tor-commits March 2015

tor-commits@lists.torproject.org

23 participants
1889 discussions

[translation/torbutton-torbuttonproperties] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttonproperties
by translation＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit e9ab860b1a23c3d4a8de44b0692716d22e5d1410 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 15:15:46 2015 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttonproperties --- lo/torbutton.properties | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/lo/torbutton.properties b/lo/torbutton.properties index 1ec20d6..cfe4289 100644 --- a/lo/torbutton.properties +++ b/lo/torbutton.properties @@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ torbutton.popup.test.auto_failed = The automatic Tor proxy test failed to use To torbutton.prefs.recommended = (recommended) torbutton.prefs.optional = (optional) torbutton.prefs.crucial = (crucial) -torbutton.popup.external.title = Download an external file type? -torbutton.popup.external.app = Tor Browser cannot display this file. You will need to open it with another application.\n\n -torbutton.popup.external.note = Some types of files can cause applications to connect to the Internet without using Tor.\n\n +torbutton.popup.external.title = ດາວໂຫຼດ ປະເພດ ຟາຍລ໌ ທາງນອກບໍ່? +torbutton.popup.external.app = Tor ບໍ່ສາມາດສະແດງ ຟາຍລ໌ ນີ້ໄດ້. ທ່ານຈະຕ້ອງໄດ້ໄຂມັນດ້ວຍ ແອັບພຼີເຄຊັນ ໂຕໃໝ່.\n\n +torbutton.popup.external.note = ບາງປະເພດຟາຍລ໌ ອາດເຮັດໃຫ້ ແອັບ ເຊື່ອມຕໍ່ໄປ ຍັງອິນເຕີເນັດ ໂດຍບໍ່ຕ້ອງ ໃຊ້ Tor ກໍໄດ້.\n\n torbutton.popup.external.suggest = To be safe, you should only open downloaded files while offline, or use a Tor Live CD such as Tails.\n torbutton.popup.launch = Download file torbutton.popup.cancel = Cancel

1 0

[torspec/master] Initial version of "HSDir needs Stable" proposal.
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit 876da86f30525103b30dd0e7391b0a39dd61d597 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Mar 24 14:33:37 2015 +0000 Initial version of "HSDir needs Stable" proposal. --- proposals/243-hsdir-flag-need-stable.txt | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+) diff --git a/proposals/243-hsdir-flag-need-stable.txt b/proposals/243-hsdir-flag-need-stable.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1807d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/243-hsdir-flag-need-stable.txt @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +Filename: 243-hsdir-flag-need-stable.txt +Title: Give out HSDir flag only to relays with Stable flag +Author: George Kadianakis +Created: 2015-03-23 +Status: Open + +1. Introduction + + The descriptors of hidden services are stored by hidden service + directories. Those are chosen by directory authorities who assign + the "HSDir" flag to those relays according to their uptime. + + It's important for new relays to not be able to get the HSDir flag + too easily, because a few correctly placed HSDirs can launch a + denial of service attack on a hidden service. We should make sure + that a naive Sybil attacker that injects thousands of new Tor + relays to the network cannot position herself like this. + +2. Motivation + + Currently, directory authorities give out the HSDir flag to relays + that volunteer to be hidden service directories by sending a + "hidden-service-dir" line in their relay descriptor, which is the + default relay behavior. Furthermore, the HSDir flag is only given + to relays that have been up for more than MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 hours. + MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 is a parameter locally set at the + directory authorities and it's somewhere between 25 to 96 hours. + + We propose changing that last requirement, and instead giving the + HSDir flag only to relays that have the Stable flag. We believe + that this will result in a few benefits: + + - We stop using the ad-hoc uptime calculation that we are currently + doing (see dirserv_thinks_router_is_hs_dir()). Instead, we use + the MTBF uptime calculation that is performed for the Stable flag + which is more robust. + + - We increase the time required to get the HSDir flag, making it + harder for naive adversaries that flood the network with relays + to actually get the HSDir flag. + + - After implementing non-deterministic HSDir picks (#8244) we also + make it harder for sophisticated adversaries to DoS a hidden + service, since at that point their main attack strategy is to + flood the network with relays. + + - By increasing the stability of HSDirs, we reduce the misses + during descriptor fetching that get caused by natural churn of + relays on the list of HSDirs. + +3. Specification + + We are suggesting changing the criteria that directory authorities + use to vote for HSDirs to the following: + + - The relay has included the "hidden-service-dir\n" line in its + descriptor. + + - The relay is eligible for having the "Stable" flag. + +4. Security considerations + + As it currently is, a router is 'Stable' if it is active, and + either its Weighted MTBF is at least the median for known active + routers or its Weighted MTBF corresponds to at least 7 days. This + is stricter criteria than what's required for HSDir, which means + that the number of HSDirs will decrease after the suggested changes. + + Currently there are about 2400 HSDirs in the consensus, and about + 2300 of them are Stable, which means that we will lose about 100 HSDirs. + We believe that this is an acceptable temporary loss. In the + short-term future, the number of HSDirs will greatly improve as + more directory authorities upgrade to #14202 and more relays + upgrade to #12538. + +5. Future + + Should we give out the HSDir flag only to relays that are Fast? Is + being an HSDir a demanding job bandwidth-wise? + + With the upcoming keyblinding scheme (#8106) and non-deterministic + HSDir selection (#8244), are there any other criteria that we + should use when assigning HSDir flags?

1 0

[torspec/master] reindex
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit 267864fcbcc6494150a3969fa4a8ead81ac3f01a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:53:37 2015 -0400 reindex --- proposals/000-index.txt | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index 81d52af..ffc2af1 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ Proposals by number: 240 Early signing key revocation for directory authorities [DRAFT] 241 Resisting guard-turnover attacks [DRAFT] 242 Better performance and usability for the MyFamily option [OPEN] +243 Give out HSDir flag only to relays with Stable flag [OPEN] Proposals by status: @@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ Proposals by status: 236 The move to a single guard node 237 All relays are directory servers [for 0.2.6.x] 242 Better performance and usability for the MyFamily option + 243 Give out HSDir flag only to relays with Stable flag ACCEPTED: 140 Provide diffs between consensuses 172 GETINFO controller option for circuit information

1 0

[tor/master] Check return values for tor_addr_parse(default) in config.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit fec923d72b2cb40f4d696cc1d2306d4c5779bed0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:46:39 2015 -0400 Check return values for tor_addr_parse(default) in config.c In these cases, the address is always a constant "default", so should always succeed. But coverity can't tell that. Fixes CID 1291645 --- src/or/config.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index fca350c..cfa5aa7 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -5934,7 +5934,8 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, port = 1; } else if (!strcmp(addrport, "auto")) { port = CFG_AUTO_PORT; - tor_addr_parse(&addr, defaultaddr); + int af = tor_addr_parse(&addr, defaultaddr); + tor_assert(af >= 0); } else if (!strcasecmpend(addrport, ":auto")) { char *addrtmp = tor_strndup(addrport, strlen(addrport)-5); port = CFG_AUTO_PORT; @@ -5949,7 +5950,8 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, "9050" might be a valid address. */ port = (int) tor_parse_long(addrport, 10, 0, 65535, &ok, NULL); if (ok) { - tor_addr_parse(&addr, defaultaddr); + int af = tor_addr_parse(&addr, defaultaddr); + tor_assert(af >= 0); } else if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, &addr, &ptmp) == 0) { if (ptmp == 0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%sPort line has address but no port", portname);

1 0

[tor/master] Put an upper bound on test_workqueue -I argument
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit 8f951d019656ecdc49f2b944781539c40e1a8392 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:49:29 2015 -0400 Put an upper bound on test_workqueue -I argument This makes coverity happy, since it doesn't like us looping against a value which might be INT_MAX. This is CID 1268069 --- src/test/test_workqueue.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_workqueue.c b/src/test/test_workqueue.c index aaff506..83f6f3e 100644 --- a/src/test/test_workqueue.c +++ b/src/test/test_workqueue.c @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include <event.h> #endif +#define MAX_INFLIGHT (1<<16) + static int opt_verbose = 0; static int opt_n_threads = 8; static int opt_n_items = 10000; @@ -348,7 +350,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } if (opt_n_threads < 1 || opt_n_items < 1 || opt_n_inflight < 1 || opt_n_lowwater < 0 || - opt_n_cancel > opt_n_inflight || + opt_n_cancel > opt_n_inflight || opt_n_inflight > MAX_INFLIGHT || opt_ratio_rsa < 0) { help(); return 1;

1 0

[tor/master] bump to 0.2.6.6
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit dfd6cf9ea2b3f84e868c71af909c26358db07dac Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:23:34 2015 -0400 bump to 0.2.6.6 --- configure.ac | 2 +- contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 3adcc2b..e575881 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2015, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information -AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.6.5-rc-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.6.6]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 3eb287f..dda8244 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.6.5-rc-dev" +!define VERSION "0.2.6.6" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index 608ae35..9b2a9b0 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.6.5-rc-dev" +#define VERSION "0.2.6.6"

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.6'
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit 572b9ff4d7937a568bc786f7dce08b34011de7d9 Merge: 60d147f dfd6cf9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:24:53 2015 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.6'

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.6] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.6' into release-0.2.6
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit bb8c4e69ca5c8bcad7d66b2ad502ab35b1a5032b Merge: 5ebe7f2 dfd6cf9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:23:44 2015 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.6' into release-0.2.6 configure.ac | 2 +- contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.6] bump to 0.2.6.6
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.6] Pick a date for 0.2.6.6
by nickm＠torproject.org 24 Mar '15

24 Mar '15

commit 5ebe7f216076df05dae218b7dc5ef37a0e18a9e5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 24 10:22:02 2015 -0400 Pick a date for 0.2.6.6 --- ChangeLog | 2 +- ReleaseNotes | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 27e1616..22b4da0 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-0?-?? +Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-03-24 Tor 0.2.6.6 is the first stable release in the 0.2.6 series. It adds numerous safety, security, correctness, and performance diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes index 1a3fb01..f84aac2 100644 --- a/ReleaseNotes +++ b/ReleaseNotes @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file. -Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-0?-?? +Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-03-24 Tor 0.2.6.6 is the first stable release in the 0.2.6 series. It adds numerous safety, security, correctness, and performance

1 0

Jump to page:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-commits March 2015