June 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[user-manual/master] Change "also known as hidden services" to "formerly known as hidden services"
by colin＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit 27ef4eb5cf11ca2df2a1cf2744c2458c2da89600 Author: Colin Childs <colin(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 18:36:18 2016 -0500 Change "also known as hidden services" to "formerly known as hidden services" --- C/onionsites.page | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/C/onionsites.page b/C/onionsites.page index c0829d5..6cfa20e 100644 --- a/C/onionsites.page +++ b/C/onionsites.page @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ <title>Onion Services</title> -Onion services (also known as “hidden services”) are services (like websites) +Onion services (formerly known as “hidden services”) are services (like websites) that are only accessible through the Tor network.

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[user-manual/master] Adding test onion service (duckduckgo)
by colin＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit 794798dccb841351c76e9835bd2d44ef80bc4d93 Author: Colin Childs <colin(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 18:27:34 2016 -0500 Adding test onion service (duckduckgo) --- C/onionsites.page | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/C/onionsites.page b/C/onionsites.page index f443ba4..c0829d5 100644 --- a/C/onionsites.page +++ b/C/onionsites.page @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ <title>Onion Services</title> -Onion services (also known as “hidden services”) are services (like websites) +Onion services (also known as “hidden services”) are services (like websites) that are only accessible through the Tor network. @@ -66,5 +66,10 @@ If you are still unable to connect to the onion service, please try again later. There may be a temporary connection issue, or the site operators may have allowed it to go offline without warning. + +You can also ensure that you're able to access other onion services by +connecting to <link href="http://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/">DuckDuckGo's Onion +Service</link> + </section> </page>

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[tor/master] Remove some duplicated warnings from the big list
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit e54f8e3429f75783dc7b89af79eec019b5c80d9c Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 19:28:56 2016 -0400 Remove some duplicated warnings from the big list --- configure.ac | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 40e60f4..386fcdd 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -1707,7 +1707,6 @@ if test "x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory" != "xno"; then -Wbind-to-temporary-copy -Wbitfield-constant-conversion -Wbool-conversion - -Wbool-conversion -Wbool-conversions -Wbuiltin-requires-header -Wchar-align @@ -1755,7 +1754,6 @@ if test "x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory" != "xno"; then -Wgnu-array-member-paren-init -Wgnu-designator -Wgnu-static-float-init - -Wgnu-static-float-init -Wheader-guard -Wheader-hygiene -Widiomatic-parentheses @@ -1813,7 +1811,6 @@ if test "x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory" != "xno"; then -Wnull-arithmetic -Wnull-character -Wnull-conversion - -Wnull-conversion -Wnull-dereference -Wout-of-line-declaration -Wover-aligned @@ -1842,7 +1839,6 @@ if test "x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory" != "xno"; then -Wshift-overflow=2 -Wshift-sign-overflow -Wshorten-64-to-32 - -Wshorten-64-to-32 -Wsizeof-array-argument -Wsource-uses-openmp -Wstatic-float-init @@ -1895,8 +1891,6 @@ if test "x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory" != "xno"; then -Wvexing-parse -Wvisibility -Wvla-extension - -Wvla-extension - -Wzero-length-array -Wzero-length-array ], [ TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS([warning_flag]) ])

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[tor/release-0.2.8] One more changelog entry.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit 299f892815bff3aea4b1b2c3bd6b925d94c37a08 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 13:42:48 2016 -0400 One more changelog entry. --- ChangeLog | 4 ++++ changes/bug19191 | 5 ----- changes/bug19203 | 4 ---- changes/bug19213 | 3 --- changes/bug19406 | 4 ---- changes/geoip-jun2016 | 4 ---- 6 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index f03e25e..a1b0a51 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ Changes in version 0.2.8.4-rc - 2016-06-15 by nickname, and one such relay is found, but it is not officially Named. Fixes bug 19203; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. + o Minor features (build): + - Tor now builds once again with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development + branch (tested against 1.1.0-pre5 and 1.1.0-pre6-dev). + o Minor features (geoip): - Update geoip and geoip6 to the June 7 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 Country database. diff --git a/changes/bug19191 b/changes/bug19191 deleted file mode 100644 index 8670aaa..0000000 --- a/changes/bug19191 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (downloading): - - Predict more correctly whether we'll be downloading over HTTP when we - determine the maximum length of a URL. This should avoid a "BUG" - warning about the Squid HTTP proxy and its URL limits. Fixes bug 19191; - bugfix on ?????. diff --git a/changes/bug19203 b/changes/bug19203 deleted file mode 100644 index 96bc1e8..0000000 --- a/changes/bug19203 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (user interface): - - Correctly give a warning in the cases where a relay is specified by - nickname, and one such relay is found, but it is not officially Named. - Fixes bug 19203; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug19213 b/changes/bug19213 deleted file mode 100644 index 6217814..0000000 --- a/changes/bug19213 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (compilation): - - Cause the unit tests to compile correctly on mingw64 versions - that lack sscanf. Fixes bug 19213; bugfix on 0.2.7.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug19406 b/changes/bug19406 deleted file mode 100644 index e8b661b..0000000 --- a/changes/bug19406 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (build): - - Tor now again builds with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development branch - (tested against 1.1.0-pre5 and 1.1.0-pre6-dev). - diff --git a/changes/geoip-jun2016 b/changes/geoip-jun2016 deleted file mode 100644 index 6c9847c..0000000 --- a/changes/geoip-jun2016 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (geoip): - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the June 7 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 - Country database. -

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[tor/master] Disable -Wc99-c11-compat
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit 99a7ddd6f9d8644864f5fb8d8632fbc14cc26d7a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 14 13:28:26 2016 -0400 Disable -Wc99-c11-compat It triggers on the openssl headers, and doesn't seem to actually help us. --- configure.ac | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 03ada37..40e60f4 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -1710,7 +1710,6 @@ if test "x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory" != "xno"; then -Wbool-conversion -Wbool-conversions -Wbuiltin-requires-header - -Wc99-c11-compat -Wchar-align -Wcompare-distinct-pointer-types -Wcomplex-component-init

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Bug 19406: OpenSSL changed the Thread API in 1.1.0 again.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit 86f0b806812da8a53c25061acca500e0dcfb1103 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Tue Jun 14 04:40:36 2016 +0000 Bug 19406: OpenSSL changed the Thread API in 1.1.0 again. Instead of `ERR_remove_thread_state()` having a modified prototype, it now has the old prototype and a deprecation annotation. Since it's pointless to add extra complexity just to remain compatible with an old OpenSSL development snapshot, update the code to work with 1.1.0pre5 and later. --- src/common/crypto.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 933f103..ca04e4e 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -72,13 +72,18 @@ #define DISABLE_ENGINES #endif -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,4) && \ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) && \ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) -/* OpenSSL as of 1.1.0-pre4 has an "new" thread API, which doesn't require +/* OpenSSL as of 1.1.0pre4 has an "new" thread API, which doesn't require * seting up various callbacks. * - * Note: Yes, using OPENSSL_VER is naughty, but this was introduced in the - * pre-release series. + * OpenSSL 1.1.0pre4 has a messed up `ERR_remove_thread_state()` prototype, + * while the previous one was restored in pre5, and the function made a no-op + * (along with a deprecated annotation, which produces a compiler warning). + * + * While it is possible to support all three versions of the thread API, + * a version that existed only for one snapshot pre-release is kind of + * pointless, so let's not. */ #define NEW_THREAD_API #endif @@ -430,9 +435,7 @@ crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir) void crypto_thread_cleanup(void) { -#ifdef NEW_THREAD_API - ERR_remove_thread_state(); -#else +#ifndef NEW_THREAD_API ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); #endif } @@ -3193,9 +3196,7 @@ int crypto_global_cleanup(void) { EVP_cleanup(); -#ifdef NEW_THREAD_API - ERR_remove_thread_state(); -#else +#ifndef NEW_THREAD_API ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); #endif ERR_free_strings();

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Bug 19406: OpenSSL made RSA and DH opaque in 1.1.0.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit b563a3a09dd94892454210e82e46b62b947c5061 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Tue Jun 14 06:14:28 2016 +0000 Bug 19406: OpenSSL made RSA and DH opaque in 1.1.0. There's accessors to get at things, but it ends up being rather cumbersome. The only place where behavior should change is that the code will fail instead of attempting to generate a new DH key if our internal sanity check fails. Like the previous commit, this probably breaks snapshots prior to pre5. --- src/common/crypto.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/common/tortls.c | 4 ++ src/tools/tor-checkkey.c | 11 +++- 3 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index ca04e4e..614f9b5 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -94,11 +94,6 @@ /** Largest strong entropy request */ #define MAX_STRONGEST_RAND_SIZE 256 -/** Macro: is k a valid RSA public or private key? */ -#define PUBLIC_KEY_OK(k) ((k) && (k)->key && (k)->key->n) -/** Macro: is k a valid RSA private key? */ -#define PRIVATE_KEY_OK(k) ((k) && (k)->key && (k)->key->p) - #ifndef NEW_THREAD_API /** A number of preallocated mutexes for use by OpenSSL. */ static tor_mutex_t **openssl_mutexes_ = NULL; @@ -440,6 +435,24 @@ crypto_thread_cleanup(void) #endif } +/** used internally: quicly validate a crypto_pk_t object as a private key. + * Return 1 iff the public key is valid, 0 if obviously invalid. + */ +static int +crypto_pk_private_ok(const crypto_pk_t *k) +{ +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + if (!k || !k->key) + return 0; + + BIGNUM *p, *q; + RSA_get0_factors(k->key, &p, &q); + return p != NULL; /* XXX/yawning: Should we check q? */ +#else + return k && k->key && k->key->p; +#endif +} + /** used by tortls.c: wrap an RSA* in a crypto_pk_t. */ crypto_pk_t * crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(RSA *rsa) @@ -802,7 +815,7 @@ crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_t *env, char *s; int r; - tor_assert(PRIVATE_KEY_OK(env)); + tor_assert(crypto_pk_private_ok(env)); if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) return -1; @@ -844,7 +857,7 @@ int crypto_pk_key_is_private(const crypto_pk_t *key) { tor_assert(key); - return PRIVATE_KEY_OK(key); + return crypto_pk_private_ok(key); } /** Return true iff env contains a public key whose public exponent @@ -856,7 +869,15 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env) tor_assert(env); tor_assert(env->key); - return BN_is_word(env->key->e, 65537); + BIGNUM *e; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *n, *d; + RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d); +#else + e = env->key->e; +#endif + return BN_is_word(e, 65537); } /** Compare the public-key components of a and b. Return less than 0 @@ -877,12 +898,27 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b) if (an_argument_is_null) return result; - tor_assert(PUBLIC_KEY_OK(a)); - tor_assert(PUBLIC_KEY_OK(b)); - result = BN_cmp((a->key)->n, (b->key)->n); + BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e; + BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d; + RSA_get0_key(a->key, &a_n, &a_e, &a_d); + RSA_get0_key(b->key, &b_n, &b_e, &b_d); +#else + a_n = a->key->n; + a_e = a->key->e; + b_n = b->key->n; + b_e = b->key->e; +#endif + + tor_assert(a_n != NULL && a_e != NULL); + tor_assert(b_n != NULL && b_e != NULL); + + result = BN_cmp(a_n, b_n); if (result) return result; - return BN_cmp((a->key)->e, (b->key)->e); + return BN_cmp(a_e, b_e); } /** Compare the public-key components of a and b. Return non-zero iff @@ -913,9 +949,20 @@ crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env) { tor_assert(env); tor_assert(env->key); - tor_assert(env->key->n); +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + /* It's so stupid that there's no other way to check that n is valid + * before calling RSA_bits(). + */ + BIGNUM *n, *e, *d; + RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d); + tor_assert(n != NULL); + + return RSA_bits(env->key); +#else + tor_assert(env->key->n); return BN_num_bits(env->key->n); +#endif } /** Increase the reference count of env, and return it. @@ -940,7 +987,7 @@ crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_t *env) tor_assert(env); tor_assert(env->key); - if (PRIVATE_KEY_OK(env)) { + if (crypto_pk_private_ok(env)) { new_key = RSAPrivateKey_dup(env->key); privatekey = 1; } else { @@ -1009,7 +1056,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_decrypt(crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, tor_assert(env->key); tor_assert(fromlen<INT_MAX); tor_assert(tolen >= crypto_pk_keysize(env)); - if (!env->key->p) + if (!crypto_pk_key_is_private(env)) /* Not a private key */ return -1; @@ -1115,7 +1162,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_sign(const crypto_pk_t *env, char *to, size_t tolen, tor_assert(to); tor_assert(fromlen < INT_MAX); tor_assert(tolen >= crypto_pk_keysize(env)); - if (!env->key->p) + if (!crypto_pk_key_is_private(env)) /* Not a private key */ return -1; @@ -2108,25 +2155,35 @@ crypto_validate_dh_params(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g) DH *dh = NULL; int ret = -1; - /* Copy into a temporary DH object. */ + /* Copy into a temporary DH object, just so that DH_check() can be called. */ if (!(dh = DH_new())) goto out; +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; + if (!(dh_p = BN_dup(p))) + goto out; + if (!(dh_g = BN_dup(g))) + goto out; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) + goto out; +#else if (!(dh->p = BN_dup(p))) goto out; if (!(dh->g = BN_dup(g))) goto out; +#endif /* Perform the validation. */ int codes = 0; if (!DH_check(dh, &codes)) goto out; - if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) { + if (BN_is_word(g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) { /* Per https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Diffie-Hellman_parameters * * OpenSSL checks the prime is congruent to 11 when g = 2; while the * IETF's primes are congruent to 23 when g = 2. */ - BN_ULONG residue = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 24); + BN_ULONG residue = BN_mod_word(p, 24); if (residue == 11 || residue == 23) codes &= ~DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; } @@ -2257,6 +2314,30 @@ crypto_dh_new(int dh_type) if (!(res->dh = DH_new())) goto err; +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; + + if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) { + dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls); + } else { + dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p); + } + if (!dh_p) + goto err; + + dh_g = BN_dup(dh_param_g); + if (!dh_g) { + BN_free(dh_p); + goto err; + } + + if (!DH_set0_pqg(res->dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) { + goto err; + } + + if (!DH_set_length(res->dh, DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS)) + goto err; +#else if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) { if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls))) goto err; @@ -2269,6 +2350,7 @@ crypto_dh_new(int dh_type) goto err; res->dh->length = DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS; +#endif return res; err: @@ -2305,11 +2387,26 @@ crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh) int crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API again: +#endif if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) { crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key"); return -1; } +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + /* OpenSSL 1.1.x doesn't appear to let you regenerate a DH key, without + * recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness + * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure. + */ + BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; + DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key); + if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" + "the-universe chances really do happen. Treating as a failure."); + return -1; + } +#else if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) { log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" "the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again."); @@ -2319,6 +2416,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL; goto again; } +#endif return 0; } @@ -2331,13 +2429,30 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) { int bytes; tor_assert(dh); - if (!dh->dh->pub_key) { + + BIGNUM *dh_pub; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *dh_priv; + DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); +#else + dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; +#endif + + if (!dh_pub) { if (crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) return -1; + else { +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); +#else + dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; +#endif + } } - tor_assert(dh->dh->pub_key); - bytes = BN_num_bytes(dh->dh->pub_key); + tor_assert(dh_pub); + bytes = BN_num_bytes(dh_pub); tor_assert(bytes >= 0); if (pubkey_len < (size_t)bytes) { log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, @@ -2347,7 +2462,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) } memset(pubkey, 0, pubkey_len); - BN_bn2bin(dh->dh->pub_key, (unsigned char*)(pubkey+(pubkey_len-bytes))); + BN_bn2bin(dh_pub, (unsigned char*)(pubkey+(pubkey_len-bytes))); return 0; } diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 4ffc672..7d070c5 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -904,7 +904,11 @@ tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) { RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key); +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024) +#else if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024) +#endif key_ok = 1; if (rsa) RSA_free(rsa); diff --git a/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c b/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c index ed68bdf..8e957c2 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "torlog.h" #include "util.h" #include "compat.h" +#include "compat_openssl.h" #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/rsa.h> @@ -70,7 +71,15 @@ main(int c, char **v) printf("%s\n",digest); } else { rsa = crypto_pk_get_rsa_(env); - str = BN_bn2hex(rsa->n); + + BIGNUM *rsa_n; +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d; + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); +#else + rsa_n = rsa->n; +#endif + str = BN_bn2hex(rsa_n); printf("%s\n", str); }

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Bug 19406: Add a changes file.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit b217e4ac65532742ffd9527738303ca14ae3c6c0 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Tue Jun 14 06:37:03 2016 +0000 Bug 19406: Add a changes file. --- changes/bug19406 | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug19406 b/changes/bug19406 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8b661b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug19406 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (build): + - Tor now again builds with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development branch + (tested against 1.1.0-pre5 and 1.1.0-pre6-dev). +

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Bug 19406: OpenSSL removed SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE in 1.1.0.
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit 6ddef1f7e0fe36f6e0b87873dfef5809dd593539 Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Tue Jun 14 06:22:19 2016 +0000 Bug 19406: OpenSSL removed SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE in 1.1.0. This is a logging onlu change, we were suppressing the severity down to INFO when it occured (treating it as "Mostly harmless"). Now it is no more. --- src/common/tortls.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 7d070c5..b68f5df 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -228,7 +228,9 @@ tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err, case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST: case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST: case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH: +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE: +#endif case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL: case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL: severity = LOG_INFO;

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[tor/release-0.2.8] Bug 19406: Fix the unit tests to work with OpenSSL 1.1.x
by nickm＠torproject.org 14 Jun '16

14 Jun '16

commit c5e2f7b9448cd0b7739e8515d0931b47fd208b9a Author: Yawning Angel <yawning(a)schwanenlied.me> Date: Tue Jun 14 06:24:13 2016 +0000 Bug 19406: Fix the unit tests to work with OpenSSL 1.1.x Just as it says on the tin. Don't need to fully disable any tests and reduce coverage either. Yay me. --- src/test/test_tortls.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c index 973e727..b9b74a1 100644 --- a/src/test/test_tortls.c +++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c @@ -385,10 +385,12 @@ test_tortls_log_one_error(void *ignored) LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API mock_clean_saved_logs(); tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE), LOG_WARN, 0, NULL); expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO); +#endif mock_clean_saved_logs(); tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL), @@ -683,7 +685,7 @@ test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored) crypto_pk_t *ret; crypto_pk_t *expected; tor_tls_context_t *ctx; - RSA *k = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(RSA)); + RSA *k = RSA_new(); ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t)); expected = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(k); @@ -698,8 +700,8 @@ test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored) tt_assert(ret == expected); done: + RSA_free(k); tor_free(expected); - tor_free(k); tor_free(ctx); }

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