current certificate is still valid, or when a new certificate was + * successfully generated, or no certificate was needed). + */ +int +generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now, + int force) +{ + const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL; + tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL; + + if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL) { + if (!server_mode(options)) { + /* No need to make an Ed25519->Link cert: we are a client */ + return 0; + } + log_warn(LD_OR, "Can't get my x509 link cert."); + return -1; + } + + const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_); + + if (force == 0 && + link_cert_cert && + ! EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop) && + fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey, + DIGEST256_LEN)) { + return 0; + } + + ed25519_public_key_t dummy_key; + memcpy(dummy_key.pubkey, digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], DIGEST256_LEN); + + link_cert = tor_cert_create(get_master_signing_keypair(), + CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_LINK, + &dummy_key, + now, + options->TestingLinkCertLifetime, 0); + + if (link_cert) { + SET_CERT(link_cert_cert, link_cert); + } + return 0; +} + +#undef FAIL +#undef SET_KEY +#undef SET_CERT + +/** + * Return 1 if any of the following are true: + * + * - if one of our Ed25519 signing, auth, or link certificates would expire + * soon w.r.t. the time now, + * - if we do not currently have a link certificate, or + * - if our cached Ed25519 link certificate is not same as the one we're + * currently using. + * + * Otherwise, returns 0. + */ +int +should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now) +{ + if (!master_identity_key || + !master_signing_key || + !current_auth_key || + !link_cert_cert || + EXPIRES_SOON(signing_key_cert, options->TestingSigningKeySlop) || + EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop) || + EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop)) + return 1; + + const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL; + + if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL) + return 1; + + const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_); + + if (!fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], + link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey, + DIGEST256_LEN)) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#undef EXPIRES_SOON +#undef HAPPENS_SOON + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* Helper for unit tests: populate the ed25519 keys without saving or + * loading */ +void +init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key) +{ + routerkeys_free_all(); + +#define MAKEKEY(k) \ + k = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*k)); \ + if (ed25519_keypair_generate(k, 0) < 0) { \ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make a keypair"); \ + goto err; \ + } + MAKEKEY(master_identity_key); + MAKEKEY(master_signing_key); + MAKEKEY(current_auth_key); +#define MAKECERT(cert, signing, signed_, type, flags) \ + cert = tor_cert_create(signing, \ + type, \ + &signed_->pubkey, \ + time(NULL), 86400, \ + flags); \ + if (!cert) { \ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make a %s certificate!", #cert); \ + goto err; \ + } + + MAKECERT(signing_key_cert, + master_identity_key, master_signing_key, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, + CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + MAKECERT(auth_key_cert, + master_signing_key, current_auth_key, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, 0); + + if (generate_ed_link_cert(get_options(), time(NULL), 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make link certificate"); + goto err; + } + + rsa_ed_crosscert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert( + &master_identity_key->pubkey, + rsa_identity_key, + time(NULL)+86400, + &rsa_ed_crosscert); + + return; + + err: + routerkeys_free_all(); + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); +} +#undef MAKEKEY +#undef MAKECERT +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +/** + * Print the ISO8601-formated expiration for a certificate with + * some description to stdout. + * + * For example, for a signing certificate, this might print out: + * signing-cert-expiry: 2017-07-25 08:30:15 UTC + */ +static void +print_cert_expiration(const char *expiration, + const char *description) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "%s-cert-expiry: %s\n", description, expiration); +} + +/** + * Log when a certificate, cert, with some description and + * stored in a file named fname, is going to expire. + */ +static void +log_ed_cert_expiration(const tor_cert_t *cert, + const char *description, + const char *fname) { + char expiration[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + + if (BUG(!cert)) { /* If the specified key hasn't been loaded */ + log_warn(LD_OR, "No %s key loaded; can't get certificate expiration.", + description); + } else { + format_local_iso_time(expiration, cert->valid_until); + log_notice(LD_OR, "The %s certificate stored in %s is valid until %s.", + description, fname, expiration); + print_cert_expiration(expiration, description); + } +} + +/** + * Log when our master signing key certificate expires. Used when tor is given + * the --key-expiration command-line option. + * + * Returns 0 on success and 1 on failure. + */ +static int +log_master_signing_key_cert_expiration(const or_options_t *options) +{ + const tor_cert_t *signing_key; + char *fn = NULL; + int failed = 0; + time_t now = approx_time(); + + fn = options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_signing_cert"); + + /* Try to grab our cached copy of the key. */ + signing_key = get_master_signing_key_cert(); + + tor_assert(server_identity_key_is_set()); + + /* Load our keys from disk, if necessary. */ + if (!signing_key) { + failed = load_ed_keys(options, now) < 0; + signing_key = get_master_signing_key_cert(); + } + + /* If we do have a signing key, log the expiration time. */ + if (signing_key) { + log_ed_cert_expiration(signing_key, "signing", fn); + } else { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Could not load signing key certificate from %s, so " \ + "we couldn't learn anything about certificate expiration.", fn); + } + + tor_free(fn); + + return failed; +} + +/** + * Log when a key certificate expires. Used when tor is given the + * --key-expiration command-line option. + * + * If an command argument is given, which should specify the type of + * key to get expiry information about (currently supported arguments + * are "sign"), get info about that type of certificate. Otherwise, + * print info about the supported arguments. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +int +log_cert_expiration(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const char *arg = options->command_arg; + + if (!strcmp(arg, "sign")) { + return log_master_signing_key_cert_expiration(options); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "No valid argument to --key-expiration found!\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Currently recognised arguments are: 'sign'\n"); + + return -1; + } +} + +const ed25519_public_key_t * +get_master_identity_key(void) +{ + if (!master_identity_key) + return NULL; + return &master_identity_key->pubkey; +} + +/** Return true iff id is our Ed25519 master identity key. */ +int +router_ed25519_id_is_me(const ed25519_public_key_t *id) +{ + return id && master_identity_key && + ed25519_pubkey_eq(id, &master_identity_key->pubkey); +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* only exists for the unit tests, since otherwise the identity key + * should be used to sign nothing but the signing key. */ +const ed25519_keypair_t * +get_master_identity_keypair(void) +{ + return master_identity_key; +} +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +const ed25519_keypair_t * +get_master_signing_keypair(void) +{ + return master_signing_key; +} + +const struct tor_cert_st * +get_master_signing_key_cert(void) +{ + return signing_key_cert; +} + +const ed25519_keypair_t * +get_current_auth_keypair(void) +{ + return current_auth_key; +} + +const tor_cert_t * +get_current_link_cert_cert(void) +{ + return link_cert_cert; +} + +const tor_cert_t * +get_current_auth_key_cert(void) +{ + return auth_key_cert; +} + +void +get_master_rsa_crosscert(const uint8_t **cert_out, + size_t *size_out) +{ + *cert_out = rsa_ed_crosscert; + *size_out = rsa_ed_crosscert_len; +} + +/** Construct cross-certification for the master identity key with + * the ntor onion key. Store the sign of the corresponding ed25519 public key + * in *sign_out. */ +tor_cert_t * +make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(const curve25519_keypair_t *onion_key, + const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key, time_t now, time_t lifetime, + int *sign_out) +{ + tor_cert_t *cert = NULL; + ed25519_keypair_t ed_onion_key; + + if (ed25519_keypair_from_curve25519_keypair(&ed_onion_key, sign_out, + onion_key) < 0) + goto end; + + cert = tor_cert_create(&ed_onion_key, CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID, master_id_key, + now, lifetime, 0); + + end: + memwipe(&ed_onion_key, 0, sizeof(ed_onion_key)); + return cert; +} + +/** Construct and return an RSA signature for the TAP onion key to + * cross-certify the RSA and Ed25519 identity keys. Set len_out to its + * length. */ +uint8_t * +make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key, + const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key, + const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key, + int *len_out) +{ + uint8_t signature[PK_BYTES]; + uint8_t signed_data[DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN]; + + *len_out = 0; + if (crypto_pk_get_digest(rsa_id_key, (char*)signed_data) < 0) { + return NULL; + } + memcpy(signed_data + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + + int r = crypto_pk_private_sign(onion_key, + (char*)signature, sizeof(signature), + (const char*)signed_data, sizeof(signed_data)); + if (r < 0) + return NULL; + + *len_out = r; + + return tor_memdup(signature, r); +} + +void +routerkeys_free_all(void) +{ + ed25519_keypair_free(master_identity_key); + ed25519_keypair_free(master_signing_key); + ed25519_keypair_free(current_auth_key); + tor_cert_free(signing_key_cert); + tor_cert_free(link_cert_cert); + tor_cert_free(auth_key_cert); + tor_free(rsa_ed_crosscert); + + master_identity_key = master_signing_key = NULL; + current_auth_key = NULL; + signing_key_cert = link_cert_cert = auth_key_cert = NULL; + rsa_ed_crosscert = NULL; // redundant + rsa_ed_crosscert_len = 0; +} [View Less]

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[tor/release-0.4.1] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/911' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 955cf9620c68c17f6531e80f9f4a7fa7d9f0f479 Merge: 3287cae68 4dd96f744 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:40:08 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/911' into maint-0.3.5 changes/29241_diagnostic | 4 ++++ changes/bug29241 | 6 ++++++ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+)

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[tor/release-0.4.1] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/987' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 8ea0903222610b75e8b0c58297148267a299af31 Merge: 6ed56ee4e 0ab4dc7ef Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:45:32 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/987' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug30316 | 4 ++++ src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.1] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/951' into maint-0.3.5
by teor＠torproject.org 12 Aug '19

12 Aug '19

commit 2d4772dc47e6e7c43c3909540e73a139333fc7d6 Merge: ef345ab56 8c4e68438 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 12 09:43:37 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/951' into maint-0.3.5 changes/bug30190 | 3 +++ src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_openssl_mgt.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

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