tor-commits September 2018

tor-commits@lists.torproject.org

17 participants
3230 discussions

[tor/master] Fix minor memleak in edge-case of crypto_rsa.c function.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 43324b0e4d9835ca7bab1d8e6bc4544a708b8ea4 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Sep 18 14:01:15 2018 +0300 Fix minor memleak in edge-case of crypto_rsa.c function. --- src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c index c3c6db6c3..a510e1296 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.c @@ -554,8 +554,10 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, char *buf = read_file_to_str(keyfile, 0, &st); if (!buf) return -1; - if (st.st_size > MAX_PRIVKEY_FILE_LEN) + if (st.st_size > MAX_PRIVKEY_FILE_LEN) { + tor_free(buf); return -1; + } int rv = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, buf, (ssize_t)st.st_size);

1 0

[tor/master] Bump to 0.3.5.1-alpha-dev
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 7ca0f66b8234d32657f8866da46289533dba1750 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 18 07:52:27 2018 -0400 Bump to 0.3.5.1-alpha-dev --- configure.ac | 2 +- contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index d36c9c163..a77c6bb05 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_PREREQ([2.63]) -AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.5.1-alpha]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.3.5.1-alpha-dev]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/app/main/tor_main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index f1d742e9e..9297d592a 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.3.5.1-alpha" +!define VERSION "0.3.5.1-alpha-dev" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index 112160979..457cfa794 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.3.5.1-alpha" +#define VERSION "0.3.5.1-alpha-dev"

1 0

[translation/torbutton-browseronboardingproperties] Update translations for torbutton-browseronboardingproperties
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 1762ca9a45e662940b046d28d563caa7a0dc7f35 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 18 11:48:14 2018 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-browseronboardingproperties --- da/browserOnboarding.properties | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/da/browserOnboarding.properties b/da/browserOnboarding.properties index 7ebc3b548..5e2c22f55 100644 --- a/da/browserOnboarding.properties +++ b/da/browserOnboarding.properties @@ -9,32 +9,32 @@ onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.button=Start nu onboarding.tour-tor-privacy=Privatliv onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.title=Sæt en stopper for trackere og snoopers. -onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.description=Tor Browser isolates cookies and deletes your browser history after your session. These modifications ensure your privacy and security are protected in the browser. Click ‘Tor Network’ to learn how we protect you on the network level. +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.description=Tor Browser isolerer cookies og sletter din browserhistorik efter din session. Ændringerne sikre dit privatliv, og sikkerheden beskyttes i browseren. Klik på ‘Tor-netværk’ for at lære hvordan vi beskytter dig på netværksniveauet. onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.button=Gå til Tor-netværk onboarding.tour-tor-network=Tor-netværk onboarding.tour-tor-network.title=Rejs på et decentraliseret netværk. -onboarding.tour-tor-network.description=Tor Browser connects you to the Tor network run by thousands of volunteers around the world. Unlike a VPN, there’s no one point of failure or centralized entity you need to trust in order to enjoy the internet privately. +onboarding.tour-tor-network.description=Tor Browser opretter forbindelse for dig til Tor-netværket, som køres af tusindvis af frivillige verden over. I modsætning til en VPN, er der ikke ét punkt som kan få det til at fejle, eller centraliseret indgang som du skal have tillid til for at bruge internettet privat. onboarding.tour-tor-network.button=Gå til kredsløb-visning onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display=Kredsløb-visning onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.title=Se din sti. -onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.description=For each domain you visit, your traffic is relayed and encrypted in a circuit across three Tor relays around the world. No website knows where you are connecting from. You can request a new circuit by clicking ‘New Circuit for this Site’ on our Circuit Display. +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.description=Hver gang du besøger et domæne, videresendes og krypteres din trafik i et kredsløb hen over tre Tor-relæ verden over. Webstederne kan ikke se hvor du opretter forbindelse fra. Du kan anmode om et nyt kredsløb ved at klikke på ‘Nyt kredsløb til dette sted’ på vores kredsløb-display. onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.button=Se min sti onboarding.tour-tor-security=Sikkerhed onboarding.tour-tor-security.title=Vælg din oplevelse. -onboarding.tour-tor-security.description=We also provide you with additional settings for bumping up your browser security. Our Security Settings allow you to block elements that could be used to attack your computer. Click below to see what the different options do. +onboarding.tour-tor-security.description=Vi giver dig også yderligere sikkerhedsindstillinger for at øge din browsersikkerhed. Vores sikkerhedsindstillinger giver dig mulighed for at blokere elementer der kan bruges til at angribe din computer. Klik nedenfor for at se hvad de forskellige valgmuligheder gør. onboarding.tour-tor-security.button=Gennemgå indstillinger onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences=Oplevelesestips onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.title=Forvent nogen forskelle. -onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.description=With all the security and privacy features provided by Tor, your experience while browsing the internet may be a little different. Things may be a bit slower, and depending on your security level, some elements may not work or load. You may also be asked to prove you are a human and not a robot. +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.description=Med alle de sikkerheds- og privatlivsfunktionaliteter som gives af Tor, kan din oplevelse på internettet være lidt anderledes. Ting man være lidt langsommere, og afhængig af dit sikkerhedsniveau, kan det være at nogle elementer ikke virker eller ikke indlæses. Du bliver måske også spurgt om du er et menneske eller en robot. onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.button=Se FAQ'er onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services=Onion-tjenester onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.title=Vær ekstra beskyttet. -onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.description=Onion services are sites that end with a .onion that provide extra protections to publishers and visitors, including added safeguards against censorship. Onion services allow anyone to provide content and services anonymously. Click below to visit the DuckDuckGo onion site. +onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.description=Onion-tjenester er steder som slutter med .onion som giver yderligere beskyttelse til udgivere og besøgende, inklusiv tilføjelse af sikkhedsforanstaltninger mod censur. Onion-tjenester giver alle mulighed for at levere indhold og tjenester anonymt. Klik nedenfor for at besøge DuckDuckGo's onion-sted. onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.button=Besøg et onion # Circuit Display onboarding. @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ onboarding.tor-circuit-display.two-of-three=2 af 3 onboarding.tor-circuit-display.three-of-three=3 af 3 onboarding.tor-circuit-display.intro.title=Hvordan virker kredsløb? -onboarding.tor-circuit-display.intro.msg=Circuits are made up of randomly assigned relays, which are computers around the world configured to forward Tor traffic. Circuits allow you to browse privately and to connect to onion services. +onboarding.tor-circuit-display.intro.msg=Kredsløb består af relæ som er tildelt tilfældigt, hvilket er computere verden over som er konfigureret til at videresende Tor-trafik. Kredskøb giv dig mulighed for at bruge internettet privat og at oprette forbindelse til onion-tjenester. onboarding.tor-circuit-display.diagram.title=Kredsløb-visning onboarding.tor-circuit-display.diagram.msg=This diagram shows the relays that make up the circuit for this website. To prevent linking of activity across different sites, each website gets a different circuit.

1 0

[translation/https_everywhere_completed] Update translations for https_everywhere_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 3c4f5da2bd8616ea9ea95c51708a98e355fed4f2 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 18 11:45:35 2018 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere_completed --- da/https-everywhere.dtd | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/da/https-everywhere.dtd b/da/https-everywhere.dtd index 6e704c873..b83d4a589 100644 --- a/da/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/da/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enableMixedRulesets "Aktivér blandet indhold-regelsæt"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.showDevtoolsTab "Vis Devtools-faneblad"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.autoUpdateRulesets "Automatisk opdatering af regelsæt"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.disabledUrlsListed "HTTPS Everywhere-steder deaktiveret"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updateChannelsWarning "Advarsel: Tilføjelse af opdateringskanaler kan gøre at angribere kan kidnappe din browser. Rediger kun sektionen hvis du ved hvad du gør!"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.addUpdateChannel "Tilføj opdateringskanal"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enterUpdateChannelName "Indtast navn på opdateringskanal"> @@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules_description "Sørg for at forbindelserne krypteres til følgende websteder:"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules "Eksperimentelle regler"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules_description "Kan give anledning til advarsler og fejl. Deaktiveret som standardindstilling."> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.disable_on_this_site "Deaktivér HTTPS Everywhere på dette sted"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.enable_on_this_site "Aktivér HTTPS Everywhere på dette sted"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_rule "Tilføj en regel til webstedet"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_new_rule "Tilføj en ny regel til webstedet"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.always_https_for_host "Brug altid HTTPS til værtsnavnet">

1 0

[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 6475570fcd23ce4c6f34308deefaf48ea07296c4 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 18 11:45:28 2018 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- da/https-everywhere.dtd | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/da/https-everywhere.dtd b/da/https-everywhere.dtd index 71a582c93..b83d4a589 100644 --- a/da/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/da/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enableMixedRulesets "Aktivér blandet indhold-regelsæt"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.showDevtoolsTab "Vis Devtools-faneblad"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.autoUpdateRulesets "Automatisk opdatering af regelsæt"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.disabledUrlsListed "HTTPS Everywhere Sites Disabled"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.disabledUrlsListed "HTTPS Everywhere-steder deaktiveret"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.updateChannelsWarning "Advarsel: Tilføjelse af opdateringskanaler kan gøre at angribere kan kidnappe din browser. Rediger kun sektionen hvis du ved hvad du gør!"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.addUpdateChannel "Tilføj opdateringskanal"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.options.enterUpdateChannelName "Indtast navn på opdateringskanal"> @@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.stable_rules_description "Sørg for at forbindelserne krypteres til følgende websteder:"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules "Eksperimentelle regler"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.experimental_rules_description "Kan give anledning til advarsler og fejl. Deaktiveret som standardindstilling."> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.disable_on_this_site "Disable HTTPS Everywhere on this site"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.enable_on_this_site "Enable HTTPS Everywhere on this site"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.disable_on_this_site "Deaktivér HTTPS Everywhere på dette sted"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.enable_on_this_site "Aktivér HTTPS Everywhere på dette sted"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_rule "Tilføj en regel til webstedet"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.add_new_rule "Tilføj en ny regel til webstedet"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.chrome.always_https_for_host "Brug altid HTTPS til værtsnavnet">

1 0

[webwml/master] 0.3.5.1-alpha is released.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 356b111267fea3e3a4ad86737c39f6790f2404a9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 18 07:34:42 2018 -0400 0.3.5.1-alpha is released. --- Makefile | 2 +- include/versions.wmi | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 771529e0..760297cd 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ # website component, and set it to needs_review. export STABLETAG=tor-0.3.4.8 -export DEVTAG=tor-0.3.4.8 +export DEVTAG=tor-0.3.5.1-alpha WMLBASE=. SUBDIRS=docs eff projects press about download getinvolved donate docs/torbutton diff --git a/include/versions.wmi b/include/versions.wmi index 8e2a0040..74d5f443 100644 --- a/include/versions.wmi +++ b/include/versions.wmi @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ <define-tag version-stable whitespace=delete>0.3.4.8</define-tag> - +<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.3.5.1-alpha</define-tag> <define-tag version-torbrowserdevelopbranch whitespace=delete>maint-7.5</define-tag>

1 0

[torbutton/master] Bug 21263: Remove outdated information from the README
by gk＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 02f3a9334acb1b1b72ee27c3e81013f8706f20d1 Author: traumschule <traumschuleriebau(a)riseup.net> Date: Sat Sep 15 15:43:15 2018 +0200 Bug 21263: Remove outdated information from the README --- README | 155 ++++++++--------------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-) diff --git a/README b/README index 3b3af2d6..f4dc12d4 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,144 +1,23 @@ -Torbutton is a 1-click way for Firefox users to enable or disable the -browser's use of Tor. It adds a panel to the statusbar that says "Tor -Enabled" (in green) or "Tor Disabled" (in red). The user may click on the -panel to toggle the status. If the user (or some other extension) changes -the proxy settings, the change is automatically reflected in the -statusbar. +Torbutton comes pre-installed with Tor Browser and we urge you not to change it. +We do not recommend to install it to Firefox because this is not a sufficient +way to surf anonymously. -Some users may prefer a toolbar button instead of a statusbar panel. Such -a button is included, and one adds it to the toolbar by right-clicking on -the desired toolbar, selecting "Customize...", and then dragging the -Torbutton icon onto the toolbar. There is an option in the preferences to -hide the statusbar panel (Tools->Extensions, select Torbutton, and click -on Preferences). +Torbutton guarantees that DNS requests are sent through the Tor instance that +comes with Tor Browser. You should not change the proxy settings. -Newer Firefoxes have the ability to send DNS resolves through the socks -proxy, and Torbutton will make use of this feature if it is available in -your version of Firefox. +It’s strongly discouraged to install new Add-ons in Tor Browser, because they +can compromise both your privacy and your security. Plus, Tor Browser already +comes installed with two add-ons — HTTPS Everywhere and NoScript — which give +you a lot of added protection. - FAQ +You can read more about it here: +https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/ -1. I can't click on links or hit reload after I toggle Tor! Why? +Also have a look at this page for already answered questions: +https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Support_discuss - Due to Firefox Bug 409737, pages can still open popups and perform - Javascript redirects and history access after Tor has been toggled. These - popups and redirects can be blocked, but unfortunately they are - indistinguishable from normal user interactions with the page (such as - clicking on links, opening them in new tabs/windows, or using the history - buttons), and so those are blocked as a side effect. Once that Firefox bug - is fixed, this degree of isolation will become optional (for people who do - not want to accidentally click on links and give away information via - referrers). A workaround is to right click on the link, and open it in a - new tab or window. The tab or window won't load automatically, but you can - hit enter in the URL bar, and it will begin loading. Hitting enter in the - URL bar will also reload the page without clicking the reload button. +For other issues you should know about have a look at this blog post: +https://blog.torproject.org/toggle-or-not-toggle-end-torbutton -2. My browser is in some weird state where nothing works right! - - Try to disable Tor by clicking on the button, and then open a new window. - If that doesn't fix the issue, go to the preferences page and hit 'Restore - Defaults'. This should reset the extension and Firefox to a known good - configuration. If you can manage to reproduce whatever issue gets your - Firefox wedged, please file details at the bug tracker. - -3. When I toggle Tor, my sites that use javascript stop working. Why? - - Javascript can do things like wait until you have disabled Tor before - trying to contact its source site, thus revealing your IP address. As - such, Torbutton must disable Javascript, Meta-Refresh tags, and certain - CSS behavior when Tor state changes from the state that was used to load a - given page. These features are re-enabled when Torbutton goes back into - the state that was used to load the page, but in some cases (particularly - with Javascript and CSS) it is sometimes not possible to fully recover - from the resulting errors, and the page is broken. Unfortunately, the only - thing you can do (and still remain safe from having your IP address leak) - is to reload the page when you toggle Tor, or just ensure you do all your - work in a page before switching tor state. - -4. When I use Tor, Firefox is no longer filling in logins/search boxes for - me. Why? - - Currently, this is tied to the "Block history writes during Tor" setting. - If you have enabled that setting, all formfill functionality (both saving - and reading) is disabled. If this bothers you, you can uncheck that - option, but both history and forms will be saved. To prevent history - disclosure attacks via Non-Tor usage, it is recommended you disable - Non-Tor history reads if you allow history writing during Tor. - -5. Which Firefox extensions should I avoid using? - - This is a tough one. There are thousands of Firefox extensions: making a - complete list of ones that are bad for anonymity is near impossible. - However, here are a few examples that should get you started as to what - sorts of behavior are dangerous. - - 1. StumbleUpon, et al These extensions will send all sorts of information - about the websites you visit to the stumbleupon servers, and correlate - this information with a unique identifier. This is obviously terrible - for your anonymity. More generally, any sort of extension that - requires registration, or even extensions that provide information - about websites you visit should be suspect. - 2. FoxyProxy While FoxyProxy is a nice idea in theory, in practice it is - impossible to configure securely for Tor usage without Torbutton. Like - all vanilla third party proxy plugins, the main risks are plugin - leakage and history disclosure, followed closely by cookie theft - by exit nodes and tracking by adservers (see the Torbutton - Adversary Model for more information). However, even with Torbutton - installed in tandem and always enabled, it is still very difficult - (though not impossible) to configure FoxyProxy securely. Since - FoxyProxy's 'Patterns' mode only applies to specific urls, and not to - an entire tab, setting FoxyProxy to only send specific sites through - Tor will still allow adservers to still learn your real IP. Worse, if - those sites use offsite logging services such as Google Analytics, you - may still end up in their logs with your real IP. Malicious exit nodes - can also cooperate with sites to inject images into pages that bypass - your filters. Setting FoxyProxy to only send certain URLs via Non-Tor - is much more viable, but be very careful with the filters you allow. - For example, something as simple as allowing *google* to go via - Non-Tor will still cause you to end up in all the logs of all websites - that use Google Analytics! See this question on the FoxyProxy FAQ - for more information. - 3. NoScript Torbutton currently mitigates all known anonymity issues with - Javascript. While it may be tempting to get better security by - disabling Javascript for certain sites, you are far better off with an - all-or-nothing approach. NoScript is exceedingly complicated, and has - many subtleties that can surprise even advanced users. For example, - addons.mozilla.org verifies extension integrity via Javascript over - https, but downloads them in the clear. Not adding it to your - whitelist effectively means you are pulling down unverified - extensions. Worse still, using NoScript can actually disable - protections that Torbutton itself provides via Javascript, yet still - allow malicious exit nodes to compromise your anonymity via the - default whitelist (which they can spoof to inject any script they - want). - -6. Which Firefox extensions do you recommend? - - 1. RefControl Mentioned above, this extension allows more - fine-grained referrer spoofing than Torbutton currently provides. It - should break less sites than Torbutton's referrer spoofing option. - 2. SafeCache If you use Tor excessively, and rarely disable it, you - probably want to install this extension to minimize the ability of - sites to store long term identifiers in your cache. This extension - applies same origin policy to the cache, so that elements are - retrieved from the cache only if they are fetched from a document in - the same origin domain as the cached element. - -7. Are there any other issues I should be concerned about? - - There is currently one known unfixed security issue with Torbutton: it is - possible to unmask the javascript hooks that wrap the Date object to - conceal your timezone in Firefox 2, and the timezone masking code does not - work at all on Firefox 3. We are working with the Firefox team to fix one - of Bug 399274 or Bug 419598 to address this. In the meantime, it - is possible to set the TZ environment variable to UTC to cause the browser - to use UTC as your timezone. Under Linux, you can add an export TZ=UTC to - the /usr/bin/firefox script, or edit your system bashrc to do the same. - Under Windows, you can set either a User or System Environment - Variable for TZ via My Computer's properties. In MacOS, the situation is - a lot more complicated, unfortunately. - - In addition, RSS readers such as Firefox Livemarks can perform periodic - fetches. Due to Firefox Bug 436250, there is no way to disable - Livemark fetches during Tor. This can be a problem if you have a lot of - custom Livemark urls that can give away information about your identity. +For a list of all torbutton announcements see +https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/torbutton

1 0

[torbutton/master] Bug 27175: Add pref to allow users to persist custom noscript settings
by gk＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 461b828c70bb85501db99fdf077af71b69ef7e0a Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Sep 17 23:03:26 2018 -0700 Bug 27175: Add pref to allow users to persist custom noscript settings The pref is called "extensions.torbutton.noscript_persist". Warning! It is dangerous and could reveal what sites you have visited in the past. (We also use a pref named "extensions.torbutton.noscript_inited" to keep track of the first run.) --- src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js | 3 +++ src/modules/noscript-control.js | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js index fecf0e69..45b60ce8 100644 --- a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js +++ b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js @@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ pref("extensions.torbutton.prompt_torbrowser", true); pref("extensions.torbutton.confirm_plugins", true); pref("extensions.torbutton.confirm_newnym", true); +pref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_inited", false); +pref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_persist", false); + // Browser home page: pref("browser.startup.homepage", "chrome://torbutton/content/locale/non-localized.properties"); diff --git a/src/modules/noscript-control.js b/src/modules/noscript-control.js index 621f2b7f..275f9dba 100644 --- a/src/modules/noscript-control.js +++ b/src/modules/noscript-control.js @@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ // ## Utilities const { utils: Cu } = Components; +const { Services } = Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm", {}); const { LegacyExtensionContext } = Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/LegacyExtensionsUtils.jsm", {}); -const { bindPrefAndInit } = +const { bindPref } = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js", {}); let logger = Components.classes["@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1"] .getService(Components.interfaces.nsISupports).wrappedJSObject; @@ -128,14 +129,28 @@ var initialize = () => { // Wait for the first message from NoScript to arrive, and then // bind the security_slider pref to the NoScript settings. let messageListener = (a,b,c) => { - log(3, `Message received from NoScript: ${JSON.stringify([a,b,c])}`); - if (!["started", "pageshow"].includes(a.__meta.name)) { - return; + try { + log(3, `Message received from NoScript: ${JSON.stringify([a,b,c])}`); + if (!["started", "pageshow"].includes(a.__meta.name)) { + return; + } + extensionContext.api.browser.runtime.onMessage.removeListener(messageListener); + let noscriptPersist = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_persist", false); + let noscriptInited = Services.prefs.getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_inited", false); + // Set the noscript safety level once if we have never run noscript + // before, or if we are not allowing noscript per-site settings to be + // persisted between browser sessions. Otherwise make sure that the + // security slider position, if changed, will rewrite the noscript + // settings. + bindPref("extensions.torbutton.security_slider", + sliderState => setNoScriptSafetyLevel(securitySliderToSafetyLevel(sliderState)), + !noscriptPersist || !noscriptInited); + if (!noscriptInited) { + Services.prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.noscript_inited", true); + } + } catch (e) { + log(5, e.message); } - extensionContext.api.browser.runtime.onMessage.removeListener(messageListener); - bindPrefAndInit( - "extensions.torbutton.security_slider", - sliderState => setNoScriptSafetyLevel(securitySliderToSafetyLevel(sliderState))); }; extensionContext.api.browser.runtime.onMessage.addListener(messageListener); log(3, "Listening for message from NoScript.");

1 0

[torbutton/master] Revert "Fix NoScript IPC for about:blank by whitelisting messages"
by gk＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 0a7d19da90202e5d40851432400444dd6287ffd9 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 18 10:46:58 2018 +0000 Revert "Fix NoScript IPC for about:blank by whitelisting messages" This reverts commit efdc83fec6244d5f2e4b8880fef010a6e362d9dc. --- src/modules/noscript-control.js | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/modules/noscript-control.js b/src/modules/noscript-control.js index c1442950..934a4ef0 100644 --- a/src/modules/noscript-control.js +++ b/src/modules/noscript-control.js @@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ var initialize = () => { // bind the security_slider pref to the NoScript settings. let messageListener = (a,b,c) => { log(3, `Message received from NoScript: ${JSON.stringify([a,b,c])}`); - if (a._messageName != "started" && a._messageName != "pageshow") { - return; - } extensionContext.api.browser.runtime.onMessage.removeListener(messageListener); bindPrefAndInit( "extensions.torbutton.security_slider",

1 0

[torbutton/master] Bug 27760: Fix NoScript IPC for about:blank by whitelisting messages
by gk＠torproject.org 18 Sep '18

18 Sep '18

commit 6016a170f0266cf926b7ff305796ba83cc353536 Author: Rusty Bird <rustybird(a)net-c.com> Date: Fri Sep 14 13:05:08 2018 +0000 Bug 27760: Fix NoScript IPC for about:blank by whitelisting messages If about:blank is the homepage (or has been passed as a command line parameter), NoScript will send a message named "fetchChildPolicy" _before_ "started". Torbutton would then send its "updateSettings" too soon, resulting in the dreaded error "Could not establish connection. Receiving end does not exist" (see bug 26520). Fix this by whitelisting the relevant messages from NoScript: "started" and also "pageshow" for a slightly more graceful failure mode in case Torbutton somehow misses NoScript startup. --- src/modules/noscript-control.js | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/modules/noscript-control.js b/src/modules/noscript-control.js index 934a4ef0..621f2b7f 100644 --- a/src/modules/noscript-control.js +++ b/src/modules/noscript-control.js @@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ var initialize = () => { // bind the security_slider pref to the NoScript settings. let messageListener = (a,b,c) => { log(3, `Message received from NoScript: ${JSON.stringify([a,b,c])}`); + if (!["started", "pageshow"].includes(a.__meta.name)) { + return; + } extensionContext.api.browser.runtime.onMessage.removeListener(messageListener); bindPrefAndInit( "extensions.torbutton.security_slider",

1 0

Jump to page:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-commits September 2018