May 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[stem/master] Move attribute validation into Directory constructors
by atagar＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit cdffc5a9c81145877907ec0135c45d24e6676ae6 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 8 11:31:11 2018 -0700 Move attribute validation into Directory constructors Doing validation in the constructors not only makes sense, but lets us deduplicate this. --- stem/directory.py | 90 ++++++++++++++++------------------------ test/unit/directory/authority.py | 6 +-- test/unit/directory/fallback.py | 17 ++++---- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/directory.py b/stem/directory.py index c70cbecf..acd24a80 100644 --- a/stem/directory.py +++ b/stem/directory.py @@ -102,9 +102,22 @@ class Directory(object): """ def __init__(self, address, or_port, dir_port, fingerprint, nickname): + identifier = '%s (%s)' % (fingerprint, nickname) if nickname else fingerprint + + if not connection.is_valid_ipv4_address(address): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv4 address: %s' % (identifier, address)) + elif not connection.is_valid_port(or_port): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid ORPort: %s' % (identifier, or_port)) + elif not connection.is_valid_port(dir_port): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid DirPort: %s' % (identifier, dir_port)) + elif not tor_tools.is_valid_fingerprint(fingerprint): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid fingerprint: %s' % (identifier, fingerprint)) + elif nickname and not tor_tools.is_valid_nickname(nickname): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid nickname: %s' % (fingerprint, nickname)) + self.address = address - self.or_port = or_port - self.dir_port = dir_port + self.or_port = int(or_port) + self.dir_port = int(dir_port) self.fingerprint = fingerprint self.nickname = nickname @@ -183,6 +196,11 @@ class Authority(Directory): def __init__(self, address = None, or_port = None, dir_port = None, fingerprint = None, nickname = None, v3ident = None, is_bandwidth_authority = False): super(Authority, self).__init__(address, or_port, dir_port, fingerprint, nickname) + identifier = '%s (%s)' % (fingerprint, nickname) if nickname else fingerprint + + if v3ident and not tor_tools.is_valid_fingerprint(v3ident): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid v3ident: %s' % (identifier, v3ident)) + self.v3ident = v3ident self.is_bandwidth_authority = is_bandwidth_authority @@ -253,33 +271,14 @@ class Authority(Directory): nickname, or_port = matches.get(AUTHORITY_NAME) v3ident = matches.get(AUTHORITY_V3IDENT) - orport_v6 = matches.get(AUTHORITY_IPV6) # TODO: add this to stem's data? + # orport_v6 = matches.get(AUTHORITY_IPV6) # TODO: add this to stem's data? address, dir_port, fingerprint = matches.get(AUTHORITY_ADDR) - fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(' ', '') - - if not connection.is_valid_ipv4_address(address): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv4 address: %s' % (nickname, address)) - elif not connection.is_valid_port(or_port): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid or_port: %s' % (nickname, or_port)) - elif not connection.is_valid_port(dir_port): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid dir_port: %s' % (nickname, dir_port)) - elif not tor_tools.is_valid_fingerprint(fingerprint): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid fingerprint: %s' % (nickname, fingerprint)) - elif nickname and not tor_tools.is_valid_nickname(nickname): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid nickname: %s' % (nickname, nickname)) - elif orport_v6 and not connection.is_valid_ipv6_address(orport_v6[0]): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv6 address: %s' % (nickname, orport_v6[0])) - elif orport_v6 and not connection.is_valid_port(orport_v6[1]): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid ORPort for its IPv6 endpoint: %s' % (nickname, orport_v6[1])) - elif v3ident and not tor_tools.is_valid_fingerprint(v3ident): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid v3ident: %s' % (nickname, v3ident)) - return Authority( address = address, - or_port = int(or_port), - dir_port = int(dir_port), - fingerprint = fingerprint, + or_port = or_port, + dir_port = dir_port, + fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(' ', ''), nickname = nickname, v3ident = v3ident, ) @@ -353,9 +352,18 @@ class Fallback(Directory): def __init__(self, address = None, or_port = None, dir_port = None, fingerprint = None, nickname = None, has_extrainfo = False, orport_v6 = None, header = None): super(Fallback, self).__init__(address, or_port, dir_port, fingerprint, nickname) + identifier = '%s (%s)' % (fingerprint, nickname) if nickname else fingerprint + + if orport_v6: + if not isinstance(orport_v6, tuple) or len(orport_v6) != 2: + raise ValueError('%s orport_v6 should be a two value tuple: %s' % (identifier, str(orport_v6))) + elif not connection.is_valid_ipv6_address(orport_v6[0]): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv6 address: %s' % (identifier, orport_v6[0])) + elif not connection.is_valid_port(orport_v6[1]): + raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv6 port: %s' % (identifier, orport_v6[1])) self.has_extrainfo = has_extrainfo - self.orport_v6 = orport_v6 + self.orport_v6 = (orport_v6[0], int(orport_v6[1])) if orport_v6 else None self.header = header if header else OrderedDict() @staticmethod @@ -379,19 +387,6 @@ class Fallback(Directory): if not attr[attr_name] and attr_name not in ('nickname', 'has_extrainfo', 'orport6_address', 'orport6_port'): raise IOError("'%s' is missing from %s" % (key, FALLBACK_CACHE_PATH)) - if not connection.is_valid_ipv4_address(attr['address']): - raise IOError("'%s.address' was an invalid IPv4 address (%s)" % (fingerprint, attr['address'])) - elif not connection.is_valid_port(attr['or_port']): - raise IOError("'%s.or_port' was an invalid port (%s)" % (fingerprint, attr['or_port'])) - elif not connection.is_valid_port(attr['dir_port']): - raise IOError("'%s.dir_port' was an invalid port (%s)" % (fingerprint, attr['dir_port'])) - elif attr['nickname'] and not tor_tools.is_valid_nickname(attr['nickname']): - raise IOError("'%s.nickname' was an invalid nickname (%s)" % (fingerprint, attr['nickname'])) - elif attr['orport6_address'] and not connection.is_valid_ipv6_address(attr['orport6_address']): - raise IOError("'%s.orport6_address' was an invalid IPv6 address (%s)" % (fingerprint, attr['orport6_address'])) - elif attr['orport6_port'] and not connection.is_valid_port(attr['orport6_port']): - raise IOError("'%s.orport6_port' was an invalid port (%s)" % (fingerprint, attr['orport6_port'])) - if attr['orport6_address'] and attr['orport6_port']: orport_v6 = (attr['orport6_address'], int(attr['orport6_port'])) else: @@ -496,21 +491,6 @@ class Fallback(Directory): has_extrainfo = matches.get(FALLBACK_EXTRAINFO) == '1' orport_v6 = matches.get(FALLBACK_IPV6) - if not connection.is_valid_ipv4_address(address): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv4 address: %s' % (fingerprint, address)) - elif not connection.is_valid_port(or_port): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid or_port: %s' % (fingerprint, or_port)) - elif not connection.is_valid_port(dir_port): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid dir_port: %s' % (fingerprint, dir_port)) - elif not tor_tools.is_valid_fingerprint(fingerprint): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid fingerprint: %s' % (fingerprint, fingerprint)) - elif nickname and not tor_tools.is_valid_nickname(nickname): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid nickname: %s' % (fingerprint, nickname)) - elif orport_v6 and not connection.is_valid_ipv6_address(orport_v6[0]): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid IPv6 address: %s' % (fingerprint, orport_v6[0])) - elif orport_v6 and not connection.is_valid_port(orport_v6[1]): - raise ValueError('%s has an invalid ORPort for its IPv6 endpoint: %s' % (fingerprint, orport_v6[1])) - return Fallback( address = address, or_port = int(or_port), @@ -518,7 +498,7 @@ class Fallback(Directory): fingerprint = fingerprint, nickname = nickname, has_extrainfo = has_extrainfo, - orport_v6 = (orport_v6[0], int(orport_v6[1])) if orport_v6 else None, + orport_v6 = (orport_v6[0], orport_v6[1]) if orport_v6 else None, ) @staticmethod diff --git a/test/unit/directory/authority.py b/test/unit/directory/authority.py index 431cbf52..8fd70880 100644 --- a/test/unit/directory/authority.py +++ b/test/unit/directory/authority.py @@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ class TestAuthority(unittest.TestCase): for attr in authority_attr: for value in (None, 'something else'): - second_authority = dict(authority_attr) - second_authority[attr] = value - self.assertNotEqual(stem.directory.Authority(**authority_attr), stem.directory.Authority(**second_authority)) + second_authority = stem.directory.Authority(**authority_attr) + setattr(second_authority, attr, value) + self.assertNotEqual(stem.directory.Authority(**authority_attr), second_authority) def test_from_cache(self): authorities = stem.directory.Authority.from_cache() diff --git a/test/unit/directory/fallback.py b/test/unit/directory/fallback.py index 1cbff9a3..c2d66173 100644 --- a/test/unit/directory/fallback.py +++ b/test/unit/directory/fallback.py @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ Unit tests for stem.directory.Fallback. """ import io +import re import tempfile import unittest @@ -91,9 +92,9 @@ class TestFallback(unittest.TestCase): for attr in fallback_attr: for value in (None, 'something else'): - second_fallback = dict(fallback_attr) - second_fallback[attr] = value - self.assertNotEqual(stem.directory.Fallback(**fallback_attr), stem.directory.Fallback(**second_fallback)) + second_fallback = stem.directory.Fallback(**fallback_attr) + setattr(second_fallback, attr, value) + self.assertNotEqual(stem.directory.Fallback(**fallback_attr), second_fallback) def test_from_cache(self): fallbacks = stem.directory.Fallback.from_cache() @@ -155,15 +156,15 @@ class TestFallback(unittest.TestCase): def test_from_str_malformed(self): test_values = { FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'id=0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB', b''): 'Malformed fallback address line:', - FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'5.9.110.236', b'5.9.110'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB has an invalid IPv4 address: 5.9.110', - FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b':9030', b':7814713228'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB has an invalid dir_port: 7814713228', - FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'orport=9001', b'orport=7814713228'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB has an invalid or_port: 7814713228', - FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'ipv6=[2a01', b'ipv6=[:::'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB has an invalid IPv6 address: ::::4f8:162:51e2::2', + FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'5.9.110.236', b'5.9.110'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB (rueckgrat) has an invalid IPv4 address: 5.9.110', + FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b':9030', b':7814713228'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB (rueckgrat) has an invalid DirPort: 7814713228', + FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'orport=9001', b'orport=7814713228'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB (rueckgrat) has an invalid ORPort: 7814713228', + FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'ipv6=[2a01', b'ipv6=[:::'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB (rueckgrat) has an invalid IPv6 address: ::::4f8:162:51e2::2', FALLBACK_ENTRY.replace(b'nickname=rueckgrat', b'nickname=invalid~nickname'): '0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB has an invalid nickname: invalid~nickname', } for entry, expected in test_values.items(): - self.assertRaisesRegexp(ValueError, expected, stem.directory.Fallback._from_str, entry) + self.assertRaisesRegexp(ValueError, re.escape(expected), stem.directory.Fallback._from_str, entry) def test_persistence(self): expected = {

1 0

[tor/master] Allow bandwidth-file lines to have node_id in the last position
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit dbc80ad19b8a27aab557fe7930e18eef8f415133 Author: juga0 <juga(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu May 3 08:29:57 2018 +0000 Allow bandwidth-file lines to have node_id in the last position Closes ticket 26004. --- src/or/dirserv.c | 6 ++++++ src/test/test_dir.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 41c6bf3dc..d9a9b8522 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -2640,6 +2640,12 @@ measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line) int got_bw = 0; int got_node_id = 0; char *strtok_state; /* lame sauce d'jour */ + + /* Remove end of line character, so that is not part of the token */ + if (line[strlen(line) - 1] == '\n') { + line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0'; + } + cp = tor_strtok_r(cp, " \t", &strtok_state); if (!cp) { diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c index cdc56acb8..b3817a092 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir.c @@ -1314,6 +1314,13 @@ test_dir_measured_bw_kb(void *arg) "bw=1024 junk=007\n", "misc=junk node_id=$557365204145532d32353620696e73746561642e " "bw=1024 junk=007\n", + /* check whether node_id can be at the end */ + "bw=1024 node_id=$557365204145532d32353620696e73746561642e\n", + /* check whether node_id can be at the end and bw has something in front*/ + "foo=bar bw=1024 node_id=$557365204145532d32353620696e73746561642e\n", + /* check whether node_id can be at the end and something in the + * in the middle of bw and node_id */ + "bw=1024 foo=bar node_id=$557365204145532d32353620696e73746561642e\n", "end" }; const char *lines_fail[] = {

1 0

[tor/master] Add a changes file for ticket 26004.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit bed3e8da9cc291546da06d5a5163a3598650d545 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 7 13:57:14 2018 -0400 Add a changes file for ticket 26004. --- changes/ticket26004 | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket26004 b/changes/ticket26004 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b082f145 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket26004 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features (directory authority, forward compatibility): + - Make the lines of the measured bandwidth file able to contain their + entries in any order. Previously, the node_id entry needed to come + first. Closes ticket 26004. +

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug26004_029_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit 3df37d7b6be4f7d6ece0cd12812595d5f91ea72f Merge: 5edc72a45 bed3e8da9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 8 14:26:05 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'bug26004_029_squashed' changes/ticket26004 | 5 +++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 12 ++++++++++++ src/test/test_dir.c | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

1 0

[tor/master] Avoid unsigned integer underflow on empty input.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit a17dc0875ad0d434d9cf66d36ed23fbd69286bf3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 7 13:56:39 2018 -0400 Avoid unsigned integer underflow on empty input. --- src/or/dirserv.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index d9a9b8522..e47533759 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -2641,6 +2641,12 @@ measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line) int got_node_id = 0; char *strtok_state; /* lame sauce d'jour */ + if (strlen(line) == 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Empty line in bandwidth file"); + tor_free(line); + return -1; + } + /* Remove end of line character, so that is not part of the token */ if (line[strlen(line) - 1] == '\n') { line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';

1 0

[torspec/master] Mention how HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes alter path restrictions.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit 2058ddded039f532c61a94cdfcb190f2e8f74b1d Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 8 16:39:10 2018 +0000 Mention how HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes alter path restrictions. --- path-spec.txt | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/path-spec.txt b/path-spec.txt index 0122dc5..15d9a3b 100644 --- a/path-spec.txt +++ b/path-spec.txt @@ -339,6 +339,11 @@ of their choices. <target>, and the request is only supported by the exit whose nickname or fingerprint is <servername>. + - When set, "HSLayer2Nodes" and "HSLayer3Nodes" relax Tor's path + restrictions to allow nodes in the same /16 and node family to reappear + in the path. They also allow the guard node to be chosen as the RP, IP, + and HSDIR, and as the hop before those positions. + 2.3. Cannibalizing circuits If we need a circuit and have a clean one already established, in

1 0

[tor/master] Write unittests to check basic vanguard path selection.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit 627d2fdbf0903498807fdd21c59a91502d731f7d Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Fri Apr 27 15:27:17 2018 +0300 Write unittests to check basic vanguard path selection. Adds two unittests: - First checks the path selection of basic Tor circs. - Second checks the path selection of vanguard circs. There is a TODO on the second unittest that we might want to test sooner than later, but it's not trivial to do it right now. To do these unittests we needed the following mods: - Make some functions STATIC. - Add some more fields to the big fake network nodes of test_entrynodes.c - Switch fake node nicknames to base32 (because base64 does not produce valid nicknames). --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 7 ++ src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 68ff964f6..74e607d18 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -72,10 +72,7 @@ static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, int relayed); -static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit, - int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); -static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); STATIC int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); static int circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ); @@ -2285,7 +2282,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, * be used as an HS v3 rendezvous point. * * Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */ -static int +STATIC int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit) { @@ -2719,7 +2716,7 @@ onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath) * Return 1 if the path is complete, 0 if we successfully added a hop, * and -1 on error. */ -static int +STATIC int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) { uint8_t purpose = circ->base_.purpose; diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index bea31ad0d..ae4aef768 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ STATIC circid_t get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan); STATIC int new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, smartlist_t *nodes); MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, count_acceptable_nodes, (smartlist_t *nodes)); + +STATIC int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); + +STATIC int +onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, + int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); + #if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) STATIC const node_t *pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, const or_options_t *options); diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 92a860360..c97aced04 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include "orconfig.h" #define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE #define STATEFILE_PRIVATE #define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE #define ROUTERLIST_PRIVATE @@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ #include "bridges.h" #include "circuitlist.h" +#include "circuitbuild.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" #include "directory.h" @@ -74,6 +76,17 @@ bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(const char *id) return NULL; } +/* Helper function to free a test node. */ +static void +test_node_free(node_t *n) +{ + tor_free(n->rs); + tor_free(n->md->onion_curve25519_pkey); + short_policy_free(n->md->exit_policy); + tor_free(n->md); + tor_free(n); +} + /* Unittest cleanup function: Cleanup the fake network. */ static int big_fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) @@ -83,9 +96,7 @@ big_fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) if (big_fake_net_nodes) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, { - tor_free(n->rs); - tor_free(n->md); - tor_free(n); + test_node_free(n); }); smartlist_free(big_fake_net_nodes); } @@ -113,9 +124,18 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) big_fake_net_nodes = smartlist_new(); for (i = 0; i < N_NODES; ++i) { + curve25519_secret_key_t curve25519_secret_key; + node_t *n = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(node_t)); n->md = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(microdesc_t)); + /* Generate curve25519 key for this node */ + n->md->onion_curve25519_pkey = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); + curve25519_secret_key_generate(&curve25519_secret_key, 0); + curve25519_public_key_generate(n->md->onion_curve25519_pkey, + &curve25519_secret_key); + crypto_rand(n->identity, sizeof(n->identity)); n->rs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerstatus_t)); @@ -135,8 +155,8 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) { char nickname_binary[8]; crypto_rand(nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary)); - base64_encode(n->rs->nickname, sizeof(n->rs->nickname), - nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary), 0); + base32_encode(n->rs->nickname, sizeof(n->rs->nickname), + nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary)); } /* Call half of the nodes a possible guard. */ @@ -144,6 +164,12 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) n->is_possible_guard = 1; n->rs->guardfraction_percentage = 100; n->rs->has_guardfraction = 1; + n->rs->is_possible_guard = 1; + } + + /* Make some of these nodes a possible exit */ + if (i % 7 == 0) { + n->md->exit_policy = parse_short_policy("accept 443"); } smartlist_add(big_fake_net_nodes, n); @@ -1075,9 +1101,7 @@ test_entry_guard_expand_sample_small_net(void *arg) /* Fun corner case: not enough guards to make up our whole sample size. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, { if (n_sl_idx >= 15) { - tor_free(n->rs); - tor_free(n->md); - tor_free(n); + test_node_free(n); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(big_fake_net_nodes, n); } else { n->rs->addr = 0; // make the filter reject this. @@ -1171,9 +1195,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status(void *arg) entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 5); node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity); smartlist_remove(big_fake_net_nodes, n); - tor_free(n->rs); - tor_free(n->md); - tor_free(n); + test_node_free(n); } update_approx_time(start + 300); sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs); @@ -2787,6 +2809,161 @@ test_entry_guard_outdated_dirserver_exclusion(void *arg) } } +/** Test helper to extend the <b>oc</b> circuit path <b>n</b> times and then + * ensure that the circuit is now complete. */ +static void +helper_extend_circuit_path_n_times(origin_circuit_t *oc, int n) +{ + int retval; + int i; + + /* Extend path n times */ + for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) { + retval = onion_extend_cpath(oc); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(circuit_get_cpath_len(oc), OP_EQ, i+1); + } + + /* Now do it one last time and see that circ is complete */ + retval = onion_extend_cpath(oc); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: + ; +} + +/** Test for basic Tor path selection. Makes sure we build 3-hop circuits. */ +static void +test_entry_guard_basic_path_selection(void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + + int retval; + + /* Enable entry guards */ + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + options->UseEntryGuards = 1; + + /* disables /16 check since all nodes have the same addr... */ + options->EnforceDistinctSubnets = 0; + + /* Create our circuit */ + circuit_t *circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(30); + origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + oc->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t)); + + /* First pick the exit and pin it on the build_state */ + retval = onion_pick_cpath_exit(oc, NULL, 0); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Extend path 3 times. First we pick guard, then middle, then exit. */ + helper_extend_circuit_path_n_times(oc, 3); + + done: + circuit_free_(circ); +} + +/** Test helper to build an L2 and L3 vanguard list. The vanguard lists + * produced should be completely disjoint. */ +static void +helper_setup_vanguard_list(or_options_t *options) +{ + int i = 0; + + /* Add some nodes to the vanguard L2 list */ + options->HSLayer2Nodes = routerset_new(); + for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i += 2) { + node_t *vanguard_node = smartlist_get(big_fake_net_nodes, i); + tt_assert(vanguard_node->is_possible_guard); + routerset_parse(options->HSLayer2Nodes, vanguard_node->rs->nickname, "l2"); + } + /* also add some nodes to vanguard L3 list + * (L2 list and L3 list should be disjoint for this test to work) */ + options->HSLayer3Nodes = routerset_new(); + for (i = 10; i < 20 ; i += 2) { + node_t *vanguard_node = smartlist_get(big_fake_net_nodes, i); + tt_assert(vanguard_node->is_possible_guard); + routerset_parse(options->HSLayer3Nodes, vanguard_node->rs->nickname, "l3"); + } + + done: + ; +} + +/** Test to ensure that vanguard path selection works properly. Ensures that + * default vanguard circuits are 4 hops, and that path selection works + * correctly given the vanguard settings. */ +static void +test_entry_guard_vanguard_path_selection(void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + + int retval; + + /* Enable entry guards */ + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + options->UseEntryGuards = 1; + + /* XXX disables /16 check */ + options->EnforceDistinctSubnets = 0; + + /* Setup our vanguard list */ + helper_setup_vanguard_list(options); + + /* Create our circuit */ + circuit_t *circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(30); + origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + oc->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t)); + oc->build_state->is_internal = 1; + + /* Switch circuit purpose to vanguards */ + circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS; + + /* First pick the exit and pin it on the build_state */ + tt_int_op(oc->build_state->desired_path_len, OP_EQ, 0); + retval = onion_pick_cpath_exit(oc, NULL, 0); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Ensure that vanguards make 4-hop circuits by default */ + tt_int_op(oc->build_state->desired_path_len, OP_EQ, 4); + + /* Extend path as many times as needed to have complete circ. */ + helper_extend_circuit_path_n_times(oc, oc->build_state->desired_path_len); + + /* Test that the cpath linked list is set correctly. */ + crypt_path_t *l1_node = oc->cpath; + crypt_path_t *l2_node = l1_node->next; + crypt_path_t *l3_node = l2_node->next; + crypt_path_t *l4_node = l3_node->next; + crypt_path_t *l1_node_again = l4_node->next; + tt_ptr_op(l1_node, OP_EQ, l1_node_again); + + /* Test that L2 is indeed HSLayer2Node */ + retval = routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->HSLayer2Nodes, + l2_node->extend_info); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 4); + /* test that L3 node is _not_ contained in HSLayer2Node */ + retval = routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->HSLayer2Nodes, + l3_node->extend_info); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_LT, 4); + + /* Test that L3 is indeed HSLayer3Node */ + retval = routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->HSLayer3Nodes, + l3_node->extend_info); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 4); + /* test that L2 node is _not_ contained in HSLayer3Node */ + retval = routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->HSLayer3Nodes, + l2_node->extend_info); + tt_int_op(retval, OP_LT, 4); + + /* TODO: Test that L1 can be the same as exit. To test this we need start + enforcing EnforceDistinctSubnets again, which means that we need to give + each test node a different address which currently breaks some tests. */ + + done: + circuit_free_(circ); +} + static const struct testcase_setup_t big_fake_network = { big_fake_network_setup, big_fake_network_cleanup }; @@ -2848,6 +3025,8 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { BFN_TEST(select_and_cancel), BFN_TEST(drop_guards), BFN_TEST(outdated_dirserver_exclusion), + BFN_TEST(basic_path_selection), + BFN_TEST(vanguard_path_selection), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_a_circuit, "c1-done c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_live_primary_guards, "c1-done c2-done"),

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[tor/master] Bug 25870: Mention path restriction differences in manpage.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit e716c92127f0da2fc5758c091a9e33857cd5e5d5 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 8 16:35:20 2018 +0000 Bug 25870: Mention path restriction differences in manpage. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 05a612d6a..2f74d567e 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1574,6 +1574,14 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be picked. + + When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet + and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service + circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present + as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This + is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information + about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points + in the path. + + This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load @@ -1619,6 +1627,14 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes, which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be picked. + + + When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet + and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service + circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present + as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This + is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information + about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points + in the path. + This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and

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[tor/master] Fix memleak found by unittests.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit e17f436fff541e0c31827f0e99bd345096d276e0 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Fri Apr 27 15:27:44 2018 +0300 Fix memleak found by unittests. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 74e607d18..1eb3947ae 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2633,7 +2633,9 @@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, /** If a hidden service circuit wants a specific middle node, pin it. */ if (middle_node_must_be_vanguard(options, purpose, cur_len)) { log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Picking a sticky node (cur_len = %d)", cur_len); - return pick_vanguard_middle_node(options, flags, cur_len, excluded); + choice = pick_vanguard_middle_node(options, flags, cur_len, excluded); + smartlist_free(excluded); + return choice; } choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug25870_rebase'
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '18

08 May '18

commit 5edc72a45b7479f5fe791054aa19f6b3b478c725 Merge: 2a4439adf e716c9212 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 8 14:12:29 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug25870_rebase' changes/bug25870 | 6 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 16 ++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++------- src/or/circuitbuild.h | 7 ++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 11 ++- src/or/entrynodes.h | 1 + src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 7 files changed, 307 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --cc src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 6af18f8f4,c97aced04..cfcb88a66 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@@ -14,9 -15,9 +15,10 @@@ #include "bridges.h" #include "circuitlist.h" + #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" +#include "crypto_rand.h" #include "directory.h" #include "entrynodes.h" #include "nodelist.h"

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