tor-commits November 2016

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[tor/master] Fix a use-after-free error.
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 954fb99a48ea12a6c1aa48e2ce1a8acf8fbe456b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 4 14:03:35 2016 -0400 Fix a use-after-free error. --- src/or/hs_cache.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_cache.c b/src/or/hs_cache.c index b5369c0..b7ff979 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cache.c +++ b/src/or/hs_cache.c @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ cache_store_v3_as_dir(hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *desc) * remove the entry we currently have from our cache so we can then * store the new one. */ remove_v3_desc_as_dir(cache_entry); - cache_dir_desc_free(cache_entry); rend_cache_decrement_allocation(cache_get_entry_size(cache_entry)); + cache_dir_desc_free(cache_entry); } /* Store the descriptor we just got. We are sure here that either we * don't have the entry or we have a newer descriptor and the old one

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[tor/master] prop224: Fix memleaks in hs descriptor unit test
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit c1bbc8405b8f1624d008688627303911b93e7fb0 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Nov 4 14:45:37 2016 -0400 prop224: Fix memleaks in hs descriptor unit test Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c index 5ddb4d0..8377a45 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -972,6 +972,7 @@ test_decode_plaintext(void *arg) char *plaintext; tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", bad_value, "42", "MESSAGE"); ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); } @@ -980,6 +981,7 @@ test_decode_plaintext(void *arg) char *plaintext; tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", "7181615", "42", "MESSAGE"); ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); } @@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ test_decode_plaintext(void *arg) char *plaintext; tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", "180", "42", bad_value); ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); } @@ -996,6 +999,7 @@ test_decode_plaintext(void *arg) char *plaintext; tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", "180", bad_value, "MESSAGE"); ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); }

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Refactor rend_data_t for multi version support
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 8293356ad993e06c66e6b56534be91fb912c9b5a Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 31 14:51:30 2016 -0400 hs: Refactor rend_data_t for multi version support In order to implement proposal 224, we need the data structure rend_data_t to be able to accomodate versionning that is the current version of hidden service (2) and the new version (3) and future version. For that, we implement a series of accessors and a downcast function to get the v2 data structure. rend_data_t becomes a top level generic place holder. The entire rend_data_t API has been moved to hs_common.{c|h} in order to seperate code that is shared from between HS versions and unshared code (in rendcommon.c). Closes #19024 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 38 ++++--- src/or/circuitlist.h | 2 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 9 +- src/or/connection.c | 5 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 10 +- src/or/control.c | 21 ++-- src/or/directory.c | 10 +- src/or/hs_common.c | 264 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_common.h | 34 ++++++ src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/or.h | 42 +++++--- src/or/rendcache.c | 16 +-- src/or/rendclient.c | 148 ++++++++++++++----------- src/or/rendclient.h | 2 +- src/or/rendcommon.c | 147 +++++-------------------- src/or/rendcommon.h | 24 +---- src/or/rendservice.c | 87 ++++++++------- src/test/test_connection.c | 12 +-- src/test/test_hs.c | 102 ++++++++++-------- src/test/test_rendcache.c | 21 ++-- 20 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 361 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 5c69164..7c6dbc5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" #include "main.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "onion.h" @@ -1311,9 +1312,11 @@ circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data) if (!circ->marked_for_close && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - if (ocirc->rend_data && - !rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data->onion_address, - ocirc->rend_data->onion_address) && + if (ocirc->rend_data == NULL) { + continue; + } + if (!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data_get_address(rend_data), + rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)) && tor_memeq(ocirc->rend_data->rend_cookie, rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN)) @@ -1325,13 +1328,14 @@ circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data) } /** Return the first circuit originating here in global_circuitlist after - * start whose purpose is purpose, and where - * digest (if set) matches the rend_pk_digest field. Return NULL if no - * circuit is found. If start is NULL, begin at the start of the list. + * start whose purpose is purpose, and where digest (if + * set) matches the private key digest of the rend data associated with the + * circuit. Return NULL if no circuit is found. If start is NULL, + * begin at the start of the list. */ origin_circuit_t * circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, - const char *digest, uint8_t purpose) + const uint8_t *digest, uint8_t purpose) { int idx; smartlist_t *lst = circuit_get_global_list(); @@ -1343,17 +1347,23 @@ circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, for ( ; idx < smartlist_len(lst); ++idx) { circuit_t *circ = smartlist_get(lst, idx); + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; if (circ->marked_for_close) continue; if (circ->purpose != purpose) continue; + /* At this point we should be able to get a valid origin circuit because + * the origin purpose we are looking for matches this circuit. */ + if (BUG(!CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(circ->purpose))) { + break; + } + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (!digest) - return TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data && - tor_memeq(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, - digest, DIGEST_LEN)) - return TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + return ocirc; + if (rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(ocirc, digest)) { + return ocirc; + } } return NULL; } @@ -1831,7 +1841,7 @@ circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ) if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT) { /* treat this like getting a nack from it */ log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). %s", - safe_str_client(ocirc->rend_data->onion_address), + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)), safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state)), timed_out ? "Recording timeout." : "Removing from descriptor."); rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, @@ -1848,7 +1858,7 @@ circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ) log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s " "(building circuit to intro point). " "Marking intro point as possibly unreachable.", - safe_str_client(ocirc->rend_data->onion_address), + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)), safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname( ocirc->build_state))); rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index 2707b42..2e9ce89 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data( const rend_data_t *rend_data); origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, - const char *digest, uint8_t purpose); + const uint8_t *digest, uint8_t purpose); or_circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const uint8_t *cookie); or_circuit_t *circuit_get_intro_point(const uint8_t *digest); void circuit_set_rendezvous_cookie(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cookie); diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index f344703..44bf94c 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include "connection_edge.h" #include "control.h" #include "entrynodes.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "policies.h" @@ -154,8 +155,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, if ((edge_conn->rend_data && !origin_circ->rend_data) || (!edge_conn->rend_data && origin_circ->rend_data) || (edge_conn->rend_data && origin_circ->rend_data && - rend_cmp_service_ids(edge_conn->rend_data->onion_address, - origin_circ->rend_data->onion_address))) { + rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data_get_address(edge_conn->rend_data), + rend_data_get_address(origin_circ->rend_data)))) { /* this circ is not for this conn */ return 0; } @@ -1989,7 +1990,7 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, if (!extend_info) { log_info(LD_REND, "No intro points for '%s': re-fetching service descriptor.", - safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(rend_data))); rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data); connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(conn); ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT; @@ -1997,7 +1998,7 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, } log_info(LD_REND,"Chose %s as intro point for '%s'.", extend_info_describe(extend_info), - safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(rend_data))); } /* If we have specified a particular exit node for our diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 5ecd1ad..73a8691 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "ext_orport.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "main.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" #include "reasons.h" @@ -4082,12 +4083,12 @@ connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(int type, int state, (type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data && !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery, - TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data->onion_address)) + rend_data_get_address(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->rend_data))) || (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn) && TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data && !rend_cmp_service_ids(rendquery, - TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data->onion_address)) + rend_data_get_address(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data))) )); } diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index dc6b093..2726349 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include "dnsserv.h" #include "dirserv.h" #include "hibernate.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" @@ -1707,21 +1708,22 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, if (rend_data == NULL) { return -1; } + const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data); log_info(LD_REND,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'", - safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); /* Lookup the given onion address. If invalid, stop right now else we * might have it in the cache or not, it will be tested later on. */ unsigned int refetch_desc = 0; rend_cache_entry_t *entry = NULL; const int rend_cache_lookup_result = - rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry); + rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &entry); if (rend_cache_lookup_result < 0) { switch (-rend_cache_lookup_result) { case EINVAL: /* We should already have rejected this address! */ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Invalid service name '%s'", - safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1; case ENOENT: @@ -1745,7 +1747,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(conn); base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT; log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown descriptor %s. Fetching.", - safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data); return 0; } diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 1337af4..1cc2e14 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "entrynodes.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "hibernate.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" @@ -2515,7 +2516,7 @@ circuit_describe_status_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (circ->rend_data != NULL) { smartlist_add_asprintf(descparts, "REND_QUERY=%s", - circ->rend_data->onion_address); + rend_data_get_address(circ->rend_data)); } { @@ -6810,8 +6811,10 @@ control_event_hs_descriptor_requested(const rend_data_t *rend_query, send_control_event(EVENT_HS_DESC, "650 HS_DESC REQUESTED %s %s %s %s\r\n", - rend_hsaddress_str_or_unknown(rend_query->onion_address), - rend_auth_type_to_string(rend_query->auth_type), + rend_hsaddress_str_or_unknown( + rend_data_get_address(rend_query)), + rend_auth_type_to_string( + TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_query)->auth_type), node_describe_longname_by_id(id_digest), desc_id_base32); } @@ -6827,11 +6830,12 @@ get_desc_id_from_query(const rend_data_t *rend_data, const char *hsdir_fp) { int replica; const char *desc_id = NULL; + const rend_data_v2_t *rend_data_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data); /* Possible if the fetch was done using a descriptor ID. This means that * the HSFETCH command was used. */ - if (!tor_digest_is_zero(rend_data->desc_id_fetch)) { - desc_id = rend_data->desc_id_fetch; + if (!tor_digest_is_zero(rend_data_v2->desc_id_fetch)) { + desc_id = rend_data_v2->desc_id_fetch; goto end; } @@ -6839,7 +6843,7 @@ get_desc_id_from_query(const rend_data_t *rend_data, const char *hsdir_fp) * is the one associated with the HSDir fingerprint. */ for (replica = 0; replica < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; replica++) { - const char *digest = rend_data->descriptor_id[replica]; + const char *digest = rend_data_get_desc_id(rend_data, replica, NULL); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_data->hsdirs_fp, char *, fingerprint) { if (tor_memcmp(fingerprint, hsdir_fp, DIGEST_LEN) == 0) { @@ -6948,7 +6952,8 @@ control_event_hs_descriptor_receive_end(const char *action, "650 HS_DESC %s %s %s %s%s%s\r\n", action, rend_hsaddress_str_or_unknown(onion_address), - rend_auth_type_to_string(rend_data->auth_type), + rend_auth_type_to_string( + TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data)->auth_type), node_describe_longname_by_id(id_digest), desc_id_field ? desc_id_field : "", reason_field ? reason_field : ""); @@ -7045,7 +7050,7 @@ control_event_hs_descriptor_failed(const rend_data_t *rend_data, return; } control_event_hs_descriptor_receive_end("FAILED", - rend_data->onion_address, + rend_data_get_address(rend_data), rend_data, id_digest, reason); } diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index d37b5c2..49efeef 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "dirvote.h" #include "entrynodes.h" #include "geoip.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" #include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" @@ -2346,7 +2347,7 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) conn->identity_digest, \ reason) ) #define SEND_HS_DESC_FAILED_CONTENT() ( \ - control_event_hs_descriptor_content(conn->rend_data->onion_address, \ + control_event_hs_descriptor_content(rend_data_get_address(conn->rend_data), \ conn->requested_resource, \ conn->identity_digest, \ NULL) ) @@ -2422,7 +2423,7 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) #define SEND_HS_DESC_UPLOAD_FAILED_EVENT(reason) ( \ control_event_hs_descriptor_upload_failed( \ conn->identity_digest, \ - conn->rend_data->onion_address, \ + rend_data_get_address(conn->rend_data), \ reason) ) log_info(LD_REND,"Uploaded rendezvous descriptor (status %d " "(%s))", @@ -2436,7 +2437,7 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) "Uploading rendezvous descriptor: finished with status " "200 (%s)", escaped(reason)); control_event_hs_descriptor_uploaded(conn->identity_digest, - conn->rend_data->onion_address); + rend_data_get_address(conn->rend_data)); rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(conn->rend_data); break; case 400: @@ -2547,7 +2548,8 @@ connection_dir_about_to_close(dir_connection_t *dir_conn) * refetching is unnecessary.) */ if (conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2 && dir_conn->rend_data && - strlen(dir_conn->rend_data->onion_address) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32) + strlen(rend_data_get_address(dir_conn->rend_data)) == + REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32) rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(dir_conn->rend_data); } diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.c b/src/or/hs_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2166005 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_common.c + * \brief Contains code shared between different HS protocol version as well + * as useful data structures and accessors used by other subsystems. + * The rendcommon.c should only contains code relating to the v2 + * protocol. + **/ + +#include "or.h" + +#include "hs_common.h" +#include "rendcommon.h" + +/* Create a new rend_data_t for a specific given version. + * Return a pointer to the newly allocated data structure. */ +static rend_data_t * +rend_data_alloc(uint32_t version) +{ + rend_data_t *rend_data = NULL; + + switch (version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + { + rend_data_v2_t *v2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*v2)); + v2->base_.version = HS_VERSION_TWO; + v2->base_.hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); + rend_data = &v2->base_; + break; + } + default: + tor_assert(0); + break; + } + + return rend_data; +} + +/** Free all storage associated with data */ +void +rend_data_free(rend_data_t *data) +{ + if (!data) { + return; + } + /* By using our allocation function, this should always be set. */ + tor_assert(data->hsdirs_fp); + /* Cleanup the HSDir identity digest. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data->hsdirs_fp, char *, d, tor_free(d)); + smartlist_free(data->hsdirs_fp); + /* Depending on the version, cleanup. */ + switch (data->version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + { + rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(data); + tor_free(v2_data); + break; + } + default: + tor_assert(0); + } +} + +/* Allocate and return a deep copy of data. */ +rend_data_t * +rend_data_dup(const rend_data_t *data) +{ + rend_data_t *data_dup = NULL; + smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(data); + tor_assert(data->hsdirs_fp); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data->hsdirs_fp, char *, fp, + smartlist_add(hsdirs_fp, tor_memdup(fp, DIGEST_LEN))); + + switch (data->version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + { + rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = tor_memdup(TO_REND_DATA_V2(data), + sizeof(*v2_data)); + data_dup = &v2_data->base_; + data_dup->hsdirs_fp = hsdirs_fp; + break; + } + default: + tor_assert(0); + break; + } + + return data_dup; +} + +/* Compute the descriptor ID for each HS descriptor replica and save them. A + * valid onion address must be present in the rend_data. + * + * Return 0 on success else -1. */ +static int +compute_desc_id(rend_data_t *rend_data) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned replica; + time_t now = time(NULL); + + tor_assert(rend_data); + + switch (rend_data->version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + { + rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data); + /* Compute descriptor ID for each replicas. */ + for (replica = 0; replica < ARRAY_LENGTH(v2_data->descriptor_id); + replica++) { + ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(v2_data->descriptor_id[replica], + v2_data->onion_address, + v2_data->descriptor_cookie, + now, replica); + if (ret < 0) { + goto end; + } + } + break; + } + default: + tor_assert(0); + } + +end: + return ret; +} + +/* Allocate and initialize a rend_data_t object for a service using the + * provided arguments. All arguments are optional (can be NULL), except from + * onion_address which MUST be set. + * + * Return a valid rend_data_t pointer. This only returns a version 2 object of + * rend_data_t. */ +rend_data_t * +rend_data_service_create(const char *onion_address, const char *pk_digest, + const uint8_t *cookie, rend_auth_type_t auth_type) +{ + /* Create a rend_data_t object for version 2. */ + rend_data_t *rend_data = rend_data_alloc(HS_VERSION_TWO); + rend_data_v2_t *v2= TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data); + + /* We need at least one else the call is wrong. */ + tor_assert(onion_address != NULL); + + if (pk_digest) { + memcpy(v2->rend_pk_digest, pk_digest, sizeof(v2->rend_pk_digest)); + } + if (cookie) { + memcpy(rend_data->rend_cookie, cookie, sizeof(rend_data->rend_cookie)); + } + + strlcpy(v2->onion_address, onion_address, sizeof(v2->onion_address)); + v2->auth_type = auth_type; + + return rend_data; +} + +/* Allocate and initialize a rend_data_t object for a client request using + * the given arguments. Either an onion address or a descriptor ID is + * needed. Both can be given but only the onion address will be used to make + * the descriptor fetch. + * + * Return a valid rend_data_t pointer or NULL on error meaning the + * descriptor IDs couldn't be computed from the given data. */ +rend_data_t * +rend_data_client_create(const char *onion_address, const char *desc_id, + const char *cookie, rend_auth_type_t auth_type) +{ + /* Create a rend_data_t object for version 2. */ + rend_data_t *rend_data = rend_data_alloc(HS_VERSION_TWO); + rend_data_v2_t *v2= TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data); + + /* We need at least one else the call is wrong. */ + tor_assert(onion_address != NULL || desc_id != NULL); + + if (cookie) { + memcpy(v2->descriptor_cookie, cookie, sizeof(v2->descriptor_cookie)); + } + if (desc_id) { + memcpy(v2->desc_id_fetch, desc_id, sizeof(v2->desc_id_fetch)); + } + if (onion_address) { + strlcpy(v2->onion_address, onion_address, sizeof(v2->onion_address)); + if (compute_desc_id(rend_data) < 0) { + goto error; + } + } + + v2->auth_type = auth_type; + + return rend_data; + + error: + rend_data_free(rend_data); + return NULL; +} + +/* Return the onion address from the rend data. Depending on the version, + * the size of the address can vary but it's always NUL terminated. */ +const char * +rend_data_get_address(const rend_data_t *rend_data) +{ + tor_assert(rend_data); + + switch (rend_data->version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + return TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data)->onion_address; + default: + /* We should always have a supported version. */ + tor_assert(0); + } +} + +/* Return the descriptor ID for a specific replica number from the rend + * data. The returned data is a binary digest and depending on the version its + * size can vary. The size of the descriptor ID is put in len_out if + * non NULL. */ +const char * +rend_data_get_desc_id(const rend_data_t *rend_data, uint8_t replica, + size_t *len_out) +{ + tor_assert(rend_data); + + switch (rend_data->version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + tor_assert(replica < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS); + if (len_out) { + *len_out = DIGEST_LEN; + } + return TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data)->descriptor_id[replica]; + default: + /* We should always have a supported version. */ + tor_assert(0); + } +} + +/* Return the public key digest using the given rend_data. The size of + * the digest is put in len_out (if set) which can differ depending on + * the version. */ +const uint8_t * +rend_data_get_pk_digest(const rend_data_t *rend_data, size_t *len_out) +{ + tor_assert(rend_data); + + switch (rend_data->version) { + case HS_VERSION_TWO: + { + const rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data); + if (len_out) { + *len_out = sizeof(v2_data->rend_pk_digest); + } + return (const uint8_t *) v2_data->rend_pk_digest; + } + default: + /* We should always have a supported version. */ + tor_assert(0); + } +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.h b/src/or/hs_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e74fdc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_common.h + * \brief Header file for hs_common.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_HS_COMMON_H +#define TOR_HS_COMMON_H + +#include "or.h" + +/* Protocol version 2. Use this instead of hardcoding "2" in the code base, + * this adds a clearer semantic to the value when used. */ +#define HS_VERSION_TWO 2 + +void rend_data_free(rend_data_t *data); +rend_data_t *rend_data_dup(const rend_data_t *data); +rend_data_t *rend_data_client_create(const char *onion_address, + const char *desc_id, + const char *cookie, + rend_auth_type_t auth_type); +rend_data_t *rend_data_service_create(const char *onion_address, + const char *pk_digest, + const uint8_t *cookie, + rend_auth_type_t auth_type); +const char *rend_data_get_address(const rend_data_t *rend_data); +const char *rend_data_get_desc_id(const rend_data_t *rend_data, + uint8_t replica, size_t *len_out); +const uint8_t *rend_data_get_pk_digest(const rend_data_t *rend_data, + size_t *len_out); + +#endif /* TOR_HS_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 3988eef..f9199dd 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/entrynodes.c \ src/or/ext_orport.c \ src/or/hibernate.c \ + src/or/hs_common.c \ src/or/keypin.c \ src/or/main.c \ src/or/microdesc.c \ @@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/geoip.h \ src/or/entrynodes.h \ src/or/hibernate.h \ + src/or/hs_common.h \ src/or/keypin.h \ src/or/main.h \ src/or/microdesc.h \ diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index be58fa0..88f5363 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ #define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1 #endif +/** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */ +#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_)) + /** Length of longest allowable configured nickname. */ #define MAX_NICKNAME_LEN 19 /** Length of a router identity encoded as a hexadecimal digest, plus @@ -779,6 +782,24 @@ typedef struct rend_service_authorization_t { * establishment. Not all fields contain data depending on where this struct * is used. */ typedef struct rend_data_t { + /* Hidden service protocol version of this base object. */ + uint32_t version; + + /** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to. This + * contains binary identity digest of the directory of size DIGEST_LEN. */ + smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp; + + /** Rendezvous cookie used by both, client and service. */ + char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN]; + + /** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */ + int nr_streams; +} rend_data_t; + +typedef struct rend_data_v2_t { + /* Rendezvous base data. */ + rend_data_t base_; + /** Onion address (without the .onion part) that a client requests. */ char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; @@ -800,17 +821,16 @@ typedef struct rend_data_t { /** Hash of the hidden service's PK used by a service. */ char rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; +} rend_data_v2_t; - /** Rendezvous cookie used by both, client and service. */ - char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN]; - - /** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to. - * This contains binary identity digest of the directory. */ - smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp; - - /** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */ - int nr_streams; -} rend_data_t; +/* From a base rend_data_t object d</d>, return the v2 object. */ +static inline +rend_data_v2_t *TO_REND_DATA_V2(const rend_data_t *d) +{ + tor_assert(d); + tor_assert(d->version == 2); + return DOWNCAST(rend_data_v2_t, d); +} /** Time interval for tracking replays of DH public keys received in * INTRODUCE2 cells. Used only to avoid launching multiple @@ -1759,8 +1779,6 @@ typedef struct control_connection_t { /** Cast a connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/ #define TO_CONN(c) (&(((c)->base_))) -/** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */ -#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_)) /** Cast a entry_connection_t subtype pointer to a edge_connection_t **/ #define ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(c) (&(((c))->edge_)) diff --git a/src/or/rendcache.c b/src/or/rendcache.c index e61a96b..709aaff 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcache.c +++ b/src/or/rendcache.c @@ -849,6 +849,8 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, char want_desc_id[DIGEST_LEN]; rend_cache_entry_t *e; int retval = -1; + rend_data_v2_t *rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_query); + tor_assert(rend_cache); tor_assert(desc); tor_assert(desc_id_base32); @@ -874,11 +876,11 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't compute service ID."); goto err; } - if (rend_query->onion_address[0] != '\0' && - strcmp(rend_query->onion_address, service_id)) { + if (rend_data->onion_address[0] != '\0' && + strcmp(rend_data->onion_address, service_id)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Received service descriptor for service ID %s; " "expected descriptor for service ID %s.", - service_id, safe_str(rend_query->onion_address)); + service_id, safe_str(rend_data->onion_address)); goto err; } if (tor_memneq(desc_id, want_desc_id, DIGEST_LEN)) { @@ -890,14 +892,14 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, /* Decode/decrypt introduction points. */ if (intro_content && intro_size > 0) { int n_intro_points; - if (rend_query->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH && - !tor_mem_is_zero(rend_query->descriptor_cookie, - sizeof(rend_query->descriptor_cookie))) { + if (rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH && + !tor_mem_is_zero(rend_data->descriptor_cookie, + sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_cookie))) { char *ipos_decrypted = NULL; size_t ipos_decrypted_size; if (rend_decrypt_introduction_points(&ipos_decrypted, &ipos_decrypted_size, - rend_query->descriptor_cookie, + rend_data->descriptor_cookie, intro_content, intro_size) < 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to decrypt introduction points. We are " diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 3468b07..ad47ca6 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "connection.h" #include "connection_edge.h" #include "directory.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" @@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (!extend_info) { log_warn(LD_REND, "No usable introduction points left for %s. Closing.", - safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(circ->rend_data))); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); return -1; } @@ -143,20 +144,21 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, off_t dh_offset; crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL; int status = 0; + const char *onion_address; tor_assert(introcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING); tor_assert(rendcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); tor_assert(introcirc->rend_data); tor_assert(rendcirc->rend_data); - tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, - rendcirc->rend_data->onion_address)); + tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data_get_address(introcirc->rend_data), + rend_data_get_address(rendcirc->rend_data))); #ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED tor_assert(!(introcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel)); tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel)); #endif + onion_address = rend_data_get_address(introcirc->rend_data); - r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, -1, - &entry); + r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &entry); /* An invalid onion address is not possible else we have a big issue. */ tor_assert(r != -EINVAL); if (r < 0 || !rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) { @@ -165,14 +167,13 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, log_info(LD_REND, "query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. " "Refetching descriptor.", - safe_str_client(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(introcirc->rend_data); { connection_t *conn; while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP, - AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, - introcirc->rend_data->onion_address))) { + AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, onion_address))) { connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)); conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT; } @@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, log_info(LD_REND, "Could not find intro key for %s at %s; we " "have a v2 rend desc with %d intro points. " "Trying a different intro point...", - safe_str_client(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address), + safe_str_client(onion_address), safe_str_client(extend_info_describe( introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)), smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); @@ -236,11 +237,12 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, /* If version is 3, write (optional) auth data and timestamp. */ if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<3)) { tmp[0] = 3; /* version 3 of the cell format */ - tmp[1] = (uint8_t)introcirc->rend_data->auth_type; /* auth type, if any */ + /* auth type, if any */ + tmp[1] = (uint8_t) TO_REND_DATA_V2(introcirc->rend_data)->auth_type; v3_shift = 1; - if (introcirc->rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) { + if (tmp[1] != REND_NO_AUTH) { set_uint16(tmp+2, htons(REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN)); - memcpy(tmp+4, introcirc->rend_data->descriptor_cookie, + memcpy(tmp+4, TO_REND_DATA_V2(introcirc->rend_data)->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN; } @@ -360,7 +362,7 @@ rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) * Called to close other intro circuits we launched in parallel. */ static void -rend_client_close_other_intros(const char *onion_address) +rend_client_close_other_intros(const uint8_t *rend_pk_digest) { /* abort parallel intro circs, if any */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, c) { @@ -369,8 +371,7 @@ rend_client_close_other_intros(const char *onion_address) !c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) { origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c); if (oc->rend_data && - !rend_cmp_service_ids(onion_address, - oc->rend_data->onion_address)) { + rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, rend_pk_digest)) { log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit %d that we " "built in parallel (Purpose %d).", oc->global_identifier, c->purpose); @@ -434,7 +435,8 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); /* close any other intros launched in parallel */ - rend_client_close_other_intros(circ->rend_data->onion_address); + rend_client_close_other_intros(rend_data_get_pk_digest(circ->rend_data, + NULL)); } else { /* It's a NAK; the introduction point didn't relay our request. */ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING); @@ -443,7 +445,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, * If none remain, refetch the service descriptor. */ log_info(LD_REND, "Got nack for %s from %s...", - safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), + safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(circ->rend_data)), safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit))); if (rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(circ->build_state->chosen_exit, circ->rend_data, @@ -697,13 +699,15 @@ pick_hsdir(const char *desc_id, const char *desc_id_base32) * in the case that no hidden service directory is left to ask for the * descriptor, return 0, and in case of a failure -1. */ static int -directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, +directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, + const rend_data_t *rend_query, routerstatus_t *rs_hsdir) { routerstatus_t *hs_dir = rs_hsdir; char *hsdir_fp; char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64]; + const rend_data_v2_t *rend_data; #ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE const int tor2web_mode = get_options()->Tor2webMode; const int how_to_fetch = tor2web_mode ? DIRIND_ONEHOP : DIRIND_ANONYMOUS; @@ -712,6 +716,8 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, #endif tor_assert(desc_id); + tor_assert(rend_query); + rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_query); base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32), desc_id, DIGEST_LEN); @@ -734,10 +740,11 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, /* Encode descriptor cookie for logging purposes. Also, if the cookie is * malformed, no fetch is triggered thus this needs to be done before the * fetch request. */ - if (rend_query->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) { + if (rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) { if (base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64), - rend_query->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, + rend_data->descriptor_cookie, + REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, 0)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie."); return 0; @@ -763,9 +770,9 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, "service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s', auth type %d, " "and descriptor cookie '%s' to hidden service " "directory %s", - rend_query->onion_address, desc_id_base32, - rend_query->auth_type, - (rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ? "[none]" : + rend_data->onion_address, desc_id_base32, + rend_data->auth_type, + (rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ? "[none]" : escaped_safe_str_client(descriptor_cookie_base64)), routerstatus_describe(hs_dir)); control_event_hs_descriptor_requested(rend_query, @@ -780,8 +787,8 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, * On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0. * On error, -1 is returned. */ static int -fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, - smartlist_t *hsdirs) +fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(const char *desc_id, + const rend_data_t *rend_query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) { int ret; @@ -814,13 +821,12 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query, * On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0. * On error, -1 is returned. */ static int -fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) +fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *rend_query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) { char descriptor_id[DIGEST_LEN]; int replicas_left_to_try[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS]; int i, tries_left, ret; - - tor_assert(query); + rend_data_v2_t *rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_query); /* Randomly iterate over the replicas until a descriptor can be fetched * from one of the consecutive nodes, or no options are left. */ @@ -834,9 +840,10 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand_val]; replicas_left_to_try[rand_val] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left]; - ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id, query->onion_address, - query->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ? - query->descriptor_cookie : NULL, + ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id, + rend_data->onion_address, + rend_data->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ? + rend_data->descriptor_cookie : NULL, time(NULL), chosen_replica); if (ret < 0) { /* Normally, on failure the descriptor_id is untouched but let's be @@ -844,18 +851,18 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) goto end; } - if (tor_memcmp(descriptor_id, query->descriptor_id[chosen_replica], + if (tor_memcmp(descriptor_id, rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica], sizeof(descriptor_id)) != 0) { /* Not equal from what we currently have so purge the last hid serv * request cache and update the descriptor ID with the new value. */ purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests( - query->descriptor_id[chosen_replica]); - memcpy(query->descriptor_id[chosen_replica], descriptor_id, - sizeof(query->descriptor_id[chosen_replica])); + rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica]); + memcpy(rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica], descriptor_id, + sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_id[chosen_replica])); } /* Trigger the fetch with the computed descriptor ID. */ - ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(descriptor_id, query, hsdirs); + ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(descriptor_id, rend_query, hsdirs); if (ret != 0) { /* Either on success or failure, as long as we tried a fetch we are * done here. */ @@ -883,16 +890,23 @@ int rend_client_fetch_v2_desc(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs) { int ret; + rend_data_v2_t *rend_data; + const char *onion_address; tor_assert(query); + /* Get the version 2 data structure of the query. */ + rend_data = TO_REND_DATA_V2(query); + onion_address = rend_data_get_address(query); + /* Depending on what's available in the rend data query object, we will * trigger a fetch by HS address or using a descriptor ID. */ - if (query->onion_address[0] != '\0') { + if (onion_address[0] != '\0') { ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(query, hsdirs); - } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(query->desc_id_fetch)) { - ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(query->desc_id_fetch, query, hsdirs); + } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(rend_data->desc_id_fetch)) { + ret = fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(rend_data->desc_id_fetch, query, + hsdirs); } else { /* Query data is invalid. */ ret = -1; @@ -910,10 +924,11 @@ void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data_t *rend_query) { rend_cache_entry_t *e = NULL; + const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_query); tor_assert(rend_query); /* Before fetching, check if we already have a usable descriptor here. */ - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) == 0 && + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &e) == 0 && rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(e)) { log_info(LD_REND, "We would fetch a v2 rendezvous descriptor, but we " "already have a usable descriptor here. Not fetching."); @@ -926,7 +941,7 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data_t *rend_query) return; } log_debug(LD_REND, "Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor for service %s", - safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); rend_client_fetch_v2_desc(rend_query, NULL); /* We don't need to look the error code because either on failure or @@ -962,7 +977,7 @@ rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void) } else { log_debug(LD_REND, "Marking for close dir conn fetching " "rendezvous descriptor for service %s", - safe_str(rd->onion_address)); + safe_str(rend_data_get_address(rd))); } connection_mark_for_close(conn); } @@ -992,25 +1007,26 @@ rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void) */ int rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, - rend_data_t *rend_query, + rend_data_t *rend_data, unsigned int failure_type) { int i, r; rend_cache_entry_t *ent; connection_t *conn; + const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data); - r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &ent); + r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &ent); if (r < 0) { /* Either invalid onion address or cache entry not found. */ switch (-r) { case EINVAL: log_warn(LD_BUG, "Malformed service ID %s.", - escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address)); return -1; case ENOENT: log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown service %s. Re-fetching descriptor.", - escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); - rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_query); + escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address)); + rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data); return 0; default: log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown cache lookup returned code: %d", r); @@ -1034,7 +1050,7 @@ rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC: rend_cache_intro_failure_note(failure_type, (uint8_t *)failed_intro->identity_digest, - rend_query->onion_address); + onion_address); rend_intro_point_free(intro); smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i); break; @@ -1052,8 +1068,7 @@ rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, if (zap_intro_point) { rend_cache_intro_failure_note( failure_type, - (uint8_t *) failed_intro->identity_digest, - rend_query->onion_address); + (uint8_t *) failed_intro->identity_digest, onion_address); rend_intro_point_free(intro); smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i); } @@ -1067,14 +1082,14 @@ rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(ent)) { log_info(LD_REND, "No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.", - escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); - rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_query); + escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address)); + rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data); /* move all pending streams back to renddesc_wait */ /* NOTE: We can now do this faster, if we use pending_entry_connections */ while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP, AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, - rend_query->onion_address))) { + onion_address))) { connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)); conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT; } @@ -1083,7 +1098,7 @@ rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, } log_info(LD_REND,"%d options left for %s.", smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes), - escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + escaped_safe_str_client(onion_address)); return 1; } @@ -1224,10 +1239,11 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) rend_data = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data; if (!rend_data) continue; - if (rend_cmp_service_ids(query, rend_data->onion_address)) + const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data); + if (rend_cmp_service_ids(query, onion_address)) continue; assert_connection_ok(base_conn, now); - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_data->onion_address, -1, + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &entry) == 0 && rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) { /* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a @@ -1262,11 +1278,12 @@ rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const rend_data_t *rend_data) { unsigned int have_onion = 0; rend_cache_entry_t *cache_entry = NULL; + const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data); + rend_data_v2_t *rend_data_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(rend_data); - if (*rend_data->onion_address != '\0') { + if (onion_address[0] != '\0') { /* Ignore return value; we find an entry, or we don't. */ - (void) rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_data->onion_address, -1, - &cache_entry); + (void) rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &cache_entry); have_onion = 1; } @@ -1280,17 +1297,17 @@ rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const rend_data_t *rend_data) /* Remove the HS's entries in last_hid_serv_requests. */ if (have_onion) { unsigned int replica; - for (replica = 0; replica < ARRAY_LENGTH(rend_data->descriptor_id); + for (replica = 0; replica < ARRAY_LENGTH(rend_data_v2->descriptor_id); replica++) { - const char *desc_id = rend_data->descriptor_id[replica]; + const char *desc_id = rend_data_v2->descriptor_id[replica]; purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(desc_id); } log_info(LD_REND, "Connection attempt for %s has ended; " "cleaning up temporary state.", - safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); } else { /* We only have an ID for a fetch. Probably used by HSFETCH. */ - purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(rend_data->desc_id_fetch); + purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(rend_data_v2->desc_id_fetch); } } @@ -1304,12 +1321,13 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) int ret; extend_info_t *result; rend_cache_entry_t *entry; + const char *onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_query); - ret = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry); + ret = rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &entry); if (ret < 0 || !rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.", - safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); + safe_str_client(onion_address)); /* XXX: Should we refetch the descriptor here if the IPs are not usable * anymore ?. */ return NULL; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index e90dac0..459988d 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void); void rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void); int rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, - rend_data_t *rend_query, + rend_data_t *rend_data, unsigned int failure_type); int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 01b0766..e6a7bbc 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "config.h" #include "control.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" #include "rendmid.h" @@ -804,124 +805,6 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, command); } -/** Allocate and return a new rend_data_t with the same - * contents as query. */ -rend_data_t * -rend_data_dup(const rend_data_t *data) -{ - rend_data_t *data_dup; - tor_assert(data); - data_dup = tor_memdup(data, sizeof(rend_data_t)); - data_dup->hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data->hsdirs_fp, char *, fp, - smartlist_add(data_dup->hsdirs_fp, - tor_memdup(fp, DIGEST_LEN))); - return data_dup; -} - -/** Compute descriptor ID for each replicas and save them. A valid onion - * address must be present in the rend_data. - * - * Return 0 on success else -1. */ -static int -compute_desc_id(rend_data_t *rend_data) -{ - int ret = 0; - unsigned replica; - time_t now = time(NULL); - - tor_assert(rend_data); - - /* Compute descriptor ID for each replicas. */ - for (replica = 0; replica < ARRAY_LENGTH(rend_data->descriptor_id); - replica++) { - ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(rend_data->descriptor_id[replica], - rend_data->onion_address, - rend_data->descriptor_cookie, - now, replica); - if (ret < 0) { - goto end; - } - } - - end: - return ret; -} - -/** Allocate and initialize a rend_data_t object for a service using the - * given arguments. Only the onion_address is not optional. - * - * Return a valid rend_data_t pointer. */ -rend_data_t * -rend_data_service_create(const char *onion_address, const char *pk_digest, - const uint8_t *cookie, rend_auth_type_t auth_type) -{ - rend_data_t *rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rend_data)); - - /* We need at least one else the call is wrong. */ - tor_assert(onion_address != NULL); - - if (pk_digest) { - memcpy(rend_data->rend_pk_digest, pk_digest, - sizeof(rend_data->rend_pk_digest)); - } - if (cookie) { - memcpy(rend_data->rend_cookie, cookie, - sizeof(rend_data->rend_cookie)); - } - - strlcpy(rend_data->onion_address, onion_address, - sizeof(rend_data->onion_address)); - rend_data->auth_type = auth_type; - /* Won't be used but still need to initialize it for rend_data dup and - * free. */ - rend_data->hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); - - return rend_data; -} - -/** Allocate and initialize a rend_data_t object for a client request using - * the given arguments. Either an onion address or a descriptor ID is - * needed. Both can be given but only the onion address will be used to make - * the descriptor fetch. - * - * Return a valid rend_data_t pointer or NULL on error meaning the - * descriptor IDs couldn't be computed from the given data. */ -rend_data_t * -rend_data_client_create(const char *onion_address, const char *desc_id, - const char *cookie, rend_auth_type_t auth_type) -{ - rend_data_t *rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rend_data)); - - /* We need at least one else the call is wrong. */ - tor_assert(onion_address != NULL || desc_id != NULL); - - if (cookie) { - memcpy(rend_data->descriptor_cookie, cookie, - sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_cookie)); - } - if (desc_id) { - memcpy(rend_data->desc_id_fetch, desc_id, - sizeof(rend_data->desc_id_fetch)); - } - if (onion_address) { - strlcpy(rend_data->onion_address, onion_address, - sizeof(rend_data->onion_address)); - if (compute_desc_id(rend_data) < 0) { - goto error; - } - } - - rend_data->auth_type = auth_type; - rend_data->hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); - - return rend_data; - - error: - rend_data_free(rend_data); - return NULL; -} - /** Determine the routers that are responsible for id (binary) and * add pointers to those routers' routerstatus_t to responsible_dirs. * Return -1 if we're returning an empty smartlist, else return 0. @@ -1067,3 +950,31 @@ rend_auth_decode_cookie(const char *cookie_in, uint8_t *cookie_out, return res; } +/* Return 1 iff the given digest of a permenanent hidden service key is + * equal to the digest in the origin circuit ocirc of its rend data . + * If the rend data doesn't exist, 0 is returned. This function is agnostic to + * the rend data version. */ +int +rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(const origin_circuit_t *ocirc, + const uint8_t *digest) +{ + size_t rend_pk_digest_len; + const uint8_t *rend_pk_digest; + + tor_assert(ocirc); + tor_assert(digest); + + if (ocirc->rend_data == NULL) { + goto no_match; + } + + rend_pk_digest = rend_data_get_pk_digest(ocirc->rend_data, + &rend_pk_digest_len); + if (tor_memeq(rend_pk_digest, digest, rend_pk_digest_len)) { + goto match; + } + no_match: + return 0; + match: + return 1; +} diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.h b/src/or/rendcommon.h index 88cf512..1a893e1 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.h +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.h @@ -18,19 +18,6 @@ typedef enum rend_intro_point_failure_t { INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE = 2, } rend_intro_point_failure_t; -/** Free all storage associated with data */ -static inline void -rend_data_free(rend_data_t *data) -{ - if (!data) { - return; - } - /* Cleanup the HSDir identity digest. */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data->hsdirs_fp, char *, d, tor_free(d)); - smartlist_free(data->hsdirs_fp); - tor_free(data); -} - int rend_cmp_service_ids(const char *one, const char *two); void rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint, @@ -60,15 +47,8 @@ void rend_get_descriptor_id_bytes(char *descriptor_id_out, int hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(smartlist_t *responsible_dirs, const char *id); -rend_data_t *rend_data_dup(const rend_data_t *data); -rend_data_t *rend_data_client_create(const char *onion_address, - const char *desc_id, - const char *cookie, - rend_auth_type_t auth_type); -rend_data_t *rend_data_service_create(const char *onion_address, - const char *pk_digest, - const uint8_t *cookie, - rend_auth_type_t auth_type); +int rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(const origin_circuit_t *ocirc, + const uint8_t *digest); char *rend_auth_encode_cookie(const uint8_t *cookie_in, rend_auth_type_t auth_type); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 4c88f1f..21e88eb 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "config.h" #include "control.h" #include "directory.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" @@ -792,8 +793,7 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) int keep_it = 0; tor_assert(oc->rend_data); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(surviving_services, rend_service_t *, ptr, { - if (tor_memeq(ptr->pk_digest, oc->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { + if (rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) ptr->pk_digest)) { keep_it = 1; break; } @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) log_info(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe( oc->build_state->chosen_exit)), - oc->rend_data->onion_address); + rend_data_get_address(oc->rend_data)); circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); /* XXXX Is there another reason we should use here? */ } @@ -930,12 +930,13 @@ rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id) circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) { origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); tor_assert(oc->rend_data); - if (!tor_memeq(s->pk_digest, oc->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + if (!rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) s->pk_digest)) { continue; + } log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe( oc->build_state->chosen_exit)), - oc->rend_data->onion_address); + rend_data_get_address(oc->rend_data)); circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); @@ -1441,7 +1442,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const or_options_t *options = get_options(); char *err_msg = NULL; int err_msg_severity = LOG_WARN; - const char *stage_descr = NULL; + const char *stage_descr = NULL, *rend_pk_digest; int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; /* Service/circuit/key stuff we can learn before parsing */ char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; @@ -1477,14 +1478,15 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit, tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel)); #endif tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); + /* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */ + rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL); /* We'll use this in a bazillion log messages */ base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); + rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); /* look up service depending on circuit. */ - service = - rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest); if (!service) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro " @@ -1702,8 +1704,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit, /* Fill in the circuit's state. */ launched->rend_data = - rend_data_service_create(service->service_id, - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, + rend_data_service_create(service->service_id, rend_pk_digest, parsed_req->rc, service->auth_type); launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref = @@ -2679,9 +2680,9 @@ count_intro_point_circuits(const rend_service_t *service) circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) { origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (oc->rend_data && - !rend_cmp_service_ids(service->service_id, - oc->rend_data->onion_address)) + rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) service->pk_digest)) { num_ipos++; + } } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); @@ -2701,6 +2702,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) char auth[DIGEST_LEN + 9]; char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + const char *rend_pk_digest; tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO); #ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED @@ -2708,12 +2710,13 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) #endif tor_assert(circuit->cpath); tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); + /* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only on supported). */ + rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); + rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); - service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest); if (!service) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized service ID %s on introduction circuit %u.", safe_str_client(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id); @@ -2754,9 +2757,8 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL); { - rend_data_t *rend_data = circuit->rend_data; + rend_data_free(circuit->rend_data); circuit->rend_data = NULL; - rend_data_free(rend_data); } { crypto_pk_t *intro_key = circuit->intro_key; @@ -2839,15 +2841,17 @@ rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; (void) request; (void) request_len; + tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); + /* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only supported one for now). */ + const char *rend_pk_digest = + (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL); if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on non-intro circuit."); goto err; } - tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); - service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest); if (!service) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service on introduction circuit %u.", (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id); @@ -2870,7 +2874,7 @@ rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 + 1, - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); + rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on circuit %u for service %s", (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid); @@ -2897,6 +2901,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1]; char hexcookie[9]; int reason; + const char *rend_cookie, *rend_pk_digest; tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); tor_assert(circuit->cpath); @@ -2906,6 +2911,11 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) #endif tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); + /* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */ + rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, + NULL); + rend_cookie = circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie; + /* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias */ if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty) circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); @@ -2915,9 +2925,9 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) hop = circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath; - base16_encode(hexcookie,9,circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie,4); + base16_encode(hexcookie,9, rend_cookie,4); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); + rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); log_info(LD_REND, "Done building circuit %u to rendezvous with " @@ -2945,8 +2955,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath = hop; circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath = NULL; - service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( - circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest); if (!service) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Internal error: unrecognized service ID on " "rendezvous circuit."); @@ -2955,7 +2964,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) } /* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */ - memcpy(buf, circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN); + memcpy(buf, rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN); if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state, buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key."); @@ -3019,8 +3028,8 @@ find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro, const char *pk_digest) origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL; tor_assert(intro); - while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,pk_digest, - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) { + while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ, + (uint8_t *) pk_digest, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) { if (tor_memeq(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) && circ->rend_data) { @@ -3029,8 +3038,9 @@ find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro, const char *pk_digest) } circ = NULL; - while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,pk_digest, - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) { + while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ, + (uint8_t *) pk_digest, + CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) { if (tor_memeq(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) && circ->rend_data) { @@ -3069,7 +3079,7 @@ find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ) tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO || TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO); tor_assert(circ->rend_data); - serviceid = circ->rend_data->onion_address; + serviceid = rend_data_get_address(circ->rend_data); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s, if (tor_memeq(s->service_id, serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32)) { @@ -3454,10 +3464,13 @@ void rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(const rend_data_t *rend_data) { rend_service_t *service; + const char *onion_address; tor_assert(rend_data); - service = rend_service_get_by_service_id(rend_data->onion_address); + onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data); + + service = rend_service_get_by_service_id(onion_address); if (service == NULL) { return; } @@ -3815,14 +3828,16 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn, smartlist_t *matching_ports; rend_service_port_config_t *chosen_port; unsigned int warn_once = 0; + const char *rend_pk_digest; tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED); tor_assert(circ->rend_data); log_debug(LD_REND,"beginning to hunt for addr/port"); + /* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */ + rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circ->rend_data, NULL); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, - circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); - service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( - circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); + rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN); + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest); if (!service) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't find any service associated with pk %s on " "rendezvous circuit %u; closing.", diff --git a/src/test/test_connection.c b/src/test/test_connection.c index bf95b0b..d7342e3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_connection.c +++ b/src/test/test_connection.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "test.h" #include "connection.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "main.h" #include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" @@ -239,13 +240,9 @@ test_conn_get_rend_setup(const struct testcase_t *tc) rend_cache_init(); /* TODO: use directory_initiate_command_rend() to do this - maybe? */ - conn->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t)); tor_assert(strlen(TEST_CONN_REND_ADDR) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32); - memcpy(conn->rend_data->onion_address, - TEST_CONN_REND_ADDR, - REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1); - conn->rend_data->hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); - + conn->rend_data = rend_data_client_create(TEST_CONN_REND_ADDR, NULL, NULL, + REND_NO_AUTH); assert_connection_ok(&conn->base_, time(NULL)); return conn; @@ -528,7 +525,8 @@ test_conn_get_rend(void *arg) tt_assert(connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery( conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state, - conn->rend_data->onion_address) + rend_data_get_address( + conn->rend_data)) == TO_CONN(conn)); tt_assert(connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery( TEST_CONN_TYPE, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs.c b/src/test/test_hs.c index 1daa155..a09e99f 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "test.h" #include "control.h" #include "config.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include "rendcommon.h" #include "routerset.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" @@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) #define STR_DESC_ID_BASE32 "hba3gmcgpfivzfhx5rtfqkfdhv65yrj3" int ret; - rend_data_t rend_query; + rend_data_v2_t rend_query; const char *expected_msg; char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; @@ -146,12 +147,13 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) /* setup rend_query struct */ memset(&rend_query, 0, sizeof(rend_query)); + rend_query.base_.version = 2; strncpy(rend_query.onion_address, STR_HS_ADDR, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1); rend_query.auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH; - rend_query.hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_add(rend_query.hsdirs_fp, tor_memdup(HSDIR_EXIST_ID, - DIGEST_LEN)); + rend_query.base_.hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(rend_query.base_.hsdirs_fp, tor_memdup(HSDIR_EXIST_ID, + DIGEST_LEN)); /* Compute descriptor ID for replica 0, should be STR_DESC_ID_BASE32. */ ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(rend_query.descriptor_id[0], @@ -165,7 +167,7 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) sizeof(desc_id_base32)); /* test request event */ - control_event_hs_descriptor_requested(&rend_query, HSDIR_EXIST_ID, + control_event_hs_descriptor_requested(&rend_query.base_, HSDIR_EXIST_ID, STR_DESC_ID_BASE32); expected_msg = "650 HS_DESC REQUESTED "STR_HS_ADDR" NO_AUTH "\ STR_HSDIR_EXIST_LONGNAME " " STR_DESC_ID_BASE32 "\r\n"; @@ -176,7 +178,7 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) /* test received event */ rend_query.auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH; control_event_hs_descriptor_received(rend_query.onion_address, - &rend_query, HSDIR_EXIST_ID); + &rend_query.base_, HSDIR_EXIST_ID); expected_msg = "650 HS_DESC RECEIVED "STR_HS_ADDR" BASIC_AUTH "\ STR_HSDIR_EXIST_LONGNAME " " STR_DESC_ID_BASE32"\r\n"; tt_assert(received_msg); @@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) /* test failed event */ rend_query.auth_type = REND_STEALTH_AUTH; - control_event_hs_descriptor_failed(&rend_query, + control_event_hs_descriptor_failed(&rend_query.base_, HSDIR_NONE_EXIST_ID, "QUERY_REJECTED"); expected_msg = "650 HS_DESC FAILED "STR_HS_ADDR" STEALTH_AUTH "\ @@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) /* test invalid auth type */ rend_query.auth_type = 999; - control_event_hs_descriptor_failed(&rend_query, + control_event_hs_descriptor_failed(&rend_query.base_, HSDIR_EXIST_ID, "QUERY_REJECTED"); expected_msg = "650 HS_DESC FAILED "STR_HS_ADDR" UNKNOWN "\ @@ -219,8 +221,8 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) tt_str_op(received_msg, OP_EQ, exp_msg); tor_free(received_msg); tor_free(exp_msg); - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_query.hsdirs_fp, char *, d, tor_free(d)); - smartlist_free(rend_query.hsdirs_fp); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_query.base_.hsdirs_fp, char *, d, tor_free(d)); + smartlist_free(rend_query.base_.hsdirs_fp); done: UNMOCK(queue_control_event_string); @@ -320,42 +322,45 @@ test_hs_rend_data(void *arg) client = rend_data_client_create(STR_HS_ADDR, desc_id, client_cookie, REND_NO_AUTH); tt_assert(client); - tt_int_op(client->auth_type, ==, REND_NO_AUTH); - tt_str_op(client->onion_address, OP_EQ, STR_HS_ADDR); - tt_mem_op(client->desc_id_fetch, OP_EQ, desc_id, sizeof(desc_id)); - tt_mem_op(client->descriptor_cookie, OP_EQ, client_cookie, + rend_data_v2_t *client_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(client); + tt_int_op(client_v2->auth_type, ==, REND_NO_AUTH); + tt_str_op(client_v2->onion_address, OP_EQ, STR_HS_ADDR); + tt_mem_op(client_v2->desc_id_fetch, OP_EQ, desc_id, sizeof(desc_id)); + tt_mem_op(client_v2->descriptor_cookie, OP_EQ, client_cookie, sizeof(client_cookie)); tt_assert(client->hsdirs_fp); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(client->hsdirs_fp), ==, 0); for (rep = 0; rep < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; rep++) { - int ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(desc_id, client->onion_address, - client->descriptor_cookie, now, rep); + int ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(desc_id, client_v2->onion_address, + client_v2->descriptor_cookie, now, rep); /* That shouldn't never fail. */ tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); - tt_mem_op(client->descriptor_id[rep], OP_EQ, desc_id, sizeof(desc_id)); + tt_mem_op(client_v2->descriptor_id[rep], OP_EQ, desc_id, + sizeof(desc_id)); } /* The rest should be zeroed because this is a client request. */ - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client->rend_pk_digest), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client_v2->rend_pk_digest), ==, 1); tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client->rend_cookie), ==, 1); /* Test dup(). */ client_dup = rend_data_dup(client); tt_assert(client_dup); - tt_int_op(client_dup->auth_type, ==, client->auth_type); - tt_str_op(client_dup->onion_address, OP_EQ, client->onion_address); - tt_mem_op(client_dup->desc_id_fetch, OP_EQ, client->desc_id_fetch, - sizeof(client_dup->desc_id_fetch)); - tt_mem_op(client_dup->descriptor_cookie, OP_EQ, client->descriptor_cookie, - sizeof(client_dup->descriptor_cookie)); + rend_data_v2_t *client_dup_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(client_dup); + tt_int_op(client_dup_v2->auth_type, ==, client_v2->auth_type); + tt_str_op(client_dup_v2->onion_address, OP_EQ, client_v2->onion_address); + tt_mem_op(client_dup_v2->desc_id_fetch, OP_EQ, client_v2->desc_id_fetch, + sizeof(client_dup_v2->desc_id_fetch)); + tt_mem_op(client_dup_v2->descriptor_cookie, OP_EQ, client_v2->descriptor_cookie, + sizeof(client_dup_v2->descriptor_cookie)); tt_assert(client_dup->hsdirs_fp); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(client_dup->hsdirs_fp), ==, 0); for (rep = 0; rep < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; rep++) { - tt_mem_op(client_dup->descriptor_id[rep], OP_EQ, - client->descriptor_id[rep], DIGEST_LEN); + tt_mem_op(client_dup_v2->descriptor_id[rep], OP_EQ, + client_v2->descriptor_id[rep], DIGEST_LEN); } /* The rest should be zeroed because this is a client request. */ - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client_dup->rend_pk_digest), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client_dup_v2->rend_pk_digest), ==, 1); tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client_dup->rend_cookie), ==, 1); rend_data_free(client); client = NULL; @@ -371,18 +376,19 @@ test_hs_rend_data(void *arg) * zeroed out. */ client = rend_data_client_create(NULL, desc_id, NULL, REND_BASIC_AUTH); tt_assert(client); - tt_int_op(client->auth_type, ==, REND_BASIC_AUTH); - tt_int_op(strlen(client->onion_address), ==, 0); - tt_mem_op(client->desc_id_fetch, OP_EQ, desc_id, sizeof(desc_id)); - tt_int_op(tor_mem_is_zero(client->descriptor_cookie, - sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie)), ==, 1); + client_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(client); + tt_int_op(client_v2->auth_type, ==, REND_BASIC_AUTH); + tt_int_op(strlen(client_v2->onion_address), ==, 0); + tt_mem_op(client_v2->desc_id_fetch, OP_EQ, desc_id, sizeof(desc_id)); + tt_int_op(tor_mem_is_zero(client_v2->descriptor_cookie, + sizeof(client_v2->descriptor_cookie)), ==, 1); tt_assert(client->hsdirs_fp); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(client->hsdirs_fp), ==, 0); for (rep = 0; rep < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; rep++) { - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client->descriptor_id[rep]), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client_v2->descriptor_id[rep]), ==, 1); } /* The rest should be zeroed because this is a client request. */ - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client->rend_pk_digest), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client_v2->rend_pk_digest), ==, 1); tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(client->rend_cookie), ==, 1); rend_data_free(client); client = NULL; @@ -396,37 +402,39 @@ test_hs_rend_data(void *arg) service = rend_data_service_create(STR_HS_ADDR, rend_pk_digest, rend_cookie, REND_NO_AUTH); tt_assert(service); - tt_int_op(service->auth_type, ==, REND_NO_AUTH); - tt_str_op(service->onion_address, OP_EQ, STR_HS_ADDR); - tt_mem_op(service->rend_pk_digest, OP_EQ, rend_pk_digest, + rend_data_v2_t *service_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(service); + tt_int_op(service_v2->auth_type, ==, REND_NO_AUTH); + tt_str_op(service_v2->onion_address, OP_EQ, STR_HS_ADDR); + tt_mem_op(service_v2->rend_pk_digest, OP_EQ, rend_pk_digest, sizeof(rend_pk_digest)); tt_mem_op(service->rend_cookie, OP_EQ, rend_cookie, sizeof(rend_cookie)); tt_assert(service->hsdirs_fp); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(service->hsdirs_fp), ==, 0); for (rep = 0; rep < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; rep++) { - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service->descriptor_id[rep]), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_v2->descriptor_id[rep]), ==, 1); } /* The rest should be zeroed because this is a service request. */ - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service->descriptor_cookie), ==, 1); - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service->desc_id_fetch), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_v2->descriptor_cookie), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_v2->desc_id_fetch), ==, 1); /* Test dup(). */ service_dup = rend_data_dup(service); + rend_data_v2_t *service_dup_v2 = TO_REND_DATA_V2(service_dup); tt_assert(service_dup); - tt_int_op(service_dup->auth_type, ==, service->auth_type); - tt_str_op(service_dup->onion_address, OP_EQ, service->onion_address); - tt_mem_op(service_dup->rend_pk_digest, OP_EQ, service->rend_pk_digest, - sizeof(service_dup->rend_pk_digest)); + tt_int_op(service_dup_v2->auth_type, ==, service_v2->auth_type); + tt_str_op(service_dup_v2->onion_address, OP_EQ, service_v2->onion_address); + tt_mem_op(service_dup_v2->rend_pk_digest, OP_EQ, service_v2->rend_pk_digest, + sizeof(service_dup_v2->rend_pk_digest)); tt_mem_op(service_dup->rend_cookie, OP_EQ, service->rend_cookie, sizeof(service_dup->rend_cookie)); tt_assert(service_dup->hsdirs_fp); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(service_dup->hsdirs_fp), ==, 0); for (rep = 0; rep < REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS; rep++) { - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_dup->descriptor_id[rep]), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_dup_v2->descriptor_id[rep]), ==, 1); } /* The rest should be zeroed because this is a service request. */ - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_dup->descriptor_cookie), ==, 1); - tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_dup->desc_id_fetch), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_dup_v2->descriptor_cookie), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(tor_digest_is_zero(service_dup_v2->desc_id_fetch), ==, 1); done: rend_data_free(service); diff --git a/src/test/test_rendcache.c b/src/test/test_rendcache.c index e210e05..05a0bcd 100644 --- a/src/test/test_rendcache.c +++ b/src/test/test_rendcache.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "router.h" #include "routerlist.h" #include "config.h" +#include "hs_common.h" #include <openssl/rsa.h> #include "rend_test_helpers.h" @@ -23,15 +24,16 @@ static const int TIME_IN_THE_FUTURE = REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW + 60; static rend_data_t * mock_rend_data(const char *onion_address) { - rend_data_t *rend_query = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t)); + rend_data_v2_t *v2_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*v2_data)); + rend_data_t *rend_query = &v2_data->base_; + rend_query->version = 2; - strlcpy(rend_query->onion_address, onion_address, - sizeof(rend_query->onion_address)); - rend_query->auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH; + strlcpy(v2_data->onion_address, onion_address, + sizeof(v2_data->onion_address)); + v2_data->auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH; rend_query->hsdirs_fp = smartlist_new(); smartlist_add(rend_query->hsdirs_fp, tor_memdup("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", DIGEST_LEN)); - return rend_query; } @@ -143,7 +145,8 @@ test_rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(void *data) // Test mismatch between service ID and onion address rend_cache_init(); - strncpy(mock_rend_query->onion_address, "abc", REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1); + strncpy(TO_REND_DATA_V2(mock_rend_query)->onion_address, "abc", + REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1); ret = rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(desc_holder->desc_str, desc_id_base32, mock_rend_query, NULL); @@ -229,9 +232,9 @@ test_rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(void *data) generate_desc(RECENT_TIME, &desc_holder, &service_id, 3); mock_rend_query = mock_rend_data(service_id); - mock_rend_query->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH; + TO_REND_DATA_V2(mock_rend_query)->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH; client_cookie[0] = 'A'; - memcpy(mock_rend_query->descriptor_cookie, client_cookie, + memcpy(TO_REND_DATA_V2(mock_rend_query)->descriptor_cookie, client_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN); base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32), desc_holder->desc_id, DIGEST_LEN); @@ -249,7 +252,7 @@ test_rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(void *data) generate_desc(RECENT_TIME, &desc_holder, &service_id, 3); mock_rend_query = mock_rend_data(service_id); - mock_rend_query->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH; + TO_REND_DATA_V2(mock_rend_query)->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH; base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32), desc_holder->desc_id, DIGEST_LEN); ret = rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(desc_holder->desc_str,

1 0

[tor/master] Move token parsing code to parsecommon.{c|h}
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit e8c12175fe61e4666d093b1ac85cf9bbae281f48 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Fri Mar 11 13:26:04 2016 -0500 Move token parsing code to parsecommon.{c|h} Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/parsecommon.c | 453 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/parsecommon.h | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/routerparse.c | 715 +-------------------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 749 insertions(+), 713 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index f9199dd..3ae45cb 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/shared_random.c \ src/or/shared_random_state.c \ src/or/transports.c \ + src/or/parsecommon.c \ src/or/periodic.c \ src/or/policies.c \ src/or/reasons.c \ @@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/shared_random.h \ src/or/shared_random_state.h \ src/or/transports.h \ + src/or/parsecommon.h \ src/or/periodic.h \ src/or/policies.h \ src/or/reasons.h \ diff --git a/src/or/parsecommon.c b/src/or/parsecommon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72e69e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/parsecommon.c @@ -0,0 +1,453 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file parsecommon.c + * \brief Common code to parse and validate various type of descriptors. + **/ + +#include "parsecommon.h" +#include "torlog.h" +#include "util_format.h" + +#define MIN_ANNOTATION A_PURPOSE +#define MAX_ANNOTATION A_UNKNOWN_ + +#define ALLOC_ZERO(sz) memarea_alloc_zero(area,sz) +#define ALLOC(sz) memarea_alloc(area,sz) +#define STRDUP(str) memarea_strdup(area,str) +#define STRNDUP(str,n) memarea_strndup(area,(str),(n)) + +#define RET_ERR(msg) \ + STMT_BEGIN \ + if (tok) token_clear(tok); \ + tok = ALLOC_ZERO(sizeof(directory_token_t)); \ + tok->tp = ERR_; \ + tok->error = STRDUP(msg); \ + goto done_tokenizing; \ + STMT_END + +/** Free all resources allocated for tok */ +void +token_clear(directory_token_t *tok) +{ + if (tok->key) + crypto_pk_free(tok->key); +} + +/** Read all tokens from a string between start and end, and add + * them to out. Parse according to the token rules in table. + * Caller must free tokens in out. If end is NULL, use the + * entire string. + */ +int +tokenize_string(memarea_t *area, + const char *start, const char *end, smartlist_t *out, + token_rule_t *table, int flags) +{ + const char **s; + directory_token_t *tok = NULL; + int counts[NIL_]; + int i; + int first_nonannotation; + int prev_len = smartlist_len(out); + tor_assert(area); + + s = &start; + if (!end) { + end = start+strlen(start); + } else { + /* it's only meaningful to check for nuls if we got an end-of-string ptr */ + if (memchr(start, '\0', end-start)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: internal NUL character."); + return -1; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < NIL_; ++i) + counts[i] = 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(out, const directory_token_t *, t, ++counts[t->tp]); + + while (*s < end && (!tok || tok->tp != EOF_)) { + tok = get_next_token(area, s, end, table); + if (tok->tp == ERR_) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: %s", tok->error); + token_clear(tok); + return -1; + } + ++counts[tok->tp]; + smartlist_add(out, tok); + *s = eat_whitespace_eos(*s, end); + } + + if (flags & TS_NOCHECK) + return 0; + + if ((flags & TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK)) { + first_nonannotation = -1; + for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(out); ++i) { + tok = smartlist_get(out, i); + if (tok->tp < MIN_ANNOTATION || tok->tp > MAX_ANNOTATION) { + first_nonannotation = i; + break; + } + } + if (first_nonannotation < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: item contains only annotations"); + return -1; + } + for (i=first_nonannotation; i < smartlist_len(out); ++i) { + tok = smartlist_get(out, i); + if (tok->tp >= MIN_ANNOTATION && tok->tp <= MAX_ANNOTATION) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: Annotations mixed with keywords"); + return -1; + } + } + if ((flags & TS_NO_NEW_ANNOTATIONS)) { + if (first_nonannotation != prev_len) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: Unexpected annotations."); + return -1; + } + } + } else { + for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(out); ++i) { + tok = smartlist_get(out, i); + if (tok->tp >= MIN_ANNOTATION && tok->tp <= MAX_ANNOTATION) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: no annotations allowed."); + return -1; + } + } + first_nonannotation = 0; + } + for (i = 0; table[i].t; ++i) { + if (counts[table[i].v] < table[i].min_cnt) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: missing %s element.", table[i].t); + return -1; + } + if (counts[table[i].v] > table[i].max_cnt) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: too many %s elements.", table[i].t); + return -1; + } + if (table[i].pos & AT_START) { + if (smartlist_len(out) < 1 || + (tok = smartlist_get(out, first_nonannotation))->tp != table[i].v) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: first item is not %s.", table[i].t); + return -1; + } + } + if (table[i].pos & AT_END) { + if (smartlist_len(out) < 1 || + (tok = smartlist_get(out, smartlist_len(out)-1))->tp != table[i].v) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: last item is not %s.", table[i].t); + return -1; + } + } + } + return 0; +} + + +/** Helper: parse space-separated arguments from the string s ending at + * eol, and store them in the args field of tok. Store the + * number of parsed elements into the n_args field of tok. Allocate + * all storage in area. Return the number of arguments parsed, or + * return -1 if there was an insanely high number of arguments. */ +static inline int +get_token_arguments(memarea_t *area, directory_token_t *tok, + const char *s, const char *eol) +{ +/** Largest number of arguments we'll accept to any token, ever. */ +#define MAX_ARGS 512 + char *mem = memarea_strndup(area, s, eol-s); + char *cp = mem; + int j = 0; + char *args[MAX_ARGS]; + while (*cp) { + if (j == MAX_ARGS) + return -1; + args[j++] = cp; + cp = (char*)find_whitespace(cp); + if (!cp || !*cp) + break; /* End of the line. */ + *cp++ = '\0'; + cp = (char*)eat_whitespace(cp); + } + tok->n_args = j; + tok->args = memarea_memdup(area, args, j*sizeof(char*)); + return j; +#undef MAX_ARGS +} + +/** Helper: make sure that the token tok with keyword kwd obeys + * the object syntax of o_syn. Allocate all storage in area. + * Return tok on success, or a new ERR_ token if the token didn't + * conform to the syntax we wanted. + **/ +static inline directory_token_t * +token_check_object(memarea_t *area, const char *kwd, + directory_token_t *tok, obj_syntax o_syn) +{ + char ebuf[128]; + switch (o_syn) { + case NO_OBJ: + /* No object is allowed for this token. */ + if (tok->object_body) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Unexpected object for %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + if (tok->key) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Unexpected public key for %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + break; + case NEED_OBJ: + /* There must be a (non-key) object. */ + if (!tok->object_body) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Missing object for %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + break; + case NEED_KEY_1024: /* There must be a 1024-bit public key. */ + case NEED_SKEY_1024: /* There must be a 1024-bit private key. */ + if (tok->key && crypto_pk_num_bits(tok->key) != PK_BYTES*8) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Wrong size on key for %s: %d bits", + kwd, crypto_pk_num_bits(tok->key)); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + /* fall through */ + case NEED_KEY: /* There must be some kind of key. */ + if (!tok->key) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Missing public key for %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + if (o_syn != NEED_SKEY_1024) { + if (crypto_pk_key_is_private(tok->key)) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), + "Private key given for %s, which wants a public key", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + } else { /* o_syn == NEED_SKEY_1024 */ + if (!crypto_pk_key_is_private(tok->key)) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), + "Public key given for %s, which wants a private key", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + } + break; + case OBJ_OK: + /* Anything goes with this token. */ + break; + } + + done_tokenizing: + return tok; +} + + + +/** Helper function: read the next token from *s, advance *s to the end of the + * token, and return the parsed token. Parse *s according to the list + * of tokens in table. + */ +directory_token_t * +get_next_token(memarea_t *area, + const char **s, const char *eos, token_rule_t *table) +{ + /** Reject any object at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an + * attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */ +#define MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE (128*1024) + /** Reject any line at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an + * attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */ +#define MAX_LINE_LENGTH (128*1024) + + const char *next, *eol, *obstart; + size_t obname_len; + int i; + directory_token_t *tok; + obj_syntax o_syn = NO_OBJ; + char ebuf[128]; + const char *kwd = ""; + + tor_assert(area); + tok = ALLOC_ZERO(sizeof(directory_token_t)); + tok->tp = ERR_; + + /* Set *s to first token, eol to end-of-line, next to after first token */ + *s = eat_whitespace_eos(*s, eos); /* eat multi-line whitespace */ + tor_assert(eos >= *s); + eol = memchr(*s, '\n', eos-*s); + if (!eol) + eol = eos; + if (eol - *s > MAX_LINE_LENGTH) { + RET_ERR("Line far too long"); + } + + next = find_whitespace_eos(*s, eol); + + if (!strcmp_len(*s, "opt", next-*s)) { + /* Skip past an "opt" at the start of the line. */ + *s = eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(next, eol); + next = find_whitespace_eos(*s, eol); + } else if (*s == eos) { /* If no "opt", and end-of-line, line is invalid */ + RET_ERR("Unexpected EOF"); + } + + /* Search the table for the appropriate entry. (I tried a binary search + * instead, but it wasn't any faster.) */ + for (i = 0; table[i].t ; ++i) { + if (!strcmp_len(*s, table[i].t, next-*s)) { + /* We've found the keyword. */ + kwd = table[i].t; + tok->tp = table[i].v; + o_syn = table[i].os; + *s = eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(next, eol); + /* We go ahead whether there are arguments or not, so that tok->args is + * always set if we want arguments. */ + if (table[i].concat_args) { + /* The keyword takes the line as a single argument */ + tok->args = ALLOC(sizeof(char*)); + tok->args[0] = STRNDUP(*s,eol-*s); /* Grab everything on line */ + tok->n_args = 1; + } else { + /* This keyword takes multiple arguments. */ + if (get_token_arguments(area, tok, *s, eol)<0) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf),"Far too many arguments to %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + *s = eol; + } + if (tok->n_args < table[i].min_args) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Too few arguments to %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } else if (tok->n_args > table[i].max_args) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Too many arguments to %s", kwd); + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + break; + } + } + + if (tok->tp == ERR_) { + /* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */ + if (**s == '@') + tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_; + else + tok->tp = K_OPT; + tok->args = ALLOC(sizeof(char*)); + tok->args[0] = STRNDUP(*s, eol-*s); + tok->n_args = 1; + o_syn = OBJ_OK; + } + + /* Check whether there's an object present */ + *s = eat_whitespace_eos(eol, eos); /* Scan from end of first line */ + tor_assert(eos >= *s); + eol = memchr(*s, '\n', eos-*s); + if (!eol || eol-*s<11 || strcmpstart(*s, "-----BEGIN ")) /* No object. */ + goto check_object; + + obstart = *s; /* Set obstart to start of object spec */ + if (*s+16 >= eol || memchr(*s+11,'\0',eol-*s-16) || /* no short lines, */ + strcmp_len(eol-5, "-----", 5) || /* nuls or invalid endings */ + (eol-*s) > MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE) { /* name too long */ + RET_ERR("Malformed object: bad begin line"); + } + tok->object_type = STRNDUP(*s+11, eol-*s-16); + obname_len = eol-*s-16; /* store objname length here to avoid a strlen() */ + *s = eol+1; /* Set *s to possible start of object data (could be eos) */ + + /* Go to the end of the object */ + next = tor_memstr(*s, eos-*s, "-----END "); + if (!next) { + RET_ERR("Malformed object: missing object end line"); + } + tor_assert(eos >= next); + eol = memchr(next, '\n', eos-next); + if (!eol) /* end-of-line marker, or eos if there's no '\n' */ + eol = eos; + /* Validate the ending tag, which should be 9 + NAME + 5 + eol */ + if ((size_t)(eol-next) != 9+obname_len+5 || + strcmp_len(next+9, tok->object_type, obname_len) || + strcmp_len(eol-5, "-----", 5)) { + tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Malformed object: mismatched end tag %s", + tok->object_type); + ebuf[sizeof(ebuf)-1] = '\0'; + RET_ERR(ebuf); + } + if (next - *s > MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE) + RET_ERR("Couldn't parse object: missing footer or object much too big."); + + if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PUBLIC KEY")) { /* If it's a public key */ + tok->key = crypto_pk_new(); + if (crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart)) + RET_ERR("Couldn't parse public key."); + } else if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PRIVATE KEY")) { /* private key */ + tok->key = crypto_pk_new(); + if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart)) + RET_ERR("Couldn't parse private key."); + } else { /* If it's something else, try to base64-decode it */ + int r; + tok->object_body = ALLOC(next-*s); /* really, this is too much RAM. */ + r = base64_decode(tok->object_body, next-*s, *s, next-*s); + if (r<0) + RET_ERR("Malformed object: bad base64-encoded data"); + tok->object_size = r; + } + *s = eol; + + check_object: + tok = token_check_object(area, kwd, tok, o_syn); + + done_tokenizing: + return tok; + +#undef RET_ERR +#undef ALLOC +#undef ALLOC_ZERO +#undef STRDUP +#undef STRNDUP +} + + +/** Find the first token in s whose keyword is keyword; fail + * with an assert if no such keyword is found. + */ +directory_token_t * +find_by_keyword_(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword keyword, + const char *keyword_as_string) +{ + directory_token_t *tok = find_opt_by_keyword(s, keyword); + if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tok)) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Missing %s [%d] in directory object that should have " + "been validated. Internal error.", keyword_as_string, (int)keyword); + tor_assert(tok); + } + return tok; +} + +/** Find the first token in s whose keyword is keyword; return + * NULL if no such keyword is found. + */ +directory_token_t * +find_opt_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword keyword) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s, directory_token_t *, t, if (t->tp == keyword) return t); + return NULL; +} + +/** If there are any directory_token_t entries in s whose keyword is + * k, return a newly allocated smartlist_t containing all such entries, + * in the same order in which they occur in s. Otherwise return + * NULL. */ +smartlist_t * +find_all_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword k) +{ + smartlist_t *out = NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s, directory_token_t *, t, + if (t->tp == k) { + if (!out) + out = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(out, t); + }); + return out; +} diff --git a/src/or/parsecommon.h b/src/or/parsecommon.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bb89ce --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/parsecommon.h @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file parsecommon.h + * \brief Header file for parsecommon.c + **/ + + +#ifndef TOR_PARSECOMMON_H +#define TOR_PARSECOMMON_H + +#include "container.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "memarea.h" + +/** Enumeration of possible token types. The ones starting with K_ correspond +* to directory 'keywords'. A_ is for an annotation, R or C is related to +* hidden services, ERR_ is an error in the tokenizing process, EOF_ is an +* end-of-file marker, and NIL_ is used to encode not-a-token. +*/ +typedef enum { + K_ACCEPT = 0, + K_ACCEPT6, + K_DIRECTORY_SIGNATURE, + K_RECOMMENDED_SOFTWARE, + K_REJECT, + K_REJECT6, + K_ROUTER, + K_SIGNED_DIRECTORY, + K_SIGNING_KEY, + K_ONION_KEY, + K_ONION_KEY_NTOR, + K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, + K_PUBLISHED, + K_RUNNING_ROUTERS, + K_ROUTER_STATUS, + K_PLATFORM, + K_OPT, + K_BANDWIDTH, + K_CONTACT, + K_NETWORK_STATUS, + K_UPTIME, + K_DIR_SIGNING_KEY, + K_FAMILY, + K_FINGERPRINT, + K_HIBERNATING, + K_READ_HISTORY, + K_WRITE_HISTORY, + K_NETWORK_STATUS_VERSION, + K_DIR_SOURCE, + K_DIR_OPTIONS, + K_CLIENT_VERSIONS, + K_SERVER_VERSIONS, + K_OR_ADDRESS, + K_ID, + K_P, + K_P6, + K_R, + K_A, + K_S, + K_V, + K_W, + K_M, + K_EXTRA_INFO, + K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST, + K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO, + K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, + K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, + K_IPV6_POLICY, + K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, + K_IDENTITY_ED25519, + K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519, + K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, + K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, + + K_DIRREQ_END, + K_DIRREQ_V2_IPS, + K_DIRREQ_V3_IPS, + K_DIRREQ_V2_REQS, + K_DIRREQ_V3_REQS, + K_DIRREQ_V2_SHARE, + K_DIRREQ_V3_SHARE, + K_DIRREQ_V2_RESP, + K_DIRREQ_V3_RESP, + K_DIRREQ_V2_DIR, + K_DIRREQ_V3_DIR, + K_DIRREQ_V2_TUN, + K_DIRREQ_V3_TUN, + K_ENTRY_END, + K_ENTRY_IPS, + K_CELL_END, + K_CELL_PROCESSED, + K_CELL_QUEUED, + K_CELL_TIME, + K_CELL_CIRCS, + K_EXIT_END, + K_EXIT_WRITTEN, + K_EXIT_READ, + K_EXIT_OPENED, + + K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATE_VERSION, + K_DIR_IDENTITY_KEY, + K_DIR_KEY_PUBLISHED, + K_DIR_KEY_EXPIRES, + K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATION, + K_DIR_KEY_CROSSCERT, + K_DIR_ADDRESS, + K_DIR_TUNNELLED, + + K_VOTE_STATUS, + K_VALID_AFTER, + K_FRESH_UNTIL, + K_VALID_UNTIL, + K_VOTING_DELAY, + + K_KNOWN_FLAGS, + K_PARAMS, + K_BW_WEIGHTS, + K_VOTE_DIGEST, + K_CONSENSUS_DIGEST, + K_ADDITIONAL_DIGEST, + K_ADDITIONAL_SIGNATURE, + K_CONSENSUS_METHODS, + K_CONSENSUS_METHOD, + K_LEGACY_DIR_KEY, + K_DIRECTORY_FOOTER, + K_SIGNING_CERT_ED, + K_SR_FLAG, + K_COMMIT, + K_PREVIOUS_SRV, + K_CURRENT_SRV, + K_PACKAGE, + + A_PURPOSE, + A_LAST_LISTED, + A_UNKNOWN_, + + R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR, + R_VERSION, + R_PERMANENT_KEY, + R_SECRET_ID_PART, + R_PUBLICATION_TIME, + R_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS, + R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS, + R_SIGNATURE, + + R_IPO_IDENTIFIER, + R_IPO_IP_ADDRESS, + R_IPO_ONION_PORT, + R_IPO_ONION_KEY, + R_IPO_SERVICE_KEY, + + C_CLIENT_NAME, + C_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE, + C_CLIENT_KEY, + + ERR_, + EOF_, + NIL_ +} directory_keyword; + +/** Structure to hold a single directory token. + * + * We parse a directory by breaking it into "tokens", each consisting + * of a keyword, a line full of arguments, and a binary object. The + * arguments and object are both optional, depending on the keyword + * type. + * + * This structure is only allocated in memareas; do not allocate it on + * the heap, or token_clear() won't work. + */ +typedef struct directory_token_t { + directory_keyword tp; /**< Type of the token. */ + int n_args:30; /**< Number of elements in args */ + char **args; /**< Array of arguments from keyword line. */ + + char *object_type; /**< -----BEGIN [object_type]-----*/ + size_t object_size; /**< Bytes in object_body */ + char *object_body; /**< Contents of object, base64-decoded. */ + + crypto_pk_t *key; /**< For public keys only. Heap-allocated. */ + + char *error; /**< For ERR_ tokens only. */ +} directory_token_t; + +/** We use a table of rules to decide how to parse each token type. */ + +/** Rules for whether the keyword needs an object. */ +typedef enum { + NO_OBJ, /**< No object, ever. */ + NEED_OBJ, /**< Object is required. */ + NEED_SKEY_1024,/**< Object is required, and must be a 1024 bit private key */ + NEED_KEY_1024, /**< Object is required, and must be a 1024 bit public key */ + NEED_KEY, /**< Object is required, and must be a public key. */ + OBJ_OK, /**< Object is optional. */ +} obj_syntax; + +#define AT_START 1 +#define AT_END 2 + +#define TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK 1 +#define TS_NOCHECK 2 +#define TS_NO_NEW_ANNOTATIONS 4 + +/* + * Helper macros to define token tables. 's' is a string, 't' is a + * directory_keyword, 'a' is a trio of argument multiplicities, and 'o' is an + * object syntax. + * + */ + +/** Appears to indicate the end of a table. */ +#define END_OF_TABLE { NULL, NIL_, 0,0,0, NO_OBJ, 0, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } +/** An item with no restrictions: used for obsolete document types */ +#define T(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } +/** An item with no restrictions on multiplicity or location. */ +#define T0N(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } +/** An item that must appear exactly once */ +#define T1(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, 1, 0, 0 } +/** An item that must appear exactly once, at the start of the document */ +#define T1_START(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, 1, AT_START, 0 } +/** An item that must appear exactly once, at the end of the document */ +#define T1_END(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, 1, AT_END, 0 } +/** An item that must appear one or more times */ +#define T1N(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } +/** An item that must appear no more than once */ +#define T01(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, 1, 0, 0 } +/** An annotation that must appear no more than once */ +#define A01(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, 1, 0, 1 } + +/* Argument multiplicity: any number of arguments. */ +#define ARGS 0,INT_MAX,0 +/* Argument multiplicity: no arguments. */ +#define NO_ARGS 0,0,0 +/* Argument multiplicity: concatenate all arguments. */ +#define CONCAT_ARGS 1,1,1 +/* Argument multiplicity: at least n arguments. */ +#define GE(n) n,INT_MAX,0 +/* Argument multiplicity: exactly n arguments. */ +#define EQ(n) n,n,0 + +/** Determines the parsing rules for a single token type. */ +typedef struct token_rule_t { + /** The string value of the keyword identifying the type of item. */ + const char *t; + /** The corresponding directory_keyword enum. */ + directory_keyword v; + /** Minimum number of arguments for this item */ + int min_args; + /** Maximum number of arguments for this item */ + int max_args; + /** If true, we concatenate all arguments for this item into a single + * string. */ + int concat_args; + /** Requirements on object syntax for this item. */ + obj_syntax os; + /** Lowest number of times this item may appear in a document. */ + int min_cnt; + /** Highest number of times this item may appear in a document. */ + int max_cnt; + /** One or more of AT_START/AT_END to limit where the item may appear in a + * document. */ + int pos; + /** True iff this token is an annotation. */ + int is_annotation; +} token_rule_t; + +void token_clear(directory_token_t *tok); + +int tokenize_string(memarea_t *area, + const char *start, const char *end, + smartlist_t *out, + token_rule_t *table, + int flags); +directory_token_t *get_next_token(memarea_t *area, + const char **s, + const char *eos, + token_rule_t *table); + +directory_token_t *find_by_keyword_(smartlist_t *s, + directory_keyword keyword, + const char *keyword_str); + +#define find_by_keyword(s, keyword) \ + find_by_keyword_((s), (keyword), #keyword) + +directory_token_t *find_opt_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, + directory_keyword keyword); +smartlist_t * find_all_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword k); + +#endif /* TOR_PARSECOMMON_H */ diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 03f8f4e..ef6273b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "circuitstats.h" #include "dirserv.h" #include "dirvote.h" +#include "parsecommon.h" #include "policies.h" #include "rendcommon.h" #include "router.h" @@ -36,259 +37,6 @@ /****************************************************************************/ -/** Enumeration of possible token types. The ones starting with K_ correspond - * to directory 'keywords'. A_ is for an annotation, R or C is related to - * hidden services, ERR_ is an error in the tokenizing process, EOF_ is an - * end-of-file marker, and NIL_ is used to encode not-a-token. - */ -typedef enum { - K_ACCEPT = 0, - K_ACCEPT6, - K_DIRECTORY_SIGNATURE, - K_RECOMMENDED_SOFTWARE, - K_REJECT, - K_REJECT6, - K_ROUTER, - K_SIGNED_DIRECTORY, - K_SIGNING_KEY, - K_ONION_KEY, - K_ONION_KEY_NTOR, - K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, - K_PUBLISHED, - K_RUNNING_ROUTERS, - K_ROUTER_STATUS, - K_PLATFORM, - K_OPT, - K_BANDWIDTH, - K_CONTACT, - K_NETWORK_STATUS, - K_UPTIME, - K_DIR_SIGNING_KEY, - K_FAMILY, - K_FINGERPRINT, - K_HIBERNATING, - K_READ_HISTORY, - K_WRITE_HISTORY, - K_NETWORK_STATUS_VERSION, - K_DIR_SOURCE, - K_DIR_OPTIONS, - K_CLIENT_VERSIONS, - K_SERVER_VERSIONS, - K_OR_ADDRESS, - K_ID, - K_P, - K_P6, - K_R, - K_A, - K_S, - K_V, - K_W, - K_M, - K_EXTRA_INFO, - K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST, - K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO, - K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, - K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, - K_IPV6_POLICY, - K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, - K_IDENTITY_ED25519, - K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519, - K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, - K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, - - K_DIRREQ_END, - K_DIRREQ_V2_IPS, - K_DIRREQ_V3_IPS, - K_DIRREQ_V2_REQS, - K_DIRREQ_V3_REQS, - K_DIRREQ_V2_SHARE, - K_DIRREQ_V3_SHARE, - K_DIRREQ_V2_RESP, - K_DIRREQ_V3_RESP, - K_DIRREQ_V2_DIR, - K_DIRREQ_V3_DIR, - K_DIRREQ_V2_TUN, - K_DIRREQ_V3_TUN, - K_ENTRY_END, - K_ENTRY_IPS, - K_CELL_END, - K_CELL_PROCESSED, - K_CELL_QUEUED, - K_CELL_TIME, - K_CELL_CIRCS, - K_EXIT_END, - K_EXIT_WRITTEN, - K_EXIT_READ, - K_EXIT_OPENED, - - K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATE_VERSION, - K_DIR_IDENTITY_KEY, - K_DIR_KEY_PUBLISHED, - K_DIR_KEY_EXPIRES, - K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATION, - K_DIR_KEY_CROSSCERT, - K_DIR_ADDRESS, - K_DIR_TUNNELLED, - - K_VOTE_STATUS, - K_VALID_AFTER, - K_FRESH_UNTIL, - K_VALID_UNTIL, - K_VOTING_DELAY, - - K_KNOWN_FLAGS, - K_PARAMS, - K_BW_WEIGHTS, - K_VOTE_DIGEST, - K_CONSENSUS_DIGEST, - K_ADDITIONAL_DIGEST, - K_ADDITIONAL_SIGNATURE, - K_CONSENSUS_METHODS, - K_CONSENSUS_METHOD, - K_LEGACY_DIR_KEY, - K_DIRECTORY_FOOTER, - K_SIGNING_CERT_ED, - K_SR_FLAG, - K_COMMIT, - K_PREVIOUS_SRV, - K_CURRENT_SRV, - K_PACKAGE, - - A_PURPOSE, - A_LAST_LISTED, - A_UNKNOWN_, - - R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR, - R_VERSION, - R_PERMANENT_KEY, - R_SECRET_ID_PART, - R_PUBLICATION_TIME, - R_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS, - R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS, - R_SIGNATURE, - - R_IPO_IDENTIFIER, - R_IPO_IP_ADDRESS, - R_IPO_ONION_PORT, - R_IPO_ONION_KEY, - R_IPO_SERVICE_KEY, - - C_CLIENT_NAME, - C_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE, - C_CLIENT_KEY, - - ERR_, - EOF_, - NIL_ -} directory_keyword; - -#define MIN_ANNOTATION A_PURPOSE -#define MAX_ANNOTATION A_UNKNOWN_ - -/** Structure to hold a single directory token. - * - * We parse a directory by breaking it into "tokens", each consisting - * of a keyword, a line full of arguments, and a binary object. The - * arguments and object are both optional, depending on the keyword - * type. - * - * This structure is only allocated in memareas; do not allocate it on - * the heap, or token_clear() won't work. - */ -typedef struct directory_token_t { - directory_keyword tp; /**< Type of the token. */ - int n_args:30; /**< Number of elements in args */ - char **args; /**< Array of arguments from keyword line. */ - - char *object_type; /**< -----BEGIN [object_type]-----*/ - size_t object_size; /**< Bytes in object_body */ - char *object_body; /**< Contents of object, base64-decoded. */ - - crypto_pk_t *key; /**< For public keys only. Heap-allocated. */ - - char *error; /**< For ERR_ tokens only. */ -} directory_token_t; - -/* ********************************************************************** */ - -/** We use a table of rules to decide how to parse each token type. */ - -/** Rules for whether the keyword needs an object. */ -typedef enum { - NO_OBJ, /**< No object, ever. */ - NEED_OBJ, /**< Object is required. */ - NEED_SKEY_1024,/**< Object is required, and must be a 1024 bit private key */ - NEED_KEY_1024, /**< Object is required, and must be a 1024 bit public key */ - NEED_KEY, /**< Object is required, and must be a public key. */ - OBJ_OK, /**< Object is optional. */ -} obj_syntax; - -#define AT_START 1 -#define AT_END 2 - -/** Determines the parsing rules for a single token type. */ -typedef struct token_rule_t { - /** The string value of the keyword identifying the type of item. */ - const char *t; - /** The corresponding directory_keyword enum. */ - directory_keyword v; - /** Minimum number of arguments for this item */ - int min_args; - /** Maximum number of arguments for this item */ - int max_args; - /** If true, we concatenate all arguments for this item into a single - * string. */ - int concat_args; - /** Requirements on object syntax for this item. */ - obj_syntax os; - /** Lowest number of times this item may appear in a document. */ - int min_cnt; - /** Highest number of times this item may appear in a document. */ - int max_cnt; - /** One or more of AT_START/AT_END to limit where the item may appear in a - * document. */ - int pos; - /** True iff this token is an annotation. */ - int is_annotation; -} token_rule_t; - -/* - * Helper macros to define token tables. 's' is a string, 't' is a - * directory_keyword, 'a' is a trio of argument multiplicities, and 'o' is an - * object syntax. - * - */ - -/** Appears to indicate the end of a table. */ -#define END_OF_TABLE { NULL, NIL_, 0,0,0, NO_OBJ, 0, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } -/** An item with no restrictions: used for obsolete document types */ -#define T(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } -/** An item with no restrictions on multiplicity or location. */ -#define T0N(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } -/** An item that must appear exactly once */ -#define T1(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, 1, 0, 0 } -/** An item that must appear exactly once, at the start of the document */ -#define T1_START(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, 1, AT_START, 0 } -/** An item that must appear exactly once, at the end of the document */ -#define T1_END(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, 1, AT_END, 0 } -/** An item that must appear one or more times */ -#define T1N(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 1, INT_MAX, 0, 0 } -/** An item that must appear no more than once */ -#define T01(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, 1, 0, 0 } -/** An annotation that must appear no more than once */ -#define A01(s,t,a,o) { s, t, a, o, 0, 1, 0, 1 } - -/* Argument multiplicity: any number of arguments. */ -#define ARGS 0,INT_MAX,0 -/* Argument multiplicity: no arguments. */ -#define NO_ARGS 0,0,0 -/* Argument multiplicity: concatenate all arguments. */ -#define CONCAT_ARGS 1,1,1 -/* Argument multiplicity: at least n arguments. */ -#define GE(n) n,INT_MAX,0 -/* Argument multiplicity: exactly n arguments. */ -#define EQ(n) n,n,0 - /** List of tokens recognized in router descriptors */ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = { T0N("reject", K_REJECT, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), @@ -556,28 +304,8 @@ static int router_get_hashes_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, common_digests_t *digests, const char *start_str, const char *end_str, char end_char); -static void token_clear(directory_token_t *tok); -static smartlist_t *find_all_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword k); static smartlist_t *find_all_exitpolicy(smartlist_t *s); -static directory_token_t *find_by_keyword_(smartlist_t *s, - directory_keyword keyword, - const char *keyword_str); -#define find_by_keyword(s, keyword) find_by_keyword_((s), (keyword), #keyword) -static directory_token_t *find_opt_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, - directory_keyword keyword); - -#define TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK 1 -#define TS_NOCHECK 2 -#define TS_NO_NEW_ANNOTATIONS 4 -static int tokenize_string(memarea_t *area, - const char *start, const char *end, - smartlist_t *out, - token_rule_t *table, - int flags); -static directory_token_t *get_next_token(memarea_t *area, - const char **s, - const char *eos, - token_rule_t *table); + #define CST_CHECK_AUTHORITY (1<<0) #define CST_NO_CHECK_OBJTYPE (1<<1) static int check_signature_token(const char *digest, @@ -4636,445 +4364,6 @@ assert_addr_policy_ok(smartlist_t *lst) }); } -/* - * Low-level tokenizer for router descriptors and directories. - */ - -/** Free all resources allocated for tok */ -static void -token_clear(directory_token_t *tok) -{ - if (tok->key) - crypto_pk_free(tok->key); -} - -#define ALLOC_ZERO(sz) memarea_alloc_zero(area,sz) -#define ALLOC(sz) memarea_alloc(area,sz) -#define STRDUP(str) memarea_strdup(area,str) -#define STRNDUP(str,n) memarea_strndup(area,(str),(n)) - -#define RET_ERR(msg) \ - STMT_BEGIN \ - if (tok) token_clear(tok); \ - tok = ALLOC_ZERO(sizeof(directory_token_t)); \ - tok->tp = ERR_; \ - tok->error = STRDUP(msg); \ - goto done_tokenizing; \ - STMT_END - -/** Helper: make sure that the token tok with keyword kwd obeys - * the object syntax of o_syn. Allocate all storage in area. - * Return tok on success, or a new ERR_ token if the token didn't - * conform to the syntax we wanted. - **/ -static inline directory_token_t * -token_check_object(memarea_t *area, const char *kwd, - directory_token_t *tok, obj_syntax o_syn) -{ - char ebuf[128]; - switch (o_syn) { - case NO_OBJ: - /* No object is allowed for this token. */ - if (tok->object_body) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Unexpected object for %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - if (tok->key) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Unexpected public key for %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - break; - case NEED_OBJ: - /* There must be a (non-key) object. */ - if (!tok->object_body) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Missing object for %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - break; - case NEED_KEY_1024: /* There must be a 1024-bit public key. */ - case NEED_SKEY_1024: /* There must be a 1024-bit private key. */ - if (tok->key && crypto_pk_num_bits(tok->key) != PK_BYTES*8) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Wrong size on key for %s: %d bits", - kwd, crypto_pk_num_bits(tok->key)); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - /* fall through */ - case NEED_KEY: /* There must be some kind of key. */ - if (!tok->key) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Missing public key for %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - if (o_syn != NEED_SKEY_1024) { - if (crypto_pk_key_is_private(tok->key)) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), - "Private key given for %s, which wants a public key", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - } else { /* o_syn == NEED_SKEY_1024 */ - if (!crypto_pk_key_is_private(tok->key)) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), - "Public key given for %s, which wants a private key", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - } - break; - case OBJ_OK: - /* Anything goes with this token. */ - break; - } - - done_tokenizing: - return tok; -} - -/** Helper: parse space-separated arguments from the string s ending at - * eol, and store them in the args field of tok. Store the - * number of parsed elements into the n_args field of tok. Allocate - * all storage in area. Return the number of arguments parsed, or - * return -1 if there was an insanely high number of arguments. */ -static inline int -get_token_arguments(memarea_t *area, directory_token_t *tok, - const char *s, const char *eol) -{ -/** Largest number of arguments we'll accept to any token, ever. */ -#define MAX_ARGS 512 - char *mem = memarea_strndup(area, s, eol-s); - char *cp = mem; - int j = 0; - char *args[MAX_ARGS]; - while (*cp) { - if (j == MAX_ARGS) - return -1; - args[j++] = cp; - cp = (char*)find_whitespace(cp); - if (!cp || !*cp) - break; /* End of the line. */ - *cp++ = '\0'; - cp = (char*)eat_whitespace(cp); - } - tok->n_args = j; - tok->args = memarea_memdup(area, args, j*sizeof(char*)); - return j; -#undef MAX_ARGS -} - -/** Helper function: read the next token from *s, advance *s to the end of the - * token, and return the parsed token. Parse *s according to the list - * of tokens in table. - */ -static directory_token_t * -get_next_token(memarea_t *area, - const char **s, const char *eos, token_rule_t *table) -{ - /** Reject any object at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an - * attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */ -#define MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE (128*1024) - /** Reject any line at least this big; it is probably an overflow, an - * attack, a bug, or some other nonsense. */ -#define MAX_LINE_LENGTH (128*1024) - - const char *next, *eol, *obstart; - size_t obname_len; - int i; - directory_token_t *tok; - obj_syntax o_syn = NO_OBJ; - char ebuf[128]; - const char *kwd = ""; - - tor_assert(area); - tok = ALLOC_ZERO(sizeof(directory_token_t)); - tok->tp = ERR_; - - /* Set *s to first token, eol to end-of-line, next to after first token */ - *s = eat_whitespace_eos(*s, eos); /* eat multi-line whitespace */ - tor_assert(eos >= *s); - eol = memchr(*s, '\n', eos-*s); - if (!eol) - eol = eos; - if (eol - *s > MAX_LINE_LENGTH) { - RET_ERR("Line far too long"); - } - - next = find_whitespace_eos(*s, eol); - - if (!strcmp_len(*s, "opt", next-*s)) { - /* Skip past an "opt" at the start of the line. */ - *s = eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(next, eol); - next = find_whitespace_eos(*s, eol); - } else if (*s == eos) { /* If no "opt", and end-of-line, line is invalid */ - RET_ERR("Unexpected EOF"); - } - - /* Search the table for the appropriate entry. (I tried a binary search - * instead, but it wasn't any faster.) */ - for (i = 0; table[i].t ; ++i) { - if (!strcmp_len(*s, table[i].t, next-*s)) { - /* We've found the keyword. */ - kwd = table[i].t; - tok->tp = table[i].v; - o_syn = table[i].os; - *s = eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(next, eol); - /* We go ahead whether there are arguments or not, so that tok->args is - * always set if we want arguments. */ - if (table[i].concat_args) { - /* The keyword takes the line as a single argument */ - tok->args = ALLOC(sizeof(char*)); - tok->args[0] = STRNDUP(*s,eol-*s); /* Grab everything on line */ - tok->n_args = 1; - } else { - /* This keyword takes multiple arguments. */ - if (get_token_arguments(area, tok, *s, eol)<0) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf),"Far too many arguments to %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - *s = eol; - } - if (tok->n_args < table[i].min_args) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Too few arguments to %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } else if (tok->n_args > table[i].max_args) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Too many arguments to %s", kwd); - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - break; - } - } - - if (tok->tp == ERR_) { - /* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */ - if (**s == '@') - tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_; - else - tok->tp = K_OPT; - tok->args = ALLOC(sizeof(char*)); - tok->args[0] = STRNDUP(*s, eol-*s); - tok->n_args = 1; - o_syn = OBJ_OK; - } - - /* Check whether there's an object present */ - *s = eat_whitespace_eos(eol, eos); /* Scan from end of first line */ - tor_assert(eos >= *s); - eol = memchr(*s, '\n', eos-*s); - if (!eol || eol-*s<11 || strcmpstart(*s, "-----BEGIN ")) /* No object. */ - goto check_object; - - obstart = *s; /* Set obstart to start of object spec */ - if (*s+16 >= eol || memchr(*s+11,'\0',eol-*s-16) || /* no short lines, */ - strcmp_len(eol-5, "-----", 5) || /* nuls or invalid endings */ - (eol-*s) > MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE) { /* name too long */ - RET_ERR("Malformed object: bad begin line"); - } - tok->object_type = STRNDUP(*s+11, eol-*s-16); - obname_len = eol-*s-16; /* store objname length here to avoid a strlen() */ - *s = eol+1; /* Set *s to possible start of object data (could be eos) */ - - /* Go to the end of the object */ - next = tor_memstr(*s, eos-*s, "-----END "); - if (!next) { - RET_ERR("Malformed object: missing object end line"); - } - tor_assert(eos >= next); - eol = memchr(next, '\n', eos-next); - if (!eol) /* end-of-line marker, or eos if there's no '\n' */ - eol = eos; - /* Validate the ending tag, which should be 9 + NAME + 5 + eol */ - if ((size_t)(eol-next) != 9+obname_len+5 || - strcmp_len(next+9, tok->object_type, obname_len) || - strcmp_len(eol-5, "-----", 5)) { - tor_snprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), "Malformed object: mismatched end tag %s", - tok->object_type); - ebuf[sizeof(ebuf)-1] = '\0'; - RET_ERR(ebuf); - } - if (next - *s > MAX_UNPARSED_OBJECT_SIZE) - RET_ERR("Couldn't parse object: missing footer or object much too big."); - - if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PUBLIC KEY")) { /* If it's a public key */ - tok->key = crypto_pk_new(); - if (crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart)) - RET_ERR("Couldn't parse public key."); - } else if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PRIVATE KEY")) { /* private key */ - tok->key = crypto_pk_new(); - if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart)) - RET_ERR("Couldn't parse private key."); - } else { /* If it's something else, try to base64-decode it */ - int r; - tok->object_body = ALLOC(next-*s); /* really, this is too much RAM. */ - r = base64_decode(tok->object_body, next-*s, *s, next-*s); - if (r<0) - RET_ERR("Malformed object: bad base64-encoded data"); - tok->object_size = r; - } - *s = eol; - - check_object: - tok = token_check_object(area, kwd, tok, o_syn); - - done_tokenizing: - return tok; - -#undef RET_ERR -#undef ALLOC -#undef ALLOC_ZERO -#undef STRDUP -#undef STRNDUP -} - -/** Read all tokens from a string between start and end, and add - * them to out. Parse according to the token rules in table. - * Caller must free tokens in out. If end is NULL, use the - * entire string. - */ -static int -tokenize_string(memarea_t *area, - const char *start, const char *end, smartlist_t *out, - token_rule_t *table, int flags) -{ - const char **s; - directory_token_t *tok = NULL; - int counts[NIL_]; - int i; - int first_nonannotation; - int prev_len = smartlist_len(out); - tor_assert(area); - - s = &start; - if (!end) { - end = start+strlen(start); - } else { - /* it's only meaningful to check for nuls if we got an end-of-string ptr */ - if (memchr(start, '\0', end-start)) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: internal NUL character."); - return -1; - } - } - for (i = 0; i < NIL_; ++i) - counts[i] = 0; - - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(out, const directory_token_t *, t, ++counts[t->tp]); - - while (*s < end && (!tok || tok->tp != EOF_)) { - tok = get_next_token(area, s, end, table); - if (tok->tp == ERR_) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: %s", tok->error); - token_clear(tok); - return -1; - } - ++counts[tok->tp]; - smartlist_add(out, tok); - *s = eat_whitespace_eos(*s, end); - } - - if (flags & TS_NOCHECK) - return 0; - - if ((flags & TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK)) { - first_nonannotation = -1; - for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(out); ++i) { - tok = smartlist_get(out, i); - if (tok->tp < MIN_ANNOTATION || tok->tp > MAX_ANNOTATION) { - first_nonannotation = i; - break; - } - } - if (first_nonannotation < 0) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: item contains only annotations"); - return -1; - } - for (i=first_nonannotation; i < smartlist_len(out); ++i) { - tok = smartlist_get(out, i); - if (tok->tp >= MIN_ANNOTATION && tok->tp <= MAX_ANNOTATION) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: Annotations mixed with keywords"); - return -1; - } - } - if ((flags & TS_NO_NEW_ANNOTATIONS)) { - if (first_nonannotation != prev_len) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: Unexpected annotations."); - return -1; - } - } - } else { - for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(out); ++i) { - tok = smartlist_get(out, i); - if (tok->tp >= MIN_ANNOTATION && tok->tp <= MAX_ANNOTATION) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "parse error: no annotations allowed."); - return -1; - } - } - first_nonannotation = 0; - } - for (i = 0; table[i].t; ++i) { - if (counts[table[i].v] < table[i].min_cnt) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: missing %s element.", table[i].t); - return -1; - } - if (counts[table[i].v] > table[i].max_cnt) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: too many %s elements.", table[i].t); - return -1; - } - if (table[i].pos & AT_START) { - if (smartlist_len(out) < 1 || - (tok = smartlist_get(out, first_nonannotation))->tp != table[i].v) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: first item is not %s.", table[i].t); - return -1; - } - } - if (table[i].pos & AT_END) { - if (smartlist_len(out) < 1 || - (tok = smartlist_get(out, smartlist_len(out)-1))->tp != table[i].v) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Parse error: last item is not %s.", table[i].t); - return -1; - } - } - } - return 0; -} - -/** Find the first token in s whose keyword is keyword; return - * NULL if no such keyword is found. - */ -static directory_token_t * -find_opt_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword keyword) -{ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s, directory_token_t *, t, if (t->tp == keyword) return t); - return NULL; -} - -/** Find the first token in s whose keyword is keyword; fail - * with an assert if no such keyword is found. - */ -static directory_token_t * -find_by_keyword_(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword keyword, - const char *keyword_as_string) -{ - directory_token_t *tok = find_opt_by_keyword(s, keyword); - if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tok)) { - log_err(LD_BUG, "Missing %s [%d] in directory object that should have " - "been validated. Internal error.", keyword_as_string, (int)keyword); - tor_assert(tok); - } - return tok; -} - -/** If there are any directory_token_t entries in s whose keyword is - * k, return a newly allocated smartlist_t containing all such entries, - * in the same order in which they occur in s. Otherwise return - * NULL. */ -static smartlist_t * -find_all_by_keyword(smartlist_t *s, directory_keyword k) -{ - smartlist_t *out = NULL; - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s, directory_token_t *, t, - if (t->tp == k) { - if (!out) - out = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_add(out, t); - }); - return out; -} - /** Return a newly allocated smartlist of all accept or reject tokens in * s. */

1 0

[tor/master] test: Add prop224 directory cache unit tests
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 1aeaba4906d9f0d8901f3ef928f2cbcd049f1140 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 10 16:40:06 2016 -0400 test: Add prop224 directory cache unit tests Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/hs_cache.c | 5 +- src/or/hs_cache.h | 6 + src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 1 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_hs_cache.c | 293 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 306 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_cache.c b/src/or/hs_cache.c index c2e2914..40730bd 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cache.c +++ b/src/or/hs_cache.c @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ * \brief Handle hidden service descriptor caches. **/ +/* For unit tests.*/ +#define HS_CACHE_PRIVATE + #include "hs_cache.h" #include "or.h" @@ -178,7 +181,7 @@ err: * global_cutoff value. If global_cutoff is 0, the cleaning * process will use the lifetime found in the plaintext data section. Return * the number of bytes cleaned. */ -static size_t +STATIC size_t cache_clean_v3_as_dir(time_t now, time_t global_cutoff) { size_t bytes_removed = 0; diff --git a/src/or/hs_cache.h b/src/or/hs_cache.h index 3432d61..f057317 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_cache.h +++ b/src/or/hs_cache.h @@ -50,4 +50,10 @@ int hs_cache_store_as_dir(const char *desc); int hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(uint32_t version, const char *query, char **desc_out); +#ifdef HS_CACHE_PRIVATE + +STATIC size_t cache_clean_v3_as_dir(time_t now, time_t global_cutoff); + +#endif /* HS_CACHE_PRIVATE */ + #endif /* TOR_HS_CACHE_H */ diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 79e4239..f3d0015 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES = \ src/test/test_extorport.c \ src/test/test_hs.c \ src/test/test_handles.c \ + src/test/test_hs_cache.c \ src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c \ src/test/test_introduce.c \ src/test/test_keypin.c \ diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index a81fbc8..2d3f07e 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -1205,6 +1205,7 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "guardfraction/", guardfraction_tests }, { "extorport/", extorport_tests }, { "hs/", hs_tests }, + { "hs_cache/", hs_cache }, { "hs_descriptor/", hs_descriptor }, { "introduce/", introduce_tests }, { "keypin/", keypin_tests }, diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h index 98b85b3..764b8b6 100644 --- a/src/test/test.h +++ b/src/test/test.h @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t guardfraction_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t extorport_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t hs_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t hs_cache[]; extern struct testcase_t hs_descriptor[]; extern struct testcase_t introduce_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t keypin_tests[]; diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee20225 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file test_hs_cache.c + * \brief Test hidden service caches. + */ + +#define HS_CACHE_PRIVATE + +#include "ed25519_cert.h" +#include "hs_cache.h" +#include "rendcache.h" +#include "test.h" + +/* Build an intro point using a blinded key and an address. */ +static hs_desc_intro_point_t * +helper_build_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *blinded_kp, + const char *addr) +{ + int ret; + ed25519_keypair_t auth_kp; + hs_desc_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL; + hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ip)); + ip->link_specifiers = smartlist_new(); + + { + hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ls)); + ls->u.ap.port = 9001; + int family = tor_addr_parse(&ls->u.ap.addr, addr); + switch (family) { + case AF_INET: + ls->type = LS_IPV4; + break; + case AF_INET6: + ls->type = LS_IPV6; + break; + default: + /* Stop the test, not suppose to have an error. */ + tt_int_op(family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + } + smartlist_add(ip->link_specifiers, ls); + } + + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&auth_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ip->auth_key_cert = tor_cert_create(blinded_kp, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, + &auth_kp.pubkey, time(NULL), + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME, + CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + tt_assert(ip->auth_key_cert); + + ret = curve25519_keypair_generate(&ip->enc_key.curve25519, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ip->enc_key_type = HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519; + intro_point = ip; +done: + return intro_point; +} + +/* Return a valid hs_descriptor_t object. */ +static hs_descriptor_t * +helper_build_hs_desc(uint64_t revision_counter, uint32_t lifetime, + ed25519_keypair_t *blinded_kp) +{ + int ret; + hs_descriptor_t *descp = NULL, *desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*desc)); + + desc->plaintext_data.version = HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MAX; + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + if (blinded_kp) { + memcpy(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, blinded_kp, + sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t)); + } else { + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + } + + desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert = + tor_cert_create(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, + CERT_TYPE_HS_DESC_SIGN, + &desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp.pubkey, time(NULL), + 3600, CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + tt_assert(desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert); + desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter = revision_counter; + desc->plaintext_data.lifetime_sec = lifetime; + + /* Setup encrypted data section. */ + desc->encrypted_data.create2_ntor = 1; + desc->encrypted_data.auth_types = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.auth_types, strdup("ed25519")); + desc->encrypted_data.intro_points = smartlist_new(); + /* Add an intro point. */ + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + helper_build_intro_point(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, + "1.2.3.4")); + + descp = desc; +done: + return descp; +} + +/* Static variable used to encoded the HSDir query. */ +static char query_b64[256]; + +/* Build an HSDir query using a ed25519 keypair. */ +static const char * +helper_get_hsdir_query(const hs_descriptor_t *desc) +{ + ed25519_public_to_base64(query_b64, + &desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp.pubkey); + return query_b64; +} + +static void +init_test(void) +{ + /* Always needed. Initialize the subsystem. */ + hs_cache_init(); + /* We need the v2 cache since our OOM and cache cleanup does poke at it. */ + rend_cache_init(); +} + +static void +test_directory(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + size_t oom_size; + char *desc_out, *desc1_str; + hs_descriptor_t *desc1; + + (void) arg; + + init_test(); + /* Generate a valid descriptor with normal values. */ + desc1 = helper_build_hs_desc(42, 3 * 60 * 60, NULL); + tt_assert(desc1); + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc1, &desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* Very first basic test, should be able to be stored, survive a + * clean, found with a lookup and then cleaned by our OOM. */ + { + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Re-add, it should fail since we already have it. */ + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + /* Try to clean now which should be fine, there is at worst few seconds + * between the store and this call. */ + hs_cache_clean_as_dir(time(NULL)); + /* We should find it in our cache. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), &desc_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_str_op(desc_out, OP_EQ, desc1_str); + tor_free(desc_out); + /* Tell our OOM to run and to at least remove a byte which will result in + * removing the descriptor from our cache. */ + oom_size = hs_cache_handle_oom(time(NULL), 1); + tt_int_op(oom_size, >=, 1); + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + } + + /* Store two descriptors and remove the expiring one only. */ + { + hs_descriptor_t *desc_zero_lifetime = helper_build_hs_desc(1, 0, NULL); + tt_assert(desc_zero_lifetime); + char *desc_zero_lifetime_str; + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc_zero_lifetime, + &desc_zero_lifetime_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(desc_zero_lifetime_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* This one should clear out our zero lifetime desc. */ + hs_cache_clean_as_dir(time(NULL)); + /* We should find desc1 in our cache. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), &desc_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_str_op(desc_out, OP_EQ, desc1_str); + tor_free(desc_out); + /* We should NOT find our zero lifetime desc in our cache. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, + helper_get_hsdir_query(desc_zero_lifetime), + NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Cleanup our entire cache. */ + oom_size = hs_cache_handle_oom(time(NULL), 1); + tt_int_op(oom_size, >=, 1); + } + + /* Throw junk at it. */ + { + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir("blah"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + /* Poor attempt at tricking the decoding. */ + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir("hs-descriptor 3\nJUNK"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + /* Undecodable base64 query. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, "blah", NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + /* Decodable base64 query but wrong ed25519 size. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, "dW5pY29ybg==", NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Test descriptor replacement with revision counter. */ + { + char *new_desc_str; + + /* Add a descriptor. */ + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), &desc_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tor_free(desc_out); + /* Bump revision counter. */ + desc1->plaintext_data.revision_counter++; + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc1, &new_desc_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(new_desc_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Look it up, it should have been replaced. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), &desc_out); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + tt_str_op(desc_out, OP_EQ, new_desc_str); + tor_free(desc_out); + tor_free(new_desc_str); + } + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_clean_as_dir(void *arg) +{ + size_t ret; + char *desc1_str = NULL; + time_t now = time(NULL); + hs_descriptor_t *desc1 = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + init_test(); + + /* Generate a valid descriptor with values. */ + desc1 = helper_build_hs_desc(42, 3 * 60 * 60, NULL); + tt_assert(desc1); + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc1, &desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + ret = hs_cache_store_as_dir(desc1_str); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + /* With the lifetime being 3 hours, a cleanup shouldn't remove it. */ + ret = cache_clean_v3_as_dir(now, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + /* Should be present after clean up. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + /* Set a cutoff 100 seconds in the past. It should not remove the entry + * since the entry is still recent enough. */ + ret = cache_clean_v3_as_dir(now, now - 100); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + /* Should be present after clean up. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + /* Set a cutoff of 100 seconds in the future. It should remove the entry + * that we've just added since it's not too old for the cutoff. */ + ret = cache_clean_v3_as_dir(now, now + 100); + tt_int_op(ret, >, 0); + /* Shouldn't be present after clean up. */ + ret = hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(3, helper_get_hsdir_query(desc1), NULL); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + hs_descriptor_free(desc1); + tor_free(desc1_str); +} + +struct testcase_t hs_cache[] = { + /* Encoding tests. */ + { "directory", test_directory, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "clean_as_dir", test_clean_as_dir, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + + END_OF_TESTCASES +};

1 0

[tor/master] trunnel: Uncomment link_specifier so we can use it
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 15f3563f1b9af67897fa050122cde22b5bd293de Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Thu Mar 10 17:52:36 2016 -0500 trunnel: Uncomment link_specifier so we can use it Also add a trunnel definition for link_specifier_list Signed-off-by: John Brooks <special(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c | 831 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h | 260 ++++++++++++ src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel | 7 +- 3 files changed, 1097 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c index f495743..dc1485d 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c +++ b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.c @@ -410,6 +410,557 @@ ed25519_cert_extension_parse(ed25519_cert_extension_t **output, const uint8_t *i } return result; } +link_specifier_t * +link_specifier_new(void) +{ + link_specifier_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(link_specifier_t)); + if (NULL == val) + return NULL; + return val; +} + +/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'. + */ +static void +link_specifier_clear(link_specifier_t *obj) +{ + (void) obj; + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->un_unrecognized); + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->un_unrecognized); +} + +void +link_specifier_free(link_specifier_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return; + link_specifier_clear(obj); + trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(link_specifier_t)); + trunnel_free_(obj); +} + +uint8_t +link_specifier_get_ls_type(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->ls_type; +} +int +link_specifier_set_ls_type(link_specifier_t *inp, uint8_t val) +{ + inp->ls_type = val; + return 0; +} +uint8_t +link_specifier_get_ls_len(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->ls_len; +} +int +link_specifier_set_ls_len(link_specifier_t *inp, uint8_t val) +{ + inp->ls_len = val; + return 0; +} +uint32_t +link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_ipv4_addr; +} +int +link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_addr(link_specifier_t *inp, uint32_t val) +{ + inp->un_ipv4_addr = val; + return 0; +} +uint16_t +link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_ipv4_port; +} +int +link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_port(link_specifier_t *inp, uint16_t val) +{ + inp->un_ipv4_port = val; + return 0; +} +size_t +link_specifier_getlen_un_ipv6_addr(const link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + (void)inp; return 16; +} + +uint8_t +link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_addr(const link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < 16); + return inp->un_ipv6_addr[idx]; +} + +int +link_specifier_set_un_ipv6_addr(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < 16); + inp->un_ipv6_addr[idx] = elt; + return 0; +} + +uint8_t * +link_specifier_getarray_un_ipv6_addr(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_ipv6_addr; +} +uint16_t +link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_ipv6_port; +} +int +link_specifier_set_un_ipv6_port(link_specifier_t *inp, uint16_t val) +{ + inp->un_ipv6_port = val; + return 0; +} +size_t +link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(const link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + (void)inp; return 20; +} + +uint8_t +link_specifier_get_un_legacy_id(const link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < 20); + return inp->un_legacy_id[idx]; +} + +int +link_specifier_set_un_legacy_id(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < 20); + inp->un_legacy_id[idx] = elt; + return 0; +} + +uint8_t * +link_specifier_getarray_un_legacy_id(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_legacy_id; +} +size_t +link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(const link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + (void)inp; return 32; +} + +uint8_t +link_specifier_get_un_ed25519_id(const link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < 32); + return inp->un_ed25519_id[idx]; +} + +int +link_specifier_set_un_ed25519_id(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + trunnel_assert(idx < 32); + inp->un_ed25519_id[idx] = elt; + return 0; +} + +uint8_t * +link_specifier_getarray_un_ed25519_id(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_ed25519_id; +} +size_t +link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(const link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->un_unrecognized); +} + +uint8_t +link_specifier_get_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->un_unrecognized, idx); +} + +int +link_specifier_set_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt) +{ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->un_unrecognized, idx, elt); + return 0; +} +int +link_specifier_add_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, uint8_t elt) +{ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(uint8_t, &inp->un_unrecognized, elt, {}); + return 0; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); + return -1; +} + +uint8_t * +link_specifier_getarray_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp) +{ + return inp->un_unrecognized.elts_; +} +int +link_specifier_setlen_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t newlen) +{ + uint8_t *newptr; + newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->un_unrecognized.allocated_, + &inp->un_unrecognized.n_, inp->un_unrecognized.elts_, newlen, + sizeof(inp->un_unrecognized.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) NULL, + &inp->trunnel_error_code_); + if (newptr == NULL) + goto trunnel_alloc_failed; + inp->un_unrecognized.elts_ = newptr; + return 0; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); + return -1; +} +const char * +link_specifier_check(const link_specifier_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return "Object was NULL"; + if (obj->trunnel_error_code_) + return "A set function failed on this object"; + switch (obj->ls_type) { + + case LS_IPV4: + break; + + case LS_IPV6: + break; + + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + break; + + case LS_ED25519_ID: + break; + + default: + break; + } + return NULL; +} + +ssize_t +link_specifier_encoded_len(const link_specifier_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + + if (NULL != link_specifier_check(obj)) + return -1; + + + /* Length of u8 ls_type */ + result += 1; + + /* Length of u8 ls_len */ + result += 1; + switch (obj->ls_type) { + + case LS_IPV4: + + /* Length of u32 un_ipv4_addr */ + result += 4; + + /* Length of u16 un_ipv4_port */ + result += 2; + break; + + case LS_IPV6: + + /* Length of u8 un_ipv6_addr[16] */ + result += 16; + + /* Length of u16 un_ipv6_port */ + result += 2; + break; + + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + + /* Length of u8 un_legacy_id[20] */ + result += 20; + break; + + case LS_ED25519_ID: + + /* Length of u8 un_ed25519_id[32] */ + result += 32; + break; + + default: + + /* Length of u8 un_unrecognized[] */ + result += TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->un_unrecognized); + break; + } + return result; +} +int +link_specifier_clear_errors(link_specifier_t *obj) +{ + int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_; + obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0; + return r; +} +ssize_t +link_specifier_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const link_specifier_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + size_t written = 0; + uint8_t *ptr = output; + const char *msg; +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + const ssize_t encoded_len = link_specifier_encoded_len(obj); +#endif + + uint8_t *backptr_ls_len = NULL; + + if (NULL != (msg = link_specifier_check(obj))) + goto check_failed; + +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); +#endif + + /* Encode u8 ls_type */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 1) + goto truncated; + trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->ls_type)); + written += 1; ptr += 1; + + /* Encode u8 ls_len */ + backptr_ls_len = ptr; + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 1) + goto truncated; + trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->ls_len)); + written += 1; ptr += 1; + { + size_t written_before_union = written; + + /* Encode union un[ls_type] */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + switch (obj->ls_type) { + + case LS_IPV4: + + /* Encode u32 un_ipv4_addr */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 4) + goto truncated; + trunnel_set_uint32(ptr, trunnel_htonl(obj->un_ipv4_addr)); + written += 4; ptr += 4; + + /* Encode u16 un_ipv4_port */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 2) + goto truncated; + trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->un_ipv4_port)); + written += 2; ptr += 2; + break; + + case LS_IPV6: + + /* Encode u8 un_ipv6_addr[16] */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 16) + goto truncated; + memcpy(ptr, obj->un_ipv6_addr, 16); + written += 16; ptr += 16; + + /* Encode u16 un_ipv6_port */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 2) + goto truncated; + trunnel_set_uint16(ptr, trunnel_htons(obj->un_ipv6_port)); + written += 2; ptr += 2; + break; + + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + + /* Encode u8 un_legacy_id[20] */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 20) + goto truncated; + memcpy(ptr, obj->un_legacy_id, 20); + written += 20; ptr += 20; + break; + + case LS_ED25519_ID: + + /* Encode u8 un_ed25519_id[32] */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 32) + goto truncated; + memcpy(ptr, obj->un_ed25519_id, 32); + written += 32; ptr += 32; + break; + + default: + + /* Encode u8 un_unrecognized[] */ + { + size_t elt_len = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->un_unrecognized); + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < elt_len) + goto truncated; + if (elt_len) + memcpy(ptr, obj->un_unrecognized.elts_, elt_len); + written += elt_len; ptr += elt_len; + } + break; + } + /* Write the length field back to ls_len */ + trunnel_assert(written >= written_before_union); +#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX + if (written - written_before_union > UINT8_MAX) + goto check_failed; +#endif + trunnel_set_uint8(backptr_ls_len, (written - written_before_union)); + } + + + trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written); +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + { + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); + trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written); + } + +#endif + + return written; + + truncated: + result = -2; + goto fail; + check_failed: + (void)msg; + result = -1; + goto fail; + fail: + trunnel_assert(result < 0); + return result; +} + +/** As link_specifier_parse(), but do not allocate the output object. + */ +static ssize_t +link_specifier_parse_into(link_specifier_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + const uint8_t *ptr = input; + size_t remaining = len_in; + ssize_t result = 0; + (void)result; + + /* Parse u8 ls_type */ + CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated); + obj->ls_type = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr)); + remaining -= 1; ptr += 1; + + /* Parse u8 ls_len */ + CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated); + obj->ls_len = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr)); + remaining -= 1; ptr += 1; + { + size_t remaining_after; + CHECK_REMAINING(obj->ls_len, truncated); + remaining_after = remaining - obj->ls_len; + remaining = obj->ls_len; + + /* Parse union un[ls_type] */ + switch (obj->ls_type) { + + case LS_IPV4: + + /* Parse u32 un_ipv4_addr */ + CHECK_REMAINING(4, fail); + obj->un_ipv4_addr = trunnel_ntohl(trunnel_get_uint32(ptr)); + remaining -= 4; ptr += 4; + + /* Parse u16 un_ipv4_port */ + CHECK_REMAINING(2, fail); + obj->un_ipv4_port = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr)); + remaining -= 2; ptr += 2; + break; + + case LS_IPV6: + + /* Parse u8 un_ipv6_addr[16] */ + CHECK_REMAINING(16, fail); + memcpy(obj->un_ipv6_addr, ptr, 16); + remaining -= 16; ptr += 16; + + /* Parse u16 un_ipv6_port */ + CHECK_REMAINING(2, fail); + obj->un_ipv6_port = trunnel_ntohs(trunnel_get_uint16(ptr)); + remaining -= 2; ptr += 2; + break; + + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + + /* Parse u8 un_legacy_id[20] */ + CHECK_REMAINING(20, fail); + memcpy(obj->un_legacy_id, ptr, 20); + remaining -= 20; ptr += 20; + break; + + case LS_ED25519_ID: + + /* Parse u8 un_ed25519_id[32] */ + CHECK_REMAINING(32, fail); + memcpy(obj->un_ed25519_id, ptr, 32); + remaining -= 32; ptr += 32; + break; + + default: + + /* Parse u8 un_unrecognized[] */ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(uint8_t, &obj->un_unrecognized, remaining, {}); + obj->un_unrecognized.n_ = remaining; + if (remaining) + memcpy(obj->un_unrecognized.elts_, ptr, remaining); + ptr += remaining; remaining -= remaining; + break; + } + if (remaining != 0) + goto fail; + remaining = remaining_after; + } + trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in); + return len_in - remaining; + + truncated: + return -2; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + return -1; + fail: + result = -1; + return result; +} + +ssize_t +link_specifier_parse(link_specifier_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + ssize_t result; + *output = link_specifier_new(); + if (NULL == *output) + return -1; + result = link_specifier_parse_into(*output, input, len_in); + if (result < 0) { + link_specifier_free(*output); + *output = NULL; + } + return result; +} ed25519_cert_t * ed25519_cert_new(void) { @@ -887,3 +1438,283 @@ ed25519_cert_parse(ed25519_cert_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t l } return result; } +link_specifier_list_t * +link_specifier_list_new(void) +{ + link_specifier_list_t *val = trunnel_calloc(1, sizeof(link_specifier_list_t)); + if (NULL == val) + return NULL; + return val; +} + +/** Release all storage held inside 'obj', but do not free 'obj'. + */ +static void +link_specifier_list_clear(link_specifier_list_t *obj) +{ + (void) obj; + { + + unsigned idx; + for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->spec); ++idx) { + link_specifier_free(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->spec, idx)); + } + } + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_WIPE(&obj->spec); + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_CLEAR(&obj->spec); +} + +void +link_specifier_list_free(link_specifier_list_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return; + link_specifier_list_clear(obj); + trunnel_memwipe(obj, sizeof(link_specifier_list_t)); + trunnel_free_(obj); +} + +uint8_t +link_specifier_list_get_n_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp) +{ + return inp->n_spec; +} +int +link_specifier_list_set_n_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, uint8_t val) +{ + inp->n_spec = val; + return 0; +} +size_t +link_specifier_list_getlen_spec(const link_specifier_list_t *inp) +{ + return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&inp->spec); +} + +struct link_specifier_st * +link_specifier_list_get_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t idx) +{ + return TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->spec, idx); +} + +int +link_specifier_list_set_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t idx, struct link_specifier_st * elt) +{ + link_specifier_t *oldval = TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&inp->spec, idx); + if (oldval && oldval != elt) + link_specifier_free(oldval); + return link_specifier_list_set0_spec(inp, idx, elt); +} +int +link_specifier_list_set0_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t idx, struct link_specifier_st * elt) +{ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_SET(&inp->spec, idx, elt); + return 0; +} +int +link_specifier_list_add_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, struct link_specifier_st * elt) +{ +#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT8_MAX + if (inp->spec.n_ == UINT8_MAX) + goto trunnel_alloc_failed; +#endif + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(struct link_specifier_st *, &inp->spec, elt, {}); + return 0; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); + return -1; +} + +struct link_specifier_st * * +link_specifier_list_getarray_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp) +{ + return inp->spec.elts_; +} +int +link_specifier_list_setlen_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t newlen) +{ + struct link_specifier_st * *newptr; +#if UINT8_MAX < SIZE_MAX + if (newlen > UINT8_MAX) + goto trunnel_alloc_failed; +#endif + newptr = trunnel_dynarray_setlen(&inp->spec.allocated_, + &inp->spec.n_, inp->spec.elts_, newlen, + sizeof(inp->spec.elts_[0]), (trunnel_free_fn_t) link_specifier_free, + &inp->trunnel_error_code_); + if (newptr == NULL) + goto trunnel_alloc_failed; + inp->spec.elts_ = newptr; + return 0; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + TRUNNEL_SET_ERROR_CODE(inp); + return -1; +} +const char * +link_specifier_list_check(const link_specifier_list_t *obj) +{ + if (obj == NULL) + return "Object was NULL"; + if (obj->trunnel_error_code_) + return "A set function failed on this object"; + { + const char *msg; + + unsigned idx; + for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->spec); ++idx) { + if (NULL != (msg = link_specifier_check(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->spec, idx)))) + return msg; + } + } + if (TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->spec) != obj->n_spec) + return "Length mismatch for spec"; + return NULL; +} + +ssize_t +link_specifier_list_encoded_len(const link_specifier_list_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + + if (NULL != link_specifier_list_check(obj)) + return -1; + + + /* Length of u8 n_spec */ + result += 1; + + /* Length of struct link_specifier spec[n_spec] */ + { + + unsigned idx; + for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->spec); ++idx) { + result += link_specifier_encoded_len(TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->spec, idx)); + } + } + return result; +} +int +link_specifier_list_clear_errors(link_specifier_list_t *obj) +{ + int r = obj->trunnel_error_code_; + obj->trunnel_error_code_ = 0; + return r; +} +ssize_t +link_specifier_list_encode(uint8_t *output, const size_t avail, const link_specifier_list_t *obj) +{ + ssize_t result = 0; + size_t written = 0; + uint8_t *ptr = output; + const char *msg; +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + const ssize_t encoded_len = link_specifier_list_encoded_len(obj); +#endif + + if (NULL != (msg = link_specifier_list_check(obj))) + goto check_failed; + +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); +#endif + + /* Encode u8 n_spec */ + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + if (avail - written < 1) + goto truncated; + trunnel_set_uint8(ptr, (obj->n_spec)); + written += 1; ptr += 1; + + /* Encode struct link_specifier spec[n_spec] */ + { + + unsigned idx; + for (idx = 0; idx < TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_LEN(&obj->spec); ++idx) { + trunnel_assert(written <= avail); + result = link_specifier_encode(ptr, avail - written, TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_GET(&obj->spec, idx)); + if (result < 0) + goto fail; /* XXXXXXX !*/ + written += result; ptr += result; + } + } + + + trunnel_assert(ptr == output + written); +#ifdef TRUNNEL_CHECK_ENCODED_LEN + { + trunnel_assert(encoded_len >= 0); + trunnel_assert((size_t)encoded_len == written); + } + +#endif + + return written; + + truncated: + result = -2; + goto fail; + check_failed: + (void)msg; + result = -1; + goto fail; + fail: + trunnel_assert(result < 0); + return result; +} + +/** As link_specifier_list_parse(), but do not allocate the output + * object. + */ +static ssize_t +link_specifier_list_parse_into(link_specifier_list_t *obj, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + const uint8_t *ptr = input; + size_t remaining = len_in; + ssize_t result = 0; + (void)result; + + /* Parse u8 n_spec */ + CHECK_REMAINING(1, truncated); + obj->n_spec = (trunnel_get_uint8(ptr)); + remaining -= 1; ptr += 1; + + /* Parse struct link_specifier spec[n_spec] */ + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_EXPAND(link_specifier_t *, &obj->spec, obj->n_spec, {}); + { + link_specifier_t * elt; + unsigned idx; + for (idx = 0; idx < obj->n_spec; ++idx) { + result = link_specifier_parse(&elt, ptr, remaining); + if (result < 0) + goto relay_fail; + trunnel_assert((size_t)result <= remaining); + remaining -= result; ptr += result; + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_ADD(link_specifier_t *, &obj->spec, elt, {link_specifier_free(elt);}); + } + } + trunnel_assert(ptr + remaining == input + len_in); + return len_in - remaining; + + truncated: + return -2; + relay_fail: + trunnel_assert(result < 0); + return result; + trunnel_alloc_failed: + return -1; +} + +ssize_t +link_specifier_list_parse(link_specifier_list_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in) +{ + ssize_t result; + *output = link_specifier_list_new(); + if (NULL == *output) + return -1; + result = link_specifier_list_parse_into(*output, input, len_in); + if (result < 0) { + link_specifier_list_free(*output); + *output = NULL; + } + return result; +} diff --git a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h index 75a82d8..1893957 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h +++ b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.h @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ #define CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY 4 #define CERTEXT_FLAG_AFFECTS_VALIDATION 1 +#define LS_IPV4 0 +#define LS_IPV6 1 +#define LS_LEGACY_ID 2 +#define LS_ED25519_ID 3 #if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_ED25519_CERT_EXTENSION) struct ed25519_cert_extension_st { uint16_t ext_length; @@ -21,6 +25,21 @@ struct ed25519_cert_extension_st { }; #endif typedef struct ed25519_cert_extension_st ed25519_cert_extension_t; +#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_LINK_SPECIFIER) +struct link_specifier_st { + uint8_t ls_type; + uint8_t ls_len; + uint32_t un_ipv4_addr; + uint16_t un_ipv4_port; + uint8_t un_ipv6_addr[16]; + uint16_t un_ipv6_port; + uint8_t un_legacy_id[20]; + uint8_t un_ed25519_id[32]; + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, uint8_t) un_unrecognized; + uint8_t trunnel_error_code_; +}; +#endif +typedef struct link_specifier_st link_specifier_t; #if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_ED25519_CERT) struct ed25519_cert_st { uint8_t version; @@ -35,6 +54,14 @@ struct ed25519_cert_st { }; #endif typedef struct ed25519_cert_st ed25519_cert_t; +#if !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE) && !defined(TRUNNEL_OPAQUE_LINK_SPECIFIER_LIST) +struct link_specifier_list_st { + uint8_t n_spec; + TRUNNEL_DYNARRAY_HEAD(, struct link_specifier_st *) spec; + uint8_t trunnel_error_code_; +}; +#endif +typedef struct link_specifier_list_st link_specifier_list_t; /** Return a newly allocated ed25519_cert_extension with all elements * set to zero. */ @@ -141,6 +168,164 @@ uint8_t * ed25519_cert_extension_getarray_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t * * success; return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on failure. */ int ed25519_cert_extension_setlen_un_unparsed(ed25519_cert_extension_t *inp, size_t newlen); +/** Return a newly allocated link_specifier with all elements set to + * zero. + */ +link_specifier_t *link_specifier_new(void); +/** Release all storage held by the link_specifier in 'victim'. (Do + * nothing if 'victim' is NULL.) + */ +void link_specifier_free(link_specifier_t *victim); +/** Try to parse a link_specifier from the buffer in 'input', using up + * to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, return the + * number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly allocated + * link_specifier_t. On failure, return -2 if the input appears + * truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid. + */ +ssize_t link_specifier_parse(link_specifier_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in); +/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the + * link_specifier in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. Note + * that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an + * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects. + */ +ssize_t link_specifier_encoded_len(const link_specifier_t *obj); +/** Try to encode the link_specifier from 'input' into the buffer at + * 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On + * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if + * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid. + */ +ssize_t link_specifier_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const link_specifier_t *input); +/** Check whether the internal state of the link_specifier in 'obj' is + * consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if it is not. + */ +const char *link_specifier_check(const link_specifier_t *obj); +/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter + * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared. + */ +int link_specifier_clear_errors(link_specifier_t *obj); +/** Return the value of the ls_type field of the link_specifier_t in + * 'inp' + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_get_ls_type(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Set the value of the ls_type field of the link_specifier_t in + * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error + * code on 'inp' on failure. + */ +int link_specifier_set_ls_type(link_specifier_t *inp, uint8_t val); +/** Return the value of the ls_len field of the link_specifier_t in + * 'inp' + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_get_ls_len(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Set the value of the ls_len field of the link_specifier_t in 'inp' + * to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on + * 'inp' on failure. + */ +int link_specifier_set_ls_len(link_specifier_t *inp, uint8_t val); +/** Return the value of the un_ipv4_addr field of the link_specifier_t + * in 'inp' + */ +uint32_t link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Set the value of the un_ipv4_addr field of the link_specifier_t in + * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error + * code on 'inp' on failure. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_addr(link_specifier_t *inp, uint32_t val); +/** Return the value of the un_ipv4_port field of the link_specifier_t + * in 'inp' + */ +uint16_t link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Set the value of the un_ipv4_port field of the link_specifier_t in + * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error + * code on 'inp' on failure. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_port(link_specifier_t *inp, uint16_t val); +/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the un_ipv6_addr + * field of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t link_specifier_getlen_un_ipv6_addr(const link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * un_ipv6_addr of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_addr(const link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * un_ipv6_addr of the link_specifier_t in 'inp', so that it will hold + * the value 'elt'. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_ipv6_addr(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the 16-element array field un_ipv6_addr of + * 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * link_specifier_getarray_un_ipv6_addr(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the value of the un_ipv6_port field of the link_specifier_t + * in 'inp' + */ +uint16_t link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Set the value of the un_ipv6_port field of the link_specifier_t in + * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error + * code on 'inp' on failure. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_ipv6_port(link_specifier_t *inp, uint16_t val); +/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the un_legacy_id + * field of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(const link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * un_legacy_id of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_get_un_legacy_id(const link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * un_legacy_id of the link_specifier_t in 'inp', so that it will hold + * the value 'elt'. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_legacy_id(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the 20-element array field un_legacy_id of + * 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * link_specifier_getarray_un_legacy_id(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the (constant) length of the array holding the + * un_ed25519_id field of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t link_specifier_getlen_un_ed25519_id(const link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * un_ed25519_id of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_get_un_ed25519_id(const link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the fixed array field + * un_ed25519_id of the link_specifier_t in 'inp', so that it will + * hold the value 'elt'. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_ed25519_id(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the 32-element array field un_ed25519_id of + * 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * link_specifier_getarray_un_ed25519_id(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the un_unrecognized + * field of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t link_specifier_getlen_un_unrecognized(const link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field + * un_unrecognized of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_get_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field + * un_unrecognized of the link_specifier_t in 'inp', so that it will + * hold the value 'elt'. + */ +int link_specifier_set_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); +/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field + * un_unrecognized of the link_specifier_t in 'inp'. + */ +int link_specifier_add_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, uint8_t elt); +/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field + * un_unrecognized of 'inp'. + */ +uint8_t * link_specifier_getarray_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp); +/** Change the length of the variable-length array field + * un_unrecognized of 'inp' to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with 0. + * Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on + * failure. + */ +int link_specifier_setlen_un_unrecognized(link_specifier_t *inp, size_t newlen); /** Return a newly allocated ed25519_cert with all elements set to * zero. */ @@ -283,6 +468,81 @@ int ed25519_cert_set_signature(ed25519_cert_t *inp, size_t idx, uint8_t elt); /** Return a pointer to the 64-element array field signature of 'inp'. */ uint8_t * ed25519_cert_getarray_signature(ed25519_cert_t *inp); +/** Return a newly allocated link_specifier_list with all elements set + * to zero. + */ +link_specifier_list_t *link_specifier_list_new(void); +/** Release all storage held by the link_specifier_list in 'victim'. + * (Do nothing if 'victim' is NULL.) + */ +void link_specifier_list_free(link_specifier_list_t *victim); +/** Try to parse a link_specifier_list from the buffer in 'input', + * using up to 'len_in' bytes from the input buffer. On success, + * return the number of bytes consumed and set *output to the newly + * allocated link_specifier_list_t. On failure, return -2 if the input + * appears truncated, and -1 if the input is otherwise invalid. + */ +ssize_t link_specifier_list_parse(link_specifier_list_t **output, const uint8_t *input, const size_t len_in); +/** Return the number of bytes we expect to need to encode the + * link_specifier_list in 'obj'. On failure, return a negative value. + * Note that this value may be an overestimate, and can even be an + * underestimate for certain unencodeable objects. + */ +ssize_t link_specifier_list_encoded_len(const link_specifier_list_t *obj); +/** Try to encode the link_specifier_list from 'input' into the buffer + * at 'output', using up to 'avail' bytes of the output buffer. On + * success, return the number of bytes used. On failure, return -2 if + * the buffer was not long enough, and -1 if the input was invalid. + */ +ssize_t link_specifier_list_encode(uint8_t *output, size_t avail, const link_specifier_list_t *input); +/** Check whether the internal state of the link_specifier_list in + * 'obj' is consistent. Return NULL if it is, and a short message if + * it is not. + */ +const char *link_specifier_list_check(const link_specifier_list_t *obj); +/** Clear any errors that were set on the object 'obj' by its setter + * functions. Return true iff errors were cleared. + */ +int link_specifier_list_clear_errors(link_specifier_list_t *obj); +/** Return the value of the n_spec field of the link_specifier_list_t + * in 'inp' + */ +uint8_t link_specifier_list_get_n_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp); +/** Set the value of the n_spec field of the link_specifier_list_t in + * 'inp' to 'val'. Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error + * code on 'inp' on failure. + */ +int link_specifier_list_set_n_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, uint8_t val); +/** Return the length of the dynamic array holding the spec field of + * the link_specifier_list_t in 'inp'. + */ +size_t link_specifier_list_getlen_spec(const link_specifier_list_t *inp); +/** Return the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field + * spec of the link_specifier_list_t in 'inp'. + */ +struct link_specifier_st * link_specifier_list_get_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t idx); +/** Change the element at position 'idx' of the dynamic array field + * spec of the link_specifier_list_t in 'inp', so that it will hold + * the value 'elt'. Free the previous value, if any. + */ +int link_specifier_list_set_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t idx, struct link_specifier_st * elt); +/** As link_specifier_list_set_spec, but does not free the previous + * value. + */ +int link_specifier_list_set0_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t idx, struct link_specifier_st * elt); +/** Append a new element 'elt' to the dynamic array field spec of the + * link_specifier_list_t in 'inp'. + */ +int link_specifier_list_add_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, struct link_specifier_st * elt); +/** Return a pointer to the variable-length array field spec of 'inp'. + */ +struct link_specifier_st * * link_specifier_list_getarray_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp); +/** Change the length of the variable-length array field spec of 'inp' + * to 'newlen'.Fill extra elements with NULL; free removed elements. + * Return 0 on success; return -1 and set the error code on 'inp' on + * failure. + */ +int link_specifier_list_setlen_spec(link_specifier_list_t *inp, size_t newlen); #endif diff --git a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel index c46f1b6..012b2af 100644 --- a/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel +++ b/src/trunnel/ed25519_cert.trunnel @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct auth02_cell { u8 rand[24]; u8 sig[64]; } +*/ const LS_IPV4 = 0x00; const LS_IPV6 = 0x01; @@ -73,4 +74,8 @@ struct link_specifier { default: u8 unrecognized[]; }; } -*/ \ No newline at end of file + +struct link_specifier_list { + u8 n_spec; + struct link_specifier spec[n_spec]; +}

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Directory cache support
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 025610612d78fe0a0ec95dd88c3d44e4bf643603 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Tue Mar 29 15:08:04 2016 -0400 prop224: Directory cache support This implements the proposal 224 directory descriptor cache store and lookup functionalities. Furthermore, it merges the OOM call for the HSDir cache with current protocol v2 and the new upcoming v3. Add hs_cache.{c|h} with store/lookup API. Closes #18572 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/hs_cache.c | 364 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_cache.h | 53 +++++++ src/or/hs_common.h | 2 +- src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 12 ++ src/or/hs_descriptor.h | 2 + src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/main.c | 3 +- src/or/relay.c | 5 +- src/or/rendcache.c | 63 ++++---- src/or/rendcache.h | 13 +- src/test/test_rendcache.c | 36 +---- 11 files changed, 482 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_cache.c b/src/or/hs_cache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2e2914 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_cache.c + * \brief Handle hidden service descriptor caches. + **/ + +#include "hs_cache.h" + +#include "or.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "hs_common.h" +#include "hs_descriptor.h" +#include "rendcache.h" + +/* Directory descriptor cache. Map indexed by blinded key. */ +static digest256map_t *hs_cache_v3_dir; + +/* Remove a given descriptor from our cache. */ +static void +remove_v3_desc_as_dir(const hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *desc) +{ + tor_assert(desc); + digest256map_remove(hs_cache_v3_dir, desc->key); +} + +/* Store a given descriptor in our cache. */ +static void +store_v3_desc_as_dir(hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *desc) +{ + tor_assert(desc); + digest256map_set(hs_cache_v3_dir, desc->key, desc); +} + +/* Query our cache and return the entry or NULL if not found. */ +static hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t * +lookup_v3_desc_as_dir(const uint8_t *key) +{ + tor_assert(key); + return digest256map_get(hs_cache_v3_dir, key); +} + +/* Free a directory descriptor object. */ +static void +cache_dir_desc_free(hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *desc) +{ + if (desc == NULL) { + return; + } + hs_desc_plaintext_data_free(desc->plaintext_data); + tor_free(desc->encoded_desc); + tor_free(desc); +} + +/* Create a new directory cache descriptor object from a encoded descriptor. + * On success, return the heap-allocated cache object, otherwise return NULL if + * we can't decode the descriptor. */ +static hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t * +cache_dir_desc_new(const char *desc) +{ + hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *dir_desc; + + tor_assert(desc); + + dir_desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t)); + dir_desc->plaintext_data = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t)); + dir_desc->encoded_desc = tor_strdup(desc); + + if (hs_desc_decode_plaintext(desc, dir_desc->plaintext_data) < 0) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Unable to decode descriptor. Rejecting."); + goto err; + } + + /* The blinded pubkey is the indexed key. */ + dir_desc->key = dir_desc->plaintext_data->blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey; + dir_desc->created_ts = time(NULL); + return dir_desc; + +err: + cache_dir_desc_free(dir_desc); + return NULL; +} + +/* Return the size of a cache entry in bytes. */ +static size_t +cache_get_entry_size(const hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *entry) +{ + return (sizeof(*entry) + hs_desc_plaintext_obj_size(entry->plaintext_data) + + strlen(entry->encoded_desc)); +} + +/* Try to store a valid version 3 descriptor in the directory cache. Return 0 + * on success else a negative value is returned indicating that we have a + * newer version in our cache. On error, caller is responsible to free the + * given descriptor desc. */ +static int +cache_store_v3_as_dir(hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *desc) +{ + hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *cache_entry; + + tor_assert(desc); + + /* Verify if we have an entry in the cache for that key and if yes, check + * if we should replace it? */ + cache_entry = lookup_v3_desc_as_dir(desc->key); + if (cache_entry != NULL) { + /* Only replace descriptor if revision-counter is greater than the one + * in our cache */ + if (cache_entry->plaintext_data->revision_counter >= + desc->plaintext_data->revision_counter) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor revision counter in our cache is " + "greater or equal than the one we received. " + "Rejecting!"); + goto err; + } + /* We now know that the descriptor we just received is a new one so + * remove the entry we currently have from our cache so we can then + * store the new one. */ + remove_v3_desc_as_dir(cache_entry); + cache_dir_desc_free(cache_entry); + rend_cache_decrement_allocation(cache_get_entry_size(cache_entry)); + } + /* Store the descriptor we just got. We are sure here that either we + * don't have the entry or we have a newer descriptor and the old one + * has been removed from the cache. */ + store_v3_desc_as_dir(desc); + + /* Update our total cache size with this entry for the OOM. This uses the + * old HS protocol cache subsystem for which we are tied with. */ + rend_cache_increment_allocation(cache_get_entry_size(desc)); + + /* XXX: Update HS statistics. We should have specific stats for v3. */ + + return 0; + + err: + return -1; +} + +/* Using the query which is the blinded key for a descriptor version 3, lookup + * in our directory cache the entry. If found, 1 is returned and desc_out is + * populated with a newly allocated string being the encoded descriptor. If + * not found, 0 is returned and desc_out is untouched. On error, a negative + * value is returned and desc_out is untouched. */ +static int +cache_lookup_v3_as_dir(const char *query, char **desc_out) +{ + int found = 0; + ed25519_public_key_t blinded_key; + const hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *entry; + + tor_assert(query); + + /* Decode blinded key using the given query value. */ + if (ed25519_public_from_base64(&blinded_key, query) < 0) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to decode the v3 HSDir query %s.", + safe_str_client(query)); + goto err; + } + + entry = lookup_v3_desc_as_dir(blinded_key.pubkey); + if (entry != NULL) { + found = 1; + if (desc_out) { + *desc_out = tor_strdup(entry->encoded_desc); + } + } + + return found; + +err: + return -1; +} + +/* Clean the v3 cache by removing any entry that has expired using the + * global_cutoff value. If global_cutoff is 0, the cleaning + * process will use the lifetime found in the plaintext data section. Return + * the number of bytes cleaned. */ +static size_t +cache_clean_v3_as_dir(time_t now, time_t global_cutoff) +{ + size_t bytes_removed = 0; + + /* Code flow error if this ever happens. */ + tor_assert(global_cutoff >= 0); + + if (!hs_cache_v3_dir) { /* No cache to clean. Just return. */ + return 0; + } + + DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(hs_cache_v3_dir, key, + hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *, entry) { + size_t entry_size; + time_t cutoff = global_cutoff; + if (!cutoff) { + /* Cutoff is the lifetime of the entry found in the descriptor. */ + cutoff = now - entry->plaintext_data->lifetime_sec; + } + + /* If the entry has been created _after_ the cutoff, not expired so + * continue to the next entry in our v3 cache. */ + if (entry->created_ts > cutoff) { + continue; + } + /* Here, our entry has expired, remove and free. */ + MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key); + entry_size = cache_get_entry_size(entry); + bytes_removed += entry_size; + /* Entry is not in the cache anymore, destroy it. */ + cache_dir_desc_free(entry); + /* Update our cache entry allocation size for the OOM. */ + rend_cache_decrement_allocation(entry_size); + /* Logging. */ + { + char key_b64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN + 1]; + base64_encode(key_b64, sizeof(key_b64), (const char *) key, + DIGEST256_LEN, 0); + log_info(LD_REND, "Removing v3 descriptor '%s' from HSDir cache", + safe_str_client(key_b64)); + } + } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END; + + return bytes_removed; +} + +/* Given an encoded descriptor, store it in the directory cache depending on + * which version it is. Return a negative value on error. On success, 0 is + * returned. */ +int +hs_cache_store_as_dir(const char *desc) +{ + hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t *dir_desc = NULL; + + tor_assert(desc); + + /* Create a new cache object. This can fail if the descriptor plaintext data + * is unparseable which in this case a log message will be triggered. */ + dir_desc = cache_dir_desc_new(desc); + if (dir_desc == NULL) { + goto err; + } + + /* Call the right function against the descriptor version. At this point, + * we are sure that the descriptor's version is supported else the + * decoding would have failed. */ + switch (dir_desc->plaintext_data->version) { + case 3: + default: + if (cache_store_v3_as_dir(dir_desc) < 0) { + goto err; + } + break; + } + return 0; + + err: + cache_dir_desc_free(dir_desc); + return -1; +} + +/* Using the query, lookup in our directory cache the entry. If found, 1 is + * returned and desc_out is populated with a newly allocated string being + * the encoded descriptor. If not found, 0 is returned and desc_out is + * untouched. On error, a negative value is returned and desc_out is + * untouched. */ +int +hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(uint32_t version, const char *query, + char **desc_out) +{ + int found; + + tor_assert(query); + /* This should never be called with an unsupported version. */ + tor_assert(hs_desc_is_supported_version(version)); + + switch (version) { + case 3: + default: + found = cache_lookup_v3_as_dir(query, desc_out); + break; + } + + return found; +} + +/* Clean all directory caches using the current time now. */ +void +hs_cache_clean_as_dir(time_t now) +{ + time_t cutoff; + + /* Start with v2 cache cleaning. */ + cutoff = now - rend_cache_max_entry_lifetime(); + rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(cutoff); + + /* Now, clean the v3 cache. Set the cutoff to 0 telling the cleanup function + * to compute the cutoff by itself using the lifetime value. */ + cache_clean_v3_as_dir(now, 0); +} + +/* Do a round of OOM cleanup on all directory caches. Return the amount of + * removed bytes. It is possible that the returned value is lower than + * min_remove_bytes if the caches get emptied out so the caller should be + * aware of this. */ +size_t +hs_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes) +{ + time_t k; + size_t bytes_removed = 0; + + /* Our OOM handler called with 0 bytes to remove is a code flow error. */ + tor_assert(min_remove_bytes != 0); + + /* The algorithm is as follow. K is the oldest expected descriptor age. + * + * 1) Deallocate all entries from v2 cache that are older than K hours. + * 1.1) If the amount of remove bytes has been reached, stop. + * 2) Deallocate all entries from v3 cache that are older than K hours + * 2.1) If the amount of remove bytes has been reached, stop. + * 3) Set K = K - RendPostPeriod and repeat process until K is < 0. + * + * This ends up being O(Kn). + */ + + /* Set K to the oldest expected age in seconds which is the maximum + * lifetime of a cache entry. We'll use the v2 lifetime because it's much + * bigger than the v3 thus leading to cleaning older descriptors. */ + k = rend_cache_max_entry_lifetime(); + + do { + time_t cutoff; + + /* If K becomes negative, it means we've empty the caches so stop and + * return what we were able to cleanup. */ + if (k < 0) { + break; + } + /* Compute a cutoff value with K and the current time. */ + cutoff = now - k; + + /* Start by cleaning the v2 cache with that cutoff. */ + bytes_removed += rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(cutoff); + + if (bytes_removed < min_remove_bytes) { + /* We haven't remove enough bytes so clean v3 cache. */ + bytes_removed += cache_clean_v3_as_dir(now, cutoff); + /* Decrement K by a post period to shorten the cutoff. */ + k -= get_options()->RendPostPeriod; + } + } while (bytes_removed < min_remove_bytes); + + return bytes_removed; +} + +/* Initialize the hidden service cache subsystem. */ +void +hs_cache_init(void) +{ + /* Calling this twice is very wrong code flow. */ + tor_assert(!hs_cache_v3_dir); + hs_cache_v3_dir = digest256map_new(); +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_cache.h b/src/or/hs_cache.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3432d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_cache.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_cache.h + * \brief Header file for hs_cache.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_HS_CACHE_H +#define TOR_HS_CACHE_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include "crypto.h" +#include "crypto_ed25519.h" +#include "hs_common.h" +#include "hs_descriptor.h" +#include "torcert.h" + +/* Descriptor representation on the directory side which is a subset of + * information that the HSDir can decode and serve it. */ +typedef struct hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t { + /* This object is indexed using the blinded pubkey located in the plaintext + * data which is populated only once the descriptor has been successfully + * decoded and validated. This simply points to that pubkey. */ + const uint8_t *key; + + /* When does this entry has been created. Used to expire entries. */ + time_t created_ts; + + /* Descriptor plaintext information. Obviously, we can't decrypt the + * encrypted part of the descriptor. */ + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext_data; + + /* Encoded descriptor which is basically in text form. It's a NUL terminated + * string thus safe to strlen(). */ + char *encoded_desc; +} hs_cache_dir_descriptor_t; + +/* Public API */ + +void hs_cache_init(void); +void hs_cache_clean_as_dir(time_t now); +size_t hs_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes); + +/* Store and Lookup function. They are version agnostic that is depending on + * the requested version of the descriptor, it will be re-routed to the + * right function. */ +int hs_cache_store_as_dir(const char *desc); +int hs_cache_lookup_as_dir(uint32_t version, const char *query, + char **desc_out); + +#endif /* TOR_HS_CACHE_H */ diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.h b/src/or/hs_common.h index e74fdc9..a3edf61 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_common.h +++ b/src/or/hs_common.h @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ /** * \file hs_common.h - * \brief Header file for hs_common.c. + * \brief Header file containing common data for the whole HS subsytem. **/ #ifndef TOR_HS_COMMON_H diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c index cdbea76..9714d52 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c @@ -1918,3 +1918,15 @@ hs_descriptor_free(hs_descriptor_t *desc) desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(&desc->encrypted_data); tor_free(desc); } + +/* Return the size in bytes of the given plaintext data object. A sizeof() is + * not enough because the object contains pointers and the encrypted blob. + * This is particularly useful for our OOM subsystem that tracks the HSDir + * cache size for instance. */ +size_t +hs_desc_plaintext_obj_size(const hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *data) +{ + tor_assert(data); + return (sizeof(*data) + sizeof(*data->signing_key_cert) + + data->encrypted_blob_size); +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h index 9b48096..1213597 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h @@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ int hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, int hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_out); +size_t hs_desc_plaintext_obj_size(const hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *data); + #ifdef HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE /* Encoding. */ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index e28bda4..02d67fa 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/entrynodes.c \ src/or/ext_orport.c \ src/or/hibernate.c \ + src/or/hs_cache.c \ src/or/hs_common.c \ src/or/hs_descriptor.c \ src/or/keypin.c \ @@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/geoip.h \ src/or/entrynodes.h \ src/or/hibernate.h \ + src/or/hs_cache.h \ src/or/hs_common.h \ src/or/hs_descriptor.h \ src/or/keypin.h \ diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 03c2b7e..9defdf0 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "entrynodes.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "hibernate.h" +#include "hs_cache.h" #include "keypin.h" #include "main.h" #include "microdesc.h" @@ -1651,7 +1652,7 @@ clean_caches_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) rep_history_clean(now - options->RephistTrackTime); rend_cache_clean(now, REND_CACHE_TYPE_CLIENT); rend_cache_clean(now, REND_CACHE_TYPE_SERVICE); - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, 0); + hs_cache_clean_as_dir(now); microdesc_cache_rebuild(NULL, 0); #define CLEAN_CACHES_INTERVAL (30*60) return CLEAN_CACHES_INTERVAL; diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 38096ad..e2963e3 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" #include "geoip.h" +#include "hs_cache.h" #include "main.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" @@ -2404,9 +2405,7 @@ cell_queues_check_size(void) if (rend_cache_total > get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 5) { const size_t bytes_to_remove = rend_cache_total - (size_t)(get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 10); - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(time(NULL), bytes_to_remove); - alloc -= rend_cache_total; - alloc += rend_cache_get_total_allocation(); + alloc -= hs_cache_handle_oom(time(NULL), bytes_to_remove); } circuits_handle_oom(alloc); return 1; diff --git a/src/or/rendcache.c b/src/or/rendcache.c index 709aaff..bf43407 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcache.c +++ b/src/or/rendcache.c @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ rend_cache_get_total_allocation(void) } /** Decrement the total bytes attributed to the rendezvous cache by n. */ -STATIC void +void rend_cache_decrement_allocation(size_t n) { static int have_underflowed = 0; @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ rend_cache_decrement_allocation(size_t n) } /** Increase the total bytes attributed to the rendezvous cache by n. */ -STATIC void +void rend_cache_increment_allocation(size_t n) { static int have_overflowed = 0; @@ -462,45 +462,36 @@ rend_cache_intro_failure_note(rend_intro_point_failure_t failure, } /** Remove all old v2 descriptors and those for which this hidden service - * directory is not responsible for any more. - * - * If at all possible, remove at least force_remove bytes of data. - */ -void -rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(time_t now, size_t force_remove) + * directory is not responsible for any more. The cutoff is the time limit for + * which we want to keep the cache entry. In other words, any entry created + * before will be removed. */ +size_t +rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(time_t cutoff) { digestmap_iter_t *iter; - time_t cutoff = now - REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE - REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW; - const int LAST_SERVED_CUTOFF_STEP = 1800; - time_t last_served_cutoff = cutoff; size_t bytes_removed = 0; - do { - for (iter = digestmap_iter_init(rend_cache_v2_dir); - !digestmap_iter_done(iter); ) { - const char *key; - void *val; - rend_cache_entry_t *ent; - digestmap_iter_get(iter, &key, &val); - ent = val; - if (ent->parsed->timestamp < cutoff || - ent->last_served < last_served_cutoff) { - char key_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; - base32_encode(key_base32, sizeof(key_base32), key, DIGEST_LEN); - log_info(LD_REND, "Removing descriptor with ID '%s' from cache", - safe_str_client(key_base32)); - bytes_removed += rend_cache_entry_allocation(ent); - iter = digestmap_iter_next_rmv(rend_cache_v2_dir, iter); - rend_cache_entry_free(ent); - } else { - iter = digestmap_iter_next(rend_cache_v2_dir, iter); - } + + for (iter = digestmap_iter_init(rend_cache_v2_dir); + !digestmap_iter_done(iter); ) { + const char *key; + void *val; + rend_cache_entry_t *ent; + digestmap_iter_get(iter, &key, &val); + ent = val; + if (ent->parsed->timestamp < cutoff) { + char key_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; + base32_encode(key_base32, sizeof(key_base32), key, DIGEST_LEN); + log_info(LD_REND, "Removing descriptor with ID '%s' from cache", + safe_str_client(key_base32)); + bytes_removed += rend_cache_entry_allocation(ent); + iter = digestmap_iter_next_rmv(rend_cache_v2_dir, iter); + rend_cache_entry_free(ent); + } else { + iter = digestmap_iter_next(rend_cache_v2_dir, iter); } + } - /* In case we didn't remove enough bytes, advance the cutoff a little. */ - last_served_cutoff += LAST_SERVED_CUTOFF_STEP; - if (last_served_cutoff > now) - break; - } while (bytes_removed < force_remove); + return bytes_removed; } /** Lookup in the client cache the given service ID query for diff --git a/src/or/rendcache.h b/src/or/rendcache.h index 270b614..746f142 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcache.h +++ b/src/or/rendcache.h @@ -53,10 +53,17 @@ typedef enum { REND_CACHE_TYPE_SERVICE = 2, } rend_cache_type_t; +/* Return maximum lifetime in seconds of a cache entry. */ +static inline time_t +rend_cache_max_entry_lifetime(void) +{ + return REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE + REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW; +} + void rend_cache_init(void); void rend_cache_clean(time_t now, rend_cache_type_t cache_type); void rend_cache_failure_clean(time_t now); -void rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(time_t now, size_t min_to_remove); +size_t rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(time_t cutoff); void rend_cache_purge(void); void rend_cache_free_all(void); int rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, @@ -77,6 +84,8 @@ void rend_cache_intro_failure_note(rend_intro_point_failure_t failure, const uint8_t *identity, const char *service_id); void rend_cache_failure_purge(void); +void rend_cache_decrement_allocation(size_t n); +void rend_cache_increment_allocation(size_t n); #ifdef RENDCACHE_PRIVATE @@ -89,8 +98,6 @@ STATIC int cache_failure_intro_lookup(const uint8_t *identity, const char *service_id, rend_cache_failure_intro_t **intro_entry); -STATIC void rend_cache_decrement_allocation(size_t n); -STATIC void rend_cache_increment_allocation(size_t n); STATIC rend_cache_failure_intro_t *rend_cache_failure_intro_entry_new( rend_intro_point_failure_t failure); STATIC rend_cache_failure_t *rend_cache_failure_entry_new(void); diff --git a/src/test/test_rendcache.c b/src/test/test_rendcache.c index 05a0bcd..afcd117 100644 --- a/src/test/test_rendcache.c +++ b/src/test/test_rendcache.c @@ -1072,9 +1072,10 @@ static void test_rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(void *data) { rend_cache_entry_t *e; - time_t now; + time_t now, cutoff; rend_service_descriptor_t *desc; now = time(NULL); + cutoff = now - (REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE + REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW); const char key[DIGEST_LEN] = "abcde"; (void)data; @@ -1082,7 +1083,7 @@ test_rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(void *data) rend_cache_init(); // Test running with an empty cache - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, 0); + rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(cutoff); tt_int_op(digestmap_size(rend_cache_v2_dir), OP_EQ, 0); // Test with only one new entry @@ -1094,38 +1095,15 @@ test_rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(void *data) e->parsed = desc; digestmap_set(rend_cache_v2_dir, key, e); - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, 0); + /* Set the cutoff to minus 10 seconds. */ + rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(cutoff - 10); tt_int_op(digestmap_size(rend_cache_v2_dir), OP_EQ, 1); // Test with one old entry - desc->timestamp = now - (REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE + REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW + 1000); - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, 0); - tt_int_op(digestmap_size(rend_cache_v2_dir), OP_EQ, 0); - - // Test with one entry that has an old last served - e = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_cache_entry_t)); - e->last_served = now - (REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE + REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW + 1000); - desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t)); - desc->timestamp = now; - desc->pk = pk_generate(0); - e->parsed = desc; - digestmap_set(rend_cache_v2_dir, key, e); - - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, 0); + desc->timestamp = cutoff - 1000; + rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(cutoff); tt_int_op(digestmap_size(rend_cache_v2_dir), OP_EQ, 0); - // Test a run through asking for a large force_remove - e = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_cache_entry_t)); - e->last_served = now; - desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t)); - desc->timestamp = now; - desc->pk = pk_generate(0); - e->parsed = desc; - digestmap_set(rend_cache_v2_dir, key, e); - - rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, 20000); - tt_int_op(digestmap_size(rend_cache_v2_dir), OP_EQ, 1); - done: rend_cache_free_all(); }

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Descriptor encoding implementation
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 91b5d0789ff5606cf97346590567857bfd78f9ad Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Tue Mar 8 15:51:53 2016 -0500 prop224: Descriptor encoding implementation Add hs_descriptor.{c|h} with the needed ABI to represent a descriptor and needed component. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 768 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/hs_descriptor.h | 169 +++++++++++ src/or/include.am | 2 + src/or/torcert.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 941 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a349297 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_descriptor.c + * \brief Handle hidden service descriptor encoding/decoding. + **/ + +#include "hs_descriptor.h" + +#include "or.h" +#include "ed25519_cert.h" /* Trunnel interface. */ + +/* Constant string value used for the descriptor format. */ +static const char *str_hs_desc = "hs-descriptor"; +static const char *str_desc_cert = "descriptor-signing-key-cert"; +static const char *str_rev_counter = "revision-counter"; +static const char *str_encrypted = "encrypted"; +static const char *str_signature = "signature"; +static const char *str_lifetime = "descriptor-lifetime"; +/* Constant string value for the encrypted part of the descriptor. */ +static const char *str_create2_formats = "create2-formats"; +static const char *str_auth_required = "authentication-required"; +static const char *str_intro_point = "introduction-point"; +static const char *str_ip_auth_key = "auth-key"; +static const char *str_ip_enc_key = "enc-key"; +static const char *str_ip_enc_key_cert = "enc-key-certification"; +/* Constant string value for the construction to encrypt the encrypted data + * section. */ +static const char *str_enc_hsdir_data = "hsdir-encrypted-data"; + +/* Encode the ed25519 certificate cert and put the newly allocated + * string in cert_str_out. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */ +static int +encode_cert(const tor_cert_t *cert, char **cert_str_out) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *ed_cert_b64 = NULL; + size_t ed_cert_b64_len; + + tor_assert(cert); + tor_assert(cert_str_out); + + /* Get the encoded size and add the NUL byte. */ + ed_cert_b64_len = base64_encode_size(cert->encoded_len, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) + 1; + ed_cert_b64 = tor_malloc_zero(ed_cert_b64_len); + + /* Base64 encode the encoded certificate. */ + if (base64_encode(ed_cert_b64, ed_cert_b64_len, + (const char *) cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't base64-encode descriptor signing key cert!"); + goto err; + } + + /* Put everything together in a NUL terminated string. */ + tor_asprintf(cert_str_out, + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "%s" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----", + ed_cert_b64); + /* Success! */ + ret = 0; + +err: + tor_free(ed_cert_b64); + return ret; +} + +/* Encode the given link specifier objects into a newly allocated string. + * This can't fail so caller can always assume a valid string being + * returned. */ +static char * +encode_link_specifiers(const smartlist_t *specs) +{ + char *encoded_b64 = NULL; + link_specifier_list_t *lslist = link_specifier_list_new(); + + tor_assert(specs); + /* No link specifiers is a code flow error, can't happen. */ + tor_assert(smartlist_len(specs) > 0); + tor_assert(smartlist_len(specs) <= UINT8_MAX); + + link_specifier_list_set_n_spec(lslist, smartlist_len(specs)); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(specs, const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, + spec) { + link_specifier_t *ls = link_specifier_new(); + link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls, spec->type); + + switch (spec->type) { + case LS_IPV4: + link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_addr(ls, + tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&spec->u.ap.addr)); + link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_port(ls, spec->u.ap.port); + /* Four bytes IPv4 and two bytes port. */ + link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, sizeof(spec->u.ap.addr.addr.in_addr) + + sizeof(spec->u.ap.port)); + break; + case LS_IPV6: + { + size_t addr_len = link_specifier_getlen_un_ipv6_addr(ls); + const uint8_t *in6_addr = tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&spec->u.ap.addr); + uint8_t *ipv6_array = link_specifier_getarray_un_ipv6_addr(ls); + memcpy(ipv6_array, in6_addr, addr_len); + link_specifier_set_un_ipv6_port(ls, spec->u.ap.port); + /* Sixteen bytes IPv6 and two bytes port. */ + link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, addr_len + sizeof(spec->u.ap.port)); + break; + } + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + { + size_t legacy_id_len = link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls); + uint8_t *legacy_id_array = link_specifier_getarray_un_legacy_id(ls); + memcpy(legacy_id_array, spec->u.legacy_id, legacy_id_len); + link_specifier_set_ls_len(ls, legacy_id_len); + break; + } + default: + tor_assert(0); + } + + link_specifier_list_add_spec(lslist, ls); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(spec); + + { + uint8_t *encoded; + ssize_t encoded_len, encoded_b64_len, ret; + + encoded_len = link_specifier_list_encoded_len(lslist); + tor_assert(encoded_len > 0); + encoded = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len); + ret = link_specifier_list_encode(encoded, encoded_len, lslist); + tor_assert(ret == encoded_len); + + /* Base64 encode our binary format. Add extra NUL byte for the base64 + * encoded value. */ + encoded_b64_len = base64_encode_size(encoded_len, 0) + 1; + encoded_b64 = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_b64_len); + ret = base64_encode(encoded_b64, encoded_b64_len, (const char *) encoded, + encoded_len, 0); + tor_assert(ret == (encoded_b64_len - 1)); + tor_free(encoded); + } + + link_specifier_list_free(lslist); + return encoded_b64; +} + +/* Encode an introduction point encryption key and return a newly allocated + * string with it. On failure, return NULL. */ +static char * +encode_enc_key(const ed25519_keypair_t *sig_key, + const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) +{ + char *encoded = NULL; + time_t now = time(NULL); + + tor_assert(sig_key); + tor_assert(ip); + + switch (ip->enc_key_type) { + case HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY: + { + char *key_str, b64_cert[256]; + ssize_t cert_len; + size_t key_str_len; + uint8_t *cert_data; + + /* Create cross certification cert. */ + cert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(&sig_key->pubkey, + ip->enc_key.legacy, + now + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME, + &cert_data); + if (cert_len < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create legacy crosscert."); + goto err; + } + /* Encode cross cert. */ + if (base64_encode(b64_cert, sizeof(b64_cert), (const char *) cert_data, + cert_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to encode legacy crosscert."); + goto err; + } + /* Convert the encryption key to a string. */ + if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(ip->enc_key.legacy, &key_str, + &key_str_len) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to encode legacy encryption key."); + goto err; + } + tor_asprintf(&encoded, + "%s legacy\n%s" /* Newline is added by the call above. */ + "%s\n" + "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n" + "%s" + "-----END CROSSCERT-----", + str_ip_enc_key, key_str, + str_ip_enc_key_cert, b64_cert); + tor_free(key_str); + break; + } + case HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519: + { + int signbit; + char *encoded_cert, key_fp_b64[CURVE25519_BASE64_PADDED_LEN + 1]; + ed25519_keypair_t curve_kp; + + if (ed25519_keypair_from_curve25519_keypair(&curve_kp, &signbit, + &ip->enc_key.curve25519)) { + goto err; + } + tor_cert_t *cross_cert = tor_cert_create(&curve_kp, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_ENC, + &sig_key->pubkey, now, + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME, + CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + memwipe(&curve_kp, 0, sizeof(curve_kp)); + if (!cross_cert) { + goto err; + } + if (encode_cert(cross_cert, &encoded_cert)) { + goto err; + } + if (curve25519_public_to_base64(key_fp_b64, + &ip->enc_key.curve25519.pubkey) < 0) { + tor_free(encoded_cert); + goto err; + } + tor_asprintf(&encoded, + "%s ntor %s\n" + "%s\n%s", + str_ip_enc_key, key_fp_b64, + str_ip_enc_key_cert, encoded_cert); + tor_free(encoded_cert); + break; + } + default: + tor_assert(0); + } + + err: + return encoded; +} + +/* Encode an introduction point object and return a newly allocated string + * with it. On failure, return NULL. */ +static char * +encode_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *sig_key, + const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) +{ + char *encoded_ip = NULL; + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(ip); + tor_assert(sig_key); + + /* Encode link specifier. */ + { + char *ls_str = encode_link_specifiers(ip->link_specifiers); + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %s", str_intro_point, ls_str); + tor_free(ls_str); + } + + /* Authentication key encoding. */ + { + char *encoded_cert; + if (encode_cert(ip->auth_key_cert, &encoded_cert) < 0) { + goto err; + } + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s\n%s", str_ip_auth_key, encoded_cert); + tor_free(encoded_cert); + } + + /* Encryption key encoding. */ + { + char *encoded_enc_key = encode_enc_key(sig_key, ip); + if (encoded_enc_key == NULL) { + goto err; + } + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s", encoded_enc_key); + tor_free(encoded_enc_key); + } + + /* Join them all in one blob of text. */ + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 1, NULL); + + err: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lines, char *, l, tor_free(l)); + smartlist_free(lines); + return encoded_ip; +} + +/* Using a given decriptor object, build the secret input needed for the + * KDF and put it in the dst pointer which is an already allocated buffer + * of size dstlen. */ +static void +build_secret_input(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, uint8_t *dst, size_t dstlen) +{ + size_t offset = 0; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(dst); + tor_assert(HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_INPUT_LEN <= dstlen); + + /* XXX use the destination length as the memcpy length */ + /* Copy blinded public key. */ + memcpy(dst, desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey, + sizeof(desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey)); + offset += sizeof(desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey); + /* Copy subcredential. */ + memcpy(dst + offset, desc->subcredential, sizeof(desc->subcredential)); + offset += sizeof(desc->subcredential); + /* Copy revision counter value. */ + set_uint64(dst + offset, tor_ntohll(desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter)); + offset += sizeof(uint64_t); + tor_assert(HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_INPUT_LEN == offset); +} + +/* Do the KDF construction and put the resulting data in key_out which is of + * key_out_len length. It uses SHAKE-256 as specified in the spec. */ +static void +build_kdf_key(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +{ + uint8_t secret_input[HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_INPUT_LEN]; + crypto_xof_t *xof; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(salt); + tor_assert(key_out); + + /* Build the secret input for the KDF computation. */ + build_secret_input(desc, secret_input, sizeof(secret_input)); + + xof = crypto_xof_new(); + /* Feed our KDF. [SHAKE it like a polaroid picture --Yawning]. */ + crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, secret_input, sizeof(secret_input)); + crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, salt, salt_len); + crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, (const uint8_t *) str_enc_hsdir_data, + strlen(str_enc_hsdir_data)); + /* Eat from our KDF. */ + crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, key_out, key_out_len); + crypto_xof_free(xof); + memwipe(secret_input, 0, sizeof(secret_input)); +} + +/* Using the given descriptor and salt, run it through our KDF function and + * then extract a secret key in key_out, the IV in iv_out and MAC in mac_out. + * This function can't fail. */ +static void +build_secret_key_iv_mac(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_len, + uint8_t *iv_out, size_t iv_len, + uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_len) +{ + size_t offset = 0; + uint8_t kdf_key[HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_KDF_OUTPUT_LEN]; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(salt); + tor_assert(key_out); + tor_assert(iv_out); + tor_assert(mac_out); + + build_kdf_key(desc, salt, salt_len, kdf_key, sizeof(kdf_key)); + /* Copy the bytes we need for both the secret key and IV. */ + memcpy(key_out, kdf_key, key_len); + offset += key_len; + memcpy(iv_out, kdf_key + offset, iv_len); + offset += iv_len; + memcpy(mac_out, kdf_key + offset, mac_len); + /* Extra precaution to make sure we are not out of bound. */ + tor_assert((offset + mac_len) == sizeof(kdf_key)); + memwipe(kdf_key, 0, sizeof(kdf_key)); +} + +/* Using a key, salt and encrypted payload, build a MAC and put it in mac_out. + * The length of the mac key and salt must be fixed and if not, you can't rely + * on the result to be a valid MAC. We use SHA3-256 for the MAC computation. + * This function can't fail. */ +static void +build_mac(const uint8_t *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, + const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, + const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t encrypted_len, + uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_len) +{ + crypto_digest_t *digest; + + tor_assert(mac_key); + tor_assert(salt); + tor_assert(encrypted); + tor_assert(mac_out); + + digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256); + /* As specified in section 2.5 of proposal 224, first add the mac key + * then add the salt first and then the encrypted section. */ + crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) mac_key, mac_key_len); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) salt, salt_len); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *) encrypted, encrypted_len); + crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) mac_out, mac_len); + crypto_digest_free(digest); +} + +/* Given a source length, return the new size including padding for the + * plaintext encryption. */ +static size_t +compute_padded_plaintext_length(size_t plaintext_len) +{ + size_t plaintext_padded_len; + + /* Make sure we won't overflow. */ + tor_assert(plaintext_len <= + (SIZE_T_CEILING - HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE)); + + /* Get the extra length we need to add. For example, if srclen is 234 bytes, + * this will expand to (2 * 128) == 256 thus an extra 22 bytes. */ + plaintext_padded_len = CEIL_DIV(plaintext_len, + HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE) * + HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE; + /* Can never be extra careful. Make sure we are _really_ padded. */ + tor_assert(!(plaintext_padded_len % HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE)); + return plaintext_padded_len; +} + +/* Given a buffer, pad it up to the encrypted section padding requirement. Set + * the newly allocated string in padded_out and return the length of the + * padded buffer. */ +static size_t +build_plaintext_padding(const char *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len, + uint8_t **padded_out) +{ + size_t padded_len; + uint8_t *padded; + + tor_assert(plaintext); + tor_assert(padded_out); + + /* Allocate the final length including padding. */ + padded_len = compute_padded_plaintext_length(plaintext_len); + tor_assert(padded_len >= plaintext_len); + padded = tor_malloc_zero(padded_len); + + memcpy(padded, plaintext, plaintext_len); + *padded_out = padded; + return padded_len; +} + +/* Using a key, IV and plaintext data of length plaintext_len, create the + * encrypted section by encrypting it and setting encrypted_out with the + * data. Return size of the encrypted data buffer. */ +static size_t +build_encrypted(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, const char *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_len, uint8_t **encrypted_out) +{ + size_t encrypted_len; + uint8_t *padded_plaintext, *encrypted; + crypto_cipher_t *cipher; + + tor_assert(key); + tor_assert(iv); + tor_assert(plaintext); + tor_assert(encrypted_out); + + /* This creates a cipher for AES128. It can't fail. */ + cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_iv((const char *) key, (const char *) iv); + /* This can't fail. */ + encrypted_len = build_plaintext_padding(plaintext, plaintext_len, + &padded_plaintext); + /* Extra precautions that we have a valie padding length. */ + tor_assert(encrypted_len <= HS_DESC_PADDED_PLAINTEXT_MAX_LEN); + tor_assert(!(encrypted_len % HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE)); + /* We use a stream cipher so the encrypted length will be the same as the + * plaintext padded length. */ + encrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_len); + /* This can't fail. */ + crypto_cipher_encrypt(cipher, (char *) encrypted, + (const char *) padded_plaintext, encrypted_len); + *encrypted_out = encrypted; + /* Cleanup. */ + crypto_cipher_free(cipher); + tor_free(padded_plaintext); + return encrypted_len; +} + +/* Encrypt the given plaintext buffer and using the descriptor to get the + * keys. Set encrypted_out with the encrypted data and return the length of + * it. */ +static size_t +encrypt_descriptor_data(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *plaintext, + char **encrypted_out) +{ + char *final_blob; + size_t encrypted_len, final_blob_len, offset = 0; + uint8_t *encrypted; + uint8_t salt[HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN]; + uint8_t secret_key[CIPHER_KEY_LEN], secret_iv[CIPHER_IV_LEN]; + uint8_t mac_key[DIGEST256_LEN], mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(plaintext); + tor_assert(encrypted_out); + + /* Get our salt. The returned bytes are already hashed. */ + crypto_strongest_rand(salt, sizeof(salt)); + + /* KDF construction resulting in a key from which the secret key, IV and MAC + * key are extracted which is what we need for the encryption. */ + build_secret_key_iv_mac(desc, salt, sizeof(salt), + secret_key, sizeof(secret_key), + secret_iv, sizeof(secret_iv), + mac_key, sizeof(mac_key)); + + /* Build the encrypted part that is do the actual encryption. */ + encrypted_len = build_encrypted(secret_key, secret_iv, plaintext, + strlen(plaintext), &encrypted); + memwipe(secret_key, 0, sizeof(secret_key)); + memwipe(secret_iv, 0, sizeof(secret_iv)); + /* This construction is specified in section 2.5 of proposal 224. */ + final_blob_len = sizeof(salt) + encrypted_len + DIGEST256_LEN; + final_blob = tor_malloc_zero(final_blob_len); + + /* Build the MAC. */ + build_mac(mac_key, sizeof(mac_key), salt, sizeof(salt), + encrypted, encrypted_len, mac, sizeof(mac)); + memwipe(mac_key, 0, sizeof(mac_key)); + + /* The salt is the first value. */ + memcpy(final_blob, salt, sizeof(salt)); + offset = sizeof(salt); + /* Second value is the encrypted data. */ + memcpy(final_blob + offset, encrypted, encrypted_len); + offset += encrypted_len; + /* Third value is the MAC. */ + memcpy(final_blob + offset, mac, sizeof(mac)); + offset += sizeof(mac); + /* Cleanup the buffers. */ + memwipe(salt, 0, sizeof(salt)); + memwipe(encrypted, 0, encrypted_len); + tor_free(encrypted); + /* Extra precaution. */ + tor_assert(offset == final_blob_len); + + *encrypted_out = final_blob; + return final_blob_len; +} + +/* Take care of encoding the encrypted data section and then encrypting it + * with the descriptor's key. A newly allocated NUL terminated string pointer + * containing the encrypted encoded blob is put in encrypted_blob_out. Return + * 0 on success else a negative value. */ +static int +encode_encrypted_data(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + char **encrypted_blob_out) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *encoded_str, *encrypted_blob; + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(encrypted_blob_out); + + /* Build the start of the section prior to the introduction points. */ + { + if (!desc->encrypted_data.create2_ntor) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "HS desc doesn't have recognized handshake type."); + goto err; + } + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %d\n", str_create2_formats, + ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR); + + if (desc->encrypted_data.auth_types && + smartlist_len(desc->encrypted_data.auth_types)) { + /* Put the authentication-required line. */ + char *buf = smartlist_join_strings(desc->encrypted_data.auth_types, " ", + 0, NULL); + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %s\n", str_auth_required, buf); + tor_free(buf); + } + } + + /* Build the introduction point(s) section. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + const hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) { + char *encoded_ip = encode_intro_point(&desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp, + ip); + if (encoded_ip == NULL) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "HS desc intro point is malformed."); + goto err; + } + smartlist_add(lines, encoded_ip); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip); + + /* Build the entire encrypted data section into one encoded plaintext and + * then encrypt it. */ + encoded_str = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "", 0, NULL); + + /* Encrypt the section into an encrypted blob that we'll base64 encode + * before returning it. */ + { + char *enc_b64; + ssize_t enc_b64_len, ret_len, enc_len; + + enc_len = encrypt_descriptor_data(desc, encoded_str, &encrypted_blob); + tor_free(encoded_str); + /* Get the encoded size plus a NUL terminating byte. */ + enc_b64_len = base64_encode_size(enc_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) + 1; + enc_b64 = tor_malloc_zero(enc_b64_len); + /* Base64 the encrypted blob before returning it. */ + ret_len = base64_encode(enc_b64, enc_b64_len, encrypted_blob, enc_len, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); + /* Return length doesn't count the NUL byte. */ + tor_assert(ret_len == (enc_b64_len - 1)); + tor_free(encrypted_blob); + *encrypted_blob_out = enc_b64; + } + /* Success! */ + ret = 0; + + err: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lines, char *, l, tor_free(l)); + smartlist_free(lines); + return ret; +} + +/* Encode a v3 HS descriptor. Return 0 on success and set encoded_out to the + * newly allocated string of the encoded descriptor. On error, -1 is returned + * and encoded_out is untouched. */ +static int +desc_encode_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *encoded_str = NULL; + size_t encoded_len; + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(encoded_out); + tor_assert(desc->plaintext_data.version == 3); + + /* Build the non-encrypted values. */ + { + char *encoded_cert; + /* Encode certificate then create the first line of the descriptor. */ + if (desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert->cert_type + != CERT_TYPE_HS_DESC_SIGN) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "HS descriptor signing key has an unexpected cert type " + "(%d)", (int) desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert->cert_type); + goto err; + } + if (encode_cert(desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert, + &encoded_cert) < 0) { + /* The function will print error logs. */ + goto err; + } + /* Create the hs descriptor line. */ + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %" PRIu32, str_hs_desc, + desc->plaintext_data.version); + /* Add the descriptor lifetime line (in minutes). */ + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %" PRIu32, str_lifetime, + desc->plaintext_data.lifetime_sec / 60); + /* Create the descriptor certificate line. */ + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s\n%s", str_desc_cert, encoded_cert); + tor_free(encoded_cert); + /* Create the revision counter line. */ + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %" PRIu64, str_rev_counter, + desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter); + } + + /* Build the encrypted data section. */ + { + char *enc_b64_blob; + if (encode_encrypted_data(desc, &enc_b64_blob) < 0) { + goto err; + } + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, + "%s\n" + "-----BEGIN MESSAGE-----\n" + "%s" + "-----END MESSAGE-----", + str_encrypted, enc_b64_blob); + tor_free(enc_b64_blob); + } + + /* Join all lines in one string so we can generate a signature and append + * it to the descriptor. */ + encoded_str = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 1, &encoded_len); + + /* Sign all fields of the descriptor with our short term signing key. */ + { + /* XXX: Add signature prefix. */ + ed25519_signature_t sig; + char ed_sig_b64[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN + 1]; + if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t *) encoded_str, encoded_len, + &desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't sign encoded HS descriptor!"); + tor_free(encoded_str); + goto err; + } + if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(ed_sig_b64, &sig) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't base64 encode descriptor signature!"); + tor_free(encoded_str); + goto err; + } + /* Create the signature line. */ + smartlist_add_asprintf(lines, "%s %s", str_signature, ed_sig_b64); + } + /* Free previous string that we used so compute the signature. */ + tor_free(encoded_str); + encoded_str = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 1, NULL); + *encoded_out = encoded_str; + + /* XXX: Decode the generated descriptor as an extra validation. */ + + /* XXX: Trigger a control port event. */ + + /* Success! */ + ret = 0; + + err: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lines, char *, l, tor_free(l)); + smartlist_free(lines); + return ret; +} + +/* Table of encode function version specific. The function are indexed by the + * version number so v3 callback is at index 3 in the array. */ +static int + (*encode_handlers[])( + const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + char **encoded_out) = +{ + /* v0 */ NULL, /* v1 */ NULL, /* v2 */ NULL, + desc_encode_v3, +}; + +/* Encode the given descriptor desc. On success, encoded_out points to a newly + * allocated NUL terminated string that contains the encoded descriptor as a + * string. + * + * Return 0 on success and encoded_out is a valid pointer. On error, -1 is + * returned and encoded_out is untouched. */ +int +hs_desc_encode_descriptor(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out) +{ + int ret = -1; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(encoded_out); + + /* Make sure we support the version of the descriptor format. */ + if (!hs_desc_is_supported_version(desc->plaintext_data.version)) { + goto err; + } + /* Extra precaution. Having no handler for the supported version should + * never happened else we forgot to add it but we bumped the version. */ + tor_assert(ARRAY_LENGTH(encode_handlers) >= desc->plaintext_data.version); + tor_assert(encode_handlers[desc->plaintext_data.version]); + + ret = encode_handlers[desc->plaintext_data.version](desc, encoded_out); + if (ret < 0) { + goto err; + } + + err: + return ret; +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98dbb22 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file hs_descriptor.h + * \brief Header file for hs_descriptor.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_HS_DESCRIPTOR_H +#define TOR_HS_DESCRIPTOR_H + +#include <stdint.h> + +#include "address.h" +#include "container.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "crypto_ed25519.h" +#include "torcert.h" + +/* The earliest descriptor format version we support. */ +#define HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MIN 3 +/* The latest descriptor format version we support. */ +#define HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MAX 3 + +/* Lifetime of certificate in the descriptor. This defines the lifetime of the + * descriptor signing key and the cross certification cert of that key. */ +#define HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME (24 * 60 * 60) +/* Length of the salt needed for the encrypted section of a descriptor. */ +#define HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN 16 +/* Length of the secret input needed for the KDF construction which derives + * the encryption key for the encrypted data section of the descriptor. This + * adds up to 68 bytes being the blinded key, hashed subcredential and + * revision counter. */ +#define HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_INPUT_LEN \ + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN + sizeof(uint64_t) +/* Length of the KDF output value which is the length of the secret key, + * the secret IV and MAC key length which is the length of H() output. */ +#define HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_KDF_OUTPUT_LEN \ + CIPHER_KEY_LEN + CIPHER_IV_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN +/* We need to pad the plaintext version of the encrypted data section before + * encryption and it has to be a multiple of this value. */ +#define HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE 128 +/* XXX: Let's make sure this makes sense as an upper limit for the padded + * plaintext section. Then we should enforce it as now only an assert will be + * triggered if we are above it. */ +/* Once padded, this is the maximum length in bytes for the plaintext. */ +#define HS_DESC_PADDED_PLAINTEXT_MAX_LEN 8192 + +/* Type of encryption key in the descriptor. */ +typedef enum { + HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY = 1, + HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519 = 2, +} hs_desc_key_type_t; + +/* Link specifier object that contains information on how to extend to the + * relay that is the address, port and handshake type. */ +typedef struct hs_desc_link_specifier_t { + /* Indicate the type of link specifier. See trunnel ed25519_cert + * specification. */ + uint8_t type; + + /* It's either an address/port or a legacy identity fingerprint. */ + union { + /* IP address and port of the relay use to extend. */ + tor_addr_port_t ap; + /* Legacy identity. A 20-byte SHA1 identity fingerprint. */ + uint8_t legacy_id[DIGEST_LEN]; + } u; +} hs_desc_link_specifier_t; + +/* Introduction point information located in a descriptor. */ +typedef struct hs_desc_intro_point_t { + /* Link specifier(s) which details how to extend to the relay. This list + * contains hs_desc_link_specifier_t object. It MUST have at least one. */ + smartlist_t *link_specifiers; + + /* Authentication key used to establish the introduction point circuit and + * cross-certifies the blinded public key for the replica thus signed by + * the blinded key and in turn signs it. */ + tor_cert_t *auth_key_cert; + + /* Encryption key type so we know which one to use in the union below. */ + hs_desc_key_type_t enc_key_type; + + /* Keys are mutually exclusive thus the union. */ + union { + /* Encryption key used to encrypt request to hidden service. */ + curve25519_keypair_t curve25519; + + /* Backward compat: RSA 1024 encryption key for legacy purposes. + * Mutually exclusive with enc_key. */ + crypto_pk_t *legacy; + } enc_key; +} hs_desc_intro_point_t; + +/* The encrypted data section of a descriptor. Obviously the data in this is + * in plaintext but encrypted once encoded. */ +typedef struct hs_desc_encrypted_data_t { + /* Bitfield of CREATE2 cell supported formats. The only currently supported + * format is ntor. */ + unsigned int create2_ntor : 1; + + /* A list of authentication types that a client must at least support one + * in order to contact the service. Contains NULL terminated strings. */ + smartlist_t *auth_types; + + /* A list of intro points. Contains hs_desc_intro_point_t objects. */ + smartlist_t *intro_points; +} hs_desc_encrypted_data_t; + +/* Plaintext data that is unencrypted information of the descriptor. */ +typedef struct hs_desc_plaintext_data_t { + /* Version of the descriptor format. Spec specifies this field as a + * positive integer. */ + uint32_t version; + + /* The lifetime of the descriptor in seconds. */ + uint32_t lifetime_sec; + + /* Certificate with the short-term ed22519 descriptor signing key for the + * replica which is signed by the blinded public key for that replica. */ + tor_cert_t *signing_key_cert; + + /* Signing keypair which is used to sign the descriptor. Same public key + * as in the signing key certificate. */ + ed25519_keypair_t signing_kp; + + /* Blinded keypair used for this descriptor derived from the master + * identity key and generated for a specific replica number. */ + ed25519_keypair_t blinded_kp; + + /* Revision counter is incremented at each upload, regardless of whether + * the descriptor has changed. This avoids leaking whether the descriptor + * has changed. Spec specifies this as a 8 bytes positive integer. */ + uint64_t revision_counter; +} hs_desc_plaintext_data_t; + +/* Service descriptor in its decoded form. */ +typedef struct hs_descriptor_t { + /* Contains the plaintext part of the descriptor. */ + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t plaintext_data; + + /* The following contains what's in the encrypted part of the descriptor. + * It's only encrypted in the encoded version of the descriptor thus the + * data contained in that object is in plaintext. */ + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t encrypted_data; + + /* Subcredentials of a service, used by the client and service to decrypt + * the encrypted data. */ + uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN]; +} hs_descriptor_t; + +/* Return true iff the given descriptor format version is supported. */ +static inline int +hs_desc_is_supported_version(uint32_t version) +{ + if (version < HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MIN || + version > HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MAX) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/* Public API. */ + +int hs_desc_encode_descriptor(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + char **encoded_out); + +#endif /* TOR_HS_DESCRIPTOR_H */ diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 3ae45cb..e28bda4 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/ext_orport.c \ src/or/hibernate.c \ src/or/hs_common.c \ + src/or/hs_descriptor.c \ src/or/keypin.c \ src/or/main.c \ src/or/microdesc.c \ @@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/entrynodes.h \ src/or/hibernate.h \ src/or/hs_common.h \ + src/or/hs_descriptor.h \ src/or/keypin.h \ src/or/main.h \ src/or/microdesc.h \ diff --git a/src/or/torcert.h b/src/or/torcert.h index 4665e67..29bc0fc 100644 --- a/src/or/torcert.h +++ b/src/or/torcert.h @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #define CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING 0x04 #define CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_LINK 0x05 #define CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH 0x06 +#define CERT_TYPE_HS_DESC_SIGN 0x08 +#define CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH 0x09 #define CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID 0x0A #define CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_ENC 0x0B

1 0

[tor/master] prop224: Descriptor decoding implementation
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit cff1fd63f16e83e4620afc9a8219f44e8b88b592 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 28 16:27:01 2016 -0400 prop224: Descriptor decoding implementation Closes #18571 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 1191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/hs_descriptor.h | 41 ++ src/or/parsecommon.h | 14 + 3 files changed, 1225 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c index a349297..bc7d51f 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c @@ -10,24 +10,125 @@ #include "or.h" #include "ed25519_cert.h" /* Trunnel interface. */ +#include "parsecommon.h" +#include "rendcache.h" /* Constant string value used for the descriptor format. */ -static const char *str_hs_desc = "hs-descriptor"; -static const char *str_desc_cert = "descriptor-signing-key-cert"; -static const char *str_rev_counter = "revision-counter"; -static const char *str_encrypted = "encrypted"; -static const char *str_signature = "signature"; -static const char *str_lifetime = "descriptor-lifetime"; +#define str_hs_desc "hs-descriptor" +#define str_desc_cert "descriptor-signing-key-cert" +#define str_rev_counter "revision-counter" +#define str_encrypted "encrypted" +#define str_signature "signature" +#define str_lifetime "descriptor-lifetime" /* Constant string value for the encrypted part of the descriptor. */ -static const char *str_create2_formats = "create2-formats"; -static const char *str_auth_required = "authentication-required"; -static const char *str_intro_point = "introduction-point"; -static const char *str_ip_auth_key = "auth-key"; -static const char *str_ip_enc_key = "enc-key"; -static const char *str_ip_enc_key_cert = "enc-key-certification"; +#define str_create2_formats "create2-formats" +#define str_auth_required "authentication-required" +#define str_intro_point "introduction-point" +#define str_ip_auth_key "auth-key" +#define str_ip_enc_key "enc-key" +#define str_ip_enc_key_cert "enc-key-certification" +#define str_intro_point_start "\n" str_intro_point " " /* Constant string value for the construction to encrypt the encrypted data * section. */ -static const char *str_enc_hsdir_data = "hsdir-encrypted-data"; +#define str_enc_hsdir_data "hsdir-encrypted-data" +/* Prefix required to compute/verify HS desc signatures */ +#define str_desc_sig_prefix "Tor onion service descriptor sig v3" + +/* Authentication supported types. */ +static const struct { + hs_desc_auth_type_t type; + const char *identifier; +} auth_types[] = { + { HS_DESC_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password" }, + { HS_DESC_AUTH_ED25519, "ed25519" }, + /* Indicate end of array. */ + { 0, NULL } +}; + +/* Descriptor ruleset. */ +static token_rule_t hs_desc_v3_token_table[] = { + T1_START(str_hs_desc, R_HS_DESCRIPTOR, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), + T1(str_lifetime, R3_DESC_LIFETIME, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), + T1(str_desc_cert, R3_DESC_SIGNING_CERT, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ), + T1(str_rev_counter, R3_REVISION_COUNTER, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), + T1(str_encrypted, R3_ENCRYPTED, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ), + T1_END(str_signature, R3_SIGNATURE, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), + END_OF_TABLE +}; + +/* Descriptor ruleset for the encrypted section. */ +static token_rule_t hs_desc_encrypted_v3_token_table[] = { + T1_START(str_create2_formats, R3_CREATE2_FORMATS, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ), + T01(str_auth_required, R3_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED, ARGS, NO_OBJ), + END_OF_TABLE +}; + +/* Descriptor ruleset for the introduction points section. */ +static token_rule_t hs_desc_intro_point_v3_token_table[] = { + T1_START(str_intro_point, R3_INTRODUCTION_POINT, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), + T1(str_ip_auth_key, R3_INTRO_AUTH_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ), + T1(str_ip_enc_key, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY, ARGS, OBJ_OK), + T1_END(str_ip_enc_key_cert, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY_CERTIFICATION, + NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ), + END_OF_TABLE +}; + +/* Free a descriptor intro point object. */ +static void +desc_intro_point_free(hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip) +{ + if (!ip) { + return; + } + if (ip->link_specifiers) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(ip->link_specifiers, hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, + ls, tor_free(ls)); + smartlist_free(ip->link_specifiers); + } + tor_cert_free(ip->auth_key_cert); + if (ip->enc_key_type == HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY) { + crypto_pk_free(ip->enc_key.legacy); + } + tor_free(ip); +} + +/* Free the content of the plaintext section of a descriptor. */ +static void +desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc) +{ + if (!desc) { + return; + } + + if (desc->encrypted_blob) { + tor_free(desc->encrypted_blob); + } + tor_cert_free(desc->signing_key_cert); + + memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); +} + +/* Free the content of the encrypted section of a descriptor. */ +static void +desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc) +{ + if (!desc) { + return; + } + + if (desc->auth_types) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->auth_types, char *, a, tor_free(a)); + smartlist_free(desc->auth_types); + } + if (desc->intro_points) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->intro_points, hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip, + desc_intro_point_free(ip)); + smartlist_free(desc->intro_points); + } + memwipe(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc)); +} + +/* === ENCODING === */ /* Encode the ed25519 certificate cert and put the newly allocated * string in cert_str_out. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */ @@ -689,11 +790,12 @@ desc_encode_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out) /* Sign all fields of the descriptor with our short term signing key. */ { - /* XXX: Add signature prefix. */ ed25519_signature_t sig; char ed_sig_b64[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN + 1]; - if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t *) encoded_str, encoded_len, - &desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp) < 0) { + if (ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, + (const uint8_t *) encoded_str, encoded_len, + str_desc_sig_prefix, + &desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't sign encoded HS descriptor!"); tor_free(encoded_str); goto err; @@ -711,19 +813,1028 @@ desc_encode_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out) encoded_str = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 1, NULL); *encoded_out = encoded_str; - /* XXX: Decode the generated descriptor as an extra validation. */ - /* XXX: Trigger a control port event. */ /* Success! */ ret = 0; - err: +err: SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lines, char *, l, tor_free(l)); smartlist_free(lines); return ret; } +/* === DECODING === */ + +/* XXX: Stub until this function is upstream. */ +static int +rsa_ed25519_crosscert_check(const uint8_t *crosscert, + const size_t crosscert_len, + const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key, + const ed25519_public_key_t *master_key) +{ + (void) crosscert; + (void) crosscert_len; + (void) rsa_id_key; + (void) master_key; + return 0; +} + +/* Given an encoded string of the link specifiers, return a newly allocated + * list of decoded link specifiers. Return NULL on error. */ +static smartlist_t * +decode_link_specifiers(const char *encoded) +{ + int decoded_len; + size_t encoded_len, i; + uint8_t *decoded; + smartlist_t *results = NULL; + link_specifier_list_t *specs = NULL; + + tor_assert(encoded); + + encoded_len = strlen(encoded); + decoded = tor_malloc(encoded_len); + decoded_len = base64_decode((char *) decoded, encoded_len, encoded, + encoded_len); + if (decoded_len < 0) { + goto err; + } + + if (link_specifier_list_parse(&specs, decoded, + (size_t) decoded_len) < decoded_len) { + goto err; + } + tor_assert(specs); + results = smartlist_new(); + + for (i = 0; i < link_specifier_list_getlen_spec(specs); i++) { + hs_desc_link_specifier_t *hs_spec; + link_specifier_t *ls = link_specifier_list_get_spec(specs, i); + tor_assert(ls); + + hs_spec = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*hs_spec)); + hs_spec->type = link_specifier_get_ls_type(ls); + switch (hs_spec->type) { + case LS_IPV4: + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&hs_spec->u.ap.addr, + link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(ls)); + hs_spec->u.ap.port = link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(ls); + break; + case LS_IPV6: + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&hs_spec->u.ap.addr, (const char *) + link_specifier_getarray_un_ipv6_addr(ls)); + hs_spec->u.ap.port = link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(ls); + break; + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + /* Both are known at compile time so let's make sure they are the same + * else we can copy memory out of bound. */ + tor_assert(link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls) == + sizeof(hs_spec->u.legacy_id)); + memcpy(hs_spec->u.legacy_id, link_specifier_getarray_un_legacy_id(ls), + sizeof(hs_spec->u.legacy_id)); + break; + default: + goto err; + } + + smartlist_add(results, hs_spec); + } + + goto done; + err: + if (results) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(results, hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(results); + results = NULL; + } + done: + link_specifier_list_free(specs); + tor_free(decoded); + return results; +} + +/* Given a list of authentication types, decode it and put it in the encrypted + * data section. Return 1 if we at least know one of the type or 0 if we know + * none of them. */ +static int +decode_auth_type(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc, const char *list) +{ + int match = 0; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(list); + + desc->auth_types = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_split_string(desc->auth_types, list, " ", 0, 0); + + /* Validate the types that we at least know about one. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->auth_types, const char *, auth) { + for (int idx = 0; auth_types[idx].identifier; idx++) { + if (!strncmp(auth, auth_types[idx].identifier, + strlen(auth_types[idx].identifier))) { + match = 1; + break; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(auth); + + return match; +} + +/* Parse a space-delimited list of integers representing CREATE2 formats into + * the bitfield in hs_desc_encrypted_data_t. Ignore unrecognized values. */ +static void +decode_create2_list(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc, const char *list) +{ + smartlist_t *tokens; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(list); + + tokens = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_split_string(tokens, list, " ", 0, 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(tokens, char *, s) { + int ok; + unsigned long type = tor_parse_ulong(s, 10, 1, UINT16_MAX, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unparseable value %s in create2 list", escaped(s)); + continue; + } + switch (type) { + case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR: + desc->create2_ntor = 1; + break; + default: + /* We deliberately ignore unsupported handshake types */ + continue; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(tokens); +} + +/* Given a certificate, validate the certificate for certain conditions which + * are if the given type matches the cert's one, if the signing key is + * included and if the that key was actually used to sign the certificate. + * + * Return 1 iff if all conditions pass or 0 if one of them fails. */ +static int +cert_is_valid(tor_cert_t *cert, uint8_t type, const char *log_obj_type) +{ + tor_assert(log_obj_type); + + if (cert == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Certificate for %s couldn't be parsed.", log_obj_type); + goto err; + } + if (cert->cert_type != type) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid cert type %02x for %s.", cert->cert_type, + log_obj_type); + goto err; + } + /* All certificate must have its signing key included. */ + if (!cert->signing_key_included) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Signing key is NOT included for %s.", log_obj_type); + goto err; + } + /* The following will not only check if the signature matches but also the + * expiration date and overall validity. */ + if (tor_cert_checksig(cert, &cert->signing_key, time(NULL)) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid signature for %s.", log_obj_type); + goto err; + } + + return 1; + err: + return 0; +} + +/* Given some binary data, try to parse it to get a certificate object. If we + * have a valid cert, validate it using the given wanted type. On error, print + * a log using the err_msg has the certificate identifier adding semantic to + * the log and cert_out is set to NULL. On success, 0 is returned and cert_out + * points to a newly allocated certificate object. */ +static int +cert_parse_and_validate(tor_cert_t **cert_out, const char *data, + size_t data_len, unsigned int cert_type_wanted, + const char *err_msg) +{ + tor_cert_t *cert; + + tor_assert(cert_out); + tor_assert(data); + tor_assert(err_msg); + + /* Parse certificate. */ + cert = tor_cert_parse((const uint8_t *) data, data_len); + if (!cert) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Certificate for %s couldn't be parsed.", err_msg); + goto err; + } + + /* Validate certificate. */ + if (!cert_is_valid(cert, cert_type_wanted, err_msg)) { + goto err; + } + + *cert_out = cert; + return 0; + + err: + tor_cert_free(cert); + *cert_out = NULL; + return -1; +} + +/* Return true iff the given length of the encrypted data of a descriptor + * passes validation. */ +static int +encrypted_data_length_is_valid(size_t len) +{ + /* Check for the minimum length possible. */ + if (len < HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_MIN_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Length of descriptor's encrypted data is too small. " + "Got %lu but minimum value is %d", + len, HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_MIN_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* Encrypted data has the salt and MAC concatenated to it so remove those + * from the validation calculation. */ + len -= HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN; + + /* Check that it's aligned on the block size of the crypto algorithm. */ + if (len % HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Length of descriptor's encrypted data is invalid. " + "Got %lu which is not a multiple of %d.", + len, HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE); + goto err; + } + + /* XXX: Check maximum size. Will strongly depends on the maximum intro point + * allowed we decide on and probably if they will all have to use the legacy + * key which is bigger than the ed25519 key. */ + + return 1; + err: + return 0; +} + +/* Decrypt the encrypted section of the descriptor using the given descriptor + * object desc. A newly allocated NUL terminated string is put in + * decrypted_out. Return the length of decrypted_out on success else 0 is + * returned and decrypted_out is set to NULL. */ +static size_t +desc_decrypt_data_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **decrypted_out) +{ + uint8_t *decrypted = NULL; + uint8_t secret_key[CIPHER_KEY_LEN], secret_iv[CIPHER_IV_LEN]; + uint8_t mac_key[DIGEST256_LEN], our_mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; + const uint8_t *salt, *encrypted, *desc_mac; + size_t encrypted_len, result_len = 0; + + tor_assert(decrypted_out); + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob); + + /* Construction is as follow: SALT | ENCRYPTED_DATA | MAC */ + if (!encrypted_data_length_is_valid( + desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob_size)) { + goto err; + } + + /* Start of the blob thus the salt. */ + salt = desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob; + /* Next is the encrypted data. */ + encrypted = desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob + + HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN; + encrypted_len = desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob_size - + (HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN); + + /* At the very end is the MAC. Make sure it's of the right size. */ + { + desc_mac = encrypted + encrypted_len; + size_t desc_mac_size = desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob_size - + (desc_mac - desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob); + if (desc_mac_size != DIGEST256_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor MAC length of encrypted data " + "is invalid (%lu, expected %u)", + desc_mac_size, DIGEST256_LEN); + goto err; + } + } + + /* KDF construction resulting in a key from which the secret key, IV and MAC + * key are extracted which is what we need for the decryption. */ + build_secret_key_iv_mac(desc, salt, HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN, + secret_key, sizeof(secret_key), + secret_iv, sizeof(secret_iv), + mac_key, sizeof(mac_key)); + + /* Build MAC. */ + build_mac(mac_key, sizeof(mac_key), salt, HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN, + encrypted, encrypted_len, our_mac, sizeof(our_mac)); + memwipe(mac_key, 0, sizeof(mac_key)); + /* Verify MAC; MAC is H(mac_key || salt || encrypted) + * + * This is a critical check that is making sure the computed MAC matches the + * one in the descriptor. */ + if (!tor_memeq(our_mac, desc_mac, sizeof(our_mac))) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed"); + goto err; + } + + { + /* Decrypt. Here we are assured that the encrypted length is valid for + * decryption. */ + crypto_cipher_t *cipher; + cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_iv((const char *) secret_key, + (const char *) secret_iv); + /* Extra byte for the NUL terminated byte. */ + decrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_len + 1); + crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, (char *) decrypted, + (const char *) encrypted, encrypted_len); + crypto_cipher_free(cipher); + } + + { + /* Adjust length to remove NULL padding bytes */ + uint8_t *end = memchr(decrypted, 0, encrypted_len); + result_len = encrypted_len; + if (end) { + result_len = end - decrypted; + } + } + + /* Make sure to NUL terminate the string. */ + decrypted[encrypted_len] = '\0'; + *decrypted_out = (char *) decrypted; + goto done; + +err: + if (decrypted) { + tor_free(decrypted); + } + *decrypted_out = NULL; + result_len = 0; + +done: + memwipe(secret_key, 0, sizeof(secret_key)); + memwipe(secret_iv, 0, sizeof(secret_iv)); + return result_len; +} + +/* Given the start of a section and the end of it, decode a single + * introduction point from that section. Return a newly allocated introduction + * point object containing the decoded data. Return NULL if the section can't + * be decoded. */ +static hs_desc_intro_point_t * +decode_introduction_point(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *start) +{ + hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = NULL; + memarea_t *area = NULL; + smartlist_t *tokens = NULL; + tor_cert_t *cross_cert = NULL; + const directory_token_t *tok; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(start); + + area = memarea_new(); + tokens = smartlist_new(); + if (tokenize_string(area, start, start + strlen(start), + tokens, hs_desc_intro_point_v3_token_table, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point is not parseable"); + goto err; + } + + /* Ok we seem to have a well formed section containing enough tokens to + * parse. Allocate our IP object and try to populate it. */ + ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_intro_point_t)); + + /* "introduction-point" SP link-specifiers NL */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_INTRODUCTION_POINT); + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + ip->link_specifiers = decode_link_specifiers(tok->args[0]); + if (!ip->link_specifiers) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point has invalid link specifiers"); + goto err; + } + + /* "auth-key" NL certificate NL */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_INTRO_AUTH_KEY); + tor_assert(tok->object_body); + if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unexpected object type for introduction auth key"); + goto err; + } + + /* Parse cert and do some validation. */ + if (cert_parse_and_validate(&ip->auth_key_cert, tok->object_body, + tok->object_size, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, + "introduction point auth-key") < 0) { + goto err; + } + + /* Exactly one "enc-key" ... */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY); + if (!strcmp(tok->args[0], "ntor")) { + /* "enc-key" SP "ntor" SP key NL */ + if (tok->n_args != 2 || tok->object_body) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point ntor encryption key is invalid"); + goto err; + } + + if (curve25519_public_from_base64(&ip->enc_key.curve25519.pubkey, + tok->args[1]) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point ntor encryption key is invalid"); + goto err; + } + ip->enc_key_type = HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519; + } else if (!strcmp(tok->args[0], "legacy")) { + /* "enc-key" SP "legacy" NL key NL */ + if (!tok->key) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point legacy encryption key is " + "invalid"); + goto err; + } + ip->enc_key.legacy = crypto_pk_dup_key(tok->key); + ip->enc_key_type = HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY; + } else { + /* Unknown key type so we can't use that introduction point. */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point encryption key is unrecognized."); + goto err; + } + + /* "enc-key-certification" NL certificate NL */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY_CERTIFICATION); + tor_assert(tok->object_body); + /* Do the cross certification. */ + switch (ip->enc_key_type) { + case HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519: + { + if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point ntor encryption key " + "cross-certification has an unknown format."); + goto err; + } + if (cert_parse_and_validate(&cross_cert, tok->object_body, + tok->object_size, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_ENC, + "introduction point enc-key-certification") < 0) { + goto err; + } + break; + } + case HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY: + if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "CROSSCERT")) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point legacy encryption key " + "cross-certification has an unknown format."); + goto err; + } + if (rsa_ed25519_crosscert_check((const uint8_t *) tok->object_body, + tok->object_size, ip->enc_key.legacy, + &desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert->signing_key)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to cross certify the introduction point " + "legacy encryption key."); + goto err; + } + break; + default: + tor_assert(0); + break; + } + /* It is successfully cross certified. Flag the object. */ + ip->cross_certified = 1; + goto done; + + err: + desc_intro_point_free(ip); + ip = NULL; + + done: + tor_cert_free(cross_cert); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t)); + smartlist_free(tokens); + memarea_drop_all(area); + + return ip; +} + +/* Given a descriptor string at data, decode all possible introduction points + * that we can find. Add the introduction point object to desc_enc as we find + * them. Return 0 on success. + * + * On error, a negative value is returned. It is possible that some intro + * point object have been added to the desc_enc, they should be considered + * invalid. One single bad encoded introduction point will make this function + * return an error. */ +static int +decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_enc, + const char *data) +{ + int retval = -1; + smartlist_t *chunked_desc = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_t *intro_points = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(desc_enc); + tor_assert(data); + tor_assert(desc_enc->intro_points); + + /* Take the desc string, and extract the intro point substrings out of it */ + { + /* Split the descriptor string using the intro point header as delimiter */ + smartlist_split_string(chunked_desc, data, str_intro_point_start, 0, 0); + + /* Check if there are actually any intro points included. The first chunk + * should be other descriptor fields (e.g. create2-formats), so it's not an + * intro point. */ + if (smartlist_len(chunked_desc) < 2) { + goto done; + } + } + + /* Take the intro point substrings, and prepare them for parsing */ + { + int i = 0; + /* Prepend the introduction-point header to all the chunks, since + smartlist_split_string() devoured it. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(chunked_desc, char *, chunk) { + /* Ignore first chunk. It's other descriptor fields. */ + if (i++ == 0) { + continue; + } + + smartlist_add_asprintf(intro_points, "%s %s", str_intro_point, chunk); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(chunk); + } + + /* Parse the intro points! */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(intro_points, const char *, intro_point) { + hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, intro_point); + if (!ip) { + /* Malformed introduction point section. Stop right away, this + * descriptor shouldn't be used. */ + goto err; + } + smartlist_add(desc_enc->intro_points, ip); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro_point); + + done: + retval = 0; + + err: + if (chunked_desc) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunked_desc, char *, a, tor_free(a)); + smartlist_free(chunked_desc); + } + if (intro_points) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(intro_points, char *, a, tor_free(a)); + smartlist_free(intro_points); + } + + return retval; +} +/* Return 1 iff the given base64 encoded signature in b64_sig from the encoded + * descriptor in encoded_desc validates the descriptor content. */ +static int +desc_sig_is_valid(const char *b64_sig, const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp, + const char *encoded_desc, size_t encoded_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + ed25519_signature_t sig; + const char *sig_start; + + tor_assert(b64_sig); + tor_assert(signing_kp); + tor_assert(encoded_desc); + /* Verifying nothing won't end well :). */ + tor_assert(encoded_len > 0); + + /* Signature length check. */ + if (strlen(b64_sig) != ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor has an invalid signature length." + "Exptected %d but got %lu", + ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN, strlen(b64_sig)); + goto err; + } + + /* First, convert base64 blob to an ed25519 signature. */ + if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&sig, b64_sig) != 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor does not contain a valid " + "signature"); + goto err; + } + + /* Find the start of signature. */ + sig_start = tor_memstr(encoded_desc, encoded_len, "\n" str_signature); + /* Getting here means the token parsing worked for the signature so if we + * can't find the start of the signature, we have a code flow issue. */ + if (BUG(!sig_start)) { + goto err; + } + /* Skip newline, it has to go in the signature check. */ + sig_start++; + + /* Validate signature with the full body of the descriptor. */ + if (ed25519_checksig_prefixed(&sig, + (const uint8_t *) encoded_desc, + sig_start - encoded_desc, + str_desc_sig_prefix, + &signing_kp->pubkey) != 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid signature on service descriptor"); + goto err; + } + /* Valid signature! All is good. */ + ret = 1; + +err: + return ret; +} + +/* Decode descriptor plaintext data for version 3. Given a list of tokens, an + * allocated plaintext object that will be populated and the encoded + * descriptor with its length. The last one is needed for signature + * verification. Unknown tokens are simply ignored so this won't error on + * unknowns but requires that all v3 token be present and valid. + * + * Return 0 on success else a negative value. */ +static int +desc_decode_plaintext_v3(smartlist_t *tokens, + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc, + const char *encoded_desc, size_t encoded_len) +{ + int ok; + directory_token_t *tok; + + tor_assert(tokens); + tor_assert(desc); + /* Version higher could still use this function to decode most of the + * descriptor and then they decode the extra part. */ + tor_assert(desc->version >= 3); + + /* Descriptor lifetime parsing. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_DESC_LIFETIME); + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + desc->lifetime_sec = (uint32_t) tor_parse_ulong(tok->args[0], 10, 0, + UINT32_MAX, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor lifetime value is invalid"); + goto err; + } + /* Put it from minute to second. */ + desc->lifetime_sec *= 60; + if (desc->lifetime_sec > HS_DESC_MAX_LIFETIME) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor lifetime is too big. " + "Got %" PRIu32 " but max is %d", + desc->lifetime_sec, HS_DESC_MAX_LIFETIME); + goto err; + } + + /* Descriptor signing certificate. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_DESC_SIGNING_CERT); + tor_assert(tok->object_body); + /* Expecting a prop220 cert with the signing key extension, which contains + * the blinded public key. */ + if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT") != 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor signing cert wrong type (%s)", + escaped(tok->object_type)); + goto err; + } + if (cert_parse_and_validate(&desc->signing_key_cert, tok->object_body, + tok->object_size, CERT_TYPE_HS_DESC_SIGN, + "service descriptor signing key") < 0) { + goto err; + } + + /* Copy the public keys into signing_kp and blinded_kp */ + memcpy(&desc->signing_kp.pubkey, &desc->signing_key_cert->signed_key, + sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + memcpy(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, &desc->signing_key_cert->signing_key, + sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + + /* Extract revision counter value. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_REVISION_COUNTER); + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + desc->revision_counter = tor_parse_uint64(tok->args[0], 10, 0, + UINT64_MAX, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor revision-counter is invalid"); + goto err; + } + + /* Extract the encrypted data section. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_ENCRYPTED); + tor_assert(tok->object_body); + if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "MESSAGE") != 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor encrypted data section is invalid"); + goto err; + } + /* Make sure the length of the encrypted blob is valid. */ + if (!encrypted_data_length_is_valid(tok->object_size)) { + goto err; + } + + /* Copy the encrypted blob to the descriptor object so we can handle it + * latter if needed. */ + desc->encrypted_blob = tor_memdup(tok->object_body, tok->object_size); + desc->encrypted_blob_size = tok->object_size; + + /* Extract signature and verify it. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_SIGNATURE); + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + /* First arg here is the actual encoded signature. */ + if (!desc_sig_is_valid(tok->args[0], &desc->signing_kp, + encoded_desc, encoded_len)) { + goto err; + } + + return 0; +err: + return -1; +} + +/* Decode the version 3 encrypted section of the given descriptor desc. The + * desc_encrypted_out will be populated with the decoded data. Return 0 on + * success else -1. */ +static int +desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted_out) +{ + int result = -1; + char *message = NULL; + size_t message_len; + memarea_t *area = NULL; + directory_token_t *tok; + smartlist_t *tokens = NULL; + + tor_assert(desc); + tor_assert(desc_encrypted_out); + + /* Decrypt the encrypted data that is located in the plaintext section in + * the descriptor as a blob of bytes. The following functions will use the + * keys found in the same section. */ + message_len = desc_decrypt_data_v3(desc, &message); + if (!message_len) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor decryption failed."); + goto err; + } + tor_assert(message); + + area = memarea_new(); + tokens = smartlist_new(); + if (tokenize_string(area, message, message + message_len, + tokens, hs_desc_encrypted_v3_token_table, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor is not parseable."); + goto err; + } + + /* CREATE2 supported cell format. It's mandatory. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R3_CREATE2_FORMATS); + tor_assert(tok); + decode_create2_list(desc_encrypted_out, tok->args[0]); + /* Must support ntor according to the specification */ + if (!desc_encrypted_out->create2_ntor) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service create2-formats does not include ntor."); + goto err; + } + + /* Authentication type. It's optional but only once. */ + tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, R3_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED); + if (tok) { + if (!decode_auth_type(desc_encrypted_out, tok->args[0])) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor authentication type has " + "invalid entry(ies)."); + goto err; + } + } + /* Initialize the descriptor's introduction point list before we start + * decoding. Having 0 intro point is valid. Then decode them all. */ + desc_encrypted_out->intro_points = smartlist_new(); + if (decode_intro_points(desc, desc_encrypted_out, message) < 0) { + goto err; + } + /* Validation of maximum introduction points allowed. */ + if (smartlist_len(desc_encrypted_out->intro_points) > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor contains too many introduction " + "points. Maximum allowed is %d but we have %d", + MAX_INTRO_POINTS, + smartlist_len(desc_encrypted_out->intro_points)); + goto err; + } + + /* NOTE: Unknown fields are allowed because this function could be used to + * decode other descriptor version. */ + + result = 0; + goto done; + + err: + tor_assert(result < 0); + desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(desc_encrypted_out); + + done: + if (tokens) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t)); + smartlist_free(tokens); + } + if (area) { + memarea_drop_all(area); + } + if (message) { + tor_free(message); + } + return result; +} + +/* Table of encrypted decode function version specific. The function are + * indexed by the version number so v3 callback is at index 3 in the array. */ +static int + (*decode_encrypted_handlers[])( + const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted) = +{ + /* v0 */ NULL, /* v1 */ NULL, /* v2 */ NULL, + desc_decode_encrypted_v3, +}; + +/* Decode the encrypted data section of the given descriptor and store the + * data in the given encrypted data object. Return 0 on success else a + * negative value on error. */ +int +hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_encrypted) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t version; + + tor_assert(desc); + /* Ease our life a bit. */ + version = desc->plaintext_data.version; + tor_assert(desc_encrypted); + /* Calling this function without an encrypted blob to parse is a code flow + * error. The plaintext parsing should never succeed in the first place + * without an encrypted section. */ + tor_assert(desc->plaintext_data.encrypted_blob); + /* Let's make sure we have a supported version as well. By correctly parsing + * the plaintext, this should not fail. */ + if (BUG(!hs_desc_is_supported_version(version))) { + ret = -1; + goto err; + } + /* Extra precaution. Having no handler for the supported version should + * never happened else we forgot to add it but we bumped the version. */ + tor_assert(ARRAY_LENGTH(decode_encrypted_handlers) >= version); + tor_assert(decode_encrypted_handlers[version]); + + /* Run the version specific plaintext decoder. */ + ret = decode_encrypted_handlers[version](desc, desc_encrypted); + if (ret < 0) { + goto err; + } + + err: + return ret; +} + +/* Table of plaintext decode function version specific. The function are + * indexed by the version number so v3 callback is at index 3 in the array. */ +static int + (*decode_plaintext_handlers[])( + smartlist_t *tokens, + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc, + const char *encoded_desc, + size_t encoded_len) = +{ + /* v0 */ NULL, /* v1 */ NULL, /* v2 */ NULL, + desc_decode_plaintext_v3, +}; + +/* Fully decode the given descriptor plaintext and store the data in the + * plaintext data object. Returns 0 on success else a negative value. */ +int +hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext) +{ + int ok = 0, ret = -1; + memarea_t *area = NULL; + smartlist_t *tokens = NULL; + size_t encoded_len; + directory_token_t *tok; + + tor_assert(encoded); + tor_assert(plaintext); + + encoded_len = strlen(encoded); + if (encoded_len >= HS_DESC_MAX_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor is too big (%lu bytes)", + encoded_len); + goto err; + } + + area = memarea_new(); + tokens = smartlist_new(); + /* Tokenize the descriptor so we can start to parse it. */ + if (tokenize_string(area, encoded, encoded + encoded_len, tokens, + hs_desc_v3_token_table, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor is not parseable"); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the version of the descriptor which is the first mandatory field of + * the descriptor. From there, we'll decode the right descriptor version. */ + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_HS_DESCRIPTOR); + tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); + plaintext->version = (uint32_t) tor_parse_ulong(tok->args[0], 10, 0, + UINT32_MAX, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor has unparseable version %s", + escaped(tok->args[0])); + goto err; + } + if (!hs_desc_is_supported_version(plaintext->version)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor has unsupported version %" PRIu32, + plaintext->version); + goto err; + } + /* Extra precaution. Having no handler for the supported version should + * never happened else we forgot to add it but we bumped the version. */ + tor_assert(ARRAY_LENGTH(decode_plaintext_handlers) >= plaintext->version); + tor_assert(decode_plaintext_handlers[plaintext->version]); + + /* Run the version specific plaintext decoder. */ + ret = decode_plaintext_handlers[plaintext->version](tokens, plaintext, + encoded, encoded_len); + if (ret < 0) { + goto err; + } + /* Success. Descriptor has been populated with the data. */ + ret = 0; + +err: + if (tokens) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t)); + smartlist_free(tokens); + } + if (area) { + memarea_drop_all(area); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Fully decode an encoded descriptor and set a newly allocated descriptor + * object in desc_out. Subcredentials are used if not NULL else it's ignored. + * + * Return 0 on success. A negative value is returned on error and desc_out is + * set to NULL. */ +int +hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded, + const uint8_t *subcredential, + hs_descriptor_t **desc_out) +{ + int ret; + hs_descriptor_t *desc; + + tor_assert(encoded); + + desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_descriptor_t)); + + /* Subcredentials are optional. */ + if (subcredential) { + memcpy(desc->subcredential, subcredential, sizeof(desc->subcredential)); + } + + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(encoded, &desc->plaintext_data); + if (ret < 0) { + goto err; + } + + ret = hs_desc_decode_encrypted(desc, &desc->encrypted_data); + if (ret < 0) { + goto err; + } + + if (desc_out) { + *desc_out = desc; + } else { + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + } + return ret; + + err: + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + if (desc_out) { + *desc_out = NULL; + } + + tor_assert(ret < 0); + return ret; +} + /* Table of encode function version specific. The function are indexed by the * version number so v3 callback is at index 3 in the array. */ static int @@ -740,7 +1851,7 @@ static int * string. * * Return 0 on success and encoded_out is a valid pointer. On error, -1 is - * returned and encoded_out is untouched. */ + * returned and encoded_out is set to NULL. */ int hs_desc_encode_descriptor(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out) { @@ -763,6 +1874,44 @@ hs_desc_encode_descriptor(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out) goto err; } - err: + /* Try to decode what we just encoded. Symmetry is nice! */ + ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(*encoded_out, desc->subcredential, NULL); + if (BUG(ret < 0)) { + goto err; + } + + return 0; + +err: + *encoded_out = NULL; return ret; } + +/* Free the descriptor plaintext data object. */ +void +hs_desc_plaintext_data_free(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc) +{ + desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(desc); + tor_free(desc); +} + +/* Free the descriptor encrypted data object. */ +void +hs_desc_encrypted_data_free(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc) +{ + desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(desc); + tor_free(desc); +} + +/* Free the given descriptor object. */ +void +hs_descriptor_free(hs_descriptor_t *desc) +{ + if (!desc) { + return; + } + + desc_plaintext_data_free_contents(&desc->plaintext_data); + desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(&desc->encrypted_data); + tor_free(desc); +} diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h index 98dbb22..7ee6861 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ /* The latest descriptor format version we support. */ #define HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MAX 3 +/* Maximum lifetime of a descriptor in seconds. The value is set at 12 hours + * which is 720 minutes or 43200 seconds. */ +#define HS_DESC_MAX_LIFETIME (12 * 60 * 60) /* Lifetime of certificate in the descriptor. This defines the lifetime of the * descriptor signing key and the cross certification cert of that key. */ #define HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME (24 * 60 * 60) @@ -45,6 +48,22 @@ * triggered if we are above it. */ /* Once padded, this is the maximum length in bytes for the plaintext. */ #define HS_DESC_PADDED_PLAINTEXT_MAX_LEN 8192 +/* Minimum length in bytes of the encrypted portion of the descriptor. */ +#define HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_MIN_LEN \ + HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN + \ + HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE + DIGEST256_LEN +/* Maximum length in bytes of a full hidden service descriptor. */ +#define HS_DESC_MAX_LEN 32768 // XXX justify +/* The minimum amount of fields a descriptor should contain. The parsing of + * the fields are version specific so the only required field, as a generic + * view of a descriptor, is 1 that is the version field. */ +#define HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_MIN_FIELDS 1 + +/* Type of authentication in the descriptor. */ +typedef enum { + HS_DESC_AUTH_PASSWORD = 1, + HS_DESC_AUTH_ED25519 = 2, +} hs_desc_auth_type_t; /* Type of encryption key in the descriptor. */ typedef enum { @@ -91,6 +110,10 @@ typedef struct hs_desc_intro_point_t { * Mutually exclusive with enc_key. */ crypto_pk_t *legacy; } enc_key; + + /* True iff the introduction point has passed the cross certification. Upon + * decoding an intro point, this must be true. */ + unsigned int cross_certified : 1; } hs_desc_intro_point_t; /* The encrypted data section of a descriptor. Obviously the data in this is @@ -133,6 +156,12 @@ typedef struct hs_desc_plaintext_data_t { * the descriptor has changed. This avoids leaking whether the descriptor * has changed. Spec specifies this as a 8 bytes positive integer. */ uint64_t revision_counter; + + /* Decoding only: The base64-decoded encrypted blob from the descriptor */ + uint8_t *encrypted_blob; + + /* Decoding only: Size of the encrypted_blob */ + size_t encrypted_blob_size; } hs_desc_plaintext_data_t; /* Service descriptor in its decoded form. */ @@ -163,7 +192,19 @@ hs_desc_is_supported_version(uint32_t version) /* Public API. */ +void hs_descriptor_free(hs_descriptor_t *desc); +void hs_desc_plaintext_data_free(hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *desc); +void hs_desc_encrypted_data_free(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc); + int hs_desc_encode_descriptor(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, char **encoded_out); +int hs_desc_decode_descriptor(const char *encoded, + const uint8_t *subcredential, + hs_descriptor_t **desc_out); +int hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext); +int hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_out); + #endif /* TOR_HS_DESCRIPTOR_H */ diff --git a/src/or/parsecommon.h b/src/or/parsecommon.h index 3bb89ce..f87e62d 100644 --- a/src/or/parsecommon.h +++ b/src/or/parsecommon.h @@ -145,6 +145,20 @@ typedef enum { R_INTRODUCTION_POINTS, R_SIGNATURE, + R_HS_DESCRIPTOR, /* From version 3, this MUST be generic to all future + descriptor versions thus making it R_. */ + R3_DESC_LIFETIME, + R3_DESC_SIGNING_CERT, + R3_REVISION_COUNTER, + R3_ENCRYPTED, + R3_SIGNATURE, + R3_CREATE2_FORMATS, + R3_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED, + R3_INTRODUCTION_POINT, + R3_INTRO_AUTH_KEY, + R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY, + R3_INTRO_ENC_KEY_CERTIFICATION, + R_IPO_IDENTIFIER, R_IPO_IP_ADDRESS, R_IPO_ONION_PORT,

1 0

[tor/master] test: Add prop224 descriptor unit tests
by nickm＠torproject.org 04 Nov '16

04 Nov '16

commit 473f99bf7bdb7d23b914cd1b590451333baaf7fe Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Tue Mar 15 14:18:03 2016 -0400 test: Add prop224 descriptor unit tests Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> --- src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 21 +- src/or/hs_descriptor.h | 25 + src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 1 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 1127 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 1167 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c index bc7d51f..cdbea76 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ * \brief Handle hidden service descriptor encoding/decoding. **/ +/* For unit tests.*/ +#define HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE + #include "hs_descriptor.h" #include "or.h" @@ -132,7 +135,7 @@ desc_encrypted_data_free_contents(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc) /* Encode the ed25519 certificate cert and put the newly allocated * string in cert_str_out. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */ -static int +STATIC int encode_cert(const tor_cert_t *cert, char **cert_str_out) { int ret = -1; @@ -172,7 +175,7 @@ err: /* Encode the given link specifier objects into a newly allocated string. * This can't fail so caller can always assume a valid string being * returned. */ -static char * +STATIC char * encode_link_specifiers(const smartlist_t *specs) { char *encoded_b64 = NULL; @@ -528,7 +531,7 @@ compute_padded_plaintext_length(size_t plaintext_len) /* Given a buffer, pad it up to the encrypted section padding requirement. Set * the newly allocated string in padded_out and return the length of the * padded buffer. */ -static size_t +STATIC size_t build_plaintext_padding(const char *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len, uint8_t **padded_out) { @@ -842,7 +845,7 @@ rsa_ed25519_crosscert_check(const uint8_t *crosscert, /* Given an encoded string of the link specifiers, return a newly allocated * list of decoded link specifiers. Return NULL on error. */ -static smartlist_t * +STATIC smartlist_t * decode_link_specifiers(const char *encoded) { int decoded_len; @@ -981,7 +984,7 @@ decode_create2_list(hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc, const char *list) * included and if the that key was actually used to sign the certificate. * * Return 1 iff if all conditions pass or 0 if one of them fails. */ -static int +STATIC int cert_is_valid(tor_cert_t *cert, uint8_t type, const char *log_obj_type) { tor_assert(log_obj_type); @@ -1051,7 +1054,7 @@ cert_parse_and_validate(tor_cert_t **cert_out, const char *data, /* Return true iff the given length of the encrypted data of a descriptor * passes validation. */ -static int +STATIC int encrypted_data_length_is_valid(size_t len) { /* Check for the minimum length possible. */ @@ -1191,7 +1194,7 @@ done: * introduction point from that section. Return a newly allocated introduction * point object containing the decoded data. Return NULL if the section can't * be decoded. */ -static hs_desc_intro_point_t * +STATIC hs_desc_intro_point_t * decode_introduction_point(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *start) { hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = NULL; @@ -1331,7 +1334,7 @@ decode_introduction_point(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *start) * point object have been added to the desc_enc, they should be considered * invalid. One single bad encoded introduction point will make this function * return an error. */ -static int +STATIC int decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_enc, const char *data) @@ -1401,7 +1404,7 @@ decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, } /* Return 1 iff the given base64 encoded signature in b64_sig from the encoded * descriptor in encoded_desc validates the descriptor content. */ -static int +STATIC int desc_sig_is_valid(const char *b64_sig, const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp, const char *encoded_desc, size_t encoded_len) { diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h index 7ee6861..9b48096 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.h +++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.h @@ -207,4 +207,29 @@ int hs_desc_decode_plaintext(const char *encoded, int hs_desc_decode_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_out); +#ifdef HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE + +/* Encoding. */ +STATIC int encode_cert(const tor_cert_t *cert, char **cert_str_out); +STATIC char *encode_link_specifiers(const smartlist_t *specs); +STATIC size_t build_plaintext_padding(const char *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_len, + uint8_t **padded_out); +/* Decoding. */ +STATIC smartlist_t *decode_link_specifiers(const char *encoded); +STATIC hs_desc_intro_point_t *decode_introduction_point( + const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + const char *text); +STATIC int decode_intro_points(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *desc_enc, + const char *data); +STATIC int encrypted_data_length_is_valid(size_t len); +STATIC int cert_is_valid(tor_cert_t *cert, uint8_t type, + const char *log_obj_type); +STATIC int desc_sig_is_valid(const char *b64_sig, + const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp, + const char *encoded_desc, size_t encoded_len); + +#endif /* HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE */ + #endif /* TOR_HS_DESCRIPTOR_H */ diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 2e91f7c..79e4239 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES = \ src/test/test_extorport.c \ src/test/test_hs.c \ src/test/test_handles.c \ + src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c \ src/test/test_introduce.c \ src/test/test_keypin.c \ src/test/test_link_handshake.c \ diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 2f10c7e..a81fbc8 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -1205,6 +1205,7 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "guardfraction/", guardfraction_tests }, { "extorport/", extorport_tests }, { "hs/", hs_tests }, + { "hs_descriptor/", hs_descriptor }, { "introduce/", introduce_tests }, { "keypin/", keypin_tests }, { "link-handshake/", link_handshake_tests }, diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h index c0643e1..98b85b3 100644 --- a/src/test/test.h +++ b/src/test/test.h @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t guardfraction_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t extorport_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t hs_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t hs_descriptor[]; extern struct testcase_t introduce_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t keypin_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t link_handshake_tests[]; diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9030c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c @@ -0,0 +1,1127 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file test_hs_descriptor.c + * \brief Test hidden service descriptor encoding and decoding. + */ + +#define HS_DESCRIPTOR_PRIVATE + +#include "crypto_ed25519.h" +#include "ed25519_cert.h" +#include "or.h" +#include "hs_descriptor.h" +#include "test.h" +#include "torcert.h" + +static hs_desc_intro_point_t * +helper_build_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *blinded_kp, time_t now, + const char *addr, int legacy) +{ + int ret; + ed25519_keypair_t auth_kp; + hs_desc_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL; + hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ip)); + ip->link_specifiers = smartlist_new(); + + { + hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ls)); + if (legacy) { + ls->type = LS_LEGACY_ID; + memcpy(ls->u.legacy_id, "0299F268FCA9D55CD157976D39AE92B4B455B3A8", DIGEST_LEN); + } else { + ls->u.ap.port = 9001; + int family = tor_addr_parse(&ls->u.ap.addr, addr); + switch (family) { + case AF_INET: + ls->type = LS_IPV4; + break; + case AF_INET6: + ls->type = LS_IPV6; + break; + default: + /* Stop the test, not suppose to have an error. */ + tt_int_op(family, OP_EQ, AF_INET); + } + } + smartlist_add(ip->link_specifiers, ls); + } + + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&auth_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ip->auth_key_cert = tor_cert_create(blinded_kp, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, + &auth_kp.pubkey, now, + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME, + CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + tt_assert(ip->auth_key_cert); + + if (legacy) { + ip->enc_key.legacy = crypto_pk_new(); + ip->enc_key_type = HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY; + tt_assert(ip->enc_key.legacy); + ret = crypto_pk_generate_key(ip->enc_key.legacy); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + } else { + ret = curve25519_keypair_generate(&ip->enc_key.curve25519, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ip->enc_key_type = HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519; + } + + intro_point = ip; + done: + return intro_point; +} + +/* Return a valid hs_descriptor_t object. If no_ip is set, no introduction + * points are added. */ +static hs_descriptor_t * +helper_build_hs_desc(unsigned int no_ip) +{ + int ret; + time_t now = time(NULL); + hs_descriptor_t *descp = NULL, *desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*desc)); + + desc->plaintext_data.version = HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MAX; + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + + desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert = + tor_cert_create(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, + CERT_TYPE_HS_DESC_SIGN, + &desc->plaintext_data.signing_kp.pubkey, now, + 3600, + CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + tt_assert(desc->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert); + desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter = 42; + desc->plaintext_data.lifetime_sec = 3 * 60 * 60; + + /* Setup encrypted data section. */ + desc->encrypted_data.create2_ntor = 1; + desc->encrypted_data.auth_types = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.auth_types, strdup("ed25519")); + desc->encrypted_data.intro_points = smartlist_new(); + if (!no_ip) { + /* Add four intro points. */ + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + helper_build_intro_point(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, now, + "1.2.3.4", 0)); + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + helper_build_intro_point(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, now, + "[2600::1]", 0)); + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + helper_build_intro_point(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, now, + "3.2.1.4", 1)); + smartlist_add(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, + helper_build_intro_point(&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_kp, now, + "", 1)); + } + + descp = desc; + done: + return descp; +} + +static void +helper_compare_hs_desc(const hs_descriptor_t *desc1, + const hs_descriptor_t *desc2) +{ + /* Plaintext data section. */ + tt_int_op(desc1->plaintext_data.version, OP_EQ, + desc2->plaintext_data.version); + tt_uint_op(desc1->plaintext_data.lifetime_sec, OP_EQ, + desc2->plaintext_data.lifetime_sec); + tt_assert(tor_cert_eq(desc1->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert, + desc2->plaintext_data.signing_key_cert)); + tt_mem_op(desc1->plaintext_data.signing_kp.pubkey.pubkey, OP_EQ, + desc2->plaintext_data.signing_kp.pubkey.pubkey, + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + tt_mem_op(desc1->plaintext_data.blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey, OP_EQ, + desc2->plaintext_data.blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey, + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + tt_uint_op(desc1->plaintext_data.revision_counter, ==, + desc2->plaintext_data.revision_counter); + + /* NOTE: We can't compare the encrypted blob because when encoding the + * descriptor, the object is immutable thus we don't update it with the + * encrypted blob. As contrast to the decoding process where we populate a + * descriptor object. */ + + /* Encrypted data section. */ + tt_uint_op(desc1->encrypted_data.create2_ntor, ==, + desc2->encrypted_data.create2_ntor); + + /* Authentication type. */ + tt_int_op(!!desc1->encrypted_data.auth_types, ==, + !!desc2->encrypted_data.auth_types); + if (desc1->encrypted_data.auth_types && desc2->encrypted_data.auth_types) { + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(desc1->encrypted_data.auth_types), ==, + smartlist_len(desc2->encrypted_data.auth_types)); + for (int i = 0; i < smartlist_len(desc1->encrypted_data.auth_types); i++) { + tt_str_op(smartlist_get(desc1->encrypted_data.auth_types, i), OP_EQ, + smartlist_get(desc2->encrypted_data.auth_types, i)); + } + } + + /* Introduction points. */ + { + tt_assert(desc1->encrypted_data.intro_points); + tt_assert(desc2->encrypted_data.intro_points); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(desc1->encrypted_data.intro_points), ==, + smartlist_len(desc2->encrypted_data.intro_points)); + for (int i = 0; i < smartlist_len(desc1->encrypted_data.intro_points); i++) { + hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip1 = smartlist_get(desc1->encrypted_data + .intro_points, i), + *ip2 = smartlist_get(desc2->encrypted_data + .intro_points, i); + tt_assert(tor_cert_eq(ip1->auth_key_cert, ip2->auth_key_cert)); + tt_int_op(ip1->enc_key_type, OP_EQ, ip2->enc_key_type); + tt_assert(ip1->enc_key_type == HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY || + ip1->enc_key_type == HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519); + switch (ip1->enc_key_type) { + case HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_LEGACY: + tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(ip1->enc_key.legacy, ip2->enc_key.legacy), + OP_EQ, 0); + break; + case HS_DESC_KEY_TYPE_CURVE25519: + tt_mem_op(ip1->enc_key.curve25519.pubkey.public_key, OP_EQ, + ip2->enc_key.curve25519.pubkey.public_key, + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); + break; + } + + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(ip1->link_specifiers), ==, + smartlist_len(ip2->link_specifiers)); + for (int j = 0; j < smartlist_len(ip1->link_specifiers); j++) { + hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls1 = smartlist_get(ip1->link_specifiers, j), + *ls2 = smartlist_get(ip2->link_specifiers, j); + tt_int_op(ls1->type, ==, ls2->type); + switch (ls1->type) { + case LS_IPV4: + case LS_IPV6: + { + char *addr1 = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&ls1->u.ap.addr), + *addr2 = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&ls2->u.ap.addr); + tt_str_op(addr1, OP_EQ, addr2); + tor_free(addr1); + tor_free(addr2); + tt_int_op(ls1->u.ap.port, ==, ls2->u.ap.port); + } + break; + case LS_LEGACY_ID: + tt_mem_op(ls1->u.legacy_id, OP_EQ, ls2->u.legacy_id, + sizeof(ls1->u.legacy_id)); + break; + default: + /* Unknown type, caught it and print its value. */ + tt_int_op(ls1->type, OP_EQ, -1); + } + } + } + } + + done: + ; +} + +/* Test certificate encoding put in a descriptor. */ +static void +test_cert_encoding(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + char *encoded = NULL; + time_t now = time(NULL); + ed25519_keypair_t kp; + ed25519_public_key_t signed_key; + ed25519_secret_key_t secret_key; + tor_cert_t *cert = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, == , 0); + ret = ed25519_secret_key_generate(&secret_key, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, == , 0); + ret = ed25519_public_key_generate(&signed_key, &secret_key); + tt_int_op(ret, == , 0); + + cert = tor_cert_create(&kp, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, &signed_key, + now, 3600 * 2, CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + tt_assert(cert); + + /* Test the certificate encoding function. */ + ret = encode_cert(cert, &encoded); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + + /* Validated the certificate string. */ + { + char *end, *pos = encoded; + char *b64_cert, buf[256]; + size_t b64_cert_len; + tor_cert_t *parsed_cert; + + tt_int_op(strcmpstart(pos, "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"), ==, 0); + pos += strlen("-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"); + + /* Isolate the base64 encoded certificate and try to decode it. */ + end = strstr(pos, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----"); + tt_assert(end); + b64_cert = pos; + b64_cert_len = end - pos; + ret = base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), b64_cert, b64_cert_len); + tt_int_op(ret, >, 0); + /* Parseable? */ + parsed_cert = tor_cert_parse((uint8_t *) buf, ret); + tt_assert(parsed_cert); + /* Signature is valid? */ + ret = tor_cert_checksig(parsed_cert, &kp.pubkey, now + 10); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ret = tor_cert_eq(cert, parsed_cert); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 1); + /* The cert did have the signing key? */ + ret= ed25519_pubkey_eq(&parsed_cert->signing_key, &kp.pubkey); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 1); + tor_cert_free(parsed_cert); + + /* Get to the end part of the certificate. */ + pos += b64_cert_len; + tt_int_op(strcmpstart(pos, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----"), ==, 0); + pos += strlen("-----END ED25519 CERT-----"); + } + + done: + tor_cert_free(cert); + free(encoded); +} + +/* Test the descriptor padding. */ +static void +test_descriptor_padding(void *arg) +{ + char *plaintext; + size_t plaintext_len, padded_len; + uint8_t *padded_plaintext = NULL; + +/* Example: if l = 129, the ceiled division gives 2 and then multiplied by 128 + * to give 256. With l = 127, ceiled division gives 1 then times 128. */ +#define PADDING_EXPECTED_LEN(l) \ + CEIL_DIV(l, HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE) * \ + HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE + + (void) arg; + + { /* test #1: no padding */ + plaintext_len = HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE; + plaintext = tor_malloc(plaintext_len); + padded_len = build_plaintext_padding(plaintext, plaintext_len, + &padded_plaintext); + tt_assert(padded_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); + /* Make sure our padding has been zeroed. */ + tt_int_op(tor_mem_is_zero((char *) padded_plaintext + plaintext_len, + padded_len - plaintext_len), OP_EQ, 1); + tor_free(padded_plaintext); + /* Never never have a padded length smaller than the plaintext. */ + tt_int_op(padded_len, OP_GE, plaintext_len); + tt_int_op(padded_len, OP_EQ, PADDING_EXPECTED_LEN(plaintext_len)); + } + + { /* test #2: one byte padding? */ + plaintext_len = HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE - 1; + plaintext = tor_malloc(plaintext_len); + padded_plaintext = NULL; + padded_len = build_plaintext_padding(plaintext, plaintext_len, + &padded_plaintext); + tt_assert(padded_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); + /* Make sure our padding has been zeroed. */ + tt_int_op(tor_mem_is_zero((char *) padded_plaintext + plaintext_len, + padded_len - plaintext_len), OP_EQ, 1); + tor_free(padded_plaintext); + /* Never never have a padded length smaller than the plaintext. */ + tt_int_op(padded_len, OP_GE, plaintext_len); + tt_int_op(padded_len, OP_EQ, PADDING_EXPECTED_LEN(plaintext_len)); + } + + { /* test #3: Lots more bytes of padding? */ + plaintext_len = HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE + 1; + plaintext = tor_malloc(plaintext_len); + padded_plaintext = NULL; + padded_len = build_plaintext_padding(plaintext, plaintext_len, + &padded_plaintext); + tt_assert(padded_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); + /* Make sure our padding has been zeroed. */ + tt_int_op(tor_mem_is_zero((char *) padded_plaintext + plaintext_len, + padded_len - plaintext_len), OP_EQ, 1); + tor_free(padded_plaintext); + /* Never never have a padded length smaller than the plaintext. */ + tt_int_op(padded_len, OP_GE, plaintext_len); + tt_int_op(padded_len, OP_EQ, PADDING_EXPECTED_LEN(plaintext_len)); + } + + done: + return; +} + +static void +test_link_specifier(void *arg) +{ + ssize_t ret; + hs_desc_link_specifier_t spec; + smartlist_t *link_specifiers = smartlist_new(); + + (void) arg; + + /* Always this port. */ + spec.u.ap.port = 42; + smartlist_add(link_specifiers, &spec); + + /* Test IPv4 for starter. */ + { + char *b64, buf[256]; + uint32_t ipv4; + link_specifier_t *ls; + + spec.type = LS_IPV4; + ret = tor_addr_parse(&spec.u.ap.addr, "1.2.3.4"); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, AF_INET); + b64 = encode_link_specifiers(link_specifiers); + tt_assert(b64); + + /* Decode it and validate the format. */ + ret = base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), b64, strlen(b64)); + tt_int_op(ret, >, 0); + /* First byte is the number of link specifier. */ + tt_int_op(get_uint8(buf), ==, 1); + ret = link_specifier_parse(&ls, (uint8_t *) buf + 1, ret - 1); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 8); + /* Should be 2 bytes for port and 4 bytes for IPv4. */ + tt_int_op(link_specifier_get_ls_len(ls), ==, 6); + ipv4 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(ls); + tt_int_op(tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&spec.u.ap.addr), ==, ipv4); + tt_int_op(link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(ls), ==, spec.u.ap.port); + + link_specifier_free(ls); + tor_free(b64); + } + + /* Test IPv6. */ + { + char *b64, buf[256]; + uint8_t ipv6[16]; + link_specifier_t *ls; + + spec.type = LS_IPV6; + ret = tor_addr_parse(&spec.u.ap.addr, "[1:2:3:4::]"); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, AF_INET6); + b64 = encode_link_specifiers(link_specifiers); + tt_assert(b64); + + /* Decode it and validate the format. */ + ret = base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), b64, strlen(b64)); + tt_int_op(ret, >, 0); + /* First byte is the number of link specifier. */ + tt_int_op(get_uint8(buf), ==, 1); + ret = link_specifier_parse(&ls, (uint8_t *) buf + 1, ret - 1); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 20); + /* Should be 2 bytes for port and 16 bytes for IPv6. */ + tt_int_op(link_specifier_get_ls_len(ls), ==, 18); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(ipv6); i++) { + ipv6[i] = link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_addr(ls, i); + } + tt_mem_op(tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&spec.u.ap.addr), ==, ipv6, sizeof(ipv6)); + tt_int_op(link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(ls), ==, spec.u.ap.port); + + link_specifier_free(ls); + tor_free(b64); + } + + /* Test legacy. */ + { + char *b64, buf[256]; + uint8_t *id; + link_specifier_t *ls; + + spec.type = LS_LEGACY_ID; + memset(spec.u.legacy_id, 'Y', sizeof(spec.u.legacy_id)); + b64 = encode_link_specifiers(link_specifiers); + tt_assert(b64); + + /* Decode it and validate the format. */ + ret = base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), b64, strlen(b64)); + tt_int_op(ret, >, 0); + /* First byte is the number of link specifier. */ + tt_int_op(get_uint8(buf), ==, 1); + ret = link_specifier_parse(&ls, (uint8_t *) buf + 1, ret - 1); + /* 20 bytes digest + 1 byte type + 1 byte len. */ + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 22); + tt_int_op(link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls), OP_EQ, DIGEST_LEN); + /* Digest length is 20 bytes. */ + tt_int_op(link_specifier_get_ls_len(ls), OP_EQ, DIGEST_LEN); + id = link_specifier_getarray_un_legacy_id(ls); + tt_mem_op(spec.u.legacy_id, OP_EQ, id, DIGEST_LEN); + + link_specifier_free(ls); + tor_free(b64); + } + + done: + return; +} + +static void +test_encode_descriptor(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + char *encoded = NULL; + hs_descriptor_t *desc = helper_build_hs_desc(0); + + (void) arg; + + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &encoded); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + tt_assert(encoded); + + done: + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + tor_free(encoded); +} + +static void +test_decode_descriptor(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + char *encoded = NULL; + hs_descriptor_t *desc = helper_build_hs_desc(0); + hs_descriptor_t *decoded = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + /* Give some bad stuff to the decoding function. */ + ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor("hladfjlkjadf", NULL, &decoded); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &encoded); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + tt_assert(encoded); + + ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(encoded, NULL, &decoded); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + tt_assert(decoded); + + helper_compare_hs_desc(desc, decoded); + + /* Decode a descriptor with _no_ introduction points. */ + { + hs_descriptor_t *desc_no_ip = helper_build_hs_desc(1); + tt_assert(desc_no_ip); + tor_free(encoded); + ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc_no_ip, &encoded); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + tt_assert(encoded); + hs_descriptor_free(decoded); + ret = hs_desc_decode_descriptor(encoded, NULL, &decoded); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + tt_assert(decoded); + } + + done: + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + hs_descriptor_free(decoded); + tor_free(encoded); +} + +static void +test_supported_version(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + + (void) arg; + + /* Unsupported. */ + ret = hs_desc_is_supported_version(42); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* To early. */ + ret = hs_desc_is_supported_version(HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MIN - 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* One too new. */ + ret = hs_desc_is_supported_version(HS_DESC_SUPPORTED_FORMAT_VERSION_MAX + 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Valid version. */ + ret = hs_desc_is_supported_version(3); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_encrypted_data_len(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + size_t value; + + (void) arg; + + /* No length, error. */ + ret = encrypted_data_length_is_valid(0); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Not a multiple of our encryption algorithm (thus no padding). It's + * suppose to be aligned on HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE. */ + value = HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE * 10 - 1; + ret = encrypted_data_length_is_valid(value); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Valid value. */ + value = HS_DESC_PADDED_PLAINTEXT_MAX_LEN + HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SALT_LEN + + DIGEST256_LEN; + ret = encrypted_data_length_is_valid(value); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + /* XXX: Test maximum possible size. */ + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_decode_intro_point(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + char *encoded_ip = NULL; + size_t len_out; + hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip; + hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + /* The following certificate expires in 2036. After that, one of the test + * will fail because of the expiry time. */ + + /* Seperate pieces of a valid encoded introduction point. */ + const char *intro_point = + "introduction-point AQIUMDI5OUYyNjhGQ0E5RDU1Q0QxNTc="; + const char *auth_key = + "auth-key\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQkACOhAAQW8ltYZMIWpyrfyE/b4Iyi8CNybCwYs6ADk7XfBaxsFAQAgBAD3/BE4\n" + "XojGE/N2bW/wgnS9r2qlrkydGyuCKIGayYx3haZ39LD4ZTmSMRxwmplMAqzG/XNP\n" + "0Kkpg4p2/VnLFJRdU1SMFo1lgQ4P0bqw7Tgx200fulZ4KUM5z5V7m+a/mgY=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----"; + const char *enc_key = + "enc-key ntor bpZKLsuhxP6woDQ3yVyjm5gUKSk7RjfAijT2qrzbQk0="; + const char *enc_key_legacy = + "enc-key legacy\n" + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "MIGJAoGBAO4bATcW8kW4h6RQQAKEgg+aXCpF4JwbcO6vGZtzXTDB+HdPVQzwqkbh\n" + "XzFM6VGArhYw4m31wcP1Z7IwULir7UMnAFd7Zi62aYfU6l+Y1yAoZ1wzu1XBaAMK\n" + "ejpwQinW9nzJn7c2f69fVke3pkhxpNdUZ+vplSA/l9iY+y+v+415AgMBAAE=\n" + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----"; + const char *enc_key_cert = + "enc-key-certification\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQsACOhZAUpNvCZ1aJaaR49lS6MCdsVkhVGVrRqoj0Y2T4SzroAtAQAgBABFOcGg\n" + "lbTt1DF5nKTE/gU3Fr8ZtlCIOhu1A+F5LM7fqCUupfesg0KTHwyIZOYQbJuM5/he\n" + "/jDNyLy9woPJdjkxywaY2RPUxGjLYtMQV0E8PUxWyICV+7y52fTCYaKpYQw=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----"; + const char *enc_key_cert_legacy = + "enc-key-certification\n" + "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n" + "Sk28JnVolppHj2VLowJ2xWSFUZWtGqiPRjZPhLOugC0ACOhZgFPA5egeRDUXMM1U\n" + "Fn3c7Je0gJS6mVma5FzwlgwggeriF13UZcaT71vEAN/ZJXbxOfQVGMZ0rXuFpjUq\n" + "C8CvqmZIwEUaPE1nDFtmnTcucvNS1YQl9nsjH3ejbxc+4yqps/cXh46FmXsm5yz7\n" + "NZjBM9U1fbJhlNtOvrkf70K8bLk6\n" + "-----END CROSSCERT-----"; + + (void) enc_key_legacy; + (void) enc_key_cert_legacy; + + /* Start by testing the "decode all intro points" function. */ + { + char *line; + desc = helper_build_hs_desc(0); + tt_assert(desc); + /* Only try to decode an incomplete introduction point section. */ + tor_asprintf(&line, "\n%s", intro_point); + ret = decode_intro_points(desc, &desc->encrypted_data, line); + tor_free(line); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, -1); + + /* Decode one complete intro point. */ + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + tor_asprintf(&line, "\n%s", encoded_ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + ret = decode_intro_points(desc, &desc->encrypted_data, line); + tor_free(line); + smartlist_free(lines); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + } + + /* Try to decode a junk string. */ + { + hs_descriptor_free(desc); + desc = helper_build_hs_desc(0); + const char *junk = "this is not a descriptor"; + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, junk); + tt_assert(!ip); + } + + /* Invalid link specifiers. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + const char *bad_line = "introduction-point blah"; + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) bad_line); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(!ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + /* Invalid auth key type. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + /* Try to put a valid object that our tokenize function will be able to + * parse but that has nothing to do with the auth_key. */ + const char *bad_line = + "auth-key\n" + "-----BEGIN UNICORN CERT-----\n" + "MIGJAoGBAO4bATcW8kW4h6RQQAKEgg+aXCpF4JwbcO6vGZtzXTDB+HdPVQzwqkbh\n" + "XzFM6VGArhYw4m31wcP1Z7IwULir7UMnAFd7Zi62aYfU6l+Y1yAoZ1wzu1XBaAMK\n" + "ejpwQinW9nzJn7c2f69fVke3pkhxpNdUZ+vplSA/l9iY+y+v+415AgMBAAE=\n" + "-----END UNICORN CERT-----"; + /* Build intro point text. */ + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) bad_line); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(!ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + /* Invalid enc-key. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + const char *bad_line = + "enc-key unicorn bpZKLsuhxP6woDQ3yVyjm5gUKSk7RjfAijT2qrzbQk0="; + /* Build intro point text. */ + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) bad_line); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(!ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + /* Invalid enc-key object. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + const char *bad_line = "enc-key ntor"; + /* Build intro point text. */ + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) bad_line); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(!ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + /* Invalid enc-key base64 curv25519 key. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + const char *bad_line = "enc-key ntor blah==="; + /* Build intro point text. */ + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) bad_line); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(!ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + /* Invalid enc-key invalid legacy. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + const char *bad_line = "enc-key legacy blah==="; + /* Build intro point text. */ + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) bad_line); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(!ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + /* Valid object. */ + { + smartlist_t *lines = smartlist_new(); + /* Build intro point text. */ + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) intro_point); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) auth_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key); + smartlist_add(lines, (char *) enc_key_cert); + encoded_ip = smartlist_join_strings(lines, "\n", 0, &len_out); + tt_assert(encoded_ip); + ip = decode_introduction_point(desc, encoded_ip); + tt_assert(ip); + tor_free(encoded_ip); + smartlist_free(lines); + } + + done: + hs_descriptor_free(desc); +} + +const char encrypted_desc_portion[] = "create2-formats 2\n" + "authentication-required ed25519\n" + "introduction-point AQAGAQIDBCMp\n" + "auth-key\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQkABmRZASMANx4sbMyDd4i+MciVUw29vPQ/nOFrLwUdTGEBXSXrAQAgBABo2zfd\n" + "wyqAdzSeaIzH1TUcV3u8nAG2YhNCRw2/2vVWuD6Z4Fn0aNHnh1FONNkbismC9t1X\n" + "Rf07hdZkVYEbOaPsHnFwhJULVSUo8YYuL19jghRjwMqPGeGfD4iuQqdo3QA=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "enc-key ntor xo2n5anLMoyIMuhcKSLdVZISyISBW8j1vXRbpdbK+lU=\n" + "enc-key-certification\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQsABmRZATUYQypFY7pr8FpmV61pcqUylt5fEr/QLfavfcwbzlA7AQAgBADSI5Ie\n" + "Ekdy+qeHngLmz6Gr7fQ5xvilhxB91UDIjwRfP0ufoVF+HalsyXKskYvcYhH67+lw\n" + "D947flCHzeJyfAT38jO/Cw42qM7H+SObBMcsTB93J0lPNBy4OHosH9ybtwA=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "introduction-point AQESJgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAASMp\n" + "auth-key\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQkABmRZAVdPeZyzfCyUDC1fnYyom8eOS2O1opzTytEU7dlOf9brAQAgBABo2zfd\n" + "wyqAdzSeaIzH1TUcV3u8nAG2YhNCRw2/2vVWuHVSGTrO1EM6Eu1jyOw/qtSS6Exf\n" + "omV417y8uK2gHQ+1FWqg/KaogELYzDG6pcj2NkziovnIfET0W7nZB85YjwQ=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "enc-key ntor MbxzxI1K+zcl7e+wysLK96UZWwFEJQqI0G7b0muRXx4=\n" + "enc-key-certification\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQsABmRZATUYQypFY7pr8FpmV61pcqUylt5fEr/QLfavfcwbzlA7AQAgBADimELh\n" + "lLZvy/LjXnCdpvaVRhiGBeIRAGIDGz1SY/zD6BAnpDL420ha2TdvdGsg8cgfTcJZ\n" + "g84x85+zhuh8kkdgt7bOmjOXLlButDCfTarMgCfy6pSI/hUckk+j5Q43uws=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "introduction-point AQIUMDI5OUYyNjhGQ0E5RDU1Q0QxNTc=\n" + "auth-key\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQkABmRZASnpBjHsw0Gpvi+KNlW4ouXegIsUBHMvJN1CQHDTLdfnAQAgBABo2zfd\n" + "wyqAdzSeaIzH1TUcV3u8nAG2YhNCRw2/2vVWuOlbHs8s8LAeEb36urVKTJ5exgss\n" + "V+ylIwHSWF0qanCnnTnDyNg/3YRUo0AZr0d/CoiNV+XsGE4Vuho/TBVC+wY=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "enc-key legacy\n" + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "MIGJAoGBALttUA1paMCQiuIZeCp26REztziej5dN0o6/kTU//ItT4MGxTfmnLmcq\n" + "WpvK4jdX1h2OlDCZmtA7sb0HOkjELgrDU0ATVwOaeG+3icSddmQyaeT8+cxQEktj\n" + "SXMQ+iJDxJIIWFPmLmWWQHqb4IRfl021l3iTErhtZKBz37JNK7E/AgMBAAE=\n" + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "enc-key-certification\n" + "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n" + "NRhDKkVjumvwWmZXrWlypTKW3l8Sv9At9q99zBvOUDsABmRZgBROMZr2Mhj8H8zd\n" + "xbU6ZvDUwD9xkptNHq0W04CyWb8p0y56y89y2kBF6RrSrVBJCyaHyph6Bmi5z0Lc\n" + "f4jjakRlHwB7oYqSo7l8EE9DGE0rEat3hNhN+tBIAJL5gKOL4dgfD5gMi51zzSFl\n" + "epv8idTwhqZ/sxRMUIQrb9AB8sOD\n" + "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n" + "introduction-point AQIUMDI5OUYyNjhGQ0E5RDU1Q0QxNTc=\n" + "auth-key\n" + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "AQkABmRZAdBFQcE23cIoCMFTycnQ1st2752vdjGME+QPMTTxvqZhAQAgBABo2zfd\n" + "wyqAdzSeaIzH1TUcV3u8nAG2YhNCRw2/2vVWuOGXGPnb3g9J8aSyN7jYs71ET0wC\n" + "TlDLcXCgAMnKA6of/a4QceFfAFsCnI3qCd8YUo5NYCMh2d5mtFpLK41Wpwo=\n" + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" + "enc-key legacy\n" + "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "MIGJAoGBALuyEVMz4GwZ8LnBYxLZDHNg1DHUZJZNmE7HsQDcM/FYeZ1LjYLe/K8s\n" + "BFzgFmjMU1ondIWGWpRCLYcZxQMZaSU0ObdezDwelTkHo/u7K2fQTLmI9EofcsK0\n" + "4OkY6eo8BFtXXoQJhAw5WatRpzah2sGqMPXs2jr7Ku4Pd8JuRd35AgMBAAE=\n" + "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + "enc-key-certification\n" + "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n" + "NRhDKkVjumvwWmZXrWlypTKW3l8Sv9At9q99zBvOUDsABmRZgGwpo67ybC7skFYk\n" + "JjvqcbrKg8Fwrvue9yF66p1O90fqziVsvpKGcsr3tcIJHtNsrWVRDpyFwnc1wlVE\n" + "O7rHftF4GUsKaoz3wxxmb0YyyYVQvLpH0Y6lFIvw8nGurnsMefQWLcxuEX7xZOPl\n" + "VAlVp+XtJE1ZNQ62hpnNgBDi1ikJ\n" + "-----END CROSSCERT-----"; + +static void +test_decode_multiple_intro_points(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + { + /* Build a descriptor with no intro points. */ + desc = helper_build_hs_desc(1); + tt_assert(desc); + } + + ret = decode_intro_points(desc, &desc->encrypted_data, + encrypted_desc_portion); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points), ==, 4); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_free_objects(void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + + { + const char u[] = { 'U', 'U', 'U', 'U' }; + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*data)); + /* Set a memory marker so we know if the data was properly wiped. */ + memset(&data->version, 'U', sizeof(data->version)); + hs_desc_plaintext_data_free(data); + tt_mem_op(&data->version, OP_NE, u, sizeof(u)); + } + + { + hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*data)); + /* Set a memory marker so we know if the data was properly wiped. */ + data->create2_ntor = 1; + hs_desc_encrypted_data_free(data); + tt_int_op(data->create2_ntor, OP_NE, 1); + } + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_decode_plaintext(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + hs_desc_plaintext_data_t desc_plaintext; + const char *bad_value = "unicorn"; + + (void) arg; + +#define template \ + "hs-descriptor %s\n" \ + "descriptor-lifetime %s\n" \ + "descriptor-signing-key-cert\n" \ + "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" \ + "AQgABjvPAQaG3g+dc6oV/oJV4ODAtkvx56uBnPtBT9mYVuHVOhn7AQAgBABUg3mQ\n" \ + "myBr4bu5LCr53wUEbW2EXui01CbUgU7pfo9LvJG3AcXRojj6HlfsUs9BkzYzYdjF\n" \ + "A69Apikgu0ewHYkFFASt7Il+gB3w6J8YstQJZT7dtbtl+doM7ug8B68Qdg8=\n" \ + "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" \ + "revision-counter %s\n" \ + "encrypted\n" \ + "-----BEGIN %s-----\n" \ + "UNICORN\n" \ + "-----END MESSAGE-----\n" \ + "signature m20WJH5agqvwhq7QeuEZ1mYyPWQDO+eJOZUjLhAiKu8DbL17DsDfJE6kXbWyHimbNj2we0enV3cCOOAsmPOaAw\n" + + /* Invalid version. */ + { + char *plaintext; + tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, bad_value, "180", "42", "MESSAGE"); + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Missing fields. */ + { + const char *plaintext = "hs-descriptor 3\n"; + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Max length. */ + { + size_t big = 64000; + /* Must always be bigger than HS_DESC_MAX_LEN. */ + tt_int_op(HS_DESC_MAX_LEN, <, big); + char *plaintext = tor_malloc_zero(big); + memset(plaintext, 'a', big); + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tor_free(plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Bad lifetime value. */ + { + char *plaintext; + tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", bad_value, "42", "MESSAGE"); + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Huge lifetime value. */ + { + char *plaintext; + tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", "7181615", "42", "MESSAGE"); + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Invalid encrypted section. */ + { + char *plaintext; + tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", "180", "42", bad_value); + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + /* Invalid revision counter. */ + { + char *plaintext; + tor_asprintf(&plaintext, template, "3", "180", bad_value, "MESSAGE"); + ret = hs_desc_decode_plaintext(plaintext, &desc_plaintext); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + } + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_validate_cert(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + time_t now = time(NULL); + ed25519_keypair_t kp; + + (void) arg; + + ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&kp, 0); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + + /* Cert of type CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH. */ + tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(&kp, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, + &kp.pubkey, now, 3600, + CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY); + tt_assert(cert); + /* Test with empty certificate. */ + ret = cert_is_valid(NULL, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, "unicorn"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Test with a bad type. */ + ret = cert_is_valid(cert, CERT_TYPE_HS_DESC_SIGN, "unicorn"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + /* Normal validation. */ + ret = cert_is_valid(cert, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, "unicorn"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + /* Break signing key so signature verification will fails. */ + memset(&cert->signing_key, 0, sizeof(cert->signing_key)); + ret = cert_is_valid(cert, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, "unicorn"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + tor_cert_free(cert); + + /* Try a cert without including the signing key. */ + cert = tor_cert_create(&kp, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, &kp.pubkey, now, 3600, 0); + tt_assert(cert); + /* Test with a bad type. */ + ret = cert_is_valid(cert, CERT_TYPE_HS_IP_AUTH, "unicorn"); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_desc_signature(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + char *data, *desc; + char sig_b64[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN + 1]; + ed25519_keypair_t kp; + ed25519_signature_t sig; + + (void) arg; + + ed25519_keypair_generate(&kp, 0); + /* Setup a phoony descriptor but with a valid signature token that is the + * signature is verifiable. */ + tor_asprintf(&data, "This is a signed descriptor\n"); + ret = ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, (const uint8_t *) data, strlen(data), + "Tor onion service descriptor sig v3", &kp); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + ret = ed25519_signature_to_base64(sig_b64, &sig); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + /* Build the descriptor that should be valid. */ + tor_asprintf(&desc, "%ssignature %s\n", data, sig_b64); + ret = desc_sig_is_valid(sig_b64, &kp, desc, strlen(desc)); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 1); + /* Junk signature. */ + ret = desc_sig_is_valid("JUNK", &kp, desc, strlen(desc)); + tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0); + + done: + tor_free(desc); + tor_free(data); +} + +struct testcase_t hs_descriptor[] = { + /* Encoding tests. */ + { "cert_encoding", test_cert_encoding, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "link_specifier", test_link_specifier, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "encode_descriptor", test_encode_descriptor, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "descriptor_padding", test_descriptor_padding, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + + /* Decoding tests. */ + { "decode_descriptor", test_decode_descriptor, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "encrypted_data_len", test_encrypted_data_len, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "decode_intro_point", test_decode_intro_point, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "decode_multiple_intro_points", test_decode_multiple_intro_points, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "decode_plaintext", test_decode_plaintext, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + + /* Misc. */ + { "version", test_supported_version, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "free_objects", test_free_objects, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "validate_cert", test_validate_cert, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "desc_signature", test_desc_signature, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + + END_OF_TESTCASES +};

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tor-commits November 2016