June 2016 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[webwml/staging] Fix typo
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 5c390ab853cf6c9e00a4524eb2580d2bb723d2b1 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 7 13:59:25 2016 +0200 Fix typo --- about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml b/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml index 56a28ee..5d8d50f 100644 --- a/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml +++ b/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ free speech, privacy and innovation would be helpful. </p> <p> -Salary to low- to mid-$40,000s, depending on experience. +Salary low- to mid-$40,000s, depending on experience. </p> <p>

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[webwml/staging] We're looking for a HR person
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 97b6f49888e3333576852686d86d82ae1e4b00c0 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 7 12:37:45 2016 +0200 We're looking for a HR person --- about/en/jobs.wml | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/about/en/jobs.wml b/about/en/jobs.wml index 8bd168b..23cb004 100644 --- a/about/en/jobs.wml +++ b/about/en/jobs.wml @@ -12,14 +12,16 @@ <div id="maincol"> <h1>The Tor Project is always looking for more great people to join our team!</h1> -<p>At the moment, we don't have any official open positions. Please check back -soon, though! In the meantime, you may want to glance at our -<a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">volunteers</a> page. - -#<p>Specifically, we're looking for the following people currently: -#</p> -#<ul> -#</ul> +#<p>At the moment, we don't have any official open positions. Please check back +#soon, though! In the meantime, you may want to glance at our +#<a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">volunteers</a> page. + +<p>Specifically, we're looking for the following people currently: +</p> +<ul> +<a href="<page about/jobs-hr>">Human Resources Manager</a> +</ul> +</p> <p>In the past, we looked for the following people:</p>

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[webwml/staging] Try to deceive people less about where TB will run
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 6d2bdb4a7695c9b09caeb4d01bafb770e81279ed Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 30 00:27:39 2016 +0200 Try to deceive people less about where TB will run --- download/en/download-easy.wml | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/download/en/download-easy.wml b/download/en/download-easy.wml index a2986b2..288ea87 100644 --- a/download/en/download-easy.wml +++ b/download/en/download-easy.wml @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ <div class="package" style="padding-top: 13px; border-top: 0px;"> <div class="desc"> <h2>Tor Browser for GNU/Linux</h2> - <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux32> - Linux, Unix, BSD</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> + <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux32> - Linux, FreeBSD (32-Bit)</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> <p>Everything you need to safely browse the Internet. This package requires no installation. Just extract it and run.<br /> <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Learn more »</a></p> </div> @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ <div class="package" style="padding-top: 13px; border-top: 0px;"> <div class="desc"> <h2>Tor Browser for 64-Bit GNU/Linux</h2> - <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux64> - Linux, Unix, BSD (64-Bit)</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> + <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux64> - Linux (64-Bit)</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> <p>Everything you need to safely browse the Internet. This package requires no installation. Just extract it and run.<br /><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Learn more »</a></p> </div> <form class="downloads"> @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ are blocked.</p> <ul> <li class="dropdown"><a href="#windows">Microsoft Windows</a></li> <li class="dropdown"><a href="#mac">Apple OS X</a></li> -<li class="dropdown"><a href="#linux">Linux/Unix</a></li> +<li class="dropdown"><a href="#linux">Linux/FreeBSD</a></li> <li class="dropdown"><a href="#android">Android</a></li> <li class="dropdown"><a href="<page download/download>">All Downloads</a></li> </ul>

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[webwml/staging] Drop volunteer page footer idea blob
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit c9398e89cdae3a6e00da2da5d221414f184507b6 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Mar 17 08:26:19 2016 -0700 Drop volunteer page footer idea blob This is an antique, horribly unreadable wad of text as denser than a legal footer. We should invest effort in making project ideas readable or not have them at all. Actually, this section predates me (meaning it's over six years old) and never been maintained in that time. Guess it's so dense even we ignored it. :P If we want to resurrect any of these then it should be done so as tickets. --- getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml | 210 ------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 210 deletions(-) diff --git a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml index b243544..fef7c3e 100644 --- a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml +++ b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml @@ -1556,216 +1556,6 @@ implementation. </li> </ol> - - <a id="OtherCoding"></a> - <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2> - <ol> - <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On - Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system - call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means - that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a - href="<wiki>doc/WindowsBufferProblems">causing - havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO - instead. One solution would be to teach <a - href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use - overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to - the new libevent interface. Christian King made a - <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good - start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li> - - <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end - traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc - simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work - really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator - that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's - giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research. - See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for - details on the research side of this task — who knows, when it's - done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li> - - <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto - accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is - possibly very buggy. We're looking for more rigorous testing, - performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and - Tor if needed.</li> - - <li>Write a <a - href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzzer</a> - for Tor to discover security vulnerabilities. Determine if there - are good fuzzing frameworks out there for what we want. Win fame by - getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li> - - <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link - encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells - on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and - it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a - href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list - of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would - be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a - href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification - for Tor and - UDP</a> — please let us know what's wrong with it.</li> - - <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses - (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the - first place to start.</li> - - <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How - Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a> - from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit - them by hand with Gimp. We might want to - integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are - generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li> - - <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier - to maintain, improve, and document? One example is <a - href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live - System</a>. - </li> - - <li> - Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor - more scanning-resistant. Right now, an adversary can identify <a - href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a> - just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, - and seeing if they respond. To solve this, bridges could <a - href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like - webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools, - and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key. - To start, check out Shane Pope's <a - href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>. - </li> - - </ol> - - <a id="Research"></a> - <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2> - <ol> - <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack": - by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a - href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare - traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same - stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this - attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How - much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary - is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much) - that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping - schemes work better than others?</li> - <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional - protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't - see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably? - Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the - client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue - that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it - look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking - timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a - href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>, - but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of - client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the - strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on - asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from - natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than - symmetric links for some other reason?</li> - <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a - href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from - Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it - works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the - fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true, - then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst - options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the - attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the - attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to - actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a - much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate - or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two - orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be - sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't - Clog the Queue</a> too.</li> - <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of - the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the - exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice, - though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a - href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon - that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>. - Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry, - exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet - routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical - approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li> - <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider - the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random - circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a - href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position - paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting - anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more - thinking, but it looks very promising.</li> - <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth - (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between - each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing - bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms - don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams. - Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets, - and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine - a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit, - slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We - need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design - solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance - degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li> - <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our - current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe - we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather - than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a - href="http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh/638">ssh - throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe - overhaul if the results are good.</li> - <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing - an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a - href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing - it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect - steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to - block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of - the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512 - bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes. - How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the - wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could - a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li> - <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the - ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the - third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting - streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe, - the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so - the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security - tradeoff.</li> - <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client - puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus - if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li> - <li>Programs like <a - href="<page docs/torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide - your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for - every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set - by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used - by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly - do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox - that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the - anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the - Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version - of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen - in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N - UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help, - hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users - by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain - browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer. - </li> - <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain - reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is - lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay - connected? - </li> - </ol> - - <p> - <a href="<page about/contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any - of these! - </p> </div>  <div id = "sidecol">

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[webwml/staging] mention that pdf.js is OK
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 4933b0105713f38e3063e163dd4c59a6e8a85eb3 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 30 00:35:57 2016 +0200 mention that pdf.js is OK --- download/en/download-easy.wml | 3 ++- download/en/download.wml | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/download/en/download-easy.wml b/download/en/download-easy.wml index 288ea87..e2bb72a 100644 --- a/download/en/download-easy.wml +++ b/download/en/download-easy.wml @@ -286,7 +286,8 @@ and HTTPS relate</a>. <p>The Tor Browser will warn you before automatically opening documents that are handled by external applications. <b>DO NOT IGNORE THIS WARNING</b>. You should be very careful when downloading -documents via Tor (especially DOC and PDF files) as these documents +documents via Tor (especially DOC and PDF files, unless you use the PDF +viewer that's built into Tor Browser) as these documents can contain Internet resources that will be downloaded outside of Tor by the application that opens them. This will reveal your non-Tor IP address. If you must work with DOC and/or PDF files, we strongly diff --git a/download/en/download.wml b/download/en/download.wml index d0fcb5e..556581e 100644 --- a/download/en/download.wml +++ b/download/en/download.wml @@ -288,10 +288,11 @@ and HTTPS relate</a>. The Tor Browser will warn you before automatically opening documents that are handled by external applications. <b>DO NOT IGNORE THIS WARNING</b>. You should be very careful when downloading documents via Tor (especially DOC and -PDF files) as these documents can contain Internet resources that will be -downloaded outside of Tor by the application that opens them. This will reveal -your non-Tor IP address. If you must work with DOC and/or PDF files, we -strongly recommend either using a disconnected computer, +PDF files, unless you use the PDF viewer that's built into Tor Browser) as +these documents can contain Internet resources that will be downloaded outside +of Tor by the application that opens them. This will reveal your non-Tor IP +address. If you must work with DOC and/or PDF files, we strongly recommend +either using a disconnected computer, downloading the free <a href="https://www.virtualbox.org/">VirtualBox</a> and using it with a <a href="http://virtualboxes.org/">virtual machine image</a> with networking disabled, or using <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>.

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[webwml/staging] Offend everyone thoroughly
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 3b9e68b9970f118c4e5d1acddbed9851892f7d4e Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 30 09:32:11 2016 +0200 Offend everyone thoroughly - remove one FAQ entry - consistently say Linux, not GNU/Linux - remove references of FreeBSD in TB context --- docs/en/faq.wml | 56 +------------------------------------------ download/en/download-easy.wml | 18 +++++++------- download/en/download.wml | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml index 9c7f19e..1385eac 100644 --- a/docs/en/faq.wml +++ b/docs/en/faq.wml @@ -155,8 +155,6 @@ be?</a></li> limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li> <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal with abuse issues.</a></li> - <li><a href="#BestOSForRelay">Why doesn't my Windows (or other OS) Tor - relay run well?</a></li> <li><a href="#PackagedTor">Should I install Tor from my package manager, or build from source?</a></li> <li><a href="#WhatIsTheBadExitFlag">What is the BadExit flag?</a></li> @@ -1799,7 +1797,7 @@ for details. <li> If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it? Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes -sometimes? (This is especially common on OpenBSD.) On Linux, try running +sometimes? On Linux, try running "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware @@ -2446,50 +2444,6 @@ users <hr> - <a id="BestOSForRelay"></a> - <h3><a class="anchor" href="#BestOSForRelay">Why doesn't my Windows (or other OS) Tor relay run well?</h3></a> - - <p> - Tor relays work best on Linux, FreeBSD 5.x+, OS X Tiger or - later, and Windows Server 2003 or later. - </p> - - <p>You can probably get it working just fine on other operating - systems too, but note the following caveats: - </p> - - <ul> - <li> - Versions of Windows without the word "server" in their name - sometimes have problems. This is especially the case for Win98, - but it also happens in some cases for XP, especially if you don't - have much memory. The problem is that we don't use the networking - system calls in a very Windows-like way, so we run out of space in - a fixed-size memory space known as the non-page pool, and then - everything goes bad. The symptom is an assert error with the - message "No buffer space available [WSAENOBUFS ] [10055]". <a - href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/WindowsBufferProblems">You - can read more here.</a> - </li> - - <li> - Most developers who contribute to Tor work with Unix-like operating - systems. It would be great if more people with Windows experience help - out, so we can improve Tor's usability and stability in - Windows. - </li> - - <li> - More esoteric or archaic operating systems, like SunOS 5.9 or - Irix64, may have problems with some libevent methods (devpoll, - etc), probably due to bugs in libevent. If you experience crashes, - try setting the EVENT_NODEVPOLL or equivalent environment - variable. - </li> - </ul> - - <hr> - <a id="PackagedTor"></a> <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PackagedTor">Should I install Tor from my package manager, or build from source?</a></h3> @@ -2975,14 +2929,6 @@ connections use this feature.</li> - <li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth diff --git a/download/en/download-easy.wml b/download/en/download-easy.wml index e2bb72a..7a85413 100644 --- a/download/en/download-easy.wml +++ b/download/en/download-easy.wml @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ <define-tag button-win-tbb64>Currently Unused</define-tag> <define-tag button-osx-tbb32>Tor Browser</define-tag> <define-tag button-lin-tbb32>Tor Browser</define-tag> -<define-tag button-lin-tbb64>GNU/Linux 64-bit</define-tag> +<define-tag button-lin-tbb64>Linux 64-bit</define-tag> #include "dlhead.wmi" TITLE="Download Tor" CHARSET="UTF-8" @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ (<a class="win-tbb-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/<version-torbrowserbundledir>/torbrowser-install-<version-torbrowserbundle>_<lang>.exe.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> </form> - <p class="alt-dl">Not Using Windows?<br />Download for <a href="#mac">Mac</a> or <a href="#linux">GNU/Linux</a></p> + <p class="alt-dl">Not Using Windows?<br />Download for <a href="#mac">Mac</a> or <a href="#linux">Linux</a></p> </div> </div>  @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ (<a class="osx-tbb-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/<version-torbrowserbundledir>/TorBrowser-<version-torbrowserbundleosx64>-osx64_<lang>.dmg.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> </form> - <p class="alt-dl">Not Using Mac? Download for <a href="#windows">Windows</a> or <a href="#linux">GNU/Linux</a></p> + <p class="alt-dl">Not Using Mac? Download for <a href="#windows">Windows</a> or <a href="#linux">Linux</a></p> </div>  <table class="howto"> @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ <div id="linux" class="easy linux"> <div class="package" style="padding-top: 13px; border-top: 0px;"> <div class="desc"> - <h2>Tor Browser for GNU/Linux</h2> - <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux32> - Linux, FreeBSD (32-Bit)</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> + <h2>Tor Browser for Linux</h2> + <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux32> - Linux (32-Bit)</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> <p>Everything you need to safely browse the Internet. This package requires no installation. Just extract it and run.<br /> <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Learn more »</a></p> </div> @@ -113,14 +113,14 @@ (<a class="lin-tbb32-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/<version-torbrowserbundledir>/tor-browser-linux32-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux32>_<lang>.tar.xz.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> </form> - <p class="alt-dl">Not Using GNU/Linux? Download for <a href="#mac">Mac</a> or <a href="#windows">Windows</a></p> + <p class="alt-dl">Not Using Linux? Download for <a href="#mac">Mac</a> or <a href="#windows">Windows</a></p> </div> </div>  <div class="easy linux"> <div class="package" style="padding-top: 13px; border-top: 0px;"> <div class="desc"> - <h2>Tor Browser for 64-Bit GNU/Linux</h2> + <h2>Tor Browser for 64-Bit Linux</h2> <em>Version <version-torbrowserbundlelinux64> - Linux (64-Bit)</em> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/tbb">Read the release announcements!</a> <p>Everything you need to safely browse the Internet. This package requires no installation. Just extract it and run.<br /><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Learn more »</a></p> </div> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ (<a class="lin-tbb64-sig" href="../dist/torbrowser/<version-torbrowserbundledir>/tor-browser-linux64-<version-torbrowserbundlelinux64>_<lang>.tar.xz.asc">sig</a>) <a class="siginfo" href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">What's This?</a> </div> </form> - <p class="alt-dl">Not Using GNU/Linux? Download for <a href="#mac">Mac</a> or <a href="#windows">Windows</a></p> + <p class="alt-dl">Not Using Linux? Download for <a href="#mac">Mac</a> or <a href="#windows">Windows</a></p> </div> </div>  @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ are blocked.</p> <ul> <li class="dropdown"><a href="#windows">Microsoft Windows</a></li> <li class="dropdown"><a href="#mac">Apple OS X</a></li> -<li class="dropdown"><a href="#linux">Linux/FreeBSD</a></li> +<li class="dropdown"><a href="#linux">Linux</a></li> <li class="dropdown"><a href="#android">Android</a></li> <li class="dropdown"><a href="<page download/download>">All Downloads</a></li> </ul> diff --git a/download/en/download.wml b/download/en/download.wml index 556581e..0f3550a 100644 --- a/download/en/download.wml +++ b/download/en/download.wml @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ you are used to. Please read the <a href="#warning">full list of warnings</a> fo   <div id="linux" class="accordionButton on"> - <span class="linux24">GNU/Linux, BSD, and Unix</span></div> + <span class="linux24">Linux</span></div> <div class="accordionContent"> <div class="fauxhead"></div>

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[webwml/staging] Add the remaining jobs
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 7dc31745110a511e8f3e1f1dadc9dad99ad76852 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 7 13:59:00 2016 +0200 Add the remaining jobs --- about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ about/en/jobs-editor.wml | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ about/en/jobs-hr.wml | 8 +-- about/en/jobs.wml | 2 + 4 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml b/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56a28ee --- /dev/null +++ b/about/en/jobs-admin-assistant.wml @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: Jobs (Administrative Assistant)" CHARSET="UTF-8" +<div id="content" class="clearfix"> + <div id="breadcrumbs"> + <a href="<page index>">Home » </a> + <a href="<page about/overview>">About » </a> + <a href="<page about/jobs>">Jobs</a> + </div> + <div id="maincol"> +<h1>Internet Freedom Nonprofit Seeks Exceptional Administrative +Assistant</h1> +<h2>(Posted 4 Apr 2016)</h2> + +<p> +The Tor Project seeks an organized, conscientious, upbeat +"jack-of-all-trades" with excellent communication skills to support our +Seattle-based executive director and our internationally-distributed +team. The ideal candidate has experience providing executive support and +has a "can do" attitude. This job requires a self-starter who really +enjoys supporting a diverse community of technical people. +</p> + +<p> +The tasks for the position include, but are not limited to: +</p> + +<ul> +<li>Greet people who visit or call our office.</li> +<li>Monitor, order & organize office supplies.</li> +<li>Take the initiative for making office operations run smoothly, such +as opening a FedEx account, hiring a cleaning service, and whatever +other tasks make sense.</li> +<li>Serve as liaison between Seattle office and finance department.</li> +<li>Assist with event planning.</li> +<li>Pick up, drop off and sort mail and packages.</li> +<li>Respond to items in our request tracker (rt).</li> +<li>Log into our accounts on Paypal and Bitcoin to run weekly +reports.</li> +<li>Willingness to learn and use PGP and other computer security +tools.</li> +<li>Willingness to learn and use IRC and other technology-based methods +of communications.</li> +<li>Respond to communications from our donors.</li> +<li>Follow up with event sponsors for travel reimbursement.</li> +<li>Order premiums from vendors.</li> +<li>Fold t-shirts, stuff envelopes, fulfill orders for premiums.</li> +<li>Data entry.</li> +<li>Other duties as needed.</li> + +</ul> + +<p> +The person we seek should have the following qualities: +</p> + +<ul> +<li>Self starter</li> +<li>People person who is always looking for ways to be helpful</li> +<li>Good writing skills</li> +<li>Excellent computer skills</li> +<li>Attention to detail</li> +<li>Sensitivity to computer security issues</li> +<li>Ability to juggle several items at the same time with efficiency and +grace</li> +<li>Ability to work and think independently</li> +<li>Excellent work ethic</li> +<li>Willingness to take the initiative to get things done</li> +<li>Ability to leap tall buildings in a single bound (just +kidding!)</li> +</ul> + +<p> +The Tor Project works on Internet freedom issues, and a commitment to +free speech, privacy and innovation would be helpful. +</p> + +<p> +Salary to low- to mid-$40,000s, depending on experience. +</p> + +<p> +This is a full-time position based in our new office in Seattle, WA. +Inquiries about whether this job can be done remotely or part-time will +not be answered. To apply, send a cover letter and your resume to +<a href="mailto:adminjob@torproject.org">adminjob(a)torproject.org</a>. No +phone calls please! +</p> + +<p> +The Tor Project, Inc. is an equal opportunity, affirmative action +employer. +</p> + + </div> +  + <div id = "sidecol"> +#include "side.wmi" +#include "info.wmi" + </div> +  +</div> + +#include <foot.wmi> + diff --git a/about/en/jobs-editor.wml b/about/en/jobs-editor.wml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb1612c --- /dev/null +++ b/about/en/jobs-editor.wml @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: Jobs (Writer/Editor)" CHARSET="UTF-8" +<div id="content" class="clearfix"> + <div id="breadcrumbs"> + <a href="<page index>">Home » </a> + <a href="<page about/overview>">About » </a> + <a href="<page about/jobs>">Jobs</a> + </div> + <div id="maincol"> +<h1>Experienced Writer/Editor Sought for Internet Freedom Nonprofit</h1> +<h2>(Posted 4 Apr 2016)</h2> + +<p> +The Tor Project is looking for a strong writer/editor who is familiar +with issues involving high tech freedom and can make a compelling case +about why our work is so important to current and potential funders. +This person must be able to write clearly and provide context for the +Tor Project's complicated technology and activism projects. +</p> + +<p> +The writer/editor is responsible for researching grant opportunities, +sending out letters of inquiry and proposals to foundations, keeping +track of dates and deadlines, and submitting reports at the end of the +grant periods. This person is also responsible for additional writing +and editing related to other development functions, such as updating the +"one-pagers" we distribute at conferences, editing membership emails +that go out to our constituents, and writing our annual report. In many +ways, the Tor Project's grant proposals and reports are more like +activism pieces than traditional pleas for funding, so a background in +writing about civil liberties issues, such as freedom of speech and +privacy, and/or activism issues would be ideal. Excellent interpersonal, +organizational and written and oral communications skills are essential. +Grant writing experience is helpful but not required. Experience with +technology and using secure communications tools such as PGP, IRC, and +xmpp/otr is a big plus, as the role will engage with a globally +distributed team of security-conscious developers and advocates. +</p> + +<p> +The Tor Project works on Internet freedom issues, and a commitment to +free speech, privacy and innovation would be helpful. +</p> + +<p> +Salary low- to mid-$40,000s, depending on experience. +</p> + +<p> +This is a full-time position working in our new Seattle office. To +apply, please send a cover letter and resume along with two persuasive +writing samples to <a +href="mailto:grantjob@torproject.org">grantjob(a)torproject.org</a>. +Inquiries about whether this job can be done remotely or part-time will +not be answered. No phone calls please. +</p> + +<p> +The Tor Project, Inc. is an equal opportunity, affirmative action +employer. +</p> + + </div> +  + <div id = "sidecol"> +#include "side.wmi" +#include "info.wmi" + </div> +  +</div> + +#include <foot.wmi> + diff --git a/about/en/jobs-hr.wml b/about/en/jobs-hr.wml index 86e95aa..b24ef6a 100644 --- a/about/en/jobs-hr.wml +++ b/about/en/jobs-hr.wml @@ -81,10 +81,10 @@ Salary low- to mid-$60,000s, depending on experience. <p> If you think you'd like to be part of our team, please send your resume along with a cover letter explaining why you think you'd be a good fit -to hrjob(a)torproject.org. This is a full-time position based in the Tor -Project's new office in Seattle, WA. Inquiries about whether this job -can be done remotely or part-time will not be answered. No phone calls -please! +to <a href="mailto:hrjob@torproject.org">hrjob(a)torproject.org</a>. This +is a full-time position based in the Tor Project's new office in +Seattle, WA. Inquiries about whether this job can be done remotely or +part-time will not be answered. No phone calls please! </p> <p> diff --git a/about/en/jobs.wml b/about/en/jobs.wml index 23cb004..2a962fe 100644 --- a/about/en/jobs.wml +++ b/about/en/jobs.wml @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ </p> <ul> <a href="<page about/jobs-hr>">Human Resources Manager</a> +<a href="<page about/jobs-editor>">Writer/Editor</a> +<a href="<page about/jobs-admin-assistant>">Administrative Assistant</a> </ul> </p>

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[webwml/staging] Clarify that Tor helps with local adversaries (#13342)
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 728b231cc62dbeaacac66868049895ebbbc5ef33 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Mar 30 00:45:59 2016 +0200 Clarify that Tor helps with local adversaries (#13342) --- docs/en/faq.wml | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml index 966317b..9c7f19e 100644 --- a/docs/en/faq.wml +++ b/docs/en/faq.wml @@ -3389,8 +3389,9 @@ diversity, <p> Second, Tor prevents people watching your traffic locally (such as - your ISP) from learning what information you're fetching and where - you're fetching it from. It also stops them from deciding what you're + your ISP or someone with access to your home wifi or router) from + learning what information you're fetching and where you're fetching + it from. It also stops them from deciding what you're allowed to learn and publish -- if you can get to any part of the Tor network, you can reach any site on the Internet. </p>

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[webwml/staging] Deprecating old Tor Browser version
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit 53fb0cbc45acc435d2aa1c06839d1b47f268a8a9 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Mar 20 07:28:59 2016 +0000 Deprecating old Tor Browser version --- projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions b/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions index b18a5b6..d6b52f3 100644 --- a/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions +++ b/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions @@ -1,22 +1,12 @@ [ -"5.5.3", -"5.5.3-Linux", -"5.5.3-MacOS", -"5.5.3-Windows", "5.5.4", "5.5.4-Linux", "5.5.4-MacOS", "5.5.4-Windows", -"6.0a3", -"6.0a3-Linux", -"6.0a3-MacOS", -"6.0a3-Windows", "6.0a4", "6.0a4-Linux", "6.0a4-MacOS", "6.0a4-Windows", -"6.0a3-hardened", -"6.0a3-hardened-Linux", "6.0a4-hardened", "6.0a4-hardened-Linux" ]

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[webwml/staging] 0.2.8.2-alpha is now the alpha version.
by sebastian＠torproject.org 19 Jun '16

19 Jun '16

commit b828bdde48a00ab79501d24f8d3c8b16a7bb7c79 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 15:44:08 2016 -0400 0.2.8.2-alpha is now the alpha version. --- Makefile | 2 +- include/versions.wmi | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 27c8875..033783b 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ # website component, and set it to needs_review. export STABLETAG=tor-0.2.7.6 -export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.8.1-alpha +export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.8.2-alpha WMLBASE=. diff --git a/include/versions.wmi b/include/versions.wmi index 2f1c042..cf8e6cb 100644 --- a/include/versions.wmi +++ b/include/versions.wmi @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ <define-tag version-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.7.6</define-tag> -<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.8.1-alpha</define-tag> +<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.8.2-alpha</define-tag> <define-tag version-win32-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.7.6</define-tag>

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