August 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[torbutton/master] Bug 26961: New user onboarding
by gk＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 3b3161cb9f1e96eaaa303a405df4a88a2be62a55 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Wed Aug 15 10:06:09 2018 -0400 Bug 26961: New user onboarding Add strings for use by new user onboarding. Add "TorOpenSecuritySettings" observer. --- src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 10 +++++- src/chrome/locale/en/browserOnboarding.properties | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++ trans_tools/import-translations.sh | 1 + 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js index 8e62a5ab..134f10da 100644 --- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js +++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ let { showDialog } = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js", {}); let { getLocale, unescapeTorString } = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js", {}); let SecurityPrefs = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/security-prefs.js", {}); let NoScriptControl = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/noscript-control.js", {}); -let { bindPrefAndInit } = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js", {}); +let { bindPrefAndInit, observe } = Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js", {}); Cu.importGlobalProperties(["XMLHttpRequest"]); @@ -1920,6 +1920,8 @@ function torbutton_is_windowed(wind) { return true; } +let stopOpenSecuritySettingsObserver; + // Bug 1506 P3: This is needed pretty much only for the version check // and the window resizing. See comments for individual functions for // details @@ -1953,6 +1955,11 @@ function torbutton_new_window(event) Ci.nsIWebProgress.NOTIFY_STATE_DOCUMENT); } + // Register the TorOpenSecuritySettings observer, which is used by + // UITour to open the security slider dialog. + stopOpenSecuritySettingsObserver = observe("TorOpenSecuritySettings", + torbutton_open_prefs_dialog); + // Check the version on every new window. We're already pinging check in these cases. torbutton_do_async_versioncheck(); @@ -1964,6 +1971,7 @@ function torbutton_new_window(event) function torbutton_close_window(event) { torbutton_window_pref_observer.unregister(); torbutton_tor_check_observer.unregister(); + stopOpenSecuritySettingsObserver(); window.removeEventListener("sizemodechange", m_tb_resize_handler, false); diff --git a/src/chrome/locale/en/browserOnboarding.properties b/src/chrome/locale/en/browserOnboarding.properties new file mode 100644 index 00000000..362eefea --- /dev/null +++ b/src/chrome/locale/en/browserOnboarding.properties @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# Copyright (c) 2018, The Tor Project, Inc. +# See LICENSE for licensing information. +# vim: set sw=2 sts=2 ts=8 et: + +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome=Welcome +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.title=You’re ready. +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.description=Tor Browser offers the highest standard of privacy and security while browsing the web. You are now protected against tracking, surveillance and censorship. Learn how we are doing it by following this quick onboarding. +onboarding.tour-tor-welcome.button=Start Now + +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy=Privacy +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.title=Snub trackers and snoopers. +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.description=Tor Browser will isolate all traffic for each domain you visit. That means trackers and advertisers can’t follow you. And any information storage such as isolated cookies or browser history is deleted after your session. We make all these modifications to ensure your privacy and security protections in the browser. Click ‘Tor Network’ to learn how we protect you on the network level. +onboarding.tour-tor-privacy.button=Go to Tor Network + +onboarding.tour-tor-network=Tor Network +onboarding.tour-tor-network.title=Travel a decentralized network. +onboarding.tour-tor-network.description=Tor Browser will connect you to the Tor Network. Our network protects you more than a VPN because it is not centralized. Tor is a network of servers, we call them relays, run by thousands of volunteers all around the world. This way, there’s no one point of failure and no centralized entity you need to trust in order to enjoy the internet. For each domain you open we create a circuit for you, click on ‘Circuit Display’ to learn how they work. +onboarding.tour-tor-network.button=Go to Circuit Display + +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display=Circuit Display +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.title=See your path. +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.description=For each domain you visit your traffic is relayed and encrypted in a circuit across three relays around the world. This way no website knows where you are connecting from, because they will only see the connection coming from the last relay. If you would like a new circuit you can just request one by clicking ‘New Circuit for this Site’ on our Circuit Display. Click below to see how it works. +onboarding.tour-tor-circuit-display.button=Explore + +onboarding.tour-tor-security=Security +onboarding.tour-tor-security.title=Choose your experience. +onboarding.tour-tor-security.description=Your privacy will always be taken care of by Tor Browser and the Tor network by default. Besides that we also provide you with different settings for when you would like to bump up your browser security while accessing sites. Our Security Settings will allow you to block things that could be used by bad agents to attack your computer. Click below to see the different options and what they do. +onboarding.tour-tor-security.button=Review Settings + +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences=Experience Tips +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.title=Experience Tips +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.description=With all the security and privacy features provided by the Tor Browser and the Tor Network, your experience while browsing the internet will be a little bit different. You will notice things will run a bit slower since your connection is going through three relays around the world. Sometimes sites will ask you to prove you are a human not a robot and depending on your security options, some things might not work or load. Our goal is to always provide the best experience for our users while not lowering the bar on how to provide real privacy to our users. +onboarding.tour-tor-expect-differences.button=See FAQs + +onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services=Onion Services +onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.title=Onion Services +onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.description=Finally we would like to introduce you to Onion services. For ultimate privacy and security, sites ending in .onion are configured using the Tor network. Onion services provide extra protections to publishers and visitors, including added safeguards against censorship. The same way our Browser allows you to browse the web anonymously our onion services allow people to provide content and services anonymously. You will notice a little onion icon in the URL bar when accessing these services. Click below to see the NYTimes onion services and how they work. +onboarding.tour-tor-onion-services.button=Visit an Onion diff --git a/trans_tools/import-translations.sh b/trans_tools/import-translations.sh index 2f0be994..342188d0 100755 --- a/trans_tools/import-translations.sh +++ b/trans_tools/import-translations.sh @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ FILEMAP=( "aboutDialog.dtd:torbutton-aboutdialogdtd" "aboutTBUpdate.dtd:torbutton-abouttbupdatedtd" "brand.dtd:torbutton-branddtd" "brand.properties:torbutton-brandproperties" + "browserOnboarding.properties:torbutton-browseronboardingproperties" "torbutton.dtd:torbutton-torbuttondtd" "torbutton.properties:torbutton-torbuttonproperties" )

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1] squash! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
by gk＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 36724cc11e94d0dc3094c94f046d76fb5ce44a2b Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jul 31 07:04:43 2018 -0700 squash! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides. Bug 14952: Enable http/2 and AltSvc In Firefox, SPDY/HTTP2 now uses Origin Attributes for isolation of connections, push streams, origin frames, etc. That means we get first-party isolation provided "privacy.firstparty.isolate" is true. So in this patch, we stop overriding "network.http.spdy.enabled" and "network.http.spdy.enabled.http2". Alternate Services also use Origin Attributes for isolation. So we stop overriding "network.http.altsvc.enabled" and "network.http.altsvc.oe" as well. (All 4 of the abovementioned "network.http.*" prefs adopt Firefox 60ESR's default value of true.) However, we want to disable HTTP/2 push for now, so we set "network.http.spdy.allow-push" to false. "network.http.spdy.enabled.http2draft" was removed in Bug 1132357. "network.http.sped.enabled.v2" was removed in Bug 912550. "network.http.sped.enabled.v3" was removed in Bug 1097944. "network.http.sped.enabled.v3-1" was removed in Bug 1248197. --- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js index d0fdbe1040b4..e87b38dcb775 100644 --- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js +++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js @@ -174,15 +174,8 @@ pref("browser.cache.frecency_experiment", -1); // Third party stuff pref("privacy.firstparty.isolate", true); // Always enforce first party isolation pref("network.cookie.cookieBehavior", 1); -pref("network.http.spdy.enabled", false); // Stores state and may have keepalive issues (both fixable) -pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.v2", false); // Seems redundant, but just in case -pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.v3", false); // Seems redundant, but just in case -pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.v3-1", false); // Seems redundant, but just in case -pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.http2", false); // Temporarily disabled pending implementation review -pref("network.http.spdy.enabled.http2draft", false); // Temporarily disabled pending implementation review +pref("network.http.spdy.allow-push", false); // Disabled for now. See https://bugs.torproject.org/27127 pref("network.predictor.enabled", false); // Temporarily disabled. See https://bugs.torproject.org/16633 -pref("network.http.altsvc.enabled", false); // Temporarily disabled. See https://bugs.torproject.org/16673 -pref("network.http.altsvc.oe", false); // Temporarily disabled. See https://bugs.torproject.org/16673 // Proxy and proxy security pref("network.proxy.socks", "127.0.0.1");

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[stem/master] Close time window in event handling unit test
by atagar＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit abc6f298e456f73c8562bf23f2c4ad48dbd0f18b Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 10:55:25 2018 -0700 Close time window in event handling unit test As Dave discussed on #27053 these new unit tests occasionally fail. Think I see what's up: our emit_event() helper blocked until events were consumed but *not* until they were handled. That is to say in the following psudocode... event_loop function: while True: event = event_queue.pop() # <=== right here for listener in listeners: listener(event) ... our tests could make assertions after dequeueing events but before calling the listener, producing the assertion failures he saw. Joining on the event thread to ensure it's done performing any work it has. On the upside this actually simplifies our test code too! :P Ran the tests several dozen times and this seems to do the trick for me but unforuntately since this these test failures could be pretty rare tough to be sure. --- test/unit/control/controller.py | 107 +++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/test/unit/control/controller.py b/test/unit/control/controller.py index 156e62c5..7ee2ab70 100644 --- a/test/unit/control/controller.py +++ b/test/unit/control/controller.py @@ -625,30 +625,21 @@ class TestControl(unittest.TestCase): self.assertRaises(InvalidRequest, self.controller.add_event_listener, Mock(), EventType.SIGNAL) @patch('time.time', Mock(return_value = TEST_TIMESTAMP)) - @patch('stem.control.Controller.is_alive') - def test_events_get_received(self, is_alive_mock): + def test_events_get_received(self): """ Trigger an event, checking that our listeners get notified. """ - is_alive_mock.return_value = True - self.controller._launch_threads() + self._emit_event(CIRC_EVENT) + self.circ_listener.assert_called_once_with(CIRC_EVENT) + self.bw_listener.assert_not_called() + self.malformed_listener.assert_not_called() - try: - self._emit_event(CIRC_EVENT) - self.circ_listener.assert_called_once_with(CIRC_EVENT) - self.bw_listener.assert_not_called() - self.malformed_listener.assert_not_called() - - self._emit_event(BW_EVENT) - self.bw_listener.assert_called_once_with(BW_EVENT) - finally: - is_alive_mock.return_value = False - self.controller._close() + self._emit_event(BW_EVENT) + self.bw_listener.assert_called_once_with(BW_EVENT) @patch('time.time', Mock(return_value = TEST_TIMESTAMP)) - @patch('stem.control.Controller.is_alive') - def test_event_listing_with_error(self, is_alive_mock): + def test_event_listing_with_error(self): """ Raise an exception in an event listener to confirm it doesn't break our event thread. @@ -656,32 +647,21 @@ class TestControl(unittest.TestCase): self.circ_listener.side_effect = ValueError('boom') - is_alive_mock.return_value = True - self.controller._launch_threads() + self._emit_event(CIRC_EVENT) + self.circ_listener.assert_called_once_with(CIRC_EVENT) + self.bw_listener.assert_not_called() + self.malformed_listener.assert_not_called() - try: - self._emit_event(CIRC_EVENT) - self.circ_listener.assert_called_once_with(CIRC_EVENT) - self.bw_listener.assert_not_called() - self.malformed_listener.assert_not_called() - - self._emit_event(BW_EVENT) - self.bw_listener.assert_called_once_with(BW_EVENT) - finally: - is_alive_mock.return_value = False - self.controller._close() + self._emit_event(BW_EVENT) + self.bw_listener.assert_called_once_with(BW_EVENT) @patch('time.time', Mock(return_value = TEST_TIMESTAMP)) - @patch('stem.control.Controller.is_alive') - def test_event_listing_with_malformed_event(self, is_alive_mock): + def test_event_listing_with_malformed_event(self): """ Attempt to parse a malformed event emitted from Tor. It's important this doesn't break our event thread. """ - is_alive_mock.return_value = True - self.controller._launch_threads() - # When stem.response.convert() encounters malformed content we still recast # the message. @@ -689,17 +669,13 @@ class TestControl(unittest.TestCase): setattr(expected_bad_event, 'arrived_at', TEST_TIMESTAMP) expected_bad_event.__class__ = stem.response.events.BandwidthEvent - try: - self._emit_event(BAD_EVENT) - self.circ_listener.assert_not_called() - self.bw_listener.assert_not_called() - self.malformed_listener.assert_called_once_with(expected_bad_event) + self._emit_event(BAD_EVENT) + self.circ_listener.assert_not_called() + self.bw_listener.assert_not_called() + self.malformed_listener.assert_called_once_with(expected_bad_event) - self._emit_event(BW_EVENT) - self.bw_listener.assert_called_once_with(BW_EVENT) - finally: - is_alive_mock.return_value = False - self.controller._close() + self._emit_event(BW_EVENT) + self.bw_listener.assert_called_once_with(BW_EVENT) @patch('stem.control.Controller.get_version', Mock(return_value = stem.version.Version('0.5.0.14'))) @patch('stem.control.Controller.msg', Mock(return_value = ControlMessage.from_str('250 OK\r\n'))) @@ -827,21 +803,26 @@ class TestControl(unittest.TestCase): self.controller.drop_guards() def _emit_event(self, event): - # Converting an event back into an uncast ControlMessage, then feeding it - # into our controller's event queue. - - uncast_event = ControlMessage.from_str(event.raw_content()) - self.controller._event_queue.put(uncast_event) - self.controller._event_notice.set() - - # Wait for the event to get asynchronously consumed. This should happen - # right away, but if the system is bogged down it may take quite a few - # milliseconds. - - event_sent_at = time.time() - - while not self.controller._event_queue.empty(): - time.sleep(0.01) - - if time.time() - event_sent_at > 5: - self.fail('Event did not get processed after five seconds') + # Spins up our Controller's thread pool, emits an event, then shuts it + # down. This last part is important for a couple reasons... + # + # 1. So we don't leave any lingering threads. + # + # 2. To ensure our event handlers are done being executed. Events are + # processed asynchronously, so the only way to endsure it's done + # with its work is to join on the thread. + + with patch('stem.control.Controller.is_alive') as is_alive_mock: + is_alive_mock.return_value = True + self.controller._launch_threads() + + try: + # Converting an event back into an uncast ControlMessage, then feeding it + # into our controller's event queue. + + uncast_event = ControlMessage.from_str(event.raw_content()) + self.controller._event_queue.put(uncast_event) + self.controller._event_notice.set() + finally: + is_alive_mock.return_value = False + self.controller._close()

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[torbutton/master] Bug 26189: Remove content-policy.js
by gk＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit b9b87bcb3105e7aafb42f162b4bb1e8fc7dc54ba Author: Arthur Edelstein <arthuredelstein(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Aug 13 09:55:40 2018 -0700 Bug 26189: Remove content-policy.js Our old patch for Bug 8725 was upstreamed in https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=863246 --- src/components/content-policy.js | 174 -------------------------------- src/components/startup-observer.js | 7 +- src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 180 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/components/content-policy.js b/src/components/content-policy.js deleted file mode 100644 index db72efea..00000000 --- a/src/components/content-policy.js +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -/* -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*- - * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public - * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file, - * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ - -/* - * Based on ResourceFilter: A direct workaround for https://bugzil.la/863246 - * https://notabug.org/desktopd/no-resource-uri-leak/src/master/src/resource-f… - */ - -const Cc = Components.classes, Ci = Components.interfaces, Cu = Components.utils; - -// Import XPCOMUtils object. -Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.jsm"); -let { bindPrefAndInit } = - Cu.import("resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js", {}); - -function ContentPolicy() { - this.uriFingerprinting = null; - let that = this; - bindPrefAndInit("extensions.torbutton.resource_and_chrome_uri_fingerprinting", - function (enabled) { - that.uriFingerprinting = enabled; - }); - - // Register as an nsIContentPolicy filter. - let registrar = Components.manager.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIComponentRegistrar); - registrar.registerFactory(this.classID, this.classDescription, - this.contractID, this); - - let catMan = Cc["@mozilla.org/categorymanager;1"] - .getService(Ci.nsICategoryManager); - catMan.addCategoryEntry("content-policy", this.contractID, this.contractID, - false, true); -} - -ContentPolicy.prototype = { - classDescription: "ContentPolicy", - classID: Components.ID("{4c03be7d-492f-990e-f0da-f3689e564898}"), - contractID: "@torproject.org/content-policy;1", - - uriWhitelist: { - // Video playback. - "chrome://global/content/TopLevelVideoDocument.js": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SCRIPT, - "resource://gre/res/TopLevelVideoDocument.css": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_STYLESHEET, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/videocontrols.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/scale.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/progressmeter.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/button.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/general.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/text.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - - // Image display. - "resource://gre/res/ImageDocument.css": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_STYLESHEET, - "resource://gre/res/TopLevelImageDocument.css": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_STYLESHEET, - - // Scrollbars, text box resizer, and content keyboard shortcuts. - "chrome://global/content/bindings/scrollbar.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/bindings/resizer.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - "chrome://global/content/platformHTMLBindings.xml": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_XBL, - - // Directory listing. - "chrome://global/skin/dirListing/dirListing.css": Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_STYLESHEET, - }, - - uriRegexWhitelist: [ - // Video playback: whitelist png and svg images under chrome://global/skin/media - { regex: /^chrome:\/\/global\/skin\/media\/.+\.(png|svg)$/, - type: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE }, - - // Video playback and image display: whitelist css files under chrome://global/skin/media - { regex: /^chrome:\/\/global\/skin\/media\/.+\.css$/, - type: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_STYLESHEET }, - ], - - // nsISupports - QueryInterface: XPCOMUtils.generateQI([Ci.nsIContentPolicy, Ci.nsIFactory, - Ci.nsISupportsWeakReference]), - - // nsIFactory - createInstance: function(outer, iid) - { - if (outer) - throw Cr.NS_ERROR_NO_AGGREGATION; - return this.QueryInterface(iid); - }, - - // nsIContentPolicy - shouldLoad: function(aContentType, aContentLocation, aRequestOrigin, aContext, aMimeTypeGuess, aExtra) { - - // Accept if the user does not care, no content URI is available or scheme - // is not resource/chrome. - if (this.uriFingerprinting || !aContentLocation || - !(aContentLocation.schemeIs('resource') || - aContentLocation.schemeIs('chrome'))) { - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; - } - - // Accept if no origin URI or if origin scheme is - // chrome/resource/about/view-source. - if (!aRequestOrigin || aRequestOrigin.schemeIs('resource') || - aRequestOrigin.schemeIs('chrome') || - aRequestOrigin.schemeIs('about') || - aRequestOrigin.schemeIs('view-source')) - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; - - // Accept if resource directly loaded into a tab. - if (Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT === aContentType) - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; - - // There's certain things that break horribly if they aren't allowed to - // access URIs with proscribed schemes, with `aContentOrigin` basically - // set to arbibrary URIs. - // - // XXX: Feature gate this behind the security slider or something, I don't - // give a fuck. - if (aContentLocation.spec in this.uriWhitelist) - if (this.uriWhitelist[aContentLocation.spec] == aContentType) - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; - - for (let wlObj of this.uriRegexWhitelist) { - if ((wlObj.type == aContentType) && wlObj.regex.test(aContentLocation.spec)) - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; - } - - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST; - }, - - shouldProcess: function(aContentType, aContentLocation, aRequestOrigin, aContext, aMimeType, aExtra) { - return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT; - }, -}; - -// Install a HTTP response handler to check for redirects to URLs with schemes -// that should be internal to the browser. There's various safeguards and -// checks that cause the body to be unavailable, but the `onLoad()` behavior -// is inconsistent, which results in leaking information about the specific -// user agent instance (eg: what addons are installed). -var requestObserver = { - ioService: Cc["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"].getService(Ci.nsIIOService), - observerService: Cc["@mozilla.org/observer-service;1"].getService(Ci.nsIObserverService), - - start: function() { - this.observerService.addObserver(this, "http-on-examine-response", false); - }, - - observe: function(aSubject, aTopic, aData) { - let aChannel = aSubject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel); - let aStatus = aChannel.responseStatus; - - // If this is a redirect... - // - // Note: `304 Not Modifed` isn't a redirect, so there is no Location header to check - // in that case. - if (aStatus >= 300 && aStatus < 400 && aStatus != 304) { - let location = aChannel.getResponseHeader("Location"); - let aUri = this.ioService.newURI(location, null, null); - - // And it's redirecting into the browser or addon's internal URLs... - if (aUri.schemeIs("resource") || aUri.schemeIs("chrome") || aUri.schemeIs("about")) { - // Cancel the request. - aSubject.cancel(Components.results.NS_BINDING_ABORTED); - } - } - }, -}; - -// Create a content policy object; initialization is done in the contructor. -var cp = new ContentPolicy(); - -// In the chrome process, register the request observer to handle redirects. -if (Services.appinfo.processType == Services.appinfo.PROCESS_TYPE_DEFAULT) { - requestObserver.start(); -} diff --git a/src/components/startup-observer.js b/src/components/startup-observer.js index 144d600a..cd9e7d2c 100644 --- a/src/components/startup-observer.js +++ b/src/components/startup-observer.js @@ -62,13 +62,10 @@ function StartupObserver() { this.logger.log(4, "Early proxy change failed. Will try again at profile load. Error: "+e); } - // Arrange for our nsIContentPolicy filter and about:tor handler to be - // loaded in the default (chrome) process as well as in each content - // process. + // Arrange for our about:tor handler to be loaded in the default (chrome) + // process as well as in each content process. let ppmm = Cc["@mozilla.org/parentprocessmessagemanager;1"] .getService(Ci.nsIProcessScriptLoader); - ppmm.loadProcessScript("resource://torbutton/components/content-policy.js", - true); ppmm.loadProcessScript("resource://torbutton/components/aboutTor.js", true); } diff --git a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js index 43401ad0..428e70bc 100644 --- a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js +++ b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ pref("extensions.torbutton.startup_state", 2); // 0=non-tor, 1=tor, 2=last pref("extensions.torbutton.tor_memory_jar",false); pref("extensions.torbutton.nontor_memory_jar",false); pref("extensions.torbutton.launch_warning",true); -pref("extensions.torbutton.resource_and_chrome_uri_fingerprinting",false); + // Opt out of Firefox addon pings: // https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Addons/Working_with_AMO pref("extensions.torbutton(a)torproject.org.getAddons.cache.enabled", false);

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[tor/release-0.3.4] Don't search for -lpthread on Windows
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 7a570b818246ca8c8efe4b7de116804f6ebddd91 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 8 09:56:51 2018 -0400 Don't search for -lpthread on Windows If we're building for Windows, we want to use windows threads no matter what, and we don't want to link a pthread library even if it is present. Fixes bug 27081; bugfix on 1790dc67607799a in 0.1.0.1-rc. --- changes/bug27081 | 4 ++++ configure.ac | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug27081 b/changes/bug27081 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..74e0efbd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug27081 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compilation, windows): + - Don't link or search for pthreads when building for Windows, even if we + are using build environment (like mingw) that provides a pthreads + library. Fixes bug 27081; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index d70032992..76b3f423a 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -370,8 +370,10 @@ if test "$LIBS" != "$saved_LIBS"; then have_rt=yes fi -AC_SEARCH_LIBS(pthread_create, [pthread]) -AC_SEARCH_LIBS(pthread_detach, [pthread]) +if test "$bwin32" = "false"; then + AC_SEARCH_LIBS(pthread_create, [pthread]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS(pthread_detach, [pthread]) +fi AM_CONDITIONAL(THREADS_WIN32, test "$bwin32" = "true") AM_CONDITIONAL(THREADS_PTHREADS, test "$bwin32" = "false")

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[tor/release-0.3.4] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit a26a2735b9cf9c6940d784f755f983088c333833 Merge: 8982719f6 4c355ff18 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 12:20:57 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.2 changes/bug27081 | 4 ++++ configure.ac | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.4] Merge remote-tracking branch 'github/bug27081_029' into maint-0.2.9
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 4c355ff18544783a5a283f7660bcdca6cf93062b Merge: fe19b40fe 7a570b818 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 12:20:53 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'github/bug27081_029' into maint-0.2.9 changes/bug27081 | 4 ++++ configure.ac | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.4] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into maint-0.3.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 0fc171a47be0cb3b1021816ab80ef823063ce2d1 Merge: 1868982de a26a2735b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 12:20:57 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.2' into maint-0.3.3 changes/bug27081 | 4 ++++ configure.ac | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.4] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4' into release-0.3.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 547522f56958d0b77aee48dcf0fbc87b7a26f800 Merge: 0cc4152b0 571cb2f66 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 12:20:57 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4' into release-0.3.4 changes/bug27081 | 4 ++++ configure.ac | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.4] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.3' into maint-0.3.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 15 Aug '18

15 Aug '18

commit 571cb2f662f1c39eb1069c12164a3dc202afb362 Merge: 6c1d2549d 0fc171a47 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 15 12:20:57 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.3' into maint-0.3.4 changes/bug27081 | 4 ++++ configure.ac | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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