February 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Refactor policy_summary_reject to prepare for IPv6 changes
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 82850d0da6c29fe50e2622f0cde0142ca9530ae4 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Feb 1 15:18:47 2017 +1100 Refactor policy_summary_reject to prepare for IPv6 changes No behaviour change, apart from non-fatal assertions Part of 21357 --- src/or/policies.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index 1262bef..71062eb 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -2299,7 +2299,11 @@ policy_summary_item_split(policy_summary_item_t* old, uint16_t new_starts) * my immortal soul, he can clean it up himself. */ #define AT(x) ((policy_summary_item_t*)smartlist_get(summary, x)) -#define REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT (1<<25) +#define IPV4_BITS (32) +/* Ports are rejected in an IPv4 summary if they are rejected in more than two + * IPv4 /8 address blocks */ +#define REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT_IPV4 (U64_LITERAL(1) << \ + (IPV4_BITS - 7)) /** Split an exit policy summary so that prt_min and prt_max * fall at exactly the start and end of an item respectively. */ @@ -2341,7 +2345,7 @@ policy_summary_accept(smartlist_t *summary, while (i < smartlist_len(summary) && AT(i)->prt_max <= prt_max) { if (!AT(i)->accepted && - AT(i)->reject_count <= REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT) + AT(i)->reject_count <= REJECT_CUTOFF_COUNT_IPV4) AT(i)->accepted = 1; i++; } @@ -2357,7 +2361,12 @@ policy_summary_reject(smartlist_t *summary, { int i = policy_summary_split(summary, prt_min, prt_max); /* XXX: ipv4 specific */ - uint64_t count = (U64_LITERAL(1) << (32-maskbits)); + /* The length of a single address mask */ + int addrbits = IPV4_BITS; + tor_assert_nonfatal_once(addrbits >= maskbits); + + uint64_t count = (U64_LITERAL(1) << (addrbits-maskbits)); + tor_assert_nonfatal_once(count > 0); while (i < smartlist_len(summary) && AT(i)->prt_max <= prt_max) { AT(i)->reject_count += count;

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[tor/master] Use an internal variable for HiddenServiceStatistics
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 51b562c605e2a959ee51ee85bd40de887adf9dea Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jan 27 09:32:05 2017 -0500 Use an internal variable for HiddenServiceStatistics Stop modifying the value of our torrc option HiddenServiceStatistics just because we're not a bridge or relay. This bug was causing Tor Browser users to write "HiddenServiceStatistics 0" in their torrc files as if they had chosen to change the config. Fixes #21150 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug21150 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 5 +++-- src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug21150 b/changes/bug21150 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a8b4f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug21150 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (config, hidden service): + - Stop modifying the value of our torrc option HiddenServiceStatistics + just because we're not a bridge or relay. Use an internal value for what + tor should use and keep the torrc option intact. Fixes bug 21150; bugfix + on tor-0.2.6.2-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index d0ca561..5e7fd6d 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreams",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints", LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), - V(HiddenServiceStatistics, BOOL, "1"), + VAR("HiddenServiceStatistics", BOOL, HiddenServiceStatistics_option, "1"), V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), @@ -2004,6 +2004,8 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) /* Only collect directory-request statistics on relays and bridges. */ options->DirReqStatistics = options->DirReqStatistics_option && server_mode(options); + options->HiddenServiceStatistics = + options->HiddenServiceStatistics_option && server_mode(options); if (options->CellStatistics || options->DirReqStatistics || options->EntryStatistics || options->ExitPortStatistics || @@ -2018,7 +2020,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) options->CellStatistics = 0; options->EntryStatistics = 0; options->ConnDirectionStatistics = 0; - options->HiddenServiceStatistics = 0; options->ExitPortStatistics = 0; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 18fff78..0db9f23 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -4168,6 +4168,10 @@ typedef struct { /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service * directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */ + int HiddenServiceStatistics_option; + /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on + * HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, + * else no. */ int HiddenServiceStatistics; /** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug21150_030_01_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 222f2fe469c87d575995af9fb585a5fc30c6a5d0 Merge: 78011bb 51b562c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 1 09:30:02 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug21150_030_01_squashed' changes/bug21150 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 5 +++-- src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] fix a wide line
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit c3b63544125660ef4f942cd29818ad34c4a41512 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 1 09:35:29 2017 -0500 fix a wide line --- src/or/config.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fdfbf87..a07719e 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreams",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints", LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), - VAR("HiddenServiceStatistics", BOOL, HiddenServiceStatistics_option, "1"), + VAR("HiddenServiceStatistics", BOOL, HiddenServiceStatistics_option, "1"), V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"),

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[tor/master] Don't build circuits till primary guards have descriptors
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 746d959100f0275e3ad4442e89901796f669413e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 31 12:31:43 2017 -0500 Don't build circuits till primary guards have descriptors In addition to not wanting to build circuits until we can see most of the paths in the network, and in addition to not wanting to build circuits until we have a consensus ... we shouldn't build circuits till all of our (in-use) primary guards have descriptors that we can use for them. This is another bug 21242 fix. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/entrynodes.h | 5 +++++ src/or/nodelist.c | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 1cf1ff2..6249e84 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -3335,6 +3335,43 @@ guards_retry_optimistic(const or_options_t *options) return 1; } +/** + * Return true iff we know enough directory information to construct + * circuits through all of the primary guards we'd currently use. + */ +int +guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs) +{ + if (!gs->primary_guards_up_to_date) + entry_guards_update_primary(gs); + + const int num_primary = get_n_primary_guards_to_use(GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC); + int n_missing_descriptors = 0; + int n_considered = 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { + entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); + if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) + continue; + n_considered++; + if (!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) + n_missing_descriptors++; + if (n_considered >= num_primary) + break; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); + + return n_missing_descriptors == 0; +} + +/** As guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits, but uses + * the default guard selection. */ +int +entry_guards_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits(void) +{ + return guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits( + get_guard_selection_info()); +} + /** Free one guard selection context */ STATIC void guard_selection_free(guard_selection_t *gs) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 0c29292..f02901f 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -482,6 +482,7 @@ STATIC entry_guard_t *get_sampled_guard_with_id(guard_selection_t *gs, const uint8_t *rsa_id); MOCK_DECL(STATIC time_t, randomize_time, (time_t now, time_t max_backdate)); + STATIC entry_guard_t *entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, const node_t *node); STATIC entry_guard_t *entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs); @@ -566,6 +567,10 @@ int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, int entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options); void entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options); +int guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits( + guard_selection_t *gs); +int entry_guards_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits(void); + void entry_guards_free_all(void); double pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard); diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 804af29..96e95ba 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include "config.h" #include "control.h" #include "dirserv.h" +#include "entrynodes.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "main.h" #include "microdesc.h" @@ -1991,6 +1992,13 @@ update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void) using_md = consensus->flavor == FLAV_MICRODESC; + if (! entry_guards_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits()) { + strlcpy(dir_info_status, "We're missing descriptors for some of our " + "primary entry guards", sizeof(dir_info_status)); + res = 0; + goto done; + } + /* Check fraction of available paths */ { char *status = NULL;

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[tor/master] Downgrade assertion to nonfatal for #21242
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 93b39c51629ed0ded2bf807cb6a06d59f3a55347 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 31 11:35:57 2017 -0500 Downgrade assertion to nonfatal for #21242 This assertion triggered in the (error) case where we got a result from guards_choose_guard() without a descriptor. That's not supposed to be possible, but it's not worth crashing over. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index f11c865..88445f9 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2369,7 +2369,7 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) int client = (server_mode(get_options()) == 0); info = extend_info_from_node(r, client); /* Clients can fail to find an allowed address */ - tor_assert(info || client); + tor_assert_nonfatal(info || client); } } else { const node_t *r =

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[tor/master] changes file for bug21242
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 957b9f8b83429a3dcd0258a2eab0f266adcbf87b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 31 12:35:44 2017 -0500 changes file for bug21242 --- changes/bug21242 | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug21242 b/changes/bug21242 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0bdc203 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug21242 @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + o Major bugfixes (entry guards): + - Stop trying to build circuits through entry guards for which we + have no descriptor yet. Also, stop crashing if we *do* accidentally + try to build a circuit in such a state. Fixes bug 21242; bugfix + on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + + o Minor features (entry guards): + - Do not try to build circuits until we have descriptors for our + primary entry guards. Related to fix for bug 21242. +

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug21242'
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 78011bb7bace31ecba7dff5e07d84306bf98698c Merge: 2e93bff 957b9f8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 1 09:09:58 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug21242' changes/bug21242 | 10 ++++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/entrynodes.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/entrynodes.h | 6 +++++ src/or/nodelist.c | 8 +++++++ 5 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Don't (usually) return any guards that are missing descriptors.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 02da24f8e5b2ce34da941cc25ce9808b447065ac Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 31 12:30:33 2017 -0500 Don't (usually) return any guards that are missing descriptors. Actually, it's _fine_ to use a descriptorless guard for fetching directory info -- we just shouldn't use it when building circuits. Fortunately, we already have a "usage" flag that we can use here. Partial fix for bug 21242. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/entrynodes.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 344b69d..1cf1ff2 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -185,6 +185,16 @@ should_apply_guardfraction(const networkstatus_t *ns) return options->UseGuardFraction; } +/** Return true iff we know a descriptor for <b>guard</b> */ +static int +guard_has_descriptor(const entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity); + if (!node) + return 0; + return node_has_descriptor(node); +} + /** * Try to determine the correct type for a selection named "name", * if <b>type</b> is GS_TYPE_INFER. @@ -1447,6 +1457,7 @@ sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, const unsigned exclude_primary = flags & SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY; const unsigned exclude_pending = flags & SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PENDING; const unsigned no_update_primary = flags & SAMPLE_NO_UPDATE_PRIMARY; + const unsigned need_descriptor = flags & SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_NO_DESCRIPTOR; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); @@ -1480,6 +1491,8 @@ sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, continue; if (exclude_pending && guard->is_pending) continue; + if (need_descriptor && !guard_has_descriptor(guard)) + continue; smartlist_add(reachable_filtered_sample, guard); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); @@ -1777,6 +1790,7 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, unsigned *state_out) { + const int need_descriptor = (usage == GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC); tor_assert(gs); tor_assert(state_out); @@ -1793,6 +1807,9 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) continue; if (guard->is_reachable != GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) { + if (need_descriptor && BUG(!guard_has_descriptor(guard))) { + continue; + } *state_out = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION; guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time(); smartlist_add(usable_primary_guards, guard); @@ -1821,6 +1838,8 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, continue; entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); if (guard->is_usable_filtered_guard && ! guard->is_pending) { + if (need_descriptor && !guard_has_descriptor(guard)) + continue; /* not a bug */ guard->is_pending = 1; guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time(); *state_out = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD; @@ -1836,11 +1855,15 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, random from {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}." */ { entry_guard_t *guard; + unsigned flags = 0; + if (need_descriptor) + flags |= SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_NO_DESCRIPTOR; guard = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, rst, SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED | SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY | - SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PENDING); + SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PENDING | + flags); if (guard == NULL) { log_info(LD_GUARD, "Absolutely no sampled guards were available."); return NULL; diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index d469df7..0c29292 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ STATIC int entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(guard_selection_t *gs); #define SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY (1u<<1) #define SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PENDING (1u<<2) #define SAMPLE_NO_UPDATE_PRIMARY (1u<<3) +#define SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_NO_DESCRIPTOR (1u<<4) /**@}*/ STATIC entry_guard_t *sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards( guard_selection_t *gs,

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[tor/master] entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(): TRAFFIC guards must have descriptors
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '17

01 Feb '17

commit 26957a127a80404ca243e50c3f0c2bac01e480b8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 31 11:46:06 2017 -0500 entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(): TRAFFIC guards must have descriptors This relates to the 21242 fix -- entry_guard_pick_for_circuit() should never yield nodes without descriptors when the node is going to be used for traffic, since we won't be able to extend through them. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index c5fb92e..344b69d 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2068,6 +2068,8 @@ entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, // XXXX prop271 check Ed ID. if (! node) goto fail; + if (BUG(usage != GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD && !node_has_descriptor(node))) + goto fail; *chosen_node_out = node; *guard_state_out = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circuit_guard_state_t));

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