June 2019 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Make the great grand practracker happy...
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit 05b6f73f12374e40e38bb1b35f3df593aa287610 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 13:33:10 2019 -0400 Make the great grand practracker happy... Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt index db9bf34e2..9073f2f1d 100644 --- a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt +++ b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt @@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ problem function-size /src/feature/client/addressmap.c:addressmap_rewrite() 112 problem function-size /src/feature/client/bridges.c:rewrite_node_address_for_bridge() 126 problem function-size /src/feature/client/circpathbias.c:pathbias_measure_close_rate() 108 problem function-size /src/feature/client/dnsserv.c:evdns_server_callback() 153 -problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c 3820 -problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits() 153 +problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c 3824 +problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits() 157 problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guard_parse_from_state() 246 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:handle_proxy_line() 108 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:parse_method_line_helper() 112

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[tor/maint-0.4.1] guard: Ignore marked for close circuit when changing state to open
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit 6a0763cd665e50174df5a7ea6ae0a27db7c9945f Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 13:32:45 2019 -0400 guard: Ignore marked for close circuit when changing state to open When we consider all circuits in "waiting for guard" state to be promoted to an "open" state, we were considering all circuits, even the one marked for close. This ultiamtely triggers a "circuit_has_opened()" called on the circuit that is marked for close which then leads to possible undesirable behaviors within a subsystem. For instance, the HS subsystem would be unable to find the authentication key of the introduction point circuit leading to a BUG() warning and a duplicate mark for close on the circuit. This commit also adds a unit test to make sure we never select marked for close circuits when upgrading its guard state from waiting for guard to open. Fixes #30871 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket30871 | 6 ++++++ src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 4 ++++ src/test/test_circuitbuild.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket30871 b/changes/ticket30871 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81c076bb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket30871 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Major bugfixes (circuit build, guard): + - When considering upgrading circuits from "waiting for guard" to "open", + always ignore the ones that are mark for close. Else, we can end up in + the situation where a subsystem is notified of that circuit opening but + still marked for close leading to undesirable behavior. Fixes bug 30871; + bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c index 4afcee202..54a9238d8 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c @@ -2611,6 +2611,10 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guard_handle_get(state->guard); if (!guard || guard->in_selection != gs) continue; + if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) { + /* Don't consider any marked for close circuits. */ + continue; + } smartlist_add(all_circuits, circ); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c index 47218a559..0c2309159 100644 --- a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE +#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "test/test.h" @@ -13,7 +15,11 @@ #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" + +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" /* Dummy nodes smartlist for testing */ static smartlist_t dummy_nodes; @@ -126,10 +132,51 @@ test_new_route_len_unhandled_exit(void *arg) UNMOCK(count_acceptable_nodes); } +static void +test_upgrade_from_guard_wait(void *arg) +{ + circuit_t *circ = NULL; + origin_circuit_t *orig_circ = NULL; + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + smartlist_t *list = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0); + orig_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + tt_assert(orig_circ); + + orig_circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t)); + + circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT); + + /* Put it in guard wait state. */ + guard = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*guard)); + guard->in_selection = get_guard_selection_info(); + + orig_circ->guard_state = + circuit_guard_state_new(guard, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD, + NULL); + + /* Mark the circuit for close. */ + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + tt_int_op(circ->marked_for_close, OP_NE, 0); + + /* We shouldn't pick the mark for close circuit. */ + list = circuit_find_circuits_to_upgrade_from_guard_wait(); + tt_assert(!list); + + done: + circuit_free(circ); + entry_guard_free_(guard); +} + struct testcase_t circuitbuild_tests[] = { { "noexit", test_new_route_len_noexit, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "safe_exit", test_new_route_len_safe_exit, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "unsafe_exit", test_new_route_len_unsafe_exit, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "unhandled_exit", test_new_route_len_unhandled_exit, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "upgrade_from_guard_wait", test_upgrade_from_guard_wait, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/master] guard: Ignore marked for close circuit when changing state to open
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit 16a0b7ed6779bf72a8a471c558a5e09084921d8b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 13:32:45 2019 -0400 guard: Ignore marked for close circuit when changing state to open When we consider all circuits in "waiting for guard" state to be promoted to an "open" state, we were considering all circuits, even the one marked for close. This ultiamtely triggers a "circuit_has_opened()" called on the circuit that is marked for close which then leads to possible undesirable behaviors within a subsystem. For instance, the HS subsystem would be unable to find the authentication key of the introduction point circuit leading to a BUG() warning and a duplicate mark for close on the circuit. This commit also adds a unit test to make sure we never select marked for close circuits when upgrading its guard state from waiting for guard to open. Fixes #30871 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket30871 | 6 ++++++ src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 4 ++++ src/test/test_circuitbuild.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket30871 b/changes/ticket30871 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81c076bb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket30871 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Major bugfixes (circuit build, guard): + - When considering upgrading circuits from "waiting for guard" to "open", + always ignore the ones that are mark for close. Else, we can end up in + the situation where a subsystem is notified of that circuit opening but + still marked for close leading to undesirable behavior. Fixes bug 30871; + bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c index 4afcee202..54a9238d8 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c @@ -2611,6 +2611,10 @@ entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guard_handle_get(state->guard); if (!guard || guard->in_selection != gs) continue; + if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) { + /* Don't consider any marked for close circuits. */ + continue; + } smartlist_add(all_circuits, circ); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c index 47218a559..196d8cd35 100644 --- a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE +#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "test/test.h" @@ -13,7 +15,11 @@ #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" + +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" /* Dummy nodes smartlist for testing */ static smartlist_t dummy_nodes; @@ -126,10 +132,51 @@ test_new_route_len_unhandled_exit(void *arg) UNMOCK(count_acceptable_nodes); } +static void +test_upgrade_from_guard_wait(void *arg) +{ + circuit_t *circ = NULL; + origin_circuit_t *orig_circ = NULL; + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + smartlist_t *list = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0); + orig_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + tt_assert(orig_circ); + + orig_circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t)); + + circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT); + + /* Put it in guard wait state. */ + guard = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*guard)); + guard->in_selection = get_guard_selection_info(); + + orig_circ->guard_state = + circuit_guard_state_new(guard, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD, + NULL); + + /* Mark the circuit for close. */ + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + tt_int_op(circ->marked_for_close, OP_NE, 0); + + /* We shouldn't pick the mark for close circuit. */ + list = circuit_find_circuits_to_upgrade_from_guard_wait(); + tt_assert(!list); + + done: + circuit_free(circ); + entry_guard_free_(guard); +} + struct testcase_t circuitbuild_tests[] = { { "noexit", test_new_route_len_noexit, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "safe_exit", test_new_route_len_safe_exit, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "unsafe_exit", test_new_route_len_unsafe_exit, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "unhandled_exit", test_new_route_len_unhandled_exit, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "upgrade_from_guard_wait", test_upgrade_from_guard_wait, TT_FORK, + &helper_pubsub_setup, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[translation/tba-torbrowserstringsdtd_completed] Update translations for tba-torbrowserstringsdtd_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit cc26f08d3ded45c22f51e74c0c9c6f6676bc6bc5 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 26 13:48:09 2019 +0000 Update translations for tba-torbrowserstringsdtd_completed --- ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd b/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd index 3c1d1f892..a870abc29 100644 --- a/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd +++ b/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd @@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ <!ENTITY pref_tor_select_a_bridge_title "ხიდის მითითება"> <!ENTITY pref_tor_provide_a_bridge_title "გადამცემი ხიდის მიწოდება"> -<!ENTITY pref_category_tor_network_summary "Tor-ბრაუზერით უკავშირდებით Tor-ქსელს, რომლის მუშაობასაც უზრუნველყოფს ათასობით მოხალისე. დაგეხმარებათ ეს საშუალებები?"> +<!ENTITY pref_category_tor_network_summary "Tor-ბრაუზერი გაკავშირებთ Tor-ქსელთან, რომლის მუშაობასაც უზრუნველყოფს ათასობით მოხალისე მთელი მსოფლიოდან. შეიძლება მოცემული საშუალებები გამოგადგეთ?"> <!ENTITY pref_category_tor_bridge_summary "ხიდები წარმოადგენს აღუნუსხავ გადამცემებს, რომელთა გამოყენებაც ართულებს Tor-ქსელთან კავშირის შეზღუდვას. იმისდა მიხედვით, თუ როგორ ზღუდავს ცალკეული ქვეყანა Tor-ს, გარკვეული სახის გადამცემი ხიდები, მხოლოდ შესაბამის ქვეყნებში იმუშავებს და არა სხვაგან."> -<!ENTITY pref_choice_tor_bridges_enabled_title "ინტერნეტი ცენზურის ქვეშაა აქ"> +<!ENTITY pref_choice_tor_bridges_enabled_title "ქსელი ცენზურის ქვეშაა"> <!ENTITY pref_choice_tor_bridges_enabled_summary "შეეხეთ ხიდის გასამართად Tor-თან დაკავშირებისთვის"> <!ENTITY pref_tor_bridges_provide_manual_button_title "ნაცნობი გადამცემი ხიდის მითითება">

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[translation/tba-torbrowserstringsdtd] Update translations for tba-torbrowserstringsdtd
by translation＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit ef707f368932d3a793dea9a3fb2a0967723d24b5 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 26 13:48:02 2019 +0000 Update translations for tba-torbrowserstringsdtd --- ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd b/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd index 3c1d1f892..a870abc29 100644 --- a/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd +++ b/ka/torbrowser_strings.dtd @@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ <!ENTITY pref_tor_select_a_bridge_title "ხიდის მითითება"> <!ENTITY pref_tor_provide_a_bridge_title "გადამცემი ხიდის მიწოდება"> -<!ENTITY pref_category_tor_network_summary "Tor-ბრაუზერით უკავშირდებით Tor-ქსელს, რომლის მუშაობასაც უზრუნველყოფს ათასობით მოხალისე. დაგეხმარებათ ეს საშუალებები?"> +<!ENTITY pref_category_tor_network_summary "Tor-ბრაუზერი გაკავშირებთ Tor-ქსელთან, რომლის მუშაობასაც უზრუნველყოფს ათასობით მოხალისე მთელი მსოფლიოდან. შეიძლება მოცემული საშუალებები გამოგადგეთ?"> <!ENTITY pref_category_tor_bridge_summary "ხიდები წარმოადგენს აღუნუსხავ გადამცემებს, რომელთა გამოყენებაც ართულებს Tor-ქსელთან კავშირის შეზღუდვას. იმისდა მიხედვით, თუ როგორ ზღუდავს ცალკეული ქვეყანა Tor-ს, გარკვეული სახის გადამცემი ხიდები, მხოლოდ შესაბამის ქვეყნებში იმუშავებს და არა სხვაგან."> -<!ENTITY pref_choice_tor_bridges_enabled_title "ინტერნეტი ცენზურის ქვეშაა აქ"> +<!ENTITY pref_choice_tor_bridges_enabled_title "ქსელი ცენზურის ქვეშაა"> <!ENTITY pref_choice_tor_bridges_enabled_summary "შეეხეთ ხიდის გასამართად Tor-თან დაკავშირებისთვის"> <!ENTITY pref_tor_bridges_provide_manual_button_title "ნაცნობი გადამცემი ხიდის მითითება">

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[tor/master] Improve comment in .travis.yml
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit 84f0f15066b10581c673525fe3c41d32511437e1 Author: rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> Date: Sun Jun 23 14:12:05 2019 +0300 Improve comment in .travis.yml --- .travis.yml | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml index 1901d950a..fe34fac25 100644 --- a/.travis.yml +++ b/.travis.yml @@ -191,8 +191,9 @@ install: - python --version ## run stem tests if they are enabled. - if [[ "$TEST_STEM" != "" ]]; then pushd stem; python -c "from stem import stem; print(stem.__version__);"; git log -1; popd; fi - ## We don't want Tor tests to depends on default configuration file at - ## ~/.torrc. So we put some random bytes in there, to make sure it doesn't. + ## We don't want Tor tests to depend on default configuration file at + ## ~/.torrc. So we put some random bytes in there, to make sure we get build + ## failures in case Tor is reading it during CI jobs. - dd ibs=1 count=1024 if=/dev/urandom > ~/.torrc script:

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[tor/master] On Travis, put random data in ~/.torrc
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit f9de9052e1e63401bb0d824eeb3cf0677b6dfd7d Author: rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> Date: Sun Jun 23 13:31:47 2019 +0300 On Travis, put random data in ~/.torrc --- .travis.yml | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml index 5d5d95f6b..1901d950a 100644 --- a/.travis.yml +++ b/.travis.yml @@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ install: - python --version ## run stem tests if they are enabled. - if [[ "$TEST_STEM" != "" ]]; then pushd stem; python -c "from stem import stem; print(stem.__version__);"; git log -1; popd; fi + ## We don't want Tor tests to depends on default configuration file at + ## ~/.torrc. So we put some random bytes in there, to make sure it doesn't. + - dd ibs=1 count=1024 if=/dev/urandom > ~/.torrc script: # Skip test_rebind on macOS

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1127'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit 167dd097e04936ea11d319723a2989d293b009b1 Merge: 72ef4f43d 84f0f1506 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 26 09:40:01 2019 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1127' .travis.yml | 4 ++++ changes/ticket30102 | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

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[tor/master] Add changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit 1d504a408d129bf561138360a5d727b37c0e29a9 Author: rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> Date: Sun Jun 23 13:38:49 2019 +0300 Add changes file --- changes/ticket30102 | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket30102 b/changes/ticket30102 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c8b1148da --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket30102 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (continuous integration): + - When running CI builds on Travis, put some random data in ~/.torrc, + to make sure no tests are dependent on default Tor configuration. + Resolves issue 30102.

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[tor-browser-build/master] Bug 30863: Fix tor-android-service and tor-onion-proxy-library filenames
by gk＠torproject.org 26 Jun '19

26 Jun '19

commit a27f6be9a921119cb5e7869da9b891c359651bda Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 12 12:03:54 2019 +0200 Bug 30863: Fix tor-android-service and tor-onion-proxy-library filenames --- projects/tor-android-service/config | 2 +- projects/tor-onion-proxy-library/config | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/projects/tor-android-service/config b/projects/tor-android-service/config index 2290c6e..ec0d4b0 100644 --- a/projects/tor-android-service/config +++ b/projects/tor-android-service/config @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # vim: filetype=yaml sw=2 version: '[% c("abbrev") %]' -filename: '[% project %]-[% c("version") %]-[% c("var/build_id") %].tar.gz' +filename: '[% project %]-[% c("version") %]-[% c("var/build_id") %]' git_hash: d9b049c8cee225b4e7bb6f0191093f543d0f9f65 git_url: https://git.torproject.org/tor-android-service.git git_submodule: 1 diff --git a/projects/tor-onion-proxy-library/config b/projects/tor-onion-proxy-library/config index 9db33bd..0f24402 100644 --- a/projects/tor-onion-proxy-library/config +++ b/projects/tor-onion-proxy-library/config @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # vim: filetype=yaml sw=2 version: '[% c("abbrev") %]' -filename: '[% project %]-[% c("version") %]-[% c("var/build_id") %].tar.gz' +filename: '[% project %]-[% c("version") %]-[% c("var/build_id") %]' git_hash: 27df20a5cb107a009db009df4aaef000a6e78e2e git_url: https://github.com/sisbell/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library.git git_submodule: 1

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