May 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[stem/master] Relay length attribute mangled by unpack/repack
by atagar＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit 72ba79d861972f848d6d777ed38c45663944b7ea Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 24 13:15:47 2018 -0700 Relay length attribute mangled by unpack/repack Great catch from plcp! https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26060 When getting a circuit response we unpack then repack to get the data we just read from the socket. This is silly. We only did this to separate the cell headers from the payload but in doing so we corrupted the relay cell's length attribute. Better to just read the raw encrypted data and only construct RelayCells *after* it has been decrypted. --- stem/client/__init__.py | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/client/__init__.py b/stem/client/__init__.py index 281888e7..1d87966f 100644 --- a/stem/client/__init__.py +++ b/stem/client/__init__.py @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import stem.client.cell import stem.socket import stem.util.connection -from stem.client.datatype import ZERO, Address, KDF, split +from stem.client.datatype import ZERO, Address, Size, KDF, split __all__ = [ 'cell', @@ -250,14 +250,32 @@ class Circuit(object): header, payload = split(cell.pack(self.relay.link_protocol), header_size) encrypted_payload = header + self.forward_key.update(payload) - reply = [] + reply_cells = [] self.relay._orport.send(encrypted_payload) + reply = self.relay._orport.recv() - for cell in stem.client.cell.Cell.unpack(self.relay._orport.recv(), self.relay.link_protocol): - decrypted = self.backward_key.update(cell.pack(self.relay.link_protocol)[header_size:]) - reply.append(stem.client.cell.RelayCell._unpack(decrypted, self.id, self.relay.link_protocol)) + # Check that we got the correct number of bytes for a series of RELAY cells - return reply + relay_cell_size = header_size + stem.client.cell.FIXED_PAYLOAD_LEN + relay_cell_cmd = stem.client.cell.RelayCell.VALUE + + if len(reply) % relay_cell_size != 0: + raise stem.ProtocolError('Circuit response should be a series of RELAY cells, but received an unexpected size for a response: %i' % len(reply)) + + while reply: + circ_id, reply = Size.SHORT.pop(reply) if self.relay.link_protocol < 4 else Size.LONG.pop(reply) + command, reply = Size.CHAR.pop(reply) + payload, reply = split(reply, stem.client.cell.FIXED_PAYLOAD_LEN) + + if command != relay_cell_cmd: + raise stem.ProtocolError('RELAY cell responses should be %i but was %i' % (relay_cell_cmd, command)) + elif circ_id != self.id: + raise stem.ProtocolError('Response should be for circuit id %i, not %i' % (self.id, circ_id)) + + decrypted = self.backward_key.update(payload) + reply_cells.append(stem.client.cell.RelayCell._unpack(decrypted, self.id, self.relay.link_protocol)) + + return reply_cells except: self.forward_digest = orig_digest self.forward_key = orig_key

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[metrics-web/master] Remove inconsistency between bandwidth history graphs.
by karsten＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit 0eacbbecefecde7346b64629f3ade1403785213b Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Wed May 16 21:29:34 2018 +0200 Remove inconsistency between bandwidth history graphs. The number of bytes in all bandwidth histories differed from the sum of those numbers by Exit/Guard flag. The difference came from relays that reported bandwidth histories but that the directory authorities did not list as running. With this commit we stop producing bandwidth numbers that are not broken down by Exit/Guard flag, and we sum up those columns for the bandwidth graph. Implements #26015. --- src/main/R/rserver/graphs.R | 9 ++-- src/main/sql/legacy/tordir.sql | 112 +++-------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/main/R/rserver/graphs.R b/src/main/R/rserver/graphs.R index 79d5600..2ac2756 100644 --- a/src/main/R/rserver/graphs.R +++ b/src/main/R/rserver/graphs.R @@ -451,10 +451,11 @@ write_platforms <- function(start, end, path) { prepare_bandwidth <- function(start, end) { read.csv(paste(stats_dir, "bandwidth.csv", sep = ""), colClasses = c("date" = "Date")) %>% - filter(date >= as.Date(start), date <= as.Date(end), isexit == "", - isguard == "") %>% - mutate(advbw = advbw * 8 / 1e9) %>% - mutate(bwhist = (bwread + bwwrite) * 8 / 2e9) %>% + filter(date >= as.Date(start), date <= as.Date(end), isexit != "", + isguard != "") %>% + group_by(date) %>% + summarize(advbw = sum(advbw) * 8 / 1e9, + bwhist = sum(bwread + bwwrite) * 8 / 2e9) %>% select(date, advbw, bwhist) } diff --git a/src/main/sql/legacy/tordir.sql b/src/main/sql/legacy/tordir.sql index bd91ab6..16e7166 100644 --- a/src/main/sql/legacy/tordir.sql +++ b/src/main/sql/legacy/tordir.sql @@ -151,29 +151,6 @@ CREATE TABLE relay_versions ( CONSTRAINT relay_versions_pkey PRIMARY KEY(date, version) ); --- TABLE total_bandwidth --- Contains information for the whole network's total bandwidth which is --- used in the bandwidth graphs. -CREATE TABLE total_bandwidth ( - date DATE NOT NULL, - bwavg BIGINT NOT NULL, - bwburst BIGINT NOT NULL, - bwobserved BIGINT NOT NULL, - bwadvertised BIGINT NOT NULL, - CONSTRAINT total_bandwidth_pkey PRIMARY KEY(date) -); - --- TABLE total_bwhist --- Contains the total number of read/written and the number of dir bytes --- read/written by all relays in the network on a given day. The dir bytes --- are an estimate based on the subset of relays that count dir bytes. -CREATE TABLE total_bwhist ( - date DATE NOT NULL, - read BIGINT, - written BIGINT, - CONSTRAINT total_bwhist_pkey PRIMARY KEY(date) -); - -- TABLE bandwidth_flags CREATE TABLE bandwidth_flags ( date DATE NOT NULL, @@ -473,64 +450,6 @@ CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION refresh_relay_versions() RETURNS INTEGER AS $$ END; $$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; --- FUNCTION refresh_total_bandwidth() --- This keeps the table total_bandwidth up-to-date when necessary. -CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION refresh_total_bandwidth() RETURNS INTEGER AS $$ - DECLARE - min_date TIMESTAMP WITHOUT TIME ZONE; - max_date TIMESTAMP WITHOUT TIME ZONE; - BEGIN - - min_date := (SELECT MIN(date) FROM updates); - max_date := (SELECT MAX(date) + 1 FROM updates); - - DELETE FROM total_bandwidth - WHERE date IN (SELECT date FROM updates); - - EXECUTE ' - INSERT INTO total_bandwidth - (bwavg, bwburst, bwobserved, bwadvertised, date) - SELECT (SUM(bandwidthavg) - / relay_statuses_per_day.count)::BIGINT AS bwavg, - (SUM(bandwidthburst) - / relay_statuses_per_day.count)::BIGINT AS bwburst, - (SUM(bandwidthobserved) - / relay_statuses_per_day.count)::BIGINT AS bwobserved, - (SUM(LEAST(bandwidthavg, bandwidthobserved)) - / relay_statuses_per_day.count)::BIGINT AS bwadvertised, - DATE(validafter) - FROM descriptor RIGHT JOIN statusentry - ON descriptor.descriptor = statusentry.descriptor - JOIN relay_statuses_per_day - ON DATE(validafter) = relay_statuses_per_day.date - WHERE isrunning = TRUE - AND validafter >= ''' || min_date || ''' - AND validafter < ''' || max_date || ''' - AND DATE(validafter) IN (SELECT date FROM updates) - AND relay_statuses_per_day.date >= ''' || min_date || ''' - AND relay_statuses_per_day.date < ''' || max_date || ''' - AND DATE(relay_statuses_per_day.date) IN - (SELECT date FROM updates) - GROUP BY DATE(validafter), relay_statuses_per_day.count'; - - RETURN 1; - END; -$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; - -CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION refresh_total_bwhist() RETURNS INTEGER AS $$ - BEGIN - DELETE FROM total_bwhist WHERE date IN (SELECT date FROM updates); - INSERT INTO total_bwhist (date, read, written) - SELECT date, SUM(read_sum) AS read, SUM(written_sum) AS written - FROM bwhist - WHERE date >= (SELECT MIN(date) FROM updates) - AND date <= (SELECT MAX(date) FROM updates) - AND date IN (SELECT date FROM updates) - GROUP BY date; - RETURN 1; - END; -$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; - CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION refresh_bandwidth_flags() RETURNS INTEGER AS $$ DECLARE min_date TIMESTAMP WITHOUT TIME ZONE; @@ -693,12 +612,8 @@ CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION refresh_all() RETURNS INTEGER AS $$ RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing relay versions.', timeofday(); PERFORM refresh_relay_versions(); RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing total relay bandwidth.', timeofday(); - PERFORM refresh_total_bandwidth(); - RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing relay bandwidth history.', timeofday(); - PERFORM refresh_total_bwhist(); - RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing total relay bandwidth by flags.', timeofday(); PERFORM refresh_bandwidth_flags(); - RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing bandwidth history by flags.', timeofday(); + RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing bandwidth history.', timeofday(); PERFORM refresh_bwhist_flags(); RAISE NOTICE '% Refreshing user statistics.', timeofday(); PERFORM refresh_user_stats(); @@ -799,23 +714,12 @@ CREATE VIEW stats_bandwidth AS WHERE COALESCE(bandwidth_flags.date, bwhist_flags.date) < current_date - 2) UNION ALL - (SELECT COALESCE(total_bandwidth.date, total_bwhist.date, u.date) - AS date, NULL AS isexit, NULL AS isguard, - total_bandwidth.bwadvertised AS advbw, - CASE WHEN total_bwhist.read IS NOT NULL - THEN total_bwhist.read / 86400 END AS bwread, - CASE WHEN total_bwhist.written IS NOT NULL - THEN total_bwhist.written / 86400 END AS bwwrite, - CASE WHEN u.date IS NOT NULL - THEN FLOOR(CAST(u.dr AS NUMERIC) / CAST(86400 AS NUMERIC)) END AS dirread, - CASE WHEN u.date IS NOT NULL - THEN FLOOR(CAST(u.dw AS NUMERIC) / CAST(86400 AS NUMERIC)) END AS dirwrite - FROM total_bandwidth FULL OUTER JOIN total_bwhist - ON total_bandwidth.date = total_bwhist.date - FULL OUTER JOIN (SELECT * FROM user_stats WHERE country = 'zy' - AND bwp / bwd <= 3) u - ON COALESCE(total_bandwidth.date, total_bwhist.date) = u.date - WHERE COALESCE(total_bandwidth.date, total_bwhist.date, u.date) < - current_date - 2) + (SELECT date, NULL AS isexit, NULL AS isguard, NULL AS advbw, + NULL AS bwread, NULL AS bwwrite, + FLOOR(CAST(dr AS NUMERIC) / CAST(86400 AS NUMERIC)) AS dirread, + FLOOR(CAST(dw AS NUMERIC) / CAST(86400 AS NUMERIC)) AS dirwrite + FROM user_stats + WHERE country = 'zy' + AND date < current_date - 2) ORDER BY date, isexit, isguard;

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[tor/maint-0.3.1] Merge branch 'bug26116_029' into maint-0.2.9
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit c380562aed5242eab6449b054199d742f02833dd Merge: d1e4ffc71 aeb4be1d5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 24 09:39:46 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'bug26116_029' into maint-0.2.9 changes/bug26116 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- src/test/test_crypto.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

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[tor/maint-0.3.1] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit f48fb8a720c7cca79249248f92e3bc99cee3414d Merge: d3a972561 c380562ae Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 24 09:40:06 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1 changes/bug26116 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- src/test/test_crypto.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

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[tor/maint-0.3.2] Return -1 from our PEM password callback
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit 881f7157f648eb8a39e5dfd3efb95951ee7ac215 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 16 11:39:42 2018 -0400 Return -1 from our PEM password callback Apparently, contrary to its documentation, this is how OpenSSL now wants us to report an error. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. --- changes/bug26116 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug26116 b/changes/bug26116 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3bfde74f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug26116 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compatibility, openssl): + - Work around a change in OpenSSL 1.1.1 where + return values that would previously indicate "no password" now + indicate an empty password. Without this workaround, Tor instances + running with OpenSSL 1.1.1 would accept descriptors that other Tor + instances would reject. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. + diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 39c8cc2b0..f8495bb10 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -653,7 +653,12 @@ pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) (void)size; (void)rwflag; (void)u; - return 0; + /* The openssl documentation says that a callback "must" return 0 if an + * error occurred. But during the 1.1.1 series (commit c82c3462267afdbbaa5 + * they changed the interpretation so that 0 indicates an empty password and + * -1 indicates an error. We want to reject any encrypted PEM buffers, so we + * return -1. This will work on older OpenSSL versions and LibreSSL too. */ + return -1; } /** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the len-byte string s

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[tor/maint-0.3.1] Add a unit test for PEM-encrypted documents.
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit aeb4be1d5a17f8ff836e370f8942c09c66b31e1d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 24 09:36:33 2018 -0400 Add a unit test for PEM-encrypted documents. --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 64a46f791..8fd9ca767 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -1349,6 +1349,46 @@ test_crypto_pk_base64(void *arg) tor_free(encoded); } +static void +test_crypto_pk_pem_encrypted(void *arg) +{ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + (void)arg; + + pk = crypto_pk_new(); + /* we need to make sure that we won't stall if somebody gives us a key + that's encrypted with a password. */ + { + const char *s = + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\n" + "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,EFA86BB9D2AB11E80B4E3DCD97782B16\n" + "\n" + "Z2Je4m0cFepc6coQkVbGcvNCHxTf941N2XYEVE6kn0CqWqoUH4tlwV6for5D91np\n" + "5NiEFTkWj31EhrvrYcuiJtQ/iEbABxZULFWFeJ058rb+1izBz5rScqnEacIS/3Go\n" + "YntnROBDwiKmUnue6PJVYg==\n" + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, + crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(pk, s, strlen(s))); + } + /* For fun, make sure we aren't hit by OpenSSL issue + https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6347 , where we get in trouble + if a cipher doesn't use an IV. + */ + { + const char *s = + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "Proc-Type:4,ENCRYPTED\n" + "DEK-Info:des-ede -\n" + "\n" + "iRqK\n" + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, + crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(pk, s, strlen(s))); + } + done: + crypto_pk_free(pk); +} #ifdef HAVE_TRUNCATE #define do_truncate truncate #else @@ -2914,6 +2954,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { CRYPTO_LEGACY(pk), { "pk_fingerprints", test_crypto_pk_fingerprints, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "pk_base64", test_crypto_pk_base64, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "pk_pem_encrypted", test_crypto_pk_pem_encrypted, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests), { "digest_names", test_crypto_digest_names, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "sha3", test_crypto_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL},

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[tor/maint-0.3.2] Add a unit test for PEM-encrypted documents.
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit aeb4be1d5a17f8ff836e370f8942c09c66b31e1d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 24 09:36:33 2018 -0400 Add a unit test for PEM-encrypted documents. --- src/test/test_crypto.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index 64a46f791..8fd9ca767 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -1349,6 +1349,46 @@ test_crypto_pk_base64(void *arg) tor_free(encoded); } +static void +test_crypto_pk_pem_encrypted(void *arg) +{ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + (void)arg; + + pk = crypto_pk_new(); + /* we need to make sure that we won't stall if somebody gives us a key + that's encrypted with a password. */ + { + const char *s = + "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\n" + "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,EFA86BB9D2AB11E80B4E3DCD97782B16\n" + "\n" + "Z2Je4m0cFepc6coQkVbGcvNCHxTf941N2XYEVE6kn0CqWqoUH4tlwV6for5D91np\n" + "5NiEFTkWj31EhrvrYcuiJtQ/iEbABxZULFWFeJ058rb+1izBz5rScqnEacIS/3Go\n" + "YntnROBDwiKmUnue6PJVYg==\n" + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, + crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(pk, s, strlen(s))); + } + /* For fun, make sure we aren't hit by OpenSSL issue + https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6347 , where we get in trouble + if a cipher doesn't use an IV. + */ + { + const char *s = + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "Proc-Type:4,ENCRYPTED\n" + "DEK-Info:des-ede -\n" + "\n" + "iRqK\n" + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; + tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, + crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(pk, s, strlen(s))); + } + done: + crypto_pk_free(pk); +} #ifdef HAVE_TRUNCATE #define do_truncate truncate #else @@ -2914,6 +2954,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { CRYPTO_LEGACY(pk), { "pk_fingerprints", test_crypto_pk_fingerprints, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "pk_base64", test_crypto_pk_base64, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "pk_pem_encrypted", test_crypto_pk_pem_encrypted, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests), { "digest_names", test_crypto_digest_names, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "sha3", test_crypto_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL},

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[tor/maint-0.3.3] Return -1 from our PEM password callback
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit 881f7157f648eb8a39e5dfd3efb95951ee7ac215 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 16 11:39:42 2018 -0400 Return -1 from our PEM password callback Apparently, contrary to its documentation, this is how OpenSSL now wants us to report an error. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. --- changes/bug26116 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug26116 b/changes/bug26116 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3bfde74f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug26116 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compatibility, openssl): + - Work around a change in OpenSSL 1.1.1 where + return values that would previously indicate "no password" now + indicate an empty password. Without this workaround, Tor instances + running with OpenSSL 1.1.1 would accept descriptors that other Tor + instances would reject. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. + diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 39c8cc2b0..f8495bb10 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -653,7 +653,12 @@ pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) (void)size; (void)rwflag; (void)u; - return 0; + /* The openssl documentation says that a callback "must" return 0 if an + * error occurred. But during the 1.1.1 series (commit c82c3462267afdbbaa5 + * they changed the interpretation so that 0 indicates an empty password and + * -1 indicates an error. We want to reject any encrypted PEM buffers, so we + * return -1. This will work on older OpenSSL versions and LibreSSL too. */ + return -1; } /** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the len-byte string s

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[tor/maint-0.3.3] Merge branch 'bug26116_029' into maint-0.2.9
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit c380562aed5242eab6449b054199d742f02833dd Merge: d1e4ffc71 aeb4be1d5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu May 24 09:39:46 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'bug26116_029' into maint-0.2.9 changes/bug26116 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- src/test/test_crypto.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

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[tor/maint-0.3.1] Return -1 from our PEM password callback
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 May '18

24 May '18

commit 881f7157f648eb8a39e5dfd3efb95951ee7ac215 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 16 11:39:42 2018 -0400 Return -1 from our PEM password callback Apparently, contrary to its documentation, this is how OpenSSL now wants us to report an error. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. --- changes/bug26116 | 7 +++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug26116 b/changes/bug26116 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3bfde74f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug26116 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compatibility, openssl): + - Work around a change in OpenSSL 1.1.1 where + return values that would previously indicate "no password" now + indicate an empty password. Without this workaround, Tor instances + running with OpenSSL 1.1.1 would accept descriptors that other Tor + instances would reject. Fixes bug 26116; bugfix on 0.2.5.16. + diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 39c8cc2b0..f8495bb10 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -653,7 +653,12 @@ pem_no_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) (void)size; (void)rwflag; (void)u; - return 0; + /* The openssl documentation says that a callback "must" return 0 if an + * error occurred. But during the 1.1.1 series (commit c82c3462267afdbbaa5 + * they changed the interpretation so that 0 indicates an empty password and + * -1 indicates an error. We want to reject any encrypted PEM buffers, so we + * return -1. This will work on older OpenSSL versions and LibreSSL too. */ + return -1; } /** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the len-byte string s

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