May 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] config: Improve changes file bug22060
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit 00ffc474694ecd07ceea1ec54033e99b9b0e4057 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 27 09:46:11 2017 -0400 config: Improve changes file bug22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 33 ++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 index a426e0f..d23e771 100644 --- a/changes/bug22060 +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -1,24 +1,27 @@ o Remove configuration option (confic): - AllowInvalidNodes was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been - rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + removed. It is not possible anymore to use Invalid nodes. - AllowSingleHopCircuits was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been - rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + removed. It's not possible anymore to attach streams to single hop exit + circuit. - AllowSingleHopExits was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been - rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + removed. Relays no longer advertise that they can be used for single hop + exit proxy. - ExcludeSingleHopRelays was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been - rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. - - FastFirstHopPK was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered - obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + removed. Client will always exclude relays that supports single hop + exits meaning relays that still advertise AllowSingleHopExits. + - FastFirstHopPK was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been removed. + Decision for this feature will always be decided by the consensus. - CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout was deprecated in - 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed - and feature no longer exists. + 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been removed. HS circuits never close on + circuit build timeout, they have a longer timeout period. - CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout was deprecated in - 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed - and feature no longer exists. + 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been removed. HS circuits never close on + circuit build timeout, they have a long timeout period. - WarnUnsafeSocks was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been - rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. - - TLSECGroup was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered - obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + removed. Tor will now always warn the user if only an IP address is + given instead of an hostname on a SOCKS connection if SafeSocks is 1. + - TLSECGroup was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been removed. + P256 EC group is always used. - {Control,DNS,Dir,Socks,Trans,NATD,OR}ListenAddress was deprecated in - 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed - and feature no longer exists. + 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been removed. Use the ORPort (and others).

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'dgoulet_ticket22060_031_01_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit 2a1013948d9a7415c0901c5db284afa188ddf5b2 Merge: 4273a39 00ffc47 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 9 10:32:21 2017 -0400 Merge branch 'dgoulet_ticket22060_031_01_squashed' changes/bug22060 | 27 +++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 138 +--------------------- src/or/buffers.c | 5 +- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 29 +---- src/or/circuituse.c | 16 +-- src/or/config.c | 265 +++++++------------------------------------ src/or/config.h | 3 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 12 +- src/or/control.c | 21 +--- src/or/or.h | 56 --------- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 - src/or/router.c | 14 +-- src/or/routerlist.c | 31 ++--- src/or/routerlist.h | 8 +- src/test/test_config.c | 289 ++++++++++++----------------------------------- src/test/test_options.c | 200 ++++---------------------------- 16 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 908 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/config.c index 9280868,1b40561..e1c1cbf --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@@ -401,11 -398,11 +401,11 @@@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = V(MyFamily, STRING, NULL), V(NewCircuitPeriod, INTERVAL, "30 seconds"), OBSOLETE("NamingAuthoritativeDirectory"), - V(NATDListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL), + OBSOLETE("NATDListenAddress"), VPORT(NATDPort), V(Nickname, STRING, NULL), - V(PredictedPortsRelevanceTime, INTERVAL, "1 hour"), + OBSOLETE("PredictedPortsRelevanceTime"), - V(WarnUnsafeSocks, BOOL, "1"), + OBSOLETE("WarnUnsafeSocks"), VAR("NodeFamily", LINELIST, NodeFamilies, NULL), V(NumCPUs, UINT, "0"), V(NumDirectoryGuards, UINT, "0"),

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[tor/master] config: Remove WarnUnsafeSocks option
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit 8aedc589edf78a75092868192869fe84b5a53816 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 25 14:08:40 2017 -0400 config: Remove WarnUnsafeSocks option Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans up the code associated with it. Partially fixes #22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 2 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 6 ------ src/or/buffers.c | 5 +---- src/or/config.c | 4 +--- src/or/or.h | 4 ---- 5 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 index 5b06427..e7d14b0 100644 --- a/changes/bug22060 +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -15,3 +15,5 @@ - CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + - WarnUnsafeSocks was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been + rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 03943c9..590ded3 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1271,12 +1271,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default: 0) -[[WarnUnsafeSocks]] **WarnUnsafeSocks** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is - received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname. Allowing - applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and - can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1) - [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __Address__/__bits__ + [[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__Address__]/__bits__:: diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index 4f22935..58cfdee 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf, /** * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely - * again (requires that WarnUnsafeSocks is turned on). */ + * again. */ #define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5 /** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using @@ -1331,9 +1331,6 @@ log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address, { static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL); - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (! options->WarnUnsafeSocks) - return; if (safe_socks) { log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP, "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving " diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 5b69329..1af554a 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VPORT(NATDPort), V(Nickname, STRING, NULL), V(PredictedPortsRelevanceTime, INTERVAL, "1 hour"), - V(WarnUnsafeSocks, BOOL, "1"), + OBSOLETE("WarnUnsafeSocks"), VAR("NodeFamily", LINELIST, NodeFamilies, NULL), V(NumCPUs, UINT, "0"), V(NumDirectoryGuards, UINT, "0"), @@ -664,8 +664,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { "a wide variety of application-level attacks." }, { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", "Turning this on makes your client " "easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." }, - { "WarnUnsafeSocks", "Changing this option makes it easier for you " - "to accidentally lose your anonymity by leaking DNS information" }, { "TLSECGroup", "The default is a nice secure choice; the other option " "is less secure." }, { "ControlListenAddress", "Use ControlPort instead." }, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 1cdfd1b..da32850 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4110,10 +4110,6 @@ typedef struct { * selection. */ int AllowDotExit; - /** If true, we will warn if a user gives us only an IP address - * instead of a hostname. */ - int WarnUnsafeSocks; - /** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients * requesting network statuses from us as directory. */ int DirReqStatistics_option;

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[tor/master] Tidy or_options_t by removing obsolete options.
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit b2cb3c33aca192c157ad3ff326b869e3f87c7c0d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 9 10:40:24 2017 -0400 Tidy or_options_t by removing obsolete options. Nothing was setting or inspecting these fields, and they were marked as OBSOLETE() in config.c -- but somehow we still had them in the or_options_t structure. Ouch. --- src/or/or.h | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index cc923ad..0bf7ceb 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3636,7 +3636,6 @@ typedef struct { /** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */ int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses; char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */ - char *Group; /**< Name of group to run Tor as. */ config_line_t *ORPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for OR connections. */ /** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */ config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines; @@ -3853,8 +3852,6 @@ typedef struct { int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at * least this many seconds ago. Used until * adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */ - int CircuitIdleTimeout; /**< Cull open clean circuits that were born - * at least this many seconds ago. */ int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at least this long after last activity */ int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits @@ -3866,10 +3863,6 @@ typedef struct { * a new one? */ int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than this interval ago. */ - int PredictedPortsRelevanceTime; /** How long after we've requested a - * connection for a given port, do we want - * to continue to pick exits that support - * that port? */ uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing * to use in a second? */ uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing @@ -3883,8 +3876,6 @@ typedef struct { uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */ uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */ int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */ -//int RunTesting; /**< If true, create testing circuits to measure how well the -// * other ORs are running. */ config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines * for rendezvous services. */ config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for client-side @@ -4342,8 +4333,7 @@ typedef struct { int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict; /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir - * regardless of uptime and DirPort. - * Respects VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2. */ + * regardless of uptime and DirPort. */ routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir; int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict;

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[tor/master] config: Remove AllowInvalidNodes option
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit 2b9823b3106df2cf23e2de13ae9a9b6d12607ce4 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 25 13:22:35 2017 -0400 config: Remove AllowInvalidNodes option Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans up the code associated with it. Partially fixes #22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 3 +++ doc/tor.1.txt | 7 ------- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 17 +---------------- src/or/config.c | 26 +------------------------ src/or/or.h | 14 -------------- src/or/rendservice.c | 2 -- src/or/routerlist.c | 17 ++++++----------- src/or/routerlist.h | 8 ++++---- src/test/test_options.c | 51 ------------------------------------------------- 9 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d839c9b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Remove configuration option (confic): + - AllowInvalidNodes was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been + rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index c769237..012c5b9 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -772,13 +772,6 @@ CLIENT OPTIONS The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **SocksPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or **NATDPort** is non-zero): -[[AllowInvalidNodes]] **AllowInvalidNodes** **entry**|**exit**|**middle**|**introduction**|**rendezvous**|**...**:: - If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory - authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not - recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You - can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is - "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. - [[ExcludeSingleHopRelays]] **ExcludeSingleHopRelays** **0**|**1**:: This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index f8b3609..faf2e3d 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity) * we'll retry later in this function with need_update and * need_capacity set to 0. */ } - if (!(node->is_valid || options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) { + if (!(node->is_valid)) { /* if it's invalid and we don't want it */ n_supported[i] = -1; // log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- invalid router.", @@ -1968,7 +1968,6 @@ pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, const or_options_t *options) { const node_t *rp_node = NULL; - const int allow_invalid = (flags & CRN_ALLOW_INVALID) != 0; const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0; const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0; const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0; @@ -1980,7 +1979,6 @@ pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, /* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */ router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes, - allow_invalid, 0, 0, 0, need_desc, pref_addr, @@ -2022,9 +2020,6 @@ pick_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS) - flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID; - #ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE /* We want to connect directly to the node if we can */ router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags; @@ -2081,8 +2076,6 @@ choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, switch (purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL: - if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE) - flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID; if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */ return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); else @@ -2280,10 +2273,6 @@ count_acceptable_nodes, (smartlist_t *nodes)) if (! node->is_running) // log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i); continue; - /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters - * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate - * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we - * should try to be smarter. */ if (! node->is_valid) // log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i); continue; @@ -2354,8 +2343,6 @@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME; if (state->need_capacity) flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; - if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE) - flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID; choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); smartlist_free(excluded); return choice; @@ -2408,8 +2395,6 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state, if (state->need_capacity) flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; } - if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY) - flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID; choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); smartlist_free(excluded); diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index a73f397..6edfac3 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(AccountingStart, STRING, NULL), V(Address, STRING, NULL), V(AllowDotExit, BOOL, "0"), - V(AllowInvalidNodes, CSV, "middle,rendezvous"), + OBSOLETE("AllowInvalidNodes"), V(AllowNonRFC953Hostnames, BOOL, "0"), V(AllowSingleHopCircuits, BOOL, "0"), V(AllowSingleHopExits, BOOL, "0"), @@ -662,8 +662,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { /* Deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha... */ { "AllowDotExit", "Unrestricted use of the .exit notation can be used for " "a wide variety of application-level attacks." }, - { "AllowInvalidNodes", "There is no reason to enable this option; at best " - "it will make you easier to track." }, { "AllowSingleHopCircuits", "Almost no relays actually allow single-hop " "exits, making this option pointless." }, { "AllowSingleHopExits", "Turning this on will make your relay easier " @@ -3372,28 +3370,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, server_mode(options)); options->MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold = (options->MaxMemInQueues / 4) * 3; - options->AllowInvalid_ = 0; - - if (options->AllowInvalidNodes) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(options->AllowInvalidNodes, const char *, cp) { - if (!strcasecmp(cp, "entry")) - options->AllowInvalid_ |= ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY; - else if (!strcasecmp(cp, "exit")) - options->AllowInvalid_ |= ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT; - else if (!strcasecmp(cp, "middle")) - options->AllowInvalid_ |= ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE; - else if (!strcasecmp(cp, "introduction")) - options->AllowInvalid_ |= ALLOW_INVALID_INTRODUCTION; - else if (!strcasecmp(cp, "rendezvous")) - options->AllowInvalid_ |= ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS; - else { - tor_asprintf(msg, - "Unrecognized value '%s' in AllowInvalidNodes", cp); - return -1; - } - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cp); - } - if (!options->SafeLogging || !strcasecmp(options->SafeLogging, "0")) { options->SafeLogging_ = SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE; diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9e3e409..53a8710 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3470,15 +3470,6 @@ static inline const origin_circuit_t *CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT( return DOWNCAST(origin_circuit_t, x); } -/** Bitfield type: things that we're willing to use invalid routers for. */ -typedef enum invalid_router_usage_t { - ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY =1, - ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT =2, - ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE =4, - ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS =8, - ALLOW_INVALID_INTRODUCTION=16, -} invalid_router_usage_t; - /* limits for TCP send and recv buffer size used for constrained sockets */ #define MIN_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER 2048 #define MAX_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER 262144 /* 256k */ @@ -3604,10 +3595,6 @@ typedef struct { int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our * process for all current and future memory. */ - /** List of "entry", "middle", "exit", "introduction", "rendezvous". */ - smartlist_t *AllowInvalidNodes; - /** Bitmask; derived from AllowInvalidNodes. */ - invalid_router_usage_t AllowInvalid_; config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */ int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private * addresses, and our own published addresses? @@ -5356,7 +5343,6 @@ typedef enum { CRN_NEED_UPTIME = 1<<0, CRN_NEED_CAPACITY = 1<<1, CRN_NEED_GUARD = 1<<2, - CRN_ALLOW_INVALID = 1<<3, /* XXXX not used, apparently. */ CRN_WEIGHT_AS_EXIT = 1<<5, CRN_NEED_DESC = 1<<6, diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index c19c85f..281736c 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -4179,8 +4179,6 @@ rend_consider_services_intro_points(void) const node_t *node; rend_intro_point_t *intro; router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME|CRN_NEED_DESC; - if (get_options()->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_INTRODUCTION) - flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID; router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags; direct_flags |= CRN_PREF_ADDR; direct_flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN; diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 35fe501..b3b959a 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -2317,17 +2317,16 @@ routerlist_add_node_and_family(smartlist_t *sl, const routerinfo_t *router) * we can pick a node for a circuit. */ void -router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, int allow_invalid, - int need_uptime, int need_capacity, - int need_guard, int need_desc, - int pref_addr, int direct_conn) +router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, int need_uptime, + int need_capacity, int need_guard, + int need_desc, int pref_addr, + int direct_conn) { const int check_reach = !router_skip_or_reachability(get_options(), pref_addr); /* XXXX MOVE */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodelist_get_list(), const node_t *, node) { - if (!node->is_running || - (!node->is_valid && !allow_invalid)) + if (!node->is_running || !node->is_valid) continue; if (need_desc && !(node->ri || (node->rs && node->md))) continue; @@ -2773,8 +2772,6 @@ node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(const smartlist_t *sl, * a minimum uptime, return one of those. * If CRN_NEED_CAPACITY is set in flags, weight your choice by the * advertised capacity of each router. - * If CRN_ALLOW_INVALID is not set in flags, consider only Valid - * routers. * If CRN_NEED_GUARD is set in flags, consider only Guard routers. * If CRN_WEIGHT_AS_EXIT is set in flags, we weight bandwidths as if * picking an exit node, otherwise we weight bandwidths for picking a relay @@ -2795,7 +2792,6 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist, const int need_uptime = (flags & CRN_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; const int need_capacity = (flags & CRN_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; const int need_guard = (flags & CRN_NEED_GUARD) != 0; - const int allow_invalid = (flags & CRN_ALLOW_INVALID) != 0; const int weight_for_exit = (flags & CRN_WEIGHT_AS_EXIT) != 0; const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0; const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0; @@ -2823,8 +2819,7 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist, if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) routerlist_add_node_and_family(excludednodes, r); - router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(sl, allow_invalid, - need_uptime, need_capacity, + router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(sl, need_uptime, need_capacity, need_guard, need_desc, pref_addr, direct_conn); log_debug(LD_CIRC, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index 5c1f76c..25b2f64 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ int router_skip_or_reachability(const or_options_t *options, int try_ip_pref); int router_get_my_share_of_directory_requests(double *v3_share_out); void router_reset_status_download_failures(void); int routers_have_same_or_addrs(const routerinfo_t *r1, const routerinfo_t *r2); -void router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, int allow_invalid, - int need_uptime, int need_capacity, - int need_guard, int need_desc, - int pref_addr, int direct_conn); +void router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(smartlist_t *sl, int need_uptime, + int need_capacity, int need_guard, + int need_desc, int pref_addr, + int direct_conn); const routerinfo_t *routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void); uint32_t router_get_advertised_bandwidth(const routerinfo_t *router); diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c index 1ba6a05..43aa907 100644 --- a/src/test/test_options.c +++ b/src/test/test_options.c @@ -2008,56 +2008,6 @@ test_options_validate__entry_nodes(void *ignored) } static void -test_options_validate__invalid_nodes(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - char *msg; - options_test_data_t *tdata = get_options_test_data( - "AllowInvalidNodes something_stupid\n" - "MaxClientCircuitsPending 1\n" - "ConnLimit 1\n" - "SchedulerHighWaterMark__ 42\n" - "SchedulerLowWaterMark__ 10\n"); - - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, - "Unrecognized value 'something_stupid' in AllowInvalidNodes"); - tor_free(msg); - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data("AllowInvalidNodes entry, middle, exit\n" - "MaxClientCircuitsPending 1\n" - "ConnLimit 1\n" - "SchedulerHighWaterMark__ 42\n" - "SchedulerLowWaterMark__ 10\n"); - - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - tt_int_op(tdata->opt->AllowInvalid_, OP_EQ, ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY | - ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT | ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE); - tor_free(msg); - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data("AllowInvalidNodes introduction, rendezvous\n" - "MaxClientCircuitsPending 1\n" - "ConnLimit 1\n" - "SchedulerHighWaterMark__ 42\n" - "SchedulerLowWaterMark__ 10\n"); - - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - tt_int_op(tdata->opt->AllowInvalid_, OP_EQ, ALLOW_INVALID_INTRODUCTION | - ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS); - tor_free(msg); - - done: - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tor_free(msg); -} - -static void test_options_validate__safe_logging(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; @@ -4530,7 +4480,6 @@ struct testcase_t options_tests[] = { LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(reachable_addresses), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(use_bridges), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(entry_nodes), - LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(invalid_nodes), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(safe_logging), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(publish_server_descriptor), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(testing),

1 0

[tor/master] config: Remove ExcludeSingleHopRelays option
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit 09bc858dd54101e645b31bf32fe463b73c38add2 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 25 13:49:05 2017 -0400 config: Remove ExcludeSingleHopRelays option Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans up the code associated with it. Partially fixes #22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 2 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 9 --------- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 5 +++-- src/or/config.c | 4 +--- src/or/or.h | 4 ---- src/or/routerlist.c | 14 ++++++-------- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 index caf624d..e112b89 100644 --- a/changes/bug22060 +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -5,3 +5,5 @@ rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. - AllowSingleHopExits was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + - ExcludeSingleHopRelays was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been + rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index e2e4808..54d0614 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -772,15 +772,6 @@ CLIENT OPTIONS The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **SocksPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or **NATDPort** is non-zero): -[[ExcludeSingleHopRelays]] **ExcludeSingleHopRelays** **0**|**1**:: - This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with - the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set - to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at - higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally - included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, - so using these relays might make your client stand out. - (Default: 1) - [[Bridge]] **Bridge** [__transport__] __IP__:__ORPort__ [__fingerprint__]:: When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index faf2e3d..012229b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1835,8 +1835,9 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity) // router->nickname, i); continue; /* skip invalid routers */ } - if (options->ExcludeSingleHopRelays && - node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) { + /* We do not allow relays that allow single hop exits by default. Option + * was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and removed in 0.3.1.0-alpha. */ + if (node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) { n_supported[i] = -1; continue; } diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9b3570b..a922433 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime, INTERVAL, "10 minutes"), V(ExcludeNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL), V(ExcludeExitNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL), - V(ExcludeSingleHopRelays, BOOL, "1"), + OBSOLETE("ExcludeSingleHopRelays"), V(ExitNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL), V(ExitPolicy, LINELIST, NULL), V(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, BOOL, "1"), @@ -664,8 +664,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { "a wide variety of application-level attacks." }, { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", "Turning this on makes your client " "easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." }, - { "ExcludeSingleHopRelays", "Turning it on makes your client easier to " - "fingerprint." }, { "FastFirstHopPK", "Changing this option does not make your client more " "secure, but does make it easier to fingerprint." }, { "CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout", "This option makes your " diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 3670078..e221959 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4114,10 +4114,6 @@ typedef struct { * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */ int DownloadExtraInfo; - /** If true, don't allow relays with allow-single-hop-exits to be used in - * circuits that we build. */ - int ExcludeSingleHopRelays; - /** If true, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the * socks/trans/natd ports into "www.google.com" addresses that * exit from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index b3b959a..0332054 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -2807,14 +2807,12 @@ router_choose_random_node(smartlist_t *excludedsmartlist, rule = weight_for_exit ? WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT : (need_guard ? WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD : WEIGHT_FOR_MID); - /* Exclude relays that allow single hop exit circuits, if the user - * wants to (such relays might be risky) */ - if (get_options()->ExcludeSingleHopRelays) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodelist_get_list(), node_t *, node, - if (node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) { - smartlist_add(excludednodes, node); - }); - } + /* Exclude relays that allow single hop exit circuits. This is an obsolete + * option since 0.2.9.2-alpha and done by default in 0.3.1.0-alpha. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodelist_get_list(), node_t *, node, + if (node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) { + smartlist_add(excludednodes, node); + }); if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) routerlist_add_node_and_family(excludednodes, r);

1 0

[tor/master] config: Remove AllowSingleHopExits option
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit d52a1e2faaf0edf8f5899c6fa9864d0cecebf692 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 25 13:44:06 2017 -0400 config: Remove AllowSingleHopExits option Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans up the code associated with it. Partially fixes #22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 2 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 7 ------- src/or/config.c | 11 +---------- src/or/connection_edge.c | 12 +++++------- src/or/or.h | 5 +---- src/or/router.c | 5 ++--- src/test/test_options.c | 43 ------------------------------------------- 7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 index 19c8d2c..caf624d 100644 --- a/changes/bug22060 +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. - AllowSingleHopCircuits was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + - AllowSingleHopExits was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been + rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 3088c9b..e2e4808 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1660,13 +1660,6 @@ is non-zero): Tor client binds to. To bind to a different address, use the *ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress options. -[[AllowSingleHopExits]] **AllowSingleHopExits** **0**|**1**:: - This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop - proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is - the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use - servers that set this option, since most clients have - ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0) - [[AssumeReachable]] **AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**:: This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 3621b8e..9b3570b 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { OBSOLETE("AllowInvalidNodes"), V(AllowNonRFC953Hostnames, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("AllowSingleHopCircuits"), - V(AllowSingleHopExits, BOOL, "0"), + OBSOLETE("AllowSingleHopExits"), V(AlternateBridgeAuthority, LINELIST, NULL), V(AlternateDirAuthority, LINELIST, NULL), OBSOLETE("AlternateHSAuthority"), @@ -662,8 +662,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { /* Deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha... */ { "AllowDotExit", "Unrestricted use of the .exit notation can be used for " "a wide variety of application-level attacks." }, - { "AllowSingleHopExits", "Turning this on will make your relay easier " - "to abuse." }, { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", "Turning this on makes your client " "easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." }, { "ExcludeSingleHopRelays", "Turning it on makes your client easier to " @@ -4056,13 +4054,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "AlternateDirAuthority and AlternateBridgeAuthority configured."); } - if (options->AllowSingleHopExits && !options->DirAuthorities) { - COMPLAIN("You have set AllowSingleHopExits; now your relay will allow " - "others to make one-hop exits. However, since by default most " - "clients avoid relays that set this option, most clients will " - "ignore you."); - } - #define CHECK_DEFAULT(arg) \ STMT_BEGIN \ if (!options->TestingTorNetwork && \ diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 2c60d8d..8f5d343 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -3133,15 +3133,13 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) port = bcell.port; if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) { - if (!options->AllowSingleHopExits && - (or_circ->is_first_hop || - (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay( + if ((or_circ->is_first_hop || + (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay( or_circ->p_chan->identity_digest) && should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) { - /* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user - * has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers - * and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies. - */ + /* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy. It attracts + * attackers and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop + * proxies. */ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.", safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)), diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 4381459..3670078 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4114,10 +4114,7 @@ typedef struct { * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */ int DownloadExtraInfo; - /** If true, and we are acting as a relay, allow exit circuits even when - * we are the first hop of a circuit. */ - int AllowSingleHopExits; - /** If true, don't allow relays with AllowSingleHopExits=1 to be used in + /** If true, don't allow relays with allow-single-hop-exits to be used in * circuits that we build. */ int ExcludeSingleHopRelays; diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 7fb49e8..ca86c33 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -2932,7 +2932,7 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router, "onion-key\n%s" "signing-key\n%s" "%s%s" - "%s%s%s%s", + "%s%s%s", router->nickname, address, router->or_port, @@ -2955,8 +2955,7 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router, ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "", family_line, we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "", - "hidden-service-dir\n", - options->AllowSingleHopExits ? "allow-single-hop-exits\n" : ""); + "hidden-service-dir\n"); if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) { const char *ci = options->ContactInfo; diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c index 43aa907..2a7dfbd 100644 --- a/src/test/test_options.c +++ b/src/test/test_options.c @@ -4190,48 +4190,6 @@ test_options_validate__virtual_addr(void *ignored) } static void -test_options_validate__exits(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - char *msg; - options_test_data_t *tdata = NULL; - setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "AllowSingleHopExits 1" - ); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - expect_log_msg("You have set AllowSingleHopExits; " - "now your relay will allow others to make one-hop exits. However," - " since by default most clients avoid relays that set this option," - " most clients will ignore you.\n"); - tor_free(msg); - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "AllowSingleHopExits 1\n" - VALID_DIR_AUTH - ); - mock_clean_saved_logs(); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - expect_no_log_msg("You have set AllowSingleHopExits; " - "now your relay will allow others to make one-hop exits. However," - " since by default most clients avoid relays that set this option," - " most clients will ignore you.\n"); - tor_free(msg); - - done: - policies_free_all(); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tor_free(msg); -} - -static void test_options_validate__testing_options(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; @@ -4502,7 +4460,6 @@ struct testcase_t options_tests[] = { LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(constrained_sockets), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(v3_auth), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(virtual_addr), - LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(exits), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(testing_options), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(accel), END_OF_TESTCASES /* */

1 0

[tor/master] config: Remove FastFirstHopPK option
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit bc34654ba2df0e4f4834095ab404f5429c518be9 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 25 13:58:35 2017 -0400 config: Remove FastFirstHopPK option Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans up the code associated with it. Partially fixes #22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 2 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 12 ------------ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +------ src/or/config.c | 4 +--- src/or/or.h | 2 -- 5 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 index e112b89..7447b6f 100644 --- a/changes/bug22060 +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. - ExcludeSingleHopRelays was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + - FastFirstHopPK was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered + obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 54d0614..a9a2d4a 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1326,18 +1326,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0) -[[FastFirstHopPK]] **FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first - hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have - already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure - keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building a little - slower. Setting this option to "auto" takes advice from the authorities - in the latest consensus about whether to use this feature. + - + - Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's - operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it - doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: auto) - [[TransPort]] **TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 012229b..0af962e 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -816,12 +816,7 @@ should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) * creating on behalf of others. */ return 0; } - if (options->FastFirstHopPK == -1) { - /* option is "auto", so look at the consensus. */ - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "usecreatefast", 0, 0, 1); - } - - return options->FastFirstHopPK; + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "usecreatefast", 0, 0, 1); } /** Return true if circ is the type of circuit we want to count diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index a922433..bf658ce 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { OBSOLETE("FallbackNetworkstatusFile"), V(FascistFirewall, BOOL, "0"), V(FirewallPorts, CSV, ""), - V(FastFirstHopPK, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), + OBSOLETE("FastFirstHopPK"), V(FetchDirInfoEarly, BOOL, "0"), V(FetchDirInfoExtraEarly, BOOL, "0"), V(FetchServerDescriptors, BOOL, "1"), @@ -664,8 +664,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { "a wide variety of application-level attacks." }, { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", "Turning this on makes your client " "easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." }, - { "FastFirstHopPK", "Changing this option does not make your client more " - "secure, but does make it easier to fingerprint." }, { "CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout", "This option makes your " "client easier to fingerprint." }, { "CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout", "This option makes " diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index e221959..e30d3da 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4057,8 +4057,6 @@ typedef struct { int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish? * If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */ int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */ - int FastFirstHopPK; /**< If Tor believes it is safe, should we save a third - * of our PK time by sending CREATE_FAST cells? */ /** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which * means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */ int FetchDirInfoEarly;

1 0

[tor/master] config: Remove AllowSingleHopCircuits option
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit fea72571dfc70ec766edaaea2dc80c1e759a977d Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 25 13:30:46 2017 -0400 config: Remove AllowSingleHopCircuits option Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans up the code associated with it. Partially fixes #22060 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug22060 | 2 ++ doc/tor.1.txt | 5 ----- src/or/config.c | 4 +--- src/or/control.c | 21 +++------------------ src/or/or.h | 3 --- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug22060 b/changes/bug22060 index d839c9b..19c8d2c 100644 --- a/changes/bug22060 +++ b/changes/bug22060 @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ o Remove configuration option (confic): - AllowInvalidNodes was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. + - AllowSingleHopCircuits was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and now has been + rendered obsolete. Code has been removed and feature no longer exists. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 012c5b9..3088c9b 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1468,11 +1468,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None) -[[AllowSingleHopCircuits]] **AllowSingleHopCircuits** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays - that have the **AllowSingleHopExits** option turned on to build - one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0) - [[OptimisticData]] **OptimisticData** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 6edfac3..3621b8e 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(AllowDotExit, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("AllowInvalidNodes"), V(AllowNonRFC953Hostnames, BOOL, "0"), - V(AllowSingleHopCircuits, BOOL, "0"), + OBSOLETE("AllowSingleHopCircuits"), V(AllowSingleHopExits, BOOL, "0"), V(AlternateBridgeAuthority, LINELIST, NULL), V(AlternateDirAuthority, LINELIST, NULL), @@ -662,8 +662,6 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = { /* Deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha... */ { "AllowDotExit", "Unrestricted use of the .exit notation can be used for " "a wide variety of application-level attacks." }, - { "AllowSingleHopCircuits", "Almost no relays actually allow single-hop " - "exits, making this option pointless." }, { "AllowSingleHopExits", "Turning this on will make your relay easier " "to abuse." }, { "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses", "Turning this on makes your client " diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 56f1329..1017867 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -3551,24 +3551,9 @@ handle_control_attachstream(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, } /* Is this a single hop circuit? */ if (circ && (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ)<2 || hop==1)) { - const node_t *node = NULL; - char *exit_digest = NULL; - if (circ->build_state && - circ->build_state->chosen_exit && - !tor_digest_is_zero(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest)) { - exit_digest = circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest; - node = node_get_by_id(exit_digest); - } - /* Do both the client and relay allow one-hop exit circuits? */ - if (!node || - !node_allows_single_hop_exits(node) || - !get_options()->AllowSingleHopCircuits) { - connection_write_str_to_buf( - "551 Can't attach stream to this one-hop circuit.\r\n", conn); - return 0; - } - tor_assert(exit_digest); - ap_conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(hex_str(exit_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + connection_write_str_to_buf( + "551 Can't attach stream to this one-hop circuit.\r\n", conn); + return 0; } if (circ && hop>0) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 53a8710..4381459 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4120,9 +4120,6 @@ typedef struct { /** If true, don't allow relays with AllowSingleHopExits=1 to be used in * circuits that we build. */ int ExcludeSingleHopRelays; - /** If true, and the controller tells us to use a one-hop circuit, and the - * exit allows it, we use it. */ - int AllowSingleHopCircuits; /** If true, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the * socks/trans/natd ports into "www.google.com" addresses that

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[torspec/master] adds more descriptive subsections, changes section organization
by nickm＠torproject.org 09 May '17

09 May '17

commit f6149b3d2c3c587d21fb196cc1fc8f3b2dc698a5 Author: Chelsea H. Komlo <chelsea.komlo(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Mar 14 16:12:57 2017 -0500 adds more descriptive subsections, changes section organization --- glossary.txt | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 88 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/glossary.txt b/glossary.txt index ba4baeb..9f1bdc0 100644 --- a/glossary.txt +++ b/glossary.txt @@ -15,24 +15,76 @@ This glossary is not a design document; it is only a reference. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. -0.1 Commonly used Tor configuration terms +1.0 Commonly used Tor configuration terms ORPort - Onion Router Port DirPort - Directory Port -0.2 Tor network components +2.0 Tor network components - Relay, aka OR (onion router) - - Exit relay - Non-exit relay - Guard relay - Client, aka OP (onion proxy) + 2.1 Relay, aka OR (onion router) - Bridge - + 2.1.1 Specific roles - Circuit: An established path through the network, where cryptographic keys - are negotiated using the ntor protocol with each hop. Circuits can differ - in length depending on their purpose. See also Leaky Pipe Topology. + Exit relay: The final hop in an exit circuit before traffic leaves + the Tor network to connect to external servers. + + Non-exit relay: Relays which send and receive traffic only to + other Tor relays. + + Entry relay: The first hop in a Tor circuit. Can be either a guard + relay or a bridge, with bridges taking precedant. + + Guard relay: Currently only used as entry relays. Guard relays + are rotated more slowly to prevent enumeration attacks. + + Bridge: A relay intentionally not listed in the public Tor + consensus, with the purpose of circumventing entities (such as + governments or ISPs) seeking to block clients from using Tor. + Currently, bridges are used only as entry relays. + + Directory cache: On bootstrap, clients will query a directory + authority for the latest consensus. However, later consensus + fetches can be made to directory caches, which can be any relay in + the network. + + Rendezvous point: A relay connecting a client to a hidden service. + Each party will build a three-hop circuit, meeting at the + rendezvous point. + + 2.2 Client, aka OP (onion proxy) + + 2.3 Authorities: + + Directory Authority: Nine total in the Tor network, operated by + trusted individuals. Directory authorities define and serve the + consensus document, i.e, the "state of the network," which contains + router statuses for all relays currently in the network. Directory + authorities also serve server descriptors, extra info documents, + microdescriptors, and the microdescriptor consensus, + + Bridge Authority: One total. Similar in responsibility to directory + authorities, but for bridges. + + Fallback Directory Mirror: On bootstrap, a client will first attempt + to fetch the consensus document from fallback directory mirrors, + a relay selected for this role due to its stability and longevity + on the network. + + 2.4 Hidden Service: + + A hidden service is a server that will only accept incoming + connections via the hidden service protocol. Connection + initiators will not be able to learn the IP address of the hidden + service, allowing the hidden service to receive incoming connections, + serve content, etc, while preserving its location anonymity. + + 2.5 Circuit: + + An established path through the network, where cryptographic keys + are negotiated using the ntor protocol or TAP (Tor Authentication + Protocol (deprecated) with each hop. Circuits can differ in length + depending on their purpose. See also Leaky Pipe Topology. Origin Circuit - @@ -44,15 +96,34 @@ This glossary is not a design document; it is only a reference. network. For example, a client could connect to a hidden service via an internal circuit. - Stream - Edge connection: + 2.6 Edge connection: - TLS connection: + 2.7 Consensus: The state of the Tor network, published every hour, + decided by a vote from the network's directory authorities. Clients + fetch the consensus from directory authorities, fallback + directories, or directory caches. + 2.8 Descriptor: Each descriptor represents information about one + relay in the Tor network. The descriptor includes the relay's IP + address, public key fingerprint, along with other data. Relays send + descriptors to directory authorities, who will vote and publish a + summary of them in the network consensus. + +3.0 Tor network protocols Link handshake Circuit handshake + Hidden Service Protocol + Directory Protocol + + +4.0 General network definitions + + Leaky Pipe Topology: The ability for packets to be addressed to any + hop in the path of a circuit. In Tor, the destination hop is + determined by using the recognized field of relay cells. - Leaky Pipe Topology: The ability for packets to be addressed to any hop - in the path of a circuit. The destination hop is determined by using the - recognized field of relay cells. + Stream: In the Tor network specifically, TCP streams are multiplexed + over circuits. + TLS connection: All pairwise connections in the Tor network are made + over TLS.

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