August 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] prop224: Make circuit prediction aware of v3 services
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 6c3d525c361adac1ad769f87a343fe3e9d2b050b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 11 11:18:23 2017 -0400 prop224: Make circuit prediction aware of v3 services Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- src/or/hs_service.c | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/hs_service.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index b19f9ed46..5292dc01d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ needs_exit_circuits(time_t now, int *needs_uptime, int *needs_capacity) STATIC int needs_hs_server_circuits(int num_uptime_internal) { - return (rend_num_services() && + return ((rend_num_services() || hs_service_get_num_services()) && num_uptime_internal < SUFFICIENT_UPTIME_INTERNAL_HS_SERVERS && router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN); } diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c index d717b9ce2..a20de94b1 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_service.c +++ b/src/or/hs_service.c @@ -2390,6 +2390,16 @@ service_add_fnames_to_list(const hs_service_t *service, smartlist_t *list) /* Public API */ /* ========== */ +/* Return the number of service we have configured and usable. */ +unsigned int +hs_service_get_num_services(void) +{ + if (hs_service_map == NULL) { + return 0; + } + return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map); +} + /* Called once an introduction circuit is closed. If the circuit doesn't have * a v3 identifier, it is ignored. */ void diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.h b/src/or/hs_service.h index bc29c3d82..f46c4f51a 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_service.h +++ b/src/or/hs_service.h @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ void hs_service_free_all(void); hs_service_t *hs_service_new(const or_options_t *options); void hs_service_free(hs_service_t *service); +unsigned int hs_service_get_num_services(void); void hs_service_stage_services(const smartlist_t *service_list); int hs_service_load_all_keys(void); void hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,

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[tor/master] prop224: Add service rendezvous circuit relaunch
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 713eb08bc9582b49e8073122fb68c3fac5bae188 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 30 16:11:59 2017 -0400 prop224: Add service rendezvous circuit relaunch This introduces a callback to relaunch a service rendezvous circuit when a previous one failed to build or expired. It unifies the legacy function rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() with one for specific to prop224. There is now only one entry point for that which is hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point() supporting both legacy and prop224 circuits. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuituse.c | 5 ++- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_circuit.h | 1 + src/or/hs_ident.c | 10 +++++ src/or/hs_ident.h | 1 + src/or/rendservice.c | 23 ---------- 6 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 247c5bbbb..b19f9ed46 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include "entrynodes.h" #include "hs_common.h" #include "hs_client.h" +#include "hs_circuit.h" #include "hs_ident.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "networkstatus.h" @@ -782,7 +783,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), victim->purpose); TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; - rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)); + hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)); continue; } @@ -1790,7 +1791,7 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) "(%s hop failed).", escaped(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)), failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last"); - rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circ); + hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(circ); break; /* default: * This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index d9e96c633..ce8522947 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -566,10 +566,131 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service, extend_info_free(info); } +/* Return true iff the given service rendezvous circuit circ is allowed for a + * relaunch to the rendezvous point. */ +static int +can_relaunch_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + /* This is initialized when allocating an origin circuit. */ + tor_assert(circ->build_state); + tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); + + /* XXX: Retrying under certain condition. This is related to #22455. */ + + /* Avoid to relaunch twice a circuit to the same rendezvous point at the + * same time. */ + if (circ->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit to %s has already been retried. " + "Skipping retry.", + safe_str_client( + extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit))); + goto disallow; + } + + /* A failure count that has reached maximum allowed or circuit that expired, + * we skip relaunching. */ + if (circ->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES || + circ->build_state->expiry_time <= time(NULL)) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Attempt to build a rendezvous circuit to %s has " + "failed with %d attempts and expiry time %ld. " + "Giving up building.", + safe_str_client( + extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)), + circ->build_state->failure_count, + circ->build_state->expiry_time); + goto disallow; + } + + /* Allowed to relaunch. */ + return 1; + disallow: + return 0; +} + +/* Retry the rendezvous point of circ by launching a new circuit to it. */ +static void +retry_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + int flags = 0; + origin_circuit_t *new_circ; + cpath_build_state_t *bstate; + + tor_assert(circ); + /* This is initialized when allocating an origin circuit. */ + tor_assert(circ->build_state); + tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); + + /* Ease our life. */ + bstate = circ->build_state; + + log_info(LD_REND, "Retrying rendezvous point circuit to %s", + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(bstate->chosen_exit))); + + /* Get the current build state flags for the next circuit. */ + flags |= (bstate->need_uptime) ? CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME : 0; + flags |= (bstate->need_capacity) ? CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY : 0; + flags |= (bstate->is_internal) ? CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL : 0; + + /* We do NOT add the onehop tunnel flag even though it might be a single + * onion service. The reason is that if we failed once to connect to the RP + * with a direct connection, we consider that chances are that we will fail + * again so try a 3-hop circuit and hope for the best. Because the service + * has no anonymity (single onion), this change of behavior won't affect + * security directly. */ + + /* Help predict this next time */ + rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), bstate->need_uptime, + bstate->need_capacity); + + new_circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, + bstate->chosen_exit, flags); + if (new_circ == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to launch rendezvous circuit to %s", + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(bstate->chosen_exit))); + goto done; + } + + /* Transfer build state information to the new circuit state in part to + * catch any other failures. */ + new_circ->build_state->failure_count = bstate->failure_count++; + new_circ->build_state->expiry_time = bstate->expiry_time; + new_circ->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_dup(circ->hs_ident); + + done: + return; +} + /* ========== */ /* Public API */ /* ========== */ +/* Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other than + * the last hop: launches a new circuit to the same rendezvous point. This + * supports legacy service. */ +void +hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); + + /* Check if we are allowed to relaunch to the rendezvous point of circ. */ + if (!can_relaunch_service_rendezvous_point(circ)) { + goto done; + } + + /* Flag the circuit that we are relaunching so to avoid to relaunch twice a + * circuit to the same rendezvous point at the same time. */ + circ->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched = 1; + + /* Legacy service don't have an hidden service ident. */ + (circ->hs_ident) ? retry_service_rendezvous_point(circ) : + rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circ); + + done: + return; +} + /* For a given service and a service intro point, launch a circuit to the * extend info ei. If the service is a single onion, a one-hop circuit will be * requested. Return 0 if the circuit was successfully launched and tagged diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.h b/src/or/hs_circuit.h index ca8f1b2f6..8301dea22 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.h +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ int hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service, int hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(const hs_service_t *service, const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key, const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie); +void hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ); /* Cell API. */ int hs_circ_handle_intro_established(const hs_service_t *service, diff --git a/src/or/hs_ident.c b/src/or/hs_ident.c index c3f789db5..e69350d82 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_ident.c +++ b/src/or/hs_ident.c @@ -34,6 +34,16 @@ hs_ident_circuit_free(hs_ident_circuit_t *ident) tor_free(ident); } +/* For a given circuit identifier src, return a newly allocated copy of it. + * This can't fail. */ +hs_ident_circuit_t * +hs_ident_circuit_dup(const hs_ident_circuit_t *src) +{ + hs_ident_circuit_t *ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ident)); + memcpy(ident, src, sizeof(*ident)); + return ident; +} + /* For a given directory connection identifier src, return a newly allocated * copy of it. This can't fail. */ hs_ident_dir_conn_t * diff --git a/src/or/hs_ident.h b/src/or/hs_ident.h index ca1fa3d70..a3ebd07da 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_ident.h +++ b/src/or/hs_ident.h @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ hs_ident_circuit_t *hs_ident_circuit_new( const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk, hs_ident_circuit_type_t circuit_type); void hs_ident_circuit_free(hs_ident_circuit_t *ident); +hs_ident_circuit_t *hs_ident_circuit_dup(const hs_ident_circuit_t *src); /* Directory connection identifier API. */ hs_ident_dir_conn_t *hs_ident_dir_conn_dup(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *src); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 7c4c6edc4..a205b00c6 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -2892,29 +2892,6 @@ rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc) tor_assert(oldcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); - /* Don't relaunch the same rend circ twice. */ - if (oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit to %s has already been relaunched; " - "not relaunching it again.", - oldcirc->build_state ? - safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)) - : "*unknown*"); - return; - } - oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched = 1; - - if (!oldcirc->build_state || - oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES || - oldcirc->build_state->expiry_time < time(NULL)) { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Attempt to build circuit to %s for rendezvous has failed " - "too many times or expired; giving up.", - oldcirc->build_state ? - safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)) - : "*unknown*"); - return; - } - oldstate = oldcirc->build_state; tor_assert(oldstate);

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[tor/master] prop224: Different intro point timings with TestingNetwork
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 1b403a83821d86ac358e49ae24bd1284ed0dcfab Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri May 26 14:20:00 2017 -0400 prop224: Different intro point timings with TestingNetwork Change the timing for intro point's lifetime and maximum amount of circuit we are allowed to launch in a TestingNetwork. This is particurlarly useful for chutney testing to test intro point rotation. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_service.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c index 0b524a3a8..d717b9ce2 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_service.c +++ b/src/or/hs_service.c @@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ get_intro_point_max_introduce2(void) static int32_t get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void) { +#define MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 10 + if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) { + return MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING; + } + /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide * in the future. */ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_lifetime", @@ -244,6 +249,11 @@ get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void) static int32_t get_intro_point_max_lifetime(void) { +#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 30 + if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) { + return MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING; + } + /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide * in the future. */ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_lifetime", @@ -1771,6 +1781,13 @@ get_max_intro_circ_per_period(const hs_service_t *service) tor_assert(service->config.num_intro_points <= HS_CONFIG_V3_MAX_INTRO_POINTS); +/* For a testing network, allow to do it for the maximum amount so circuit + * creation and rotation and so on can actually be tested without limit. */ +#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING -1 + if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) { + return MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING; + } + num_wanted_ip = service->config.num_intro_points; /* The calculation is as follow. We have a number of intro points that we

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[tor/master] prop224: Move get_intro_circuit() to hs_circuit.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 2cae4f41006cd1885c33870232a040f98ffd6597 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jul 19 11:42:04 2017 -0400 prop224: Move get_intro_circuit() to hs_circuit.c Make this function public so we can use it both in hs_circuit.c and hs_service.c to avoid code duplication. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/or/hs_circuit.h | 3 +++ src/or/hs_service.c | 29 +++-------------------------- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index ce8522947..adca189ad 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -215,17 +215,7 @@ count_opened_desc_intro_point_circuits(const hs_service_t *service, DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key, const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) { circuit_t *circ; - origin_circuit_t *ocirc; - if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) { - uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) { - continue; - } - ocirc = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_service_side(digest); - } else { - ocirc = - hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_service_side(&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey); - } + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip); if (ocirc == NULL) { continue; } @@ -665,6 +655,29 @@ retry_service_rendezvous_point(const origin_circuit_t *circ) /* Public API */ /* ========== */ +/* Return an introduction point circuit matching the given intro point object. + * NULL is returned is no such circuit can be found. */ +origin_circuit_t * +hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip) +{ + origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL; + + tor_assert(ip); + + if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) { + uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) { + goto end; + } + circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_service_side(digest); + } else { + circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_service_side( + &ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey); + } + end: + return circ; +} + /* Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other than * the last hop: launches a new circuit to the same rendezvous point. This * supports legacy service. */ diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.h b/src/or/hs_circuit.h index 8301dea22..8706e6b0e 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.h +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.h @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ int hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(const hs_service_t *service, const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie); void hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ); +origin_circuit_t *hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ( + const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip); + /* Cell API. */ int hs_circ_handle_intro_established(const hs_service_t *service, const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c index a20de94b1..f656592d5 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_service.c +++ b/src/or/hs_service.c @@ -578,29 +578,6 @@ get_extend_info_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, return info; } -/* Return an introduction point circuit matching the given intro point object. - * NULL is returned is no such circuit can be found. */ -static origin_circuit_t * -get_intro_circuit(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip) -{ - origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL; - - tor_assert(ip); - - if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) { - uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) { - goto end; - } - circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_service_side(digest); - } else { - circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_service_side( - &ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey); - } - end: - return circ; -} - /* Return the number of introduction points that are established for the * given descriptor. */ static unsigned int @@ -656,7 +633,7 @@ close_intro_circuits(hs_service_intropoints_t *intro_points) DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(intro_points->map, key, const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = get_intro_circuit(ip); + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip); if (ocirc) { /* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the * circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, the circuit is removed @@ -1587,7 +1564,7 @@ cleanup_intro_points(hs_service_t *service, time_t now) DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key, hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) { const node_t *node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip); - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = get_intro_circuit(ip); + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip); int has_expired = intro_point_should_expire(ip, now); /* We cleanup an intro point if it has expired or if we do not know the @@ -1733,7 +1710,7 @@ launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service, time_t now) /* Skip the intro point that already has an existing circuit * (established or not). */ - if (get_intro_circuit(ip)) { + if (hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip)) { continue; }

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[tor/master] hs: Rename num_rend_services()
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 4a8cf17897ca23f8352a27c1bffb6ebfd68a1e0e Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 10 11:31:51 2017 -0400 hs: Rename num_rend_services() Renamed to rend_num_services() so it is consistent with the legacy naming. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- src/or/hs_service.c | 6 +++--- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +- src/or/rendservice.h | 2 +- src/test/test_hs_config.c | 2 +- src/test/test_hs_service.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 4d450f114..247c5bbbb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ needs_exit_circuits(time_t now, int *needs_uptime, int *needs_capacity) STATIC int needs_hs_server_circuits(int num_uptime_internal) { - return (num_rend_services() && + return (rend_num_services() && num_uptime_internal < SUFFICIENT_UPTIME_INTERNAL_HS_SERVERS && router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN); } diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c index 2a3537966..9f496b615 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_service.c +++ b/src/or/hs_service.c @@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ run_build_circuit_event(time_t now) } /* Run v2 check. */ - if (num_rend_services() > 0) { + if (rend_num_services() > 0) { rend_consider_services_intro_points(now); } @@ -2074,7 +2074,7 @@ run_upload_descriptor_event(time_t now) { /* v2 services use the same function for descriptor creation and upload so * we do everything here because the intro circuits were checked before. */ - if (num_rend_services() > 0) { + if (rend_num_services() > 0) { rend_consider_services_upload(now); rend_consider_descriptor_republication(); } @@ -2605,7 +2605,7 @@ int hs_service_load_all_keys(void) { /* Load v2 service keys if we have v2. */ - if (num_rend_services() != 0) { + if (rend_num_services() != 0) { if (rend_service_load_all_keys(NULL) < 0) { goto err; } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 5f4a7c6a7..7c4c6edc4 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ rend_service_escaped_dir(const struct rend_service_t *s) /** Return the number of rendezvous services we have configured. */ int -num_rend_services(void) +rend_num_services(void) { if (!rend_service_list) return 0; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h index 819dfc176..ed1044f04 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.h +++ b/src/or/rendservice.h @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ STATIC void rend_service_prune_list_impl_(void); #endif /* RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE */ -int num_rend_services(void); +int rend_num_services(void); int rend_config_service(const config_line_t *line_, const or_options_t *options, hs_service_config_t *config); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_config.c b/src/test/test_hs_config.c index 4d4bbb889..2a85a7db0 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_config.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_config.c @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ test_staging_service_v3(void *arg) /* Ok, we have a service in our map! Registration went well. */ tt_int_op(get_hs_service_staging_list_size(), OP_EQ, 1); /* Make sure we don't have a magic v2 service out of this. */ - tt_int_op(num_rend_services(), OP_EQ, 0); + tt_int_op(rend_num_services(), OP_EQ, 0); done: hs_free_all(); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c index cb0ae2f45..1b8d8252e 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ test_load_keys(void *arg) tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); /* This one should now be registered into the v2 list. */ tt_int_op(get_hs_service_staging_list_size(), OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(num_rend_services(), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(rend_num_services(), OP_EQ, 1); /* v3 service. */ tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, hsdir_v3, HS_VERSION_THREE);

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[tor/master] prop224: HSDir v3 support is >= 0.3.0.8
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 85c80adf4a75e1f44250379a4806796a26e861e3 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 14 16:37:13 2017 -0400 prop224: HSDir v3 support is >= 0.3.0.8 Because of bug #22447, we have to select nodes that are at least this version. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/nodelist.c | 5 +++++ src/or/routerparse.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 117598cf1..1666fffb7 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #include "rendservice.h" #include "router.h" #include "routerlist.h" +#include "routerparse.h" #include "routerset.h" #include "torcert.h" @@ -797,6 +798,10 @@ node_supports_v3_hsdir(const node_t *node) if (node->ri->protocol_list == NULL) { return 0; } + if (node->ri->platform) { + /* Bug #22447 forces us to filter on this version. */ + return tor_version_as_new_as(node->ri->platform, "0.3.0.8"); + } return protocol_list_supports_protocol(node->ri->protocol_list, PRT_HSDIR, PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3); } diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index f4e87a00d..ec63aef4d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -2718,6 +2718,11 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, tor_version_as_new_as(tok->args[0], "0.2.4.8-alpha"); rs->protocols_known = 1; } + if (!strcmpstart(tok->args[0], "Tor ") && found_protocol_list) { + /* Bug #22447 forces us to filter on this version. */ + rs->supports_v3_hsdir = + tor_version_as_new_as(tok->args[0], "0.3.0.8"); + } if (vote_rs) { vote_rs->version = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]); }

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[tor/master] trunnel: Add prop224 RENDEZVOUS1 cell definition
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 3e537c6fe4b10b72079524829e13de65f3400c2b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jul 23 12:32:16 2017 -0400 trunnel: Add prop224 RENDEZVOUS1 cell definition Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h | 118 +++++++++++++ src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel | 18 ++ src/trunnel/include.am | 2 + 4 files changed, 430 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e961cd09d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* cell_rendezvous.c -- generated by Trunnel v1.5.1. + * https://gitweb.torproject.org/trunnel.git + * You probably shouldn't edit this file. + */ +#include <stdlib.h> +#include "trunnel-impl.h" + +#include "cell_rendezvous.h" + +#define TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(obj) \ + do { \ + (obj)->trunnel_error_code_ = 1; \ + } while (0) + +#if defined(__COVERITY__) || defined(__clang_analyzer__) +/* If we're runnning a static analysis tool, we don't want it to complain + * that some of our remaining-bytes checks are dead-code. */ +int cellrendezvous_deadcode_dummy__ = 0; +#define OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY || cellrendezvous_deadcode_dummy__ +#else +#define OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY +#endif + +#define CHECK_REMAINING(nbytes, label) \ + do { \ + if (remaining < (nbytes) OR_DEADCODE_DUMMY) { \ + goto label; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +trn_cell_rendezvous1_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous1_new(void) +{ + trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t)); + if (NULL == val) + return NULL; + return val; +} + +/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'. + */ +static void +trn_cell_rendezvous1_clear(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj) +{ + (void) obj; + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->handshake_info); + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->handshake_info); +} + +void +trn_cell_rendezvous1_free(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return; + trn_cell_rendezvous1_clear(obj); + trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t)); + trunnel_free_(obj); +} + +size_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getlen_rendezvous_cookie(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp) +{ + (void)inp; return TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN; +} + +uint8_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_rendezvous_cookie(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN); + return inp->rendezvous_cookie[idx]; +} + +uint8_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconst_rendezvous_cookie(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + return trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_rendezvous_cookie((trn_cell_rendezvous1_t*)inp, idx); +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous1_set_rendezvous_cookie(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN); + inp->rendezvous_cookie[idx] = elt; + return 0; +} + +uint8_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_rendezvous_cookie(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp) +{ + return inp->rendezvous_cookie; +} +const uint8_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconstarray_rendezvous_cookie(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp) +{ + return (const uint8_t *)trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_rendezvous_cookie((trn_cell_rendezvous1_t*)inp); +} +size_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getlen_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp) +{ + return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->handshake_info); +} + +uint8_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->handshake_info, idx); +} + +uint8_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconst_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + return trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_handshake_info((trn_cell_rendezvous1_t*)inp, idx); +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous1_set_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->handshake_info, idx, elt); + return 0; +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous1_add_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, uint8_t elt) +{ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->handshake_info, elt, {}); + return 0; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); + return -1; +} + +uint8_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp) +{ + return inp->handshake_info.elts_; +} +const uint8_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconstarray_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp) +{ + return (const uint8_t *)trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_handshake_info((trn_cell_rendezvous1_t*)inp); +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous1_setlen_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t newlen) +{ + uint8_t *newptr; + newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->handshake_info.allocated_, + &inp->handshake_info.n_, inp->handshake_info.elts_, newlen, + sizeof(inp->handshake_info.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL, + &inp->trunnel_error_code_); + if (newlen != 0 && newptr == NULL) + goto trunnel_alloc_failed; + inp->handshake_info.elts_ = newptr; + return 0; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); + return -1; +} +const char * +trn_cell_rendezvous1_check(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return "Object was NULL"; + if (obj->trunnel_error_code_) + return "A set function failed on this object"; + return NULL; +} + +ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_encoded_len(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + + if (NULL != trn_cell_rendezvous1_check(obj)) + return -1; + + + /* Length of u8 rendezvous_cookie[TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN] */ + result += TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN; + + /* Length of u8 handshake_info[] */ + result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->handshake_info); + return result; +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous1_clear_errors(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj) +{ + int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_; + obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0; + return r; +} +ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + size_t written = 0; + uint8_t *ptr = output; + const char *msg; +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + const ssize_t encoded_len = trn_cell_rendezvous1_encoded_len(obj); +#endif + + if (NULL != (msg = trn_cell_rendezvous1_check(obj))) + goto check_failed; + +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); +#endif + + /* Encode u8 rendezvous_cookie[TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN] */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN) + goto truncated; + memcpy(ptr, obj->rendezvous_cookie, TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN); + written += TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN; ptr += TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN; + + /* Encode u8 handshake_info[] */ + { + size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->handshake_info); + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < elt_len) + goto truncated; + if (elt_len) + memcpy(ptr, obj->handshake_info.elts_, elt_len); + written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len; + } + + + trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written); +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + { + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); + trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written); + } + +#endif + + return written; + + truncated: + result = -2; + goto fail; + check_failed: + (void)msg; + result = -1; + goto fail; + fail: + trunnel_assert(result < 0); + return result; +} + +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous1_parse(), but do not allocate the output + * object. + */ +static ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_parse_into(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + const uint8_t *ptr = input; + size_t remaining = len_in; + ssize_t result = 0; + (void)result; + + /* Parse u8 rendezvous_cookie[TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN] */ + CHECK_REMAINING(TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN, truncated); + memcpy(obj->rendezvous_cookie, ptr, TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN); + remaining -= TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN; ptr += TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN; + + /* Parse u8 handshake_info[] */ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->handshake_info, remaining, {}); + obj->handshake_info.n_ = remaining; + if (remaining) + memcpy(obj->handshake_info.elts_, ptr, remaining); + ptr += remaining; remaining -= remaining; + trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in); + return len_in - remaining; + + truncated: + return -2; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + return -1; +} + +ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous1_parse(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + ssize_t result; + *output = trn_cell_rendezvous1_new(); + if (NULL == *output) + return -1; + result = trn_cell_rendezvous1_parse_into(*output, input, len_in); + if (result < 0) { + trn_cell_rendezvous1_free(*output); + *output = NULL; + } + return result; +} diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2387d77f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* cell_rendezvous.h -- generated by by Trunnel v1.5.1. + * https://gitweb.torproject.org/trunnel.git + * You probably shouldn't edit this file. + */ +#ifndef TRUNNEL_CELL_RENDEZVOUS_H +#define TRUNNEL_CELL_RENDEZVOUS_H + +#include <stdint.h> +#include "trunnel.h" + +#define TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN 20 +#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_TRN_CELL_RENDEZVOUS1) +struct trn_cell_rendezvous1_st { + uint8_t rendezvous_cookie[TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN]; + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) handshake_info; + uint8_t trunnel_error_code_; +}; +#endif +typedef struct trn_cell_rendezvous1_st trn_cell_rendezvous1_t; +/** Return a newly allocated trn_cell_rendezvous1 with all elements + * set to zero. + */ +trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *trn_cell_rendezvous1_new(void); +/** Release all storage held by the trn_cell_rendezvous1 in 'victim'. + * (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.) + */ +void trn_cell_rendezvous1_free(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *victim); +/** Try to parse a trn_cell_rendezvous1 from the buffer in 'input', + * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, + * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly + * allocated trn_cell_rendezvous1_t. On failure, return -2 if the + * input appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid. + */ +ssize_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_parse(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in); +/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the + * trn_cell_rendezvous1 in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. + * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an + * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects. + */ +ssize_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_encoded_len(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj); +/** Try to encode the trn_cell_rendezvous1 from 'input' into the + * buffer at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. + * On success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 + * if the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid. + */ +ssize_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *input); +/** Check whether the internal state of the trn_cell_rendezvous1 in + * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if + * it is not. + */ +const char *trn_cell_rendezvous1_check(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj); +/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter + * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous1_clear_errors(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *obj); +/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the + * rendezvous_cookie field of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_getlen_rendezvous_cookie(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * rendezvous_cookie of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_rendezvous_cookie(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_rendezvous_cookie, but take and return + * a const pointer + */ +uint8_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconst_rendezvous_cookie(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * rendezvous_cookie of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp', so that + * it will hold the value 'elt'. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous1_set_rendezvous_cookie(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN-element array + * field rendezvous_cookie of 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_rendezvous_cookie(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp); +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_rendezvous_cookie, but take and return + * a const pointer + */ +const uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconstarray_rendezvous_cookie(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp); +/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the handshake_info + * field of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_getlen_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field + * handshake_info of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_handshake_info, but take and return a + * const pointer + */ +uint8_t trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconst_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field + * handshake_info of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp', so that it + * will hold the value 'elt'. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous1_set_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field + * handshake_info of the trn_cell_rendezvous1_t in 'inp'. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous1_add_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field handshake_info + * of 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp); +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous1_get_handshake_info, but take and return a + * const pointer + */ +const uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconstarray_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp); +/** Change the length of the variable-length array field + * handshake_info of 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. + * Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on + * failure. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous1_setlen_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t newlen); + + +#endif diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel new file mode 100644 index 000000000..27f1728b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* + * This contains the definition of the RENDEZVOUS1 cell for onion service + * version 3 and onward. The following format is specified in proposal 224 + * section 4.2. + */ + +/* Rendezvous cookie length. */ +const TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN = 20; + +/* RENDEZVOUS1 payload. See details in section 4.2. */ +struct trn_cell_rendezvous1 { + /* The RENDEZVOUS_COOKIE field. */ + u8 rendezvous_cookie[TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN]; + + /* The HANDSHAKE_INFO field which has a variable length depending on the + * handshake type used. */ + u8 handshake_info[]; +}; diff --git a/src/trunnel/include.am b/src/trunnel/include.am index de6cf4781..ca79ff3a3 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/include.am +++ b/src/trunnel/include.am @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ TRUNNELSOURCES = \ src/trunnel/hs/cell_common.c \ src/trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.c \ src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.c \ + src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c \ src/trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.c TRUNNELHEADERS = \ @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ TRUNNELHEADERS = \ src/trunnel/hs/cell_common.h \ src/trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h \ src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.h \ + src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h \ src/trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h src_trunnel_libor_trunnel_a_SOURCES = $(TRUNNELSOURCES)

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[tor/master] prop224: Helper to dup a link_specifier_t object
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit b8ceab9bb33a8096f14a671399ce34db439f63e2 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jul 23 10:43:16 2017 -0400 prop224: Helper to dup a link_specifier_t object Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_common.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.c b/src/or/hs_common.c index 27330bfcd..f6adad30c 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_common.c +++ b/src/or/hs_common.c @@ -541,6 +541,24 @@ hs_build_address(const ed25519_public_key_t *key, uint8_t version, tor_assert(hs_address_is_valid(addr_out)); } +/* Return a newly allocated copy of lspec. */ +link_specifier_t * +hs_link_specifier_dup(const link_specifier_t *lspec) +{ + link_specifier_t *dup = link_specifier_new(); + memcpy(dup, lspec, sizeof(*dup)); + /* The unrecognized field is a dynamic array so make sure to copy its + * content and not the pointer. */ + link_specifier_setlen_un_unrecognized( + dup, link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(lspec)); + if (link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(dup)) { + memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_unrecognized(dup), + link_specifier_getconstarray_un_unrecognized(lspec), + link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(dup)); + } + return dup; +} + /* Initialize the entire HS subsytem. This is called in tor_init() before any * torrc options are loaded. Only for >= v3. */ void diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.h b/src/or/hs_common.h index 203a5d081..a6c9994ef 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_common.h +++ b/src/or/hs_common.h @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ #include "or.h" +/* Trunnel */ +#include "ed25519_cert.h" + /* Protocol version 2. Use this instead of hardcoding "2" in the code base, * this adds a clearer semantic to the value when used. */ #define HS_VERSION_TWO 2 @@ -113,6 +116,8 @@ const uint8_t *rend_data_get_pk_digest(const rend_data_t *rend_data, uint64_t hs_get_next_time_period_num(time_t now); +link_specifier_t *hs_link_specifier_dup(const link_specifier_t *lspec); + #ifdef HS_COMMON_PRIVATE #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS

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[tor/master] prop224: Add onion key to service descriptor intro point
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit c9927ce4d5cf46cd12d09e73e80f435b4852f26e Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 20 12:16:39 2017 -0400 prop224: Add onion key to service descriptor intro point Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_service.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.h b/src/or/hs_service.h index 54b9e6972..ad95a20ed 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_service.h +++ b/src/or/hs_service.h @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ typedef struct hs_service_intro_point_t { /* Top level intropoint "shared" data between client/service. */ hs_intropoint_t base; + /* Onion key of the introduction point used to extend to it for the ntor + * handshake. */ + curve25519_public_key_t onion_key; + /* Authentication keypair used to create the authentication certificate * which is published in the descriptor. */ ed25519_keypair_t auth_key_kp;

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Add the introduction point onion key to descriptor
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 Aug '17

09 Aug '17

commit 78e2bc4000a9014c1762f828e15e762c359aa20e Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jul 19 13:42:35 2017 -0400 prop224: Add the introduction point onion key to descriptor A prop224 descriptor was missing the onion key for an introduction point which is needed to extend to it by the client. Closes #22979 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_descriptor.h | 4 ++++ src/or/parsecommon.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c index 2393eac25..91d0ef544 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ #define str_intro_auth_required "intro-auth-required" #define str_single_onion "single-onion-service" #define str_intro_point "introduction-point" +#define str_ip_onion_key "onion-key" #define str_ip_auth_key "auth-key" #define str_ip_enc_key "enc-key" #define str_ip_enc_key_cert "enc-key-cert" @@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ static token_rule_t hs_desc_encrypted_v3_token_table[] = { /* Descriptor ruleset for the introduction points section. */ static token_rule_t hs_desc_intro_point_v3_token_table[] = { T1_START(str_intro_point, R3_INTRODUCTION_POINT, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), + T1N(str_ip_onion_key, R3_INTRO_ONION_KEY, GE(2), OBJ_OK), T1(str_ip_auth_key, R3_INTRO_AUTH_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ), T1(str_ip_enc_key, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY, GE(2), OBJ_OK), T1(str_ip_enc_key_cert, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY_CERT, ARGS, OBJ_OK), @@ -479,6 +481,26 @@ encode_enc_key(const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) return encoded; } +/* Encode an introduction point onion key. Return a newly allocated string + * with it. On failure, return NULL. */ +static char * +encode_onion_key(const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) +{ + char *encoded = NULL; + char key_b64[CURVE25519_BASE64_PADDED_LEN + 1]; + + tor_assert(ip); + + /* Base64 encode the encryption key for the "onion-key" field. */ + if (curve25519_public_to_base64(key_b64, &ip->onion_key) < 0) { + goto done; + } + tor_asprintf(&encoded, "%s ntor %s", str_ip_onion_key, key_b64); + + done: + return encoded; +} + /* Encode an introduction point object and return a newly allocated string * with it. On failure, return NULL. */ static char * @@ -498,6 +520,16 @@ encode_intro_point(const ed25519_public_key_t *sig_key, tor_free(ls_str); } + /* Onion key encoding. */ + { + char *encoded_onion_key = encode_onion_key(ip); + if (encoded_onion_key == NULL) { + goto err; + } + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s", encoded_onion_key); + tor_free(encoded_onion_key); + } + /* Authentication key encoding. */ { char *encoded_cert; @@ -1662,6 +1694,23 @@ decode_introduction_point(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *start) goto err; } + /* "onion-key" SP ntor SP key NL */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_INTRO_ONION_KEY); + if (!strcmp(tok->args[0], "ntor")) { + /* This field is using GE(2) so for possible forward compatibility, we + * accept more fields but must be at least 2. */ + tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 2); + + if (curve25519_public_from_base64(&ip->onion_key, tok->args[1]) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point ntor onion-key is invalid"); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* Unknown key type so we can't use that introduction point. */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point onion key is unrecognized."); + goto err; + } + /* "auth-key" NL certificate NL */ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_INTRO_AUTH_KEY); tor_assert(tok->object_body); diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h index 58c408979..fdf0b90b5 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h @@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ typedef struct hs_desc_intro_point_t { * contains hs_desc_link_specifier_t object. It MUST have at least one. */ smartlist_t *link_specifiers; + /* Onion key of the introduction point used to extend to it for the ntor + * handshake. */ + curve25519_public_key_t onion_key; + /* Authentication key used to establish the introduction point circuit and * cross-certifies the blinded public key for the replica thus signed by * the blinded key and in turn signs it. */ diff --git a/src/or/parsecommon.h b/src/or/parsecommon.h index b9f161345..a76b104fd 100644 --- a/src/or/parsecommon.h +++ b/src/or/parsecommon.h @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ typedef enum { R3_INTRO_AUTH_REQUIRED, R3_SINGLE_ONION_SERVICE, R3_INTRODUCTION_POINT, + R3_INTRO_ONION_KEY, R3_INTRO_AUTH_KEY, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY_CERT,

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