September 2015 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit 84f0aa396dfb6d7953e97650f9ce0be7de06fcbd Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 14:15:24 2015 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- tr/https-everywhere.dtd | 2 +- tr/ssl-observatory.dtd | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tr/https-everywhere.dtd b/tr/https-everywhere.dtd index 97495eb..3395eb4 100644 --- a/tr/https-everywhere.dtd +++ b/tr/https-everywhere.dtd @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ <!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.donate_tor "Tor'a Bağış Yapın"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.tor_lang_code "tr"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.or "ya da"> -<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.donate_eff "EFF Projesine Bağış Yapın"> +<!ENTITY https-everywhere.about.donate_eff "EFF'ye Bağışta Bulunun"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.about "HTTPS Everywhere Hakkında"> <!ENTITY https-everywhere.menu.observatory "SSL Gözlemcisi Ayarları"> diff --git a/tr/ssl-observatory.dtd b/tr/ssl-observatory.dtd index 5349e00..4016a1a 100644 --- a/tr/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/tr/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ bu seçeneği etkinleştirmek güvenlidir."> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Gizlilik için Tor kullanılırken sertifikalar denetlensin"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_unavailable -"Gizlilik için Tor kullanırken sertifikalar denetlensin (Tor gereklidir)"> +"Gizlilik için Tor kullanılırken sertifikalar denetlensin (Tor gereklidir)"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_tooltip "Bu özellik için Tor yazılımı yüklenmiş ve çalışıyor olmalıdır">

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[translation/bridgedb_completed] Update translations for bridgedb_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit 774c275819a5b60b2685ad181dafec945d77e00a Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 14:15:07 2015 +0000 Update translations for bridgedb_completed --- tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index f617ee2..2a825e9 100644 --- a/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'POT-Creation-Date: 2015-03-19 22:13+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-01 13:38+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-01 13:54+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Ozancan Karataş <ozancankaratas96(a)outlook.com>\n" "Language-Team: Turkish (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/tr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"

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[translation/bridgedb] Update translations for bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit 6de741a96a4989161aab5ffc26dcf21cdbfe4b5c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 14:15:03 2015 +0000 Update translations for bridgedb --- tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index f617ee2..2a825e9 100644 --- a/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/tr/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: The Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'POT-Creation-Date: 2015-03-19 22:13+0000\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-01 13:38+0000\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-09-01 13:54+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Ozancan Karataş <ozancankaratas96(a)outlook.com>\n" "Language-Team: Turkish (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/tr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"

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[webwml/master] add more press
by sebastian＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit 2c8b94388e890a5850ab0f10c30c04097c95b00b Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 16:04:46 2015 +0200 add more press --- press/en/press.wml | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/press/en/press.wml b/press/en/press.wml index 0ab658b..600866d 100644 --- a/press/en/press.wml +++ b/press/en/press.wml @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ some of the significant Tor-related stories that have popped up.</p> <th>Topic</th> </tr> </thead> +<tr style=""> +<td>August 31, 2015</td> +<td>Statesman</td> +<td><a href="http://www.statesman.com/news/technology/tor-is-software-for-keeping-things…">‘Tor’ is software for keeping things online anonymous</a></td> +</tr> <tr style="background-color: #e5e5e5;"> <td>August 29,2015</td> <td>Saturday Paper</td>

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[tor/master] missing semicolon
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit d891e2a9c517e2b097456b7143f955ac66b112ea Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 09:55:20 2015 -0400 missing semicolon --- src/or/dirserv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 2e5766a..e5b1806 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3746,7 +3746,7 @@ validate_recommended_package_line(const char *line) } /* If we reach this point, we have at least 1 entry. */ - tor_assert(n_entries > 0) + tor_assert(n_entries > 0); return 1; }

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[tor/master] Fix an always-false check with an assertion
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit f4ded2cdc98f46817c381fc633e3161d52f75242 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 09:52:46 2015 -0400 Fix an always-false check with an assertion In validate_recommended_package_line, at this point in the function, n_entries is always >= 1. Coverity doesn't like us checking it for 0. CID 1268063. --- src/or/dirserv.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 58ab009..2e5766a 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3745,7 +3745,9 @@ validate_recommended_package_line(const char *line) cp = end_of_word + 1; } - return (n_entries == 0) ? 0 : 1; + /* If we reach this point, we have at least 1 entry. */ + tor_assert(n_entries > 0) + return 1; } /** Release all storage used by the directory server. */

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.2.1esr-5.0-2] fixup! Bug 12827: Create preference to disable SVG.
by gk＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit 191176cf015236f75da321b2ca0e8ddcd6881a55 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Fri Aug 21 14:59:51 2015 -0400 fixup! Bug 12827: Create preference to disable SVG. Allow SVG on about:preferences and other about: pages. Fixes #16775. --- layout/svg/moz.build | 2 ++ layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/layout/svg/moz.build b/layout/svg/moz.build index df2c209..7685cf5 100644 --- a/layout/svg/moz.build +++ b/layout/svg/moz.build @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ if CONFIG['CPU_ARCH'] == 'arm' and CONFIG['BUILD_ARM_NEON']: FAIL_ON_WARNINGS = True +#DEFINES['DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE'] = True + FINAL_LIBRARY = 'xul' LOCAL_INCLUDES += [ '../../widget', diff --git a/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp b/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp index c2b6608..5a66b8c 100644 --- a/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp +++ b/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp @@ -66,8 +66,12 @@ static bool sSVGDisplayListHitTestingEnabled; static bool sSVGDisplayListPaintingEnabled; static bool sSVGNewGetBBoxEnabled; +static bool IsWhitelisted(nsIURI *aURI); + // Determine if SVG should be enabled for aDoc. The svg.in-content.enabled -// preference is checked as well as whether aDoc is a content or chrome doc. +// preference is checked, then we check whether aDoc is a chrome doc, and +// finally as a fallback we check whether the top-level document is +// whitelisted (e.g., about:preferences). // If aDoc is NULL, the pref. value is returned. // Once we determine whether SVG is allowed for a given document, we record // that fact inside the document. This is necessary to avoid crashes due @@ -92,8 +96,9 @@ NS_SVGEnabled(nsIDocument *aDoc) } // Determine if SVG should be enabled for aChannel. The svg.in-content.enabled -// preference is checked as well as whether the load context associated with -// aChannel is content or chrome. +// preference is checked, then we check whether the load context associated +// with aChannel is a chrome doc, and finally as a fallback we check whether +// the top-level document is whitelisted (e.g., about:preferences). // If aChannel is NULL, the pref. value is returned. bool NS_SVGEnabledForChannel(nsIChannel *aChannel) @@ -104,13 +109,84 @@ NS_SVGEnabledForChannel(nsIChannel *aChannel) if (!aChannel) return false; - bool isContent = true; +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + nsAutoCString topDocSpec; // Set if approved via a whitelisted top doc. +#endif + + bool isSVGAllowed = false; nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> ctx; NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, ctx); - if (ctx) + if (ctx) { + bool isContent = true; ctx->GetIsContent(&isContent); + if (!isContent) { + isSVGAllowed = true; + } else { + // Disallowed. As a fallback, check for whitelisted URLs. + uint32_t loadFlags = 0; + aChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags); + if (loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI) { + // This is the top-level load; just check the channel's URL. + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + isSVGAllowed = IsWhitelisted(uri); +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + if (isSVGAllowed) + uri->GetSpec(topDocSpec); +#endif + } else { + // Obtain the top window's document and check it's URL. + nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> topWin; + ctx->GetTopWindow(getter_AddRefs(topWin)); + if (topWin) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> topDOMDoc; + topWin->GetDocument(getter_AddRefs(topDOMDoc)); + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> topDoc = do_QueryInterface(topDOMDoc); + if (topDoc) { + nsIURI *topDocURI = topDoc->GetDocumentURI(); + isSVGAllowed = IsWhitelisted(topDocURI); +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + if (isSVGAllowed) + topDocURI->GetSpec(topDocSpec); +#endif + } + } + } + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + nsAutoCString spec; + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + if (uri) + uri->GetSpec(spec); + + if (topDocSpec.IsEmpty()) { + printf("NS_SVGEnabledForChannel for %s: %s\n", spec.get(), + isSVGAllowed ? "YES" : "NO"); + } else { + printf("NS_SVGEnabledForChannel for %s: %s (via whitelisted top doc %s)\n", + spec.get(), isSVGAllowed ? "YES" : "NO", topDocSpec.get()); + } +#endif + + return isSVGAllowed; +} + +// Always allow SVG for about: URLs so that about:preferences and other +// built-in browser pages function correctly. Exclude about:blank because +// iframes initially contain about:blank documents, and since we cache the +// SVG status we must avoid enabling SVG in that case. +static bool +IsWhitelisted(nsIURI *aURI) +{ + if (!aURI) + return false; - return !isContent; + nsAutoCString scheme; + aURI->GetScheme(scheme); + return scheme.EqualsLiteral("about") && !NS_IsAboutBlank(aURI); } bool

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-38.2.1esr-5.5-2] fixup! Bug 12827: Create preference to disable SVG.
by gk＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit d8419037dbb3d36115702cc19de9380c6d9c0f10 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Fri Aug 21 14:59:51 2015 -0400 fixup! Bug 12827: Create preference to disable SVG. Allow SVG on about:preferences and other about: pages. Fixes #16775. --- layout/svg/moz.build | 2 ++ layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/layout/svg/moz.build b/layout/svg/moz.build index df2c209..7685cf5 100644 --- a/layout/svg/moz.build +++ b/layout/svg/moz.build @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ if CONFIG['CPU_ARCH'] == 'arm' and CONFIG['BUILD_ARM_NEON']: FAIL_ON_WARNINGS = True +#DEFINES['DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE'] = True + FINAL_LIBRARY = 'xul' LOCAL_INCLUDES += [ '../../widget', diff --git a/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp b/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp index c2b6608..5a66b8c 100644 --- a/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp +++ b/layout/svg/nsSVGUtils.cpp @@ -66,8 +66,12 @@ static bool sSVGDisplayListHitTestingEnabled; static bool sSVGDisplayListPaintingEnabled; static bool sSVGNewGetBBoxEnabled; +static bool IsWhitelisted(nsIURI *aURI); + // Determine if SVG should be enabled for aDoc. The svg.in-content.enabled -// preference is checked as well as whether aDoc is a content or chrome doc. +// preference is checked, then we check whether aDoc is a chrome doc, and +// finally as a fallback we check whether the top-level document is +// whitelisted (e.g., about:preferences). // If aDoc is NULL, the pref. value is returned. // Once we determine whether SVG is allowed for a given document, we record // that fact inside the document. This is necessary to avoid crashes due @@ -92,8 +96,9 @@ NS_SVGEnabled(nsIDocument *aDoc) } // Determine if SVG should be enabled for aChannel. The svg.in-content.enabled -// preference is checked as well as whether the load context associated with -// aChannel is content or chrome. +// preference is checked, then we check whether the load context associated +// with aChannel is a chrome doc, and finally as a fallback we check whether +// the top-level document is whitelisted (e.g., about:preferences). // If aChannel is NULL, the pref. value is returned. bool NS_SVGEnabledForChannel(nsIChannel *aChannel) @@ -104,13 +109,84 @@ NS_SVGEnabledForChannel(nsIChannel *aChannel) if (!aChannel) return false; - bool isContent = true; +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + nsAutoCString topDocSpec; // Set if approved via a whitelisted top doc. +#endif + + bool isSVGAllowed = false; nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> ctx; NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, ctx); - if (ctx) + if (ctx) { + bool isContent = true; ctx->GetIsContent(&isContent); + if (!isContent) { + isSVGAllowed = true; + } else { + // Disallowed. As a fallback, check for whitelisted URLs. + uint32_t loadFlags = 0; + aChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags); + if (loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI) { + // This is the top-level load; just check the channel's URL. + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + isSVGAllowed = IsWhitelisted(uri); +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + if (isSVGAllowed) + uri->GetSpec(topDocSpec); +#endif + } else { + // Obtain the top window's document and check it's URL. + nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> topWin; + ctx->GetTopWindow(getter_AddRefs(topWin)); + if (topWin) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> topDOMDoc; + topWin->GetDocument(getter_AddRefs(topDOMDoc)); + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> topDoc = do_QueryInterface(topDOMDoc); + if (topDoc) { + nsIURI *topDocURI = topDoc->GetDocumentURI(); + isSVGAllowed = IsWhitelisted(topDocURI); +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + if (isSVGAllowed) + topDocURI->GetSpec(topDocSpec); +#endif + } + } + } + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SVG_ENABLE + nsAutoCString spec; + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + if (uri) + uri->GetSpec(spec); + + if (topDocSpec.IsEmpty()) { + printf("NS_SVGEnabledForChannel for %s: %s\n", spec.get(), + isSVGAllowed ? "YES" : "NO"); + } else { + printf("NS_SVGEnabledForChannel for %s: %s (via whitelisted top doc %s)\n", + spec.get(), isSVGAllowed ? "YES" : "NO", topDocSpec.get()); + } +#endif + + return isSVGAllowed; +} + +// Always allow SVG for about: URLs so that about:preferences and other +// built-in browser pages function correctly. Exclude about:blank because +// iframes initially contain about:blank documents, and since we cache the +// SVG status we must avoid enabling SVG in that case. +static bool +IsWhitelisted(nsIURI *aURI) +{ + if (!aURI) + return false; - return !isContent; + nsAutoCString scheme; + aURI->GetScheme(scheme); + return scheme.EqualsLiteral("about") && !NS_IsAboutBlank(aURI); } bool

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[tor/master] Fix code for checking expired certificates on load
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit f64ef65b9d3297d2b039f1bec71192e0b73cd83b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 09:47:51 2015 -0400 Fix code for checking expired certificates on load Fixes CID 1306915, which noticed that the check was dead. --- src/or/routerkeys.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c index 80b26e6..1bf0951 100644 --- a/src/or/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c @@ -482,10 +482,12 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags, tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key"); bad_cert = 1; } else if (signing_key && - tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0 && - (signing_key || cert->cert_expired)) { + tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) { tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate"); bad_cert = 1; + } else if (cert->cert_expired) { + tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired"); + bad_cert = 1; } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included && ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) { tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");

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[tor/master] Fix a false-positive in coverity scan with an assertion
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

commit b977a570c4fea136910fb9f41fd57b9ba3e34699 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 1 09:50:33 2015 -0400 Fix a false-positive in coverity scan with an assertion CID 1301373 --- src/or/routerkeys.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c index 1bf0951..50659fc 100644 --- a/src/or/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c @@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags, if (rv == 0) { have_secret = 1; loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname; + tor_assert(got_tag); } else { if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) { tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,

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