September 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.3.1] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.1' into release-0.3.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit f0fa7a3420d2cfe1a1d28fc06b2e20a491066a1f Merge: c4ecb8f86 9c404602a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:51:16 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.1' into release-0.3.1 changes/bug23105-diagnostic | 4 ++++ src/or/relay.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

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[tor/release-0.3.1] Add a stack trace to the warning at issue with 23105.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 9c404602a0a5dd0b916957f4c456c59defecea13 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:49:11 2017 -0400 Add a stack trace to the warning at issue with 23105. With luck, this will help us diagnose 23105 and fix it. I also added a stack trace to the warning right before it, since why not. --- changes/bug23105-diagnostic | 4 ++++ src/or/relay.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug23105-diagnostic b/changes/bug23105-diagnostic new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8ba4931e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug23105-diagnostic @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (diagnostic): + - Add a stack trace to the bug warnings that can be logged when + trying to send an outgoing relay cell with n_chan == 0. + Diagnostic attempt for bug 23105. diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 0ff53ed5e..cb1a0692b 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #define RELAY_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" +#include "backtrace.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "channel.h" #include "circpathbias.h" @@ -511,11 +512,13 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (!chan) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d has n_chan==NULL." " Dropping.", filename, lineno); + log_backtrace(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,""); return 0; /* just drop it */ } if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d on non-origin " "circ. Dropping.", filename, lineno); + log_backtrace(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,""); return 0; /* just drop it */ }

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[tor/master] Add a stack trace to the warning at issue with 23105.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 9c404602a0a5dd0b916957f4c456c59defecea13 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:49:11 2017 -0400 Add a stack trace to the warning at issue with 23105. With luck, this will help us diagnose 23105 and fix it. I also added a stack trace to the warning right before it, since why not. --- changes/bug23105-diagnostic | 4 ++++ src/or/relay.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug23105-diagnostic b/changes/bug23105-diagnostic new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8ba4931e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug23105-diagnostic @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (diagnostic): + - Add a stack trace to the bug warnings that can be logged when + trying to send an outgoing relay cell with n_chan == 0. + Diagnostic attempt for bug 23105. diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 0ff53ed5e..cb1a0692b 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #define RELAY_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" +#include "backtrace.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "channel.h" #include "circpathbias.h" @@ -511,11 +512,13 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (!chan) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d has n_chan==NULL." " Dropping.", filename, lineno); + log_backtrace(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,""); return 0; /* just drop it */ } if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d on non-origin " "circ. Dropping.", filename, lineno); + log_backtrace(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,""); return 0; /* just drop it */ }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.1'
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 1e079ec30db716f92bf944489ec0408daef18d0f Merge: ae7cb3349 9c404602a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:51:16 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.1' changes/bug23105-diagnostic | 4 ++++ src/or/relay.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

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[tor/maint-0.3.1] Add a stack trace to the warning at issue with 23105.
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 9c404602a0a5dd0b916957f4c456c59defecea13 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:49:11 2017 -0400 Add a stack trace to the warning at issue with 23105. With luck, this will help us diagnose 23105 and fix it. I also added a stack trace to the warning right before it, since why not. --- changes/bug23105-diagnostic | 4 ++++ src/or/relay.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug23105-diagnostic b/changes/bug23105-diagnostic new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8ba4931e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug23105-diagnostic @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (diagnostic): + - Add a stack trace to the bug warnings that can be logged when + trying to send an outgoing relay cell with n_chan == 0. + Diagnostic attempt for bug 23105. diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 0ff53ed5e..cb1a0692b 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #define RELAY_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" +#include "backtrace.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "channel.h" #include "circpathbias.h" @@ -511,11 +512,13 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (!chan) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d has n_chan==NULL." " Dropping.", filename, lineno); + log_backtrace(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,""); return 0; /* just drop it */ } if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d on non-origin " "circ. Dropping.", filename, lineno); + log_backtrace(LOG_WARN,LD_BUG,""); return 0; /* just drop it */ }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug23361_032_01_squashed2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit ae7cb3349e8a159c3144e7d3ea66b9a439d7028e Merge: ab18e5e5f c527cde82 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:35:35 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'bug23361_032_01_squashed2' src/or/circuitbuild.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/or/circuitlist.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.h | 3 +++ src/or/hs_client.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 10 +++++++++- src/or/protover.h | 2 ++ src/or/routerlist.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- src/or/routerparse.c | 3 +++ 11 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] prop224: Pick rendezvous point of protover HSRend=2
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit c527cde82f74849ec3b183159d20441019b77e2e Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 30 10:13:22 2017 -0400 prop224: Pick rendezvous point of protover HSRend=2 Version 3 hidden service needs rendezvous point that have the protocol version HSRend >= 2 else the rendezvous cells are rejected. Fixes #23361 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/or/circuitlist.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.h | 3 +++ src/or/hs_client.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 10 +++++++++- src/or/protover.h | 2 ++ src/or/routerlist.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- src/or/routerparse.c | 3 +++ 11 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 65cd7bd5d..e5c6767d4 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, int relayed); -static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit); +static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit, + int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); @@ -505,10 +506,15 @@ circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int flags) { origin_circuit_t *circ; int err_reason = 0; + int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit = 0; + + if (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_V3_RP) { + is_hs_v3_rp_circuit = 1; + } circ = origin_circuit_init(purpose, flags); - if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit_ei) < 0 || + if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit_ei, is_hs_v3_rp_circuit) < 0 || onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) { circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH); return NULL; @@ -2156,7 +2162,8 @@ pick_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags) */ static const node_t * choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, - int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal) + int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal, + int need_hs_v3) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; @@ -2164,6 +2171,8 @@ choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME; if (need_capacity) flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; + if (need_hs_v3) + flags |= CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3; switch (purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: @@ -2263,9 +2272,15 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, /** Decide a suitable length for circ's cpath, and pick an exit * router (or use exit if provided). Store these in the - * cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */ + * cpath. + * + * If is_hs_v3_rp_circuit is set, then this exit should be suitable to + * be used as an HS v3 rendezvous point. + * + * Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */ static int -onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) +onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, + int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit) { cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state; @@ -2289,7 +2304,8 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) } else { /* we have to decide one */ const node_t *node = choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime, - state->need_capacity, state->is_internal); + state->need_capacity, state->is_internal, + is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); if (!node) { log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to choose an exit server"); return -1; diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 2f3fe327e..774edc90b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1609,6 +1609,30 @@ circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, return NULL; } +/** We might cannibalize this circuit: Return true if its last hop can be used + * as a v3 rendezvous point. */ +static int +circuit_can_be_cannibalized_for_v3_rp(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + if (!circ->build_state) { + return 0; + } + + extend_info_t *chosen_exit = circ->build_state->chosen_exit; + if (BUG(!chosen_exit)) { + return 0; + } + + const node_t *rp_node = node_get_by_id(chosen_exit->identity_digest); + if (rp_node) { + if (node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(rp_node)) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + /** Return a circuit that is open, is CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, * has a timestamp_dirty value of 0, has flags matching the CIRCLAUNCH_* * flags in flags, and if info is defined, does not already use info @@ -1691,6 +1715,14 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, hop = hop->next; } while (hop != circ->cpath); } + + if ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_V3_RP) && + !circuit_can_be_cannibalized_for_v3_rp(circ)) { + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Skipping uncannibalizable circuit for v3 " + "rendezvous point."); + goto next; + } + if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime)) best = circ; next: ; diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 570b05e57..c229c84d9 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2290,6 +2290,16 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, if (want_onehop) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL; if (need_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME; if (need_internal) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL; + + /* If we are about to pick a v3 RP right now, make sure we pick a + * rendezvous point that supports the v3 protocol! */ + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED && + new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND && + ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident) { + flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_V3_RP; + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Getting rendezvous circuit to v3 service!"); + } + circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(new_circ_purpose, extend_info, flags); } diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.h b/src/or/circuituse.h index e66679586..6c0bcbb35 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.h +++ b/src/or/circuituse.h @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ void circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ); /** Flag to set when the last hop of a circuit doesn't need to be an * exit node. */ #define CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL (1<<3) +/** Flag to set when we are trying to launch a v3 rendezvous circuit. We need + * to apply some additional filters on the node picked. */ +#define CIRCLAUNCH_IS_V3_RP (1<<4) origin_circuit_t *circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int flags); diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index 99be058eb..2acc639e4 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "connection.h" +#include "nodelist.h" #include "circpathbias.h" #include "connection.h" #include "hs_ntor.h" @@ -461,9 +462,21 @@ client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) tor_assert(circ); tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND); + const extend_info_t *rp_ei = circ->build_state->chosen_exit; + + /* Check that we didn't accidentally choose a node that does not understand + * the v3 rendezvous protocol */ + if (rp_ei) { + const node_t *rp_node = node_get_by_id(rp_ei->identity_digest); + if (rp_node) { + if (BUG(!node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(rp_node))) { + return; + } + } + } + log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit has opened to %s.", - safe_str_client( - extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit))); + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp_ei))); /* Ignore returned value, nothing we can really do. On failure, the circuit * will be marked for close. */ diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 6acc87f96..f670870f6 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -863,6 +863,28 @@ node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(const node_t *node) return 0; } +/** Return true iff node supports to be a rendezvous point for hidden + * service version 3 (HSRend=2). */ +int +node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(const node_t *node) +{ + tor_assert(node); + + if (node->rs) { + return node->rs->supports_v3_rendezvous_point; + } + if (node->ri) { + if (node->ri->protocol_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + return protocol_list_supports_protocol(node->ri->protocol_list, + PRT_HSREND, + PROTOVER_HS_RENDEZVOUS_POINT_V3); + } + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + return 0; +} + /** Return the RSA ID key's SHA1 digest for the provided node. */ const uint8_t * node_get_rsa_id_digest(const node_t *node) diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.h b/src/or/nodelist.h index d16cf0ecf..9676263f7 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.h +++ b/src/or/nodelist.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ int node_ed25519_id_matches(const node_t *node, int node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node); int node_supports_v3_hsdir(const node_t *node); int node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(const node_t *node); +int node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(const node_t *node); const uint8_t *node_get_rsa_id_digest(const node_t *node); int node_has_ipv6_addr(const node_t *node); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 5d55094a0..a2707b4d4 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2321,6 +2321,11 @@ typedef struct routerstatus_t { * requires HSDir=2. */ unsigned int supports_v3_hsdir : 1; + /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an hidden + * service rendezvous point supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224. + * This requires HSRend=2. */ + unsigned int supports_v3_rendezvous_point: 1; + unsigned int has_bandwidth:1; /**< The vote/consensus had bw info */ unsigned int has_exitsummary:1; /**< The vote/consensus had exit summaries */ unsigned int bw_is_unmeasured:1; /**< This is a consensus entry, with @@ -5381,7 +5386,10 @@ typedef enum { CRN_PREF_ADDR = 1<<7, /* On clients, only provide nodes that we can connect to directly, based on * our firewall rules */ - CRN_DIRECT_CONN = 1<<8 + CRN_DIRECT_CONN = 1<<8, + /* On clients, only provide nodes with HSRend >= 2 protocol version which + * is required for hidden service version >= 3. */ + CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3 = 1<<9, } router_crn_flags_t; /** Return value for router_add_to_routerlist() and dirserv_add_descriptor() */ diff --git a/src/or/protover.h b/src/or/protover.h index 2066aeec7..ec8da1a0d 100644 --- a/src/or/protover.h +++ b/src/or/protover.h @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #define PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3 2 /** The protover version number that signifies HSv3 intro point support */ #define PROTOVER_HS_INTRO_V3 4 +/** The protover version number that signifies HSv3 rendezvous point support */ +#define PROTOVER_HS_RENDEZVOUS_POINT_V3 2 /** List of recognized subprotocols. */ typedef enum protocol_type_t { diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 989401947..da2dff600 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -2799,6 +2799,7 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist, const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0; const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0; const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0; + const int rendezvous_v3 = (flags & CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3) != 0; smartlist_t *sl=smartlist_new(), *excludednodes=smartlist_new(); @@ -2810,12 +2811,19 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist, rule = weight_for_exit ? WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT : (need_guard ? WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD : WEIGHT_FOR_MID); - /* Exclude relays that allow single hop exit circuits. This is an obsolete - * option since 0.2.9.2-alpha and done by default in 0.3.1.0-alpha. */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodelist_get_list(), node_t *, node, + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodelist_get_list(), node_t *, node) { if (node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) { + /* Exclude relays that allow single hop exit circuits. This is an + * obsolete option since 0.2.9.2-alpha and done by default in + * 0.3.1.0-alpha. */ smartlist_add(excludednodes, node); - }); + } else if (rendezvous_v3 && + !node_supports_v3_rendezvous_point(node)) { + /* Exclude relays that do not support to rendezvous for a hidden service + * version 3. */ + smartlist_add(excludednodes, node); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) routerlist_add_node_and_family(excludednodes, r); diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 9c11f4d07..08c3fc0a0 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -2708,6 +2708,9 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, rs->supports_v3_hsdir = protocol_list_supports_protocol(tok->args[0], PRT_HSDIR, PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3); + rs->supports_v3_rendezvous_point = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(tok->args[0], PRT_HSDIR, + PROTOVER_HS_RENDEZVOUS_POINT_V3); } if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_V))) { tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);

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[torspec/master] Correct description of which cells are allowed during the handshake
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 1bbf52873ca7d585f36596ae67bc61d49105af12 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 6 13:45:16 2017 -0400 Correct description of which cells are allowed during the handshake We said that PADDING was allowed, but it wasn't. Bug 22934. --- tor-spec.txt | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index 176dfc1..600d457 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -504,9 +504,9 @@ see tor-design.pdf. authenticate or not. If it does not want to authenticate, it MUST send a NETINFO cell. If it does want to authenticate, it MUST send a CERTS cell, an AUTHENTICATE cell (4.4), and a NETINFO. When this - handshake is in use, the first cell must be VERSIONS, VPADDING or + handshake is in use, the first cell must be VERSIONS, VPADDING, or AUTHORIZE, and no other cell type is allowed to intervene besides - those specified, except for PADDING and VPADDING cells. + those specified, except for VPADDING cells. The AUTHORIZE cell type is reserved for future use by scanning-resistance designs.

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[torspec/master] Merge branch 'bug22934'
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 5a3ea37d1584eaa4a5a32181a50d8d6299f02d4f Merge: ee2ce95 1bbf528 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 08:01:09 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'bug22934' tor-spec.txt | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor-browser-build/master] README.HACKING: explain how to test an rbm patch
by boklm＠torproject.org 07 Sep '17

07 Sep '17

commit 53379a752224091a56d157f570155457936d6564 Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 7 12:45:19 2017 +0200 README.HACKING: explain how to test an rbm patch --- README.HACKING | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.HACKING b/README.HACKING index df87410..31b8352 100644 --- a/README.HACKING +++ b/README.HACKING @@ -259,3 +259,20 @@ is closed and the container containing the failed build is removed. The path to the container should be printed on the screen in case you want to backup its rootfs to be able to look at it later. + +Testing an rbm patch +-------------------- + +When you are working on a patch to rbm, you might want to try a Tor +Browser build using your patched version of rbm. You could patch the +rbm in the rbm/ directory, however your patch can be reverted if you +use any of the makefile rules that does a 'git submodule update'. +To avoid this you can clone the rbm git repository to a separate +directory, where you will apply your patch. To do a build using your +patched rbm, take the command from the makefile, but replace $(rbm) +with the path to your patched rbm. + +For example, if you want to try a Linux x86_64 alpha build, you can run: + $ /path_to_rbm/rbm build release --target alpha --target \ + torbrowser-linux-x86_64 +

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