tor-commits August 2017

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[tor/master] prop224: Handle client RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit 89eb96c19a091b1e892e4a7c05f06e188131aed0 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 21 14:20:37 2017 -0400 prop224: Handle client RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell Client now handles a RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell when it arrives on the rendezvous circuit. This new function applies for both the legacy system and prop224. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_client.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_client.h | 4 ++++ src/or/rendcommon.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index 8865bb5fb..2674e2c1e 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -538,3 +538,45 @@ hs_client_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) } } +/* Called when we receive a RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell. Change the state of + * the circuit to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY. Return 0 on success else a + * negative value and the circuit marked for close. */ +int +hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(payload); + + (void) payload_len; + + if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got a RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED but we were not " + "expecting one. Closing circuit."); + goto err; + } + + log_info(LD_REND, "Received an RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED. This circuit is " + "now ready for rendezvous."); + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); + + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it to + * specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */ + TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + + /* From a path bias point of view, this circuit is now successfully used. + * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from malicious hidden services. + * They could induce the client to attempt to connect to their hidden + * service and never reply to the client's rend requests */ + pathbias_mark_use_success(circ); + + /* If we already have the introduction circuit built, make sure we send + * the INTRODUCE cell _now_ */ + connection_ap_attach_pending(1); + + return 0; + err: + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; +} + diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.h b/src/or/hs_client.h index a716fc02e..0f82a830f 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.h +++ b/src/or/hs_client.h @@ -27,5 +27,9 @@ int hs_client_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ, void hs_client_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ); +int hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *payload, + size_t payload_len); + #endif /* TOR_HS_CLIENT_H */ diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index a6b59881a..7e5ba6b6f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "rendcommon.h" #include "rendmid.h" #include "hs_intropoint.h" +#include "hs_client.h" #include "rendservice.h" #include "rephist.h" #include "router.h" @@ -797,7 +798,7 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, break; case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED: if (origin_circ) - r = rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circ,payload,length); + r = hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circ,payload,length); break; default: tor_fragile_assert();

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[tor/master] prop224: Make client send INTRODUCE1 cell
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit e7c06e694766c6e2fb1f06ed5e1bf9c216e7a976 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 21 16:31:27 2017 -0400 prop224: Make client send INTRODUCE1 cell Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuituse.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 5b35155ee..93bccf0eb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2174,22 +2174,25 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, /* If this is a hidden service trying to start an introduction point, * handle that case. */ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) { + const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); /* need to pick an intro point */ - rend_data_t *rend_data = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data; - tor_assert(rend_data); - extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(rend_data); + extend_info = hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge(edge_conn); if (!extend_info) { - log_info(LD_REND, - "No intro points for '%s': re-fetching service descriptor.", - safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(rend_data))); - rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data); + log_info(LD_REND, "No intro points: re-fetching service descriptor."); + if (edge_conn->rend_data) { + rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(edge_conn->rend_data); + } else { + hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk); + } connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(conn); ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT; return 0; } log_info(LD_REND,"Chose %s as intro point for '%s'.", extend_info_describe(extend_info), - safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(rend_data))); + (edge_conn->rend_data) ? + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(edge_conn->rend_data)) : + "service"); } /* If we have specified a particular exit node for our @@ -2308,8 +2311,15 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { - /* write the service_id into circ */ - circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data); + const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + if (edge_conn->rend_data) { + /* write the service_id into circ */ + circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(edge_conn->rend_data); + } else if (edge_conn->hs_ident) { + circ->hs_ident = + hs_ident_circuit_new(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk, + HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_INTRO); + } if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND && circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) circuit_has_opened(circ); @@ -2737,12 +2747,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn) tor_assert(introcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING); if (introcirc->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) { + int ret; log_info(LD_REND,"found open intro circ %u (rend %u); sending " "introduction. (stream %d sec old)", (unsigned)introcirc->base_.n_circ_id, (unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age); - switch (rend_client_send_introduction(introcirc, rendcirc)) { + ret = hs_client_send_introduce1(introcirc, rendcirc); + switch (ret) { case 0: /* success */ rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);

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[tor/master] prop224: Handle INTRODUCE_ACK cell
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit fca2f64e2f563c07e2d5467adc49914bc4545e36 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 21 17:48:18 2017 -0400 prop224: Handle INTRODUCE_ACK cell The client is now able to handle an INTRODUCE_ACK cell and do the appropriate actions. An intro point failure cache is missing and a way to close all intro point that were launched in parallel. Some notes are in the comment for that. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 27 ++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.h | 3 ++ src/or/hs_cell.c | 12 +++++ src/or/hs_cell.h | 3 ++ src/or/hs_client.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_client.h | 4 ++ src/or/rendclient.c | 12 ----- src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- 8 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index d891c89f3..c2d947bea 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1498,6 +1498,33 @@ circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data) return NULL; } +/* Return an origin circuit such that: + * - Identifier identity key matches, + * - Rendezvous cookie matches + * - Circuit is not marked for close + * - Circuit has purpose CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY. + * + * Return NULL if no such circuit exits. */ +origin_circuit_t * +circuit_get_ready_rend_by_hs_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) { + if (!circ->marked_for_close && + circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (ocirc->hs_ident && + ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ident->identity_pk, + &ocirc->hs_ident->identity_pk) && + tor_memeq(ident->rendezvous_cookie, + ocirc->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie, + HS_REND_COOKIE_LEN)) { + return ocirc; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); + return NULL; +} + /** Return the first service introduction circuit originating from the global * circuit list after start or at the start of the list if start * is NULL. Return NULL if no circuit is found. diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index 048cd5f76..f2a3c4313 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #define TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H #include "testsupport.h" +#include "hs_ident.h" MOCK_DECL(smartlist_t *, circuit_get_global_list, (void)); smartlist_t *circuit_get_global_origin_circuit_list(void); @@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ void circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data( const rend_data_t *rend_data); +origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_by_hs_ident( + const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, const uint8_t *digest, uint8_t purpose); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_intro_circ(origin_circuit_t *start); diff --git a/src/or/hs_cell.c b/src/or/hs_cell.c index 1f9df825f..c5ea6e4db 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cell.c +++ b/src/or/hs_cell.c @@ -875,6 +875,18 @@ hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len) tor_assert(payload); + /* If it is a legacy IP, rend-spec.txt specifies that a ACK is 0 byte and a + * NACK is 1 byte. We can't use the legacy function for this so we have to + * do a special case. */ + if (payload_len <= 1) { + if (payload_len == 0) { + ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS; + } else { + ret = HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE; + } + goto end; + } + if (trn_cell_introduce_ack_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len) < 0) { log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE_ACK cell. Unable to parse it."); goto end; diff --git a/src/or/hs_cell.h b/src/or/hs_cell.h index 606a08dd6..14dd31c9d 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cell.h +++ b/src/or/hs_cell.h @@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ ssize_t hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data, const origin_circuit_t *circ, const hs_service_t *service); int hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len); +int hs_cell_parse_rendezvous2(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len, + uint8_t *handshake_info, + size_t handshake_info_len); #endif /* TOR_HS_CELL_H */ diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index a593999f2..ff3d12748 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -491,6 +491,99 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) return ei; } +/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE_ACK success status code. Do the appropriate + * actions for the rendezvous point and finally close intro_circ. */ +static void +handle_introduce_ack_success(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ) +{ + origin_circuit_t *rend_circ = NULL; + + tor_assert(intro_circ); + + log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE_ACK ack! Informing rendezvous"); + + /* Get the rendezvous circuit matching this intro point circuit. + * XXX Replace this by our hs circuitmap to support client? */ + rend_circ = circuit_get_ready_rend_by_hs_ident(intro_circ->hs_ident); + if (rend_circ == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't find any rendezvous circuit. Stopping"); + goto end; + } + + assert_circ_anonymity_ok(rend_circ, get_options()); + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED); + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it to + * specify when a circuit entered the + * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */ + TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + + end: + /* We don't need the intro circuit anymore. It did what it had to do! */ + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + + /* XXX: Close pending intro circuits we might have in parallel. */ + return; +} + +/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE_ACK failure status code. Depending on our + * failure cache status, either close the circuit or re-extend to a new + * introduction point. */ +static void +handle_introduce_ack_bad(origin_circuit_t *circ, int status) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + + log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE_ACK nack by %s. Reason: %u", + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit)), + status); + + /* It's a NAK. The introduction point didn't relay our request. */ + circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING); + + /* XXX: Report this failure for the intro point failure cache. Depending on + * how many times we've tried this intro point, close it or reextend. */ +} + +/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE_ACK on the intro circuit circ. The encoded + * cell is in payload of length payload_len. Return 0 on success else a + * negative value. The circuit is either close or reuse to re-extend to a new + * introduction point. */ +static int +handle_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, + size_t payload_len) +{ + int status, ret = -1; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(circ->build_state); + tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit); + assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, get_options()); + tor_assert(payload); + + status = hs_cell_parse_introduce_ack(payload, payload_len); + switch (status) { + case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_SUCCESS: + ret = 0; + handle_introduce_ack_success(circ); + break; + case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_FAILURE: + case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_BADFMT: + case HS_CELL_INTRO_ACK_NORELAY: + handle_introduce_ack_bad(circ, status); + break; + default: + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unknown INTRODUCE_ACK status code %u from %s", + status, + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit))); + break; + } + + return ret; +} + /* ========== */ /* Public API */ /* ========== */ @@ -759,4 +852,32 @@ hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge(const edge_connection_t *edge_conn) client_get_random_intro(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) : rend_client_get_random_intro(edge_conn->rend_data); } +/* Called when get an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on the introduction circuit circ. + * Return 0 on success else a negative value is returned. The circuit will be + * closed or reuse to extend again to another intro point. */ +int +hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len) +{ + int ret = -1; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(payload); + + if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit %u.", + (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + goto end; + } + + ret = (circ->hs_ident) ? handle_introduce_ack(circ, payload, payload_len) : + rend_client_introduction_acked(circ, payload, + payload_len); + /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully. NACK or ACK counts. */ + pathbias_mark_use_success(circ); + + end: + return ret; +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.h b/src/or/hs_client.h index c41baa2ce..1c0f8a4d2 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.h +++ b/src/or/hs_client.h @@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ void hs_client_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ); int hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len); +int hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *payload, + size_t payload_len); + void hs_client_desc_has_arrived(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident); extend_info_t *hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge( diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index a6fb88624..683a3916e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -391,23 +391,11 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, origin_circuit_t *rendcirc; (void) request; // XXXX Use this. - if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Received REND_INTRODUCE_ACK on unexpected circuit %u.", - (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; - } - tor_assert(circ->build_state); tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit); assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circ, options); tor_assert(circ->rend_data); - /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully. Valid - * nacks and acks count. */ - pathbias_mark_use_success(circ); - if (request_len == 0) { /* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */ /* Locate the rend circ which is waiting to hear about this ack, diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 7e5ba6b6f..86dc913cd 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, break; case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK: if (origin_circ) - r = rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circ,payload,length); + r = hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circ,payload,length); break; case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1: if (or_circ)

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[tor/master] prop224: Client function to pick intro point
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit abb840bf6431cfeb4f5e32ae2774fcde29e7724d Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 21 15:19:32 2017 -0400 prop224: Client function to pick intro point From an edge connection object, add a function that randomly pick an introduction point for the requested service. This follows the code design of rend_client_get_random_intro() and returns an extend_info_t object ready to be used to extend to. At this commit, it is not used yet. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_client.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_client.h | 4 +- 2 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index cf9bdba5a..a593999f2 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include "directory.h" #include "hs_client.h" #include "router.h" +#include "routerset.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "connection.h" @@ -387,6 +388,109 @@ client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) hs_circ_send_establish_rendezvous(circ); } +/* This is an helper function that convert a descriptor intro point object ip + * to a newly allocated extend_info_t object fully initialized. Return NULL if + * we can't convert it for which chances are that we are missing or malformed + * link specifiers. */ +static extend_info_t * +desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) +{ + extend_info_t *ei; + smartlist_t *lspecs = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(ip); + + /* We first encode the descriptor link specifiers into the binary + * representation which is a trunnel object. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->link_specifiers, + const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, desc_lspec) { + link_specifier_t *lspec = hs_desc_encode_lspec(desc_lspec); + smartlist_add(lspecs, lspec); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(desc_lspec); + + /* Explicitely put the direct connection option to 0 because this is client + * side and there is no such thing as a non anonymous client. */ + ei = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(lspecs, &ip->onion_key, 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lspecs, link_specifier_t *, ls, link_specifier_free(ls)); + smartlist_free(lspecs); + return ei; +} + +/* Using a descriptor desc, return a newly allocated extend_info_t object of a + * randomly picked introduction point from its list. Return NULL if none are + * usable. */ +static extend_info_t * +client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk) +{ + extend_info_t *ei = NULL, *ei_excluded = NULL; + smartlist_t *usable_ips = NULL; + const hs_descriptor_t *desc; + const hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *enc_data; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + tor_assert(service_pk); + + desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_pk); + if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(desc)) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to randomly select an introduction point " + "because descriptor %s.", + (desc) ? "doesn't have usable intro point" : "is missing"); + goto end; + } + + enc_data = &desc->encrypted_data; + usable_ips = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add_all(usable_ips, enc_data->intro_points); + while (smartlist_len(usable_ips) != 0) { + int idx; + const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip; + + /* Pick a random intro point and immediately remove it from the usable + * list so we don't pick it again if we have to iterate more. */ + idx = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_ips)); + ip = smartlist_get(usable_ips, idx); + smartlist_del(usable_ips, idx); + + /* Generate an extend info object from the intro point object. */ + ei = desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(ip); + if (ei == NULL) { + /* We can get here for instance if the intro point is a private address + * and we aren't allowed to extend to those. */ + continue; + } + + /* Test the pick against ExcludeNodes. */ + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, ei)) { + /* If this pick is in the ExcludeNodes list, we keep its reference so if + * we ever end up not being able to pick anything else and StrictNodes is + * unset, we'll use it. */ + ei_excluded = ei; + continue; + } + /* XXX: Intro point can time out or just be unsuable, we need to keep + * track of this and check against such cache. */ + + /* Good pick! Let's go with this. */ + goto end; + } + + /* Reaching this point means a couple of things. Either we can't use any of + * the intro point listed because the IP address can't be extended to or it + * is listed in the ExcludeNodes list. In the later case, if StrictNodes is + * set, we are forced to not use anything. */ + ei = ei_excluded; + if (options->StrictNodes) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction points are in the ExcludeNodes set " + "and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect."); + ei = NULL; + } + + end: + smartlist_free(usable_ips); + return ei; +} + /* ========== */ /* Public API */ /* ========== */ @@ -643,3 +747,16 @@ hs_client_desc_has_arrived(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident) smartlist_free(conns); } +/* Return a newly allocated extend_info_t for a randomly chosen introduction + * point for the given edge connection identifier ident. Return NULL if we + * can't pick any usable introduction points. */ +extend_info_t * +hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge(const edge_connection_t *edge_conn) +{ + tor_assert(edge_conn); + + return (edge_conn->hs_ident) ? + client_get_random_intro(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) : + rend_client_get_random_intro(edge_conn->rend_data); +} + diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.h b/src/or/hs_client.h index 50d0ad760..c41baa2ce 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.h +++ b/src/or/hs_client.h @@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ void hs_client_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ); int hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len); - void hs_client_desc_has_arrived(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident); +extend_info_t *hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge( + const edge_connection_t *edge_conn); + #endif /* TOR_HS_CLIENT_H */

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Update the IP failure cache only if legacy
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit 88f64eee68c972845131c8e372af067d8bb37cd1 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 25 11:37:55 2017 -0400 hs: Update the IP failure cache only if legacy Don't assert() on rend_data when closing circuits to report an IP failure. The prop224 code doesn't have yet the support for this. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index d891c89f3..2f3fe327e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1961,8 +1961,8 @@ circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ) int timed_out = (reason == END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT); tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); tor_assert(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit); - tor_assert(ocirc->rend_data); - if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT) { + if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT && + ocirc->rend_data) { /* treat this like getting a nack from it */ log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). %s", safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)), @@ -1978,7 +1978,8 @@ circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ) reason != END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit && ocirc->rend_data) { - if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT) { + if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT && + ocirc->rend_data) { log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s " "(building circuit to intro point). " "Marking intro point as possibly unreachable.",

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Handle RENDEZVOUS2 cell
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit 9af311630626b920aa74c4fb8d36eb086ebfb8a4 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 25 10:14:00 2017 -0400 prop224: Handle RENDEZVOUS2 cell The client can now handle RENDEZVOUS2 cell when they arrive. This consolidate both hidden service version in one function. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_client.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_client.h | 3 ++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 ------ src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index ff3d12748..337c7477d 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include "connection.h" #include "circpathbias.h" #include "connection.h" +#include "hs_ntor.h" /* Get all connections that are waiting on a circuit and flag them back to * waiting for a hidden service descriptor for the given service key @@ -584,6 +585,68 @@ handle_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, return ret; } +/* Called when we get a RENDEZVOUS2 cell on the rendezvous circuit circ. The + * encoded cell is in payload of length payload_len. Return 0 on success or a + * negative value on error. On error, the circuit is marked for close. */ +static int +handle_rendezvous2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, + size_t payload_len) +{ + int ret = -1; + curve25519_public_key_t server_pk; + uint8_t auth_mac[DIGEST256_LEN] = {0}; + uint8_t handshake_info[CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + sizeof(auth_mac)] = {0}; + hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t keys; + const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(payload); + + /* Make things easier. */ + ident = circ->hs_ident; + tor_assert(ident); + + if (hs_cell_parse_rendezvous2(payload, payload_len, handshake_info, + sizeof(handshake_info)) < 0) { + goto err; + } + /* Get from the handshake info the SERVER_PK and AUTH_MAC. */ + memcpy(&server_pk, handshake_info, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + memcpy(auth_mac, handshake_info + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, sizeof(auth_mac)); + + /* Generate the handshake info. */ + if (hs_ntor_client_get_rendezvous1_keys(&ident->intro_auth_pk, + &ident->rendezvous_client_kp, + &ident->intro_enc_pk, &server_pk, + &keys) < 0) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to compute the rendezvous keys."); + goto err; + } + + /* Critical check, make sure that the MAC matches what we got with what we + * computed just above. */ + if (!hs_ntor_client_rendezvous2_mac_is_good(&keys, auth_mac)) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid MAC in RENDEZVOUS2. Rejecting cell."); + goto err; + } + + /* Setup the e2e encryption on the circuit and finalize its state. */ + if (hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(circ, keys.ntor_key_seed, + sizeof(keys.ntor_key_seed), 0) < 0) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to setup the e2e encryption."); + goto err; + } + /* Success. Hidden service connection finalized! */ + ret = 0; + goto end; + + err: + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + end: + memwipe(&keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + return ret; +} + /* ========== */ /* Public API */ /* ========== */ @@ -881,3 +944,36 @@ hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, return ret; } +/* Called when get a RENDEZVOUS2 cell on the rendezvous circuit circ. Return + * 0 on success else a negative value is returned. The circuit will be closed + * on error. */ +int +hs_client_receive_rendezvous2(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len) +{ + int ret = -1; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(payload); + + /* Circuit can possibly be in both state because we could receive a + * RENDEZVOUS2 cell before the INTRODUCE_ACK has been received. */ + if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY && + TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected RENDEZVOUS2 cell on circuit %u. " + "Closing circuit.", + (unsigned int) TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id); + circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + goto end; + } + + log_info(LD_REND, "Got RENDEZVOUS2 cell from hidden service on circuit %u.", + TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id); + + ret = (circ->hs_ident) ? handle_rendezvous2(circ, payload, payload_len) : + rend_client_receive_rendezvous(circ, payload, + payload_len); + end: + return ret; +} + diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.h b/src/or/hs_client.h index 1c0f8a4d2..6681505ee 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.h +++ b/src/or/hs_client.h @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ int hs_client_receive_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, int hs_client_receive_introduce_ack(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len); +int hs_client_receive_rendezvous2(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *payload, + size_t payload_len); void hs_client_desc_has_arrived(const hs_ident_dir_conn_t *ident); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 683a3916e..cb7d99bed 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -932,23 +932,12 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) { - if ((circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY && - circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) - || !circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Got rendezvous2 cell from hidden service, but not " - "expecting it. Closing."); - circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; - } - if (request_len != DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Incorrect length (%d) on RENDEZVOUS2 cell.", (int)request_len); goto err; } - log_info(LD_REND,"Got RENDEZVOUS2 cell from hidden service."); - if (hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client(circ, request) < 0) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Failed to setup circ"); goto err; diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 86dc913cd..f7ae7c61f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, break; case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2: if (origin_circ) - r = rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circ,payload,length); + r = hs_client_receive_rendezvous2(origin_circ,payload,length); break; case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED: if (origin_circ)

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Only note a connection attempt with a valid rend_data
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit e67f8623f95082341c06c9c70ef664ed7b186483 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jul 25 10:31:44 2017 -0400 hs: Only note a connection attempt with a valid rend_data For now, prop224 doesn't have a mechanism to note down connection attempts so we only do it for legacy system using rend_data. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 8ef3379c4..3dd08b6d2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -155,7 +155,9 @@ connection_mark_unattached_ap_,(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, * but we should fix it someday anyway. */ if ((edge_conn->on_circuit != NULL || edge_conn->edge_has_sent_end) && connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) { - rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(edge_conn->rend_data); + if (edge_conn->rend_data) { + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(edge_conn->rend_data); + } } if (base_conn->marked_for_close) {

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Use the client-side circuitmap in hs_client.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit 379ad6f6eb5393e74daba8ac71c252155c052a34 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Jul 25 12:17:20 2017 +0300 prop224: Use the client-side circuitmap in hs_client.c Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 27 --------------------------- src/or/circuitlist.h | 2 -- src/or/hs_circuit.c | 4 ++++ src/or/hs_client.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index c2d947bea..d891c89f3 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1498,33 +1498,6 @@ circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data) return NULL; } -/* Return an origin circuit such that: - * - Identifier identity key matches, - * - Rendezvous cookie matches - * - Circuit is not marked for close - * - Circuit has purpose CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY. - * - * Return NULL if no such circuit exits. */ -origin_circuit_t * -circuit_get_ready_rend_by_hs_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident) -{ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) { - if (!circ->marked_for_close && - circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - if (ocirc->hs_ident && - ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ident->identity_pk, - &ocirc->hs_ident->identity_pk) && - tor_memeq(ident->rendezvous_cookie, - ocirc->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie, - HS_REND_COOKIE_LEN)) { - return ocirc; - } - } - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); - return NULL; -} - /** Return the first service introduction circuit originating from the global * circuit list after start or at the start of the list if start * is NULL. Return NULL if no circuit is found. diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index f2a3c4313..b882b2c6a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ void circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data( const rend_data_t *rend_data); -origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_by_hs_ident( - const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, const uint8_t *digest, uint8_t purpose); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_service_intro_circ(origin_circuit_t *start); diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c index ee453d0d5..819d25432 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,10 @@ hs_circ_send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ, goto done; } + /* Register rend circuit in circuitmap */ + hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(rend_circ, + rend_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie); + /* Success. */ ret = 0; goto done; diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c index 337c7477d..562955076 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_client.c +++ b/src/or/hs_client.c @@ -503,9 +503,9 @@ handle_introduce_ack_success(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ) log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE_ACK ack! Informing rendezvous"); - /* Get the rendezvous circuit matching this intro point circuit. - * XXX Replace this by our hs circuitmap to support client? */ - rend_circ = circuit_get_ready_rend_by_hs_ident(intro_circ->hs_ident); + /* Get the rendezvous circuit for this rendezvous cookie. */ + uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie = intro_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie; + rend_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(rendezvous_cookie); if (rend_circ == NULL) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't find any rendezvous circuit. Stopping"); goto end;

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Add client-side rend circuit support to HS circuitmap
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit 3152c583af052571cbcd058bb1569f2ad821ec42 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Jul 25 12:05:02 2017 +0300 prop224: Add client-side rend circuit support to HS circuitmap Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/hs_circuitmap.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/hs_circuitmap.h | 8 ++++++++ src/test/test_circuitlist.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c index ea66fb519..f235ecc82 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c +++ b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.c @@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ * \file hs_circuitmap.c * * \brief Hidden service circuitmap: A hash table that maps binary tokens to - * introduction and rendezvous circuits; it's used both by relays acting as - * intro points and rendezvous points, and also by hidden services themselves. + * introduction and rendezvous circuits; it's used: + * (a) by relays acting as intro points and rendezvous points + * (b) by hidden services to find intro and rend circuits and + * (c) by HS clients to find rendezvous circuits. **/ #define HS_CIRCUITMAP_PRIVATE @@ -404,6 +406,29 @@ hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_service_side(const uint8_t *cookie) return circ; } +/* Public function: Return client-side rendezvous circuit with rendezvous + * cookie. It will first lookup for the CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY + * purpose and then try for CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED. + * + * Return NULL if no such circuit is found in the circuitmap. */ +origin_circuit_t * +hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(const uint8_t *cookie) +{ + origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL; + + circ = hs_circuitmap_get_origin_circuit(HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, + REND_TOKEN_LEN, cookie, + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); + if (circ) { + return circ; + } + + circ = hs_circuitmap_get_origin_circuit(HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, + REND_TOKEN_LEN, cookie, + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED); + return circ; +} + /**** Public servide-side setters: */ /* Public function: Register v2 intro circuit with key digest to the @@ -439,6 +464,22 @@ hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_service_side(origin_circuit_t *circ, REND_TOKEN_LEN, cookie); } +/* Public function: Register rendezvous circuit with key cookie to the + * client-side circuitmap. */ +void +hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(origin_circuit_t *or_circ, + const uint8_t *cookie) +{ + circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ); + { /* Basic circ purpose sanity checking */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY || + circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED); + } + + hs_circuitmap_register_circuit(circ, HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, + REND_TOKEN_LEN, cookie); +} + /**** Misc public functions: */ /** Public function: Remove this circuit from the HS circuitmap. Clear its HS diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h index 33d5b6411..0903de234 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h +++ b/src/or/hs_circuitmap.h @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ struct origin_circuit_t * hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_service_side(const uint8_t *digest); struct origin_circuit_t * hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_service_side(const uint8_t *cookie); +struct origin_circuit_t * +hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(const uint8_t *cookie); void hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2_service_side( struct origin_circuit_t *circ, @@ -53,6 +55,9 @@ void hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3_service_side( void hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_service_side( struct origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cookie); +void hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side( + struct origin_circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *cookie); void hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(struct circuit_t *circ); @@ -76,6 +81,9 @@ typedef enum { HS_TOKEN_INTRO_V2_SERVICE_SIDE, /** A v3 introduction point pubkey on a hidden service (256bit) */ HS_TOKEN_INTRO_V3_SERVICE_SIDE, + + /** A rendezvous cookie on the client side (128bit) */ + HS_TOKEN_REND_CLIENT_SIDE, } hs_token_type_t; /** Represents a token used in the HS protocol. Each such token maps to a diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitlist.c b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c index 344ab2792..6b8dae31f 100644 --- a/src/test/test_circuitlist.c +++ b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ static void test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) { or_circuit_t *c1, *c2, *c3, *c4; + origin_circuit_t *c5; const uint8_t tok1[REND_TOKEN_LEN] = "The cat can't tell y"; const uint8_t tok2[REND_TOKEN_LEN] = "ou its name, and it "; const uint8_t tok3[REND_TOKEN_LEN] = "doesn't really care."; @@ -194,6 +195,7 @@ test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) c2 = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); c3 = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); c4 = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); + c5 = origin_circuit_new(); /* Make sure we really filled up the tok* variables */ tt_int_op(tok1[REND_TOKEN_LEN-1], OP_EQ, 'y'); @@ -264,6 +266,13 @@ test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) tt_ptr_op(TO_CIRCUIT(c4)->hs_token, OP_EQ, NULL); tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_relay_side(tok3)); + /* Now let's do a check for the client-side rend circuitmap */ + c5->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY; + hs_circuitmap_register_rend_circ_client_side(c5, tok1); + + tt_ptr_op(c5, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(tok1)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(tok2)); + done: if (c1) circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(c1)); @@ -273,6 +282,8 @@ test_rend_token_maps(void *arg) circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(c3)); if (c4) circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(c4)); + if (c5) + circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(c5)); } static void

1 0

[tor/master] trunnel: Add RENDEZVOUS2 cell definition
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Aug '17

24 Aug '17

commit 2f1b3d647ff1489f4cb0f25d96701eaf35e076da Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jul 23 15:04:59 2017 -0400 trunnel: Add RENDEZVOUS2 cell definition Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h | 69 +++++++++++++ src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel | 13 ++- 3 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c index e961cd09d..e4d3244bd 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.c @@ -290,3 +290,181 @@ trn_cell_rendezvous1_parse(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t **output, const uint8_t *input } return result; } +trn_cell_rendezvous2_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous2_new(void) +{ + trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t)); + if (NULL == val) + return NULL; + return val; +} + +/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'. + */ +static void +trn_cell_rendezvous2_clear(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj) +{ + (void) obj; +} + +void +trn_cell_rendezvous2_free(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return; + trn_cell_rendezvous2_clear(obj); + trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t)); + trunnel_free_(obj); +} + +size_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_getlen_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp) +{ + (void)inp; return TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN; +} + +uint8_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_get_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN); + return inp->handshake_info[idx]; +} + +uint8_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_getconst_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + return trn_cell_rendezvous2_get_handshake_info((trn_cell_rendezvous2_t*)inp, idx); +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous2_set_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN); + inp->handshake_info[idx] = elt; + return 0; +} + +uint8_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous2_getarray_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp) +{ + return inp->handshake_info; +} +const uint8_t * +trn_cell_rendezvous2_getconstarray_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp) +{ + return (const uint8_t *)trn_cell_rendezvous2_getarray_handshake_info((trn_cell_rendezvous2_t*)inp); +} +const char * +trn_cell_rendezvous2_check(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return "Object was NULL"; + if (obj->trunnel_error_code_) + return "A set function failed on this object"; + return NULL; +} + +ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_encoded_len(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + + if (NULL != trn_cell_rendezvous2_check(obj)) + return -1; + + + /* Length of u8 handshake_info[TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN] */ + result += TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN; + return result; +} +int +trn_cell_rendezvous2_clear_errors(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj) +{ + int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_; + obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0; + return r; +} +ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + size_t written = 0; + uint8_t *ptr = output; + const char *msg; +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + const ssize_t encoded_len = trn_cell_rendezvous2_encoded_len(obj); +#endif + + if (NULL != (msg = trn_cell_rendezvous2_check(obj))) + goto check_failed; + +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); +#endif + + /* Encode u8 handshake_info[TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN] */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN) + goto truncated; + memcpy(ptr, obj->handshake_info, TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN); + written += TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN; ptr += TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN; + + + trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written); +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + { + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); + trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written); + } + +#endif + + return written; + + truncated: + result = -2; + goto fail; + check_failed: + (void)msg; + result = -1; + goto fail; + fail: + trunnel_assert(result < 0); + return result; +} + +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous2_parse(), but do not allocate the output + * object. + */ +static ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_parse_into(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + const uint8_t *ptr = input; + size_t remaining = len_in; + ssize_t result = 0; + (void)result; + + /* Parse u8 handshake_info[TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN] */ + CHECK_REMAINING(TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN, truncated); + memcpy(obj->handshake_info, ptr, TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN); + remaining -= TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN; ptr += TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN; + trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in); + return len_in - remaining; + + truncated: + return -2; +} + +ssize_t +trn_cell_rendezvous2_parse(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + ssize_t result; + *output = trn_cell_rendezvous2_new(); + if (NULL == *output) + return -1; + result = trn_cell_rendezvous2_parse_into(*output, input, len_in); + if (result < 0) { + trn_cell_rendezvous2_free(*output); + *output = NULL; + } + return result; +} diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h index 2387d77f4..5dcc6539b 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "trunnel.h" #define TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN 20 +#define TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN 64 #if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_TRN_CELL_RENDEZVOUS1) struct trn_cell_rendezvous1_st { uint8_t rendezvous_cookie[TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN]; @@ -17,6 +18,13 @@ struct trn_cell_rendezvous1_st { }; #endif typedef struct trn_cell_rendezvous1_st trn_cell_rendezvous1_t; +#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_TRN_CELL_RENDEZVOUS2) +struct trn_cell_rendezvous2_st { + uint8_t handshake_info[TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN]; + uint8_t trunnel_error_code_; +}; +#endif +typedef struct trn_cell_rendezvous2_st trn_cell_rendezvous2_t; /** Return a newly allocated trn_cell_rendezvous1 with all elements * set to zero. */ @@ -113,6 +121,67 @@ const uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous1_getconstarray_handshake_info(const trn_cel * failure. */ int trn_cell_rendezvous1_setlen_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *inp, size_t newlen); +/** Return a newly allocated trn_cell_rendezvous2 with all elements + * set to zero. + */ +trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *trn_cell_rendezvous2_new(void); +/** Release all storage held by the trn_cell_rendezvous2 in 'victim'. + * (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.) + */ +void trn_cell_rendezvous2_free(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *victim); +/** Try to parse a trn_cell_rendezvous2 from the buffer in 'input', + * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, + * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly + * allocated trn_cell_rendezvous2_t. On failure, return -2 if the + * input appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid. + */ +ssize_t trn_cell_rendezvous2_parse(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in); +/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the + * trn_cell_rendezvous2 in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. + * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an + * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects. + */ +ssize_t trn_cell_rendezvous2_encoded_len(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj); +/** Try to encode the trn_cell_rendezvous2 from 'input' into the + * buffer at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. + * On success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 + * if the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid. + */ +ssize_t trn_cell_rendezvous2_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *input); +/** Check whether the internal state of the trn_cell_rendezvous2 in + * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if + * it is not. + */ +const char *trn_cell_rendezvous2_check(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj); +/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter + * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous2_clear_errors(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *obj); +/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the + * handshake_info field of the trn_cell_rendezvous2_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t trn_cell_rendezvous2_getlen_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * handshake_info of the trn_cell_rendezvous2_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t trn_cell_rendezvous2_get_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous2_get_handshake_info, but take and return a + * const pointer + */ +uint8_t trn_cell_rendezvous2_getconst_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * handshake_info of the trn_cell_rendezvous2_t in 'inp', so that it + * will hold the value 'elt'. + */ +int trn_cell_rendezvous2_set_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN-element array + * field handshake_info of 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous2_getarray_handshake_info(trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp); +/** As trn_cell_rendezvous2_get_handshake_info, but take and return a + * const pointer + */ +const uint8_t * trn_cell_rendezvous2_getconstarray_handshake_info(const trn_cell_rendezvous2_t *inp); #endif diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel index 27f1728b4..2128b4d12 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel +++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_rendezvous.trunnel @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ /* - * This contains the definition of the RENDEZVOUS1 cell for onion service + * This contains the definition of the RENDEZVOUS1/2 cell for onion service * version 3 and onward. The following format is specified in proposal 224 * section 4.2. */ /* Rendezvous cookie length. */ const TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN = 20; +/* The HANDSHAKE_INFO field layout is as follow: + * SERVER_PK [PK_PUBKEY_LEN bytes] + * AUTH [MAC_LEN bytes] + * This means, the size is 32 bytes + 32 bytes. */ +const TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN = 64; /* RENDEZVOUS1 payload. See details in section 4.2. */ struct trn_cell_rendezvous1 { @@ -16,3 +21,9 @@ struct trn_cell_rendezvous1 { * handshake type used. */ u8 handshake_info[]; }; + +/* RENDEZVOUS2 payload. See details in section 4.2. */ +struct trn_cell_rendezvous2 { + /* The HANDSHAKE_INFO field. */ + u8 handshake_info[TRUNNEL_HANDSHAKE_INFO_LEN]; +};

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tor-commits August 2017