February 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.9] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into release-0.2.9
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit a85fdabc60fee6db1d40129cd621c39b2772c0d1 Merge: 5cdc7a4 0f46f7d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 7 08:41:43 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into release-0.2.9

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[tor/release-0.2.9] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug17404_024' into maint-0.2.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit 51675f97d30e48da68f2cf538f7f805f51af4c36 Merge: 6cb8c0f 9459ae2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 7 08:37:07 2017 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug17404_024' into maint-0.2.4 changes/bug17404 | 6 ++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

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[tor/release-0.2.9] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.5' into maint-0.2.6
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit da0d5ad9830b22983864660ca1c732627e119747 Merge: 54771bc 332543b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 7 08:34:37 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.5' into maint-0.2.6

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[tor/release-0.2.9] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' into maint-0.2.9
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit 0f46f7d1ec8064ffc5573d60819fc7f231497e12 Merge: b928095 7b24f3e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 7 08:39:39 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8' into maint-0.2.9

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[tor/maint-0.2.7] Fix out-of-bounds read in INTRODUCE2 client auth
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit 053e11f397f3f890c52a1add6aa4e75a9178eba0 Author: John Brooks <john.brooks(a)dereferenced.net> Date: Sat Apr 25 22:52:35 2015 -0600 Fix out-of-bounds read in INTRODUCE2 client auth The length of auth_data from an INTRODUCE2 cell is checked when the auth_type is recognized (1 or 2), but not for any other non-zero auth_type. Later, auth_data is assumed to have at least REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN bytes, leading to a client-triggered out of bounds read. Fixed by checking auth_len before comparing the descriptor cookie against known clients. Fixes #15823; bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. --- changes/bug15823 | 4 ++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug15823 b/changes/bug15823 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..987de5d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug15823 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (hidden service): + - Fix an out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid INTRODUCE2 cells + on a client authorized hidden service. Fixes bug 15823; bugfix + on 0.2.1.6-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 436f2f4..0a54567 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -939,11 +939,13 @@ rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service) return 0; } -/** Check client authorization of a given descriptor_cookie for - * service. Return 1 for success and 0 for failure. */ +/** Check client authorization of a given descriptor_cookie of + * length cookie_len for service. Return 1 for success + * and 0 for failure. */ static int rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, - const char *descriptor_cookie) + const char *descriptor_cookie, + size_t cookie_len) { rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL; tor_assert(service); @@ -954,6 +956,13 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, return 0; } + if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected " + "%lu bytes. Dropping cell.", + (unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); + return 0; + } + /* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, { if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie, @@ -1300,7 +1309,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, if (service->clients) { if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) { if (rend_check_authorization(service, - (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data)) { + (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data, + parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid."); } else { log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "

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[tor/maint-0.2.7] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into maint-0.2.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit 640b4022324c19cf330a26b8d42b6bf7707346ce Merge: 34fdd51 053e11f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 7 08:32:10 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into maint-0.2.5

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[tor/maint-0.2.7] Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer or zero size
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit fb7d1f41b409761be3381efaeec0f56d2a470a9f Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jan 19 11:22:58 2016 +1100 Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer or zero size Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow. Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor". Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352), commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012. --- changes/bug18089 | 6 ++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug18089 b/changes/bug18089 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1fb342 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18089 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor fixes (security): + - Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer + or zero size. Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow. + Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor". + Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352), + commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 925beb3..f913917 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2972,6 +2972,7 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, /** * Destroy the sz bytes of data stored at mem, setting them to * the value byte. + * If mem is NULL or sz is zero, nothing happens. * * This function is preferable to memset, since many compilers will happily * optimize out memset() when they can convince themselves that the data being @@ -2989,6 +2990,13 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) { + if (mem == NULL || sz == 0) { + return; + } + + /* Data this large is likely to be an underflow. */ + tor_assert(sz < SIZE_T_CEILING); + /* Because whole-program-optimization exists, we may not be able to just * have this function call "memset". A smart compiler could inline it, then * eliminate dead memsets, and declare itself to be clever. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.7] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into maint-0.2.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit 332543baedcf651b75722e5d4626c62fdd24ef60 Merge: 640b402 6cb8c0f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 7 08:34:08 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.4' into maint-0.2.5 changes/bug18089 | 6 ++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

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[tor/maint-0.2.8] Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer or zero size
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit fb7d1f41b409761be3381efaeec0f56d2a470a9f Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Jan 19 11:22:58 2016 +1100 Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer or zero size Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow. Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor". Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352), commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012. --- changes/bug18089 | 6 ++++++ src/common/crypto.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug18089 b/changes/bug18089 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1fb342 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug18089 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor fixes (security): + - Make memwipe() do nothing when passed a NULL pointer + or zero size. Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow. + Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor". + Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352), + commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 925beb3..f913917 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -2972,6 +2972,7 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, /** * Destroy the sz bytes of data stored at mem, setting them to * the value byte. + * If mem is NULL or sz is zero, nothing happens. * * This function is preferable to memset, since many compilers will happily * optimize out memset() when they can convince themselves that the data being @@ -2989,6 +2990,13 @@ secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) { + if (mem == NULL || sz == 0) { + return; + } + + /* Data this large is likely to be an underflow. */ + tor_assert(sz < SIZE_T_CEILING); + /* Because whole-program-optimization exists, we may not be able to just * have this function call "memset". A smart compiler could inline it, then * eliminate dead memsets, and declare itself to be clever. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.8] Fix out-of-bounds read in INTRODUCE2 client auth
by nickm＠torproject.org 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

commit 053e11f397f3f890c52a1add6aa4e75a9178eba0 Author: John Brooks <john.brooks(a)dereferenced.net> Date: Sat Apr 25 22:52:35 2015 -0600 Fix out-of-bounds read in INTRODUCE2 client auth The length of auth_data from an INTRODUCE2 cell is checked when the auth_type is recognized (1 or 2), but not for any other non-zero auth_type. Later, auth_data is assumed to have at least REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN bytes, leading to a client-triggered out of bounds read. Fixed by checking auth_len before comparing the descriptor cookie against known clients. Fixes #15823; bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. --- changes/bug15823 | 4 ++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug15823 b/changes/bug15823 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..987de5d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug15823 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (hidden service): + - Fix an out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid INTRODUCE2 cells + on a client authorized hidden service. Fixes bug 15823; bugfix + on 0.2.1.6-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 436f2f4..0a54567 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -939,11 +939,13 @@ rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service) return 0; } -/** Check client authorization of a given descriptor_cookie for - * service. Return 1 for success and 0 for failure. */ +/** Check client authorization of a given descriptor_cookie of + * length cookie_len for service. Return 1 for success + * and 0 for failure. */ static int rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, - const char *descriptor_cookie) + const char *descriptor_cookie, + size_t cookie_len) { rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL; tor_assert(service); @@ -954,6 +956,13 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service, return 0; } + if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected " + "%lu bytes. Dropping cell.", + (unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); + return 0; + } + /* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, { if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie, @@ -1300,7 +1309,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, if (service->clients) { if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) { if (rend_check_authorization(service, - (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data)) { + (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data, + parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid."); } else { log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "

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