tor-commits September 2015

tor-commits@lists.torproject.org

15 participants
1411 discussions

[translation/tor-messenger-prefsdtd] Update translations for tor-messenger-prefsdtd
by translation＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit c5a5bb7f1dee22624e602bcfedefd5b1ed5164d0 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 24 15:46:36 2015 +0000 Update translations for tor-messenger-prefsdtd --- sq/prefs.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sq/prefs.dtd b/sq/prefs.dtd index 63f4d7d..a645600 100644 --- a/sq/prefs.dtd +++ b/sq/prefs.dtd @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ <!ENTITY prefs.otrPreferences "OTR Preferences"> <!ENTITY prefs.otrSettings "OTR Settings"> -<!ENTITY prefs.requireEncryption "Require encryption"> +<!ENTITY prefs.requireEncryption "Kërkoni shifrim"> <!ENTITY prefs.otrKeys "My Private Keys"> <!ENTITY prefs.keyForAccount "Key for account:"> <!ENTITY prefs.fingerprint "Fingerprint:">

1 0

[translation/tor-messenger-ircproperties] Update translations for tor-messenger-ircproperties
by translation＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit ad1c70ed5e596859ca98b59e01414854bb919daf Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 24 15:46:27 2015 +0000 Update translations for tor-messenger-ircproperties --- sq/irc.properties | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sq/irc.properties b/sq/irc.properties index 07d31e4..30d79b4 100644 --- a/sq/irc.properties +++ b/sq/irc.properties @@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ connection.error.passwordRequired=Password required # LOCALIZATION NOTE (joinChat.*): # These show up on the join chat menu. An underscore is for the access key. joinChat.channel=_Channel -joinChat.password=_Password +joinChat.password=_Fjalëkalimi # LOCALIZATION NOTE (options.*): # These are the protocol specific options shown in the account manager and # account wizard windows. -options.server=Server +options.server=Shërbyesi options.port=Portë options.ssl=Use SSL options.encoding=Character Set

1 0

[translation/tails-misc] Update translations for tails-misc
by translation＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit c06e61b53b24deed5cb81699b3e1e2ff1378686c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 24 15:45:38 2015 +0000 Update translations for tails-misc --- ca.po | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/ca.po b/ca.po index 707a562..5f677c2 100644 --- a/ca.po +++ b/ca.po @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2015-09-20 19:32+0200\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-21 09:20+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: carolyn <carolyn(a)anhalt.org>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-24 15:45+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: laia_\n" "Language-Team: Catalan (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/ca/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ msgstr "" #: config/chroot_local-includes/etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/60-tor-ready.sh:43 msgid "Tor is ready" -msgstr "Tor es troba actiu" +msgstr "El Tor està preparat" #: config/chroot_local-includes/etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/60-tor-ready.sh:44 msgid "You can now access the Internet." -msgstr "Ara ja pots accedir a Internet." +msgstr "Ara ja podeu accedir a Internet." #: config/chroot_local-includes/etc/whisperback/config.py:64 #, python-format @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ msgid "" "an opportunity for eavesdroppers, like your email or Internet provider, to\n" "confirm that you are using Tails.\n" "</p>\n" -msgstr "<h1>Ajuda'ns a arreglar aquest error!</h1>\n<p>Llegeix <a href=\"%s\">les nostres instruccions de comunicació d'errors</a>.</p>\n<p><strong>No incloeu més informació personal \nque la necessària!</strong></p>\n<h2>Sobre el fet de donar-nos una adreça de correu</h2>\n<p>\nDonar-nos una adreça de correu ens permet contactar amb vosaltres per aclarir el\nproblema. Això és necessari per la majoria d'informes que rebem, ja que la major part\nd'informes sense informació de contacte són inútils. D'altra banda, aquest fet també dóna\nuna oportunitat per als espies o al proveïdor d'internet per confirmar que esteu usant el Tails.\n</p> \n" +msgstr "<h1>Ajudeu-nos a arreglar aquest error!</h1>\n<p>Llegeix <a href=\"%s\">les nostres instruccions de comunicació d'errors</a>.</p>\n<p><strong>No incloeu més informació personal \nque la necessària!</strong></p>\n<h2>Sobre el fet de donar-nos una adreça de correu</h2>\n<p>\nDonar-nos una adreça de correu ens permet contactar amb vosaltres per aclarir el\nproblema. Això és necessari per la majoria d'informes que rebem, ja que la major part\nd'informes sense informació de contacte són inútils. D'altra banda, aquest fet també dóna\nuna oportunitat als espies o al vostre proveïdor d'internet per confirmar que esteu usant el Tails.\n</p> \n" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/electrum:14 msgid "Persistence is disabled for Electrum" @@ -56,16 +56,16 @@ msgid "" "When you reboot Tails, all of Electrum's data will be lost, including your " "Bitcoin wallet. It is strongly recommended to only run Electrum when its " "persistence feature is activated." -msgstr "Quan reinicieu el Tails, totes les dades de l'Electrum es perdran, inclòs el moneder de Bitcoins. És molt recomanable que només useu l'Electrum quan la seva propietat de persistència és activada. " +msgstr "Quan reinicieu el Tails, totes les dades de l'Electrum es perdran, inclòs el moneder de Bitcoins. És molt recomanable que només useu l'Electrum quan la seva propietat de persistència estigui activada. " #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/electrum:18 msgid "Do you want to start Electrum anyway?" -msgstr "Voleu iniciar l'Electrum de totes maneres?" +msgstr "Voleu iniciar l'Electrum igualment?" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/electrum:20 #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser:36 msgid "_Launch" -msgstr "_Launch" +msgstr "_Executa" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/electrum:21 #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser:37 @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ msgstr "_Surt" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:136 msgid "OpenPGP encryption applet" -msgstr "Applet de xifrat OpenPGP" +msgstr "Miniaplicació de xifrat OpenPGP" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:139 msgid "Exit" @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ msgstr "Surt" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:141 msgid "About" -msgstr "En quant a" +msgstr "Quant a" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:192 msgid "Encrypt Clipboard with _Passphrase" @@ -90,11 +90,11 @@ msgstr "Xifra el Portapapers amb la _Contrasenya" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:195 msgid "Sign/Encrypt Clipboard with Public _Keys" -msgstr "Signar/Xifrar el Portapapers amb les _Claus Públiques" +msgstr "Signa/Xifra el Portapapers amb les _Claus Públiques" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:200 msgid "_Decrypt/Verify Clipboard" -msgstr "_Desxifrar/Xifrar el Portapapers" +msgstr "_Desxifra/Verifica el Portapapers" #: config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/gpgApplet:204 msgid "_Manage Keys"

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'underpinning_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit a395d1aa46976fa09b9b0897213ba10c788a3f92 Merge: 2d139f7 51d18ae Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 24 11:29:14 2015 -0400 Merge branch 'underpinning_squashed' changes/bug17135 | 7 +++ doc/tor.1.txt | 7 +++ src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/dirserv.c | 27 +++++++----- src/or/keypin.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ src/or/keypin.h | 3 +- src/or/or.h | 1 + src/test/test_keypin.c | 13 +++--- 8 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/master] Allow conflicts to occur in keypinning journal
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit c5e87e33c7a3bf0f3d6b289814d303bcb4c63fe2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 23 10:44:38 2015 -0400 Allow conflicts to occur in keypinning journal When we find a conflict in the keypinning journal, treat the new entry as superseding all old entries that overlap either of its keys. Also add a (not-yet-used) configuration option to disable keypinning enforcement. --- src/or/config.c | 1 + src/or/keypin.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/or/or.h | 1 + src/test/test_keypin.c | 10 +++++----- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 44fb4ec..fa860af 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(AuthDirInvalidCCs, CSV, ""), V(AuthDirFastGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "100 KB"), V(AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "2 MB"), + V(AuthDirPinKeys, BOOL, "0"), V(AuthDirReject, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirRejectCCs, CSV, ""), OBSOLETE("AuthDirRejectUnlisted"), diff --git a/src/or/keypin.c b/src/or/keypin.c index ebe83b3..cab6c9d 100644 --- a/src/or/keypin.c +++ b/src/or/keypin.c @@ -321,19 +321,41 @@ keypin_load_journal_impl(const char *data, size_t size) continue; } - const keypin_ent_t *ent2; - if ((ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent))) { - if (fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) { - ++n_duplicates; - } else { - ++n_conflicts; - } + keypin_ent_t *ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent); + keypin_ent_t *ent3 = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent); + if (ent2 && + fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + /* We already have this mapping stored. Ignore it. */ tor_free(ent); + ++n_duplicates; continue; - } else if (HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent)) { - tor_free(ent); + } else if (ent2 || ent3) { + /* We have a conflict. (If we had no entry, we would have ent2 == ent3 + * == NULL. If we had a non-conflicting duplicate, we would have found + * it above.) + * + * We respond by having this entry (ent) supersede all entries that it + * contradicts (ent2 and/or ent3). In other words, if we receive + * <rsa,ed>, we remove all <rsa,ed'> and all <rsa',ed>, for rsa'!=rsa + * and ed'!= ed. + */ + const keypin_ent_t *t; + if (ent2) { + t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent2); + tor_assert(ent2 == t); + t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent2); + tor_assert(ent2 == t); + } + if (ent3 && ent2 != ent3) { + t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent3); + tor_assert(ent3 == t); + t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent3); + tor_assert(ent3 == t); + tor_free(ent3); + } + tor_free(ent2); ++n_conflicts; - continue; + /* Fall through */ } keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index bec39b2..4496cbc 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3790,6 +3790,7 @@ typedef struct { * number of servers per IP address shared * with an authority. */ int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */ + int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */ /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising * this amount of capacity or more. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_keypin.c b/src/test/test_keypin.c index afd4ca2..033578c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_keypin.c +++ b/src/test/test_keypin.c @@ -108,21 +108,21 @@ test_keypin_parse_file(void *arg) ; tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data2, strlen(data2))); - tt_int_op(11, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got)); + tt_int_op(13, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got)); ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 9); tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "\"You have made a goo", 20); tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "d beginning.\" But no more. Wizar", 32); - ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 10); + ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 12); tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "ds speak truth, and ", 20); - tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "it was true that all the master\n", 32); + tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, "it was tru\xa5 that all the master\n", 32); /* File truncated before NL */ const char data3[] = "Tm8gZHJhZ29uIGNhbiByZXNpc3Q IHRoZSBmYXNjaW5hdGlvbiBvZiByaWRkbGluZyB0YWw"; tt_int_op(0, ==, keypin_load_journal_impl(data3, strlen(data3))); - tt_int_op(12, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got)); - ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 11); + tt_int_op(14, ==, smartlist_len(mock_addent_got)); + ent = smartlist_get(mock_addent_got, 13); tt_mem_op(ent->rsa_id, ==, "No dragon can resist", 20); tt_mem_op(ent->ed25519_key, ==, " the fascination of riddling tal", 32);

1 0

[tor/master] Extract the add-or-replace-keypin logic into a new function
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit efea1e904a17450fe9916a0032680f752bd40bc2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 23 11:07:17 2015 -0400 Extract the add-or-replace-keypin logic into a new function We're about to need to call it in another place too. --- src/or/keypin.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/keypin.c b/src/or/keypin.c index cab6c9d..0c99429 100644 --- a/src/or/keypin.c +++ b/src/or/keypin.c @@ -174,6 +174,57 @@ keypin_add_entry_to_map, (keypin_ent_t *ent)) } /** + * Helper: add 'ent' to the maps, replacing any entries that contradict it. + * Take ownership of 'ent', freeing it if needed. + * + * Return 0 if the entry was a duplicate, -1 if there was a conflict, + * and 1 if there was no conflict. + */ +static int +keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(keypin_ent_t *ent) +{ + int r = 1; + keypin_ent_t *ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent); + keypin_ent_t *ent3 = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent); + if (ent2 && + fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + /* We already have this mapping stored. Ignore it. */ + tor_free(ent); + return 0; + } else if (ent2 || ent3) { + /* We have a conflict. (If we had no entry, we would have ent2 == ent3 + * == NULL. If we had a non-conflicting duplicate, we would have found + * it above.) + * + * We respond by having this entry (ent) supersede all entries that it + * contradicts (ent2 and/or ent3). In other words, if we receive + * <rsa,ed>, we remove all <rsa,ed'> and all <rsa',ed>, for rsa'!=rsa + * and ed'!= ed. + */ + const keypin_ent_t *t; + if (ent2) { + t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent2); + tor_assert(ent2 == t); + t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent2); + tor_assert(ent2 == t); + } + if (ent3 && ent2 != ent3) { + t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent3); + tor_assert(ent3 == t); + t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent3); + tor_assert(ent3 == t); + tor_free(ent3); + } + tor_free(ent2); + r = -1; + /* Fall through */ + } + + keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent); + return r; +} + +/** * Check whether we already have an entry in the key pinning table for a * router with RSA ID digest <b>rsa_id_digest</b>. If we have no such entry, * return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND. If we find an entry that matches the RSA key but @@ -321,44 +372,13 @@ keypin_load_journal_impl(const char *data, size_t size) continue; } - keypin_ent_t *ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent); - keypin_ent_t *ent3 = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent); - if (ent2 && - fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) { - /* We already have this mapping stored. Ignore it. */ - tor_free(ent); + const int r = keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(ent); + if (r == 0) { ++n_duplicates; - continue; - } else if (ent2 || ent3) { - /* We have a conflict. (If we had no entry, we would have ent2 == ent3 - * == NULL. If we had a non-conflicting duplicate, we would have found - * it above.) - * - * We respond by having this entry (ent) supersede all entries that it - * contradicts (ent2 and/or ent3). In other words, if we receive - * <rsa,ed>, we remove all <rsa,ed'> and all <rsa',ed>, for rsa'!=rsa - * and ed'!= ed. - */ - const keypin_ent_t *t; - if (ent2) { - t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent2); - tor_assert(ent2 == t); - t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent2); - tor_assert(ent2 == t); - } - if (ent3 && ent2 != ent3) { - t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent3); - tor_assert(ent3 == t); - t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent3); - tor_assert(ent3 == t); - tor_free(ent3); - } - tor_free(ent2); + } else if (r == -1) { ++n_conflicts; - /* Fall through */ } - keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent); ++n_entries; }

1 0

[tor/master] New AuthDirPinKeys option to enable/disable keypinning enforcement
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit 01733e2b1568dacea26765800fab2c66f0b16bd1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 23 11:22:26 2015 -0400 New AuthDirPinKeys option to enable/disable keypinning enforcement Implements ticket #17135. We're going to need this one to avoid chaos as everybody figures out how ed25519 keys work. --- src/or/dirserv.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- src/or/keypin.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- src/or/keypin.h | 3 ++- src/test/test_keypin.c | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 53b450c..8d9f166 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg, int severity) { char d[DIGEST_LEN]; + const int key_pinning = get_options()->AuthDirPinKeys; if (crypto_pk_get_digest(router->identity_pkey, d)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint"); @@ -261,14 +262,16 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg, if (KEYPIN_MISMATCH == keypin_check((const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest, router->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey)) { - if (msg) { - *msg = "Ed25519 identity key or RSA identity key has changed."; - } log_fn(severity, LD_DIR, "Descriptor from router %s has an Ed25519 key, " "but the <rsa,ed25519> keys don't match what they were before.", router_describe(router)); - return FP_REJECT; + if (key_pinning) { + if (msg) { + *msg = "Ed25519 identity key or RSA identity key has changed."; + } + return FP_REJECT; + } } } else { /* No ed25519 key */ @@ -277,13 +280,15 @@ dirserv_router_get_status(const routerinfo_t *router, const char **msg, log_fn(severity, LD_DIR, "Descriptor from router %s has no Ed25519 key, " "when we previously knew an Ed25519 for it. Ignoring for now, " - "since Tor 0.2.6 is under development.", + "since Ed25519 keys are fairly new.", router_describe(router)); #ifdef DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519 - if (msg) { - *msg = "Ed25519 identity key has disappeared."; + if (key_pinning) { + if (msg) { + *msg = "Ed25519 identity key has disappeared."; + } + return FP_REJECT; } - return FP_REJECT; #endif } } @@ -582,6 +587,7 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source) char *desc, *nickname; const size_t desclen = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len + ri->cache_info.annotations_len; + const int key_pinning = get_options()->AuthDirPinKeys; *msg = NULL; /* If it's too big, refuse it now. Otherwise we'll cache it all over the @@ -626,7 +632,8 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source) if (ri->signing_key_cert) { keypin_status = keypin_check_and_add( (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest, - ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey); + ri->signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey, + ! key_pinning); } else { keypin_status = keypin_check_lone_rsa( (const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest); @@ -635,7 +642,7 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source) keypin_status = KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND; #endif } - if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH) { + if (keypin_status == KEYPIN_MISMATCH && key_pinning) { log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Dropping descriptor from %s (source: %s) because " "its key did not match an older RSA/Ed25519 keypair", router_describe(ri), source); diff --git a/src/or/keypin.c b/src/or/keypin.c index 0c99429..047d2b0 100644 --- a/src/or/keypin.c +++ b/src/or/keypin.c @@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ static int keypin_journal_append_entry(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key); static int keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key, - int do_not_add); + const int do_not_add, + const int replace); +static int keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(keypin_ent_t *ent); static HT_HEAD(rsamap, keypin_ent_st) the_rsa_map = HT_INITIALIZER(); static HT_HEAD(edmap, keypin_ent_st) the_ed_map = HT_INITIALIZER(); @@ -100,12 +102,17 @@ HT_GENERATE2(edmap, keypin_ent_st, edmap_node, keypin_ent_hash_ed, * return KEYPIN_FOUND. If we find an entry that matches one key but * not the other, return KEYPIN_MISMATCH. If we have no entry for either * key, add such an entry to the table and return KEYPIN_ADDED. + * + * If <b>replace_existing_entry</b> is true, then any time we would have said + * KEYPIN_FOUND, we instead add this entry anyway and return KEYPIN_ADDED. */ int keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, - const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key) + const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key, + const int replace_existing_entry) { - return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 0); + return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 0, + replace_existing_entry); } /** @@ -116,7 +123,7 @@ int keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key) { - return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 1); + return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 1, 0); } /** @@ -125,7 +132,8 @@ keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, static int keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key, - int do_not_add) + const int do_not_add, + const int replace) { keypin_ent_t search, *ent; memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search)); @@ -139,18 +147,21 @@ keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, if (tor_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,sizeof(ent->ed25519_key))) { return KEYPIN_FOUND; /* Match on both keys. Great. */ } else { - return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; /* Found RSA with different Ed key */ + if (!replace) + return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; /* Found RSA with different Ed key */ } } /* See if we know a different RSA key for this ed key */ - ent = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, &search); - if (ent) { - /* If we got here, then the ed key matches and the RSA doesn't */ - tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key, - sizeof(ent->ed25519_key))); - tor_assert(fast_memneq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id))); - return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; + if (! replace) { + ent = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, &search); + if (ent) { + /* If we got here, then the ed key matches and the RSA doesn't */ + tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key, + sizeof(ent->ed25519_key))); + tor_assert(fast_memneq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id))); + return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; + } } /* Okay, this one is new to us. */ @@ -158,7 +169,12 @@ keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND; ent = tor_memdup(&search, sizeof(search)); - keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent); + int r = keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(ent); + if (! replace) { + tor_assert(r == 1); + } else { + tor_assert(r != 0); + } keypin_journal_append_entry(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key); return KEYPIN_ADDED; } diff --git a/src/or/keypin.h b/src/or/keypin.h index 2a5b3f1..798ac1f 100644 --- a/src/or/keypin.h +++ b/src/or/keypin.h @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ #include "testsupport.h" int keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, - const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key); + const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key, + const int replace_existing_entry); int keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest, const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key); diff --git a/src/test/test_keypin.c b/src/test/test_keypin.c index 033578c..bd0f6fd 100644 --- a/src/test/test_keypin.c +++ b/src/test/test_keypin.c @@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ test_keypin_parse_file(void *arg) smartlist_free(mock_addent_got); } -#define ADD(a,b) keypin_check_and_add((const uint8_t*)(a),(const uint8_t*)(b)) +#define ADD(a,b) keypin_check_and_add((const uint8_t*)(a),\ + (const uint8_t*)(b),0) #define LONE_RSA(a) keypin_check_lone_rsa((const uint8_t*)(a)) static void

1 0

[tor/master] changes file and manpage entry for AuthDirPinKeys
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit 51d18aeb425ba5127d8c68f386f3c58b5bbc38e1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Sep 23 11:30:17 2015 -0400 changes file and manpage entry for AuthDirPinKeys --- changes/bug17135 | 7 +++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug17135 b/changes/bug17135 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a0c57e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug17135 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Major features (Ed25519 keys, keypinning) + - The key-pinning option on directory authorities is now + advisory-only by default. In a future version, or when the + AuthDirPinKeys option is set, pins are enforced again. + Disabling key-pinning seemed like a good idea so that we can + survive the fallout of any usability problems associated with + ed25519 keys. Closes ticket 17135. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 14b13bc..954c8fa 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2081,6 +2081,13 @@ on the public Tor network. or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KBytes) +[[AuthDirPinKeys]] **AuthDirPinKeys** **0**|**1**:: + Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, do not allow any relay to + publish a descriptor if any other relay has reserved its <Ed25519,RSA> + identity keypair. In all cases, Tor records every keypair it accepts + in a journal if it is new, or if it differs from the most recently + accepted pinning for one of the keys it contains. (Default: 0) + [[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__:: If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially

1 0

[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit c00647aae766234c2a95af1f633e597eb3dc4029 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 24 15:15:16 2015 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- vi/ssl-observatory.dtd | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/vi/ssl-observatory.dtd b/vi/ssl-observatory.dtd index a6acb9a..b2ebf17 100644 --- a/vi/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/vi/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ mạng công ty dễ bị xâm nhập:"> "Khi bạn thấy chứng thực mới, cho Observatory biết ISP nào bạn đang kết nối vào"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.asn_tooltip -"This will fetch and send the "Autonomous System number" of your network. This will help us locate attacks against HTTPS, and to determine whether we have observations from networks in places like Iran and Syria where attacks are comparatively common."> +"Việc này sẽ tải và gửi "Số Hệ thống Tự quản" mạng của bạn. Việc này sẽ giúp chúng tôi định vị tấn công chống lại HTTPS và xác định xem chúng tôi có quan sát từ mạng trong những nơi như Iran và Syria hay không, đây là những nơi có tấn công tương đối phổ biến."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.show_cert_warning -"Show a warning when the Observatory detects a revoked certificate not caught by your browser"> +"Hiện cảnh báo khi Observatory phát hiện một chứng thực bị thu hồi không được trình duyệt phát hiện"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.show_cert_warning_tooltip -"This will check submitted certificates against known Certificate Revocation Lists. Unfortunately we cannot guarantee that we will flag every revoked certificate, but if you do see a warning there's a good chance something is wrong."> +"Việc này sẽ kiểm tra chứng thực đã gửi trước những Danh sách Thu hồi Chứng thực được xác định. Thật không may, chúng tôi không thể đảm bảo rằng chúng tôi sẽ đánh dấu mỗi chứng thực bị thu hồi, nhưng nếu bạn thấy cảnh báo thì có thể có gì đó không đúng."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.done "Hoàn thành"> @@ -70,16 +70,16 @@ received by the Observatory will indicate that somebody visited www.something.com, but not who visited the site, or what specific page they looked at. Mouseover the options for further details:"> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.hide "Hide advanced options"> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.hide "Ẩn tuỳ chọn nâng cao"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.nonanon -"Check certificates even if Tor is not available"> +"Kiểm tra chứng thực kể cả khi Tor không khả dụng"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.nonanon_tooltip -"We will still try to keep the data anonymous, but this option is less secure"> +"Chúng tôi vẫn sẽ cố giữ dữ liệu ẩn danh, nhưng tuỳ chọn này ít an toàn hơn"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.priv_dns -"Submit and check certificates for non-public DNS names"> +"Gửi và kiểm tra chứng thực cho những tên DNS không công khai"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.priv_dns_tooltip "Unless this option is checked, the Observatory will not record certificates for names that it cannot resolve through the DNS system."> @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ looked at. Mouseover the options for further details:"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.use "Use the Observatory?"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.title "WARNING from EFF's SSL Observatory"> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.showcert "Show the certificate chain"> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.showcert "Hiện chuỗi chứng thực"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.okay "Tôi hiểu"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.text "EFF's SSL Observatory has issued a warning about the HTTPS certificiate(s) for this site:"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.warning.defense "If you are logged in to this site, it may be advisable to change your password once you have a safe connection. (These warnings can be disabled in the "SSL Observatory" tab of the HTTPS Everywhere preferences dialog.)">

1 0

[tor/master] Fold new entries into changelog
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Sep '15

24 Sep '15

commit 2d139f77d7fea25288d9662f845b33152f1150bb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 24 11:00:30 2015 -0400 Fold new entries into changelog --- ChangeLog | 14 +++++++++++++- changes/bug17109 | 4 ---- changes/feature16769 | 4 ---- changes/feature16944 | 5 ----- changes/geoip-september2015 | 3 --- changes/ipv6-exitpolicy-docs | 8 -------- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 4f817e4..5559e05 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.3-rc - 2015-09-2? messages are better, and the code can recover from far more failure conditions. Thanks to "s7r" for reporting and diagnosing so many of these! + - Add a new OfflineMasterKey option to tell Tor never to try loading + or generating a secret ed25519 identity key. You can use this in + combination with tor --keygen to manage offline and/or encrypted + ed25519 keys. Implements ticket 16944. + - Add a --newpass option to allow changing or removing the + passphrase of an encrypted key with tor --keygen. Implements part + of ticket 16769. - On receiving a HUP signal, check to see whether the Ed25519 signing key has changed, and reload it if so. Closes ticket 16790. @@ -59,9 +66,12 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.3-rc - 2015-09-2? o Minor features (compilation): - Give a warning as early as possible when trying to build with an unsupported OpenSSL version. Closes ticket 16901. + - Fail during configure if we're trying to build against an OpenSSL + built without ECC support. Fixes bug 17109, bugfix on 0.2.7.1-alpha + which started requiring ECC. o Minor features (geoip): - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the July 8 2015 Maxmind GeoLite2 + - Update geoip and geoip6 to the September 3 2015 Maxmind GeoLite2 Country database. o Minor features (hidden services): @@ -128,6 +138,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.7.3-rc - 2015-09-2? incorrectly removed. Fixes bug 16924; bugfix on 0.2.4.4-alpha. o Minor bugfixes (documentation): + - Advise users how to configure separate IPv4 and IPv6 exit policies + in the manpage and sample torrcs. Related to ticket 16069. - Fix the usage message of tor-resolve(1) so that it no longer lists the removed -F option. Fixes bug 16913; bugfix on 0.2.2.28-beta. - Fix an error in the manual page and comments for diff --git a/changes/bug17109 b/changes/bug17109 deleted file mode 100644 index 9f80f6e..0000000 --- a/changes/bug17109 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fail during configure if we're trying to build against an OpenSSL - built without ECC support. Fixes bug 17109, bugfix on - 0.2.7.1-alpha which started requiring ECC. diff --git a/changes/feature16769 b/changes/feature16769 deleted file mode 100644 index acb2b9c..0000000 --- a/changes/feature16769 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (ed25519): - - Add a --newpass option to allow changing or removing the - passphrase of an encrypted key with tor --keygen. Implements - part of ticket 16769. diff --git a/changes/feature16944 b/changes/feature16944 deleted file mode 100644 index 1728bef..0000000 --- a/changes/feature16944 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (relay, ed25519): - - Add a new OfflineMasterKey option to tell Tor never to try - loading or generating a secret ed25519 identity key. You can use - this in combination with tor --keygen to manage offline and/or - encrypted ed25519 keys. Implements ticket 16944. diff --git a/changes/geoip-september2015 b/changes/geoip-september2015 deleted file mode 100644 index a4f99ef..0000000 --- a/changes/geoip-september2015 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update geoip and geoip6 to the September 3 2015 Maxmind GeoLite2 Country database. - diff --git a/changes/ipv6-exitpolicy-docs b/changes/ipv6-exitpolicy-docs deleted file mode 100644 index 033c283..0000000 --- a/changes/ipv6-exitpolicy-docs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bug fixes (documentation, torrc exit policies): - - Advise users how to configure separate IPv4 and IPv6 exit - policies in the manpage and sample torrcs. - - Fixup formatting errors in the documentation changes from - tickets #16069 and #17027. - Related to fixes in ticket #16069 and #17027. Patch by "teor". - Patch on 2eb7eafc9d78 and a96c0affcb4c (25 Oct 2012), - released in 0.2.4.7-alpha.

1 0

Jump to page:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-commits September 2015