May 2014 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.4] Begin work on a changelog for 0.2.4.22 by copying in the changes files unedited
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit 20d569882f8d4df9e41f88162e7396928cedf629 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 7 23:35:00 2014 -0400 Begin work on a changelog for 0.2.4.22 by copying in the changes files unedited --- ChangeLog | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ changes/bug10849_023 | 6 --- changes/bug11437 | 3 -- changes/bug11464_023 | 5 --- changes/bug11513 | 12 ------ changes/bug11519 | 3 -- changes/bug11553 | 5 --- changes/bug7164_downgrade | 6 --- changes/bug9213_doc | 5 --- changes/bug9229 | 5 --- changes/bug9393 | 4 -- changes/bug9686_024 | 5 --- changes/bug9700 | 3 -- changes/ff28_ciphers | 6 --- changes/md_leak_bug | 5 --- changes/ticket11528 | 6 --- 16 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index d8ae424..7992f70 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,95 @@ +Changes in version 0.2.4.22 - 2014-05-?? + Write a paragraph here. + + o Major bugfixes: + - When running a hidden service, do not allow TunneledDirConns 0; + this will keep the hidden service from running, and also + make it publish its descriptors directly over HTTP. Fixes bug 10849; + bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Stop leaking memory when we successfully resolve a PTR record. + Fixes bug 11437; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. + + o Major features (security): + - Block authority signing keys that were used on an authorities + vulnerable to the "heartbleed" bug in openssl (CVE-2014-0160). + (We don't have any evidence that these keys _were_ compromised; + we're doing this to be prudent.) Resolves ticket 11464. + + o Major bugfixes: + - Generate the server's preference list for ciphersuites + automatically based on uniform criteria, and considering all + OpenSSL ciphersuites with acceptable strength and forward + secrecy. (The sort order is: prefer AES to 3DES; break ties by + preferring ECDHE to DHE; break ties by preferring GCM to CBC; + break ties by preferring SHA384 to SHA256 to SHA1; and finally, + break ties by preferring AES256 to AES128.) This resolves bugs + #11513, #11492, #11498, #11499. Bugs reported by 'cypherpunks'. + Bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Avoid sending an garbage value to the controller when a circuit is + cannibalized. Fixes bug 11519; bugfix on 0.2.3.11-alpha. + + o Minor features: + - When we run out of usable circuit IDs on a channel, log only one + warning for the whole channel, and include a description of + how many circuits there were on the channel. Fix for part of ticket + #11553. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Downgrade the warning severity for the the "md was still referenced 1 + node(s)" warning. Tor 0.2.5.4-alpha has better code for trying to + diagnose this bug, and the current warning in earlier versions of + tor achieves nothing useful. Addresses warning from bug 7164. + + o Documentation: + - Correctly document that we search for a system torrc file before + looking in ~/.torrc. Fixes documentation side of 9213; bugfix + on 0.2.3.18-rc. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Avoid 60-second delays in the bootstrapping process when Tor + is launching for a second time while using bridges. Fixes bug 9229; + bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Give the correct URL in the warning message that we present + when the user is trying to run a Tor relay on an ancient version + of Windows. Fixes bug 9393. + + o Minor features (security): + - Decrease the lower limit of MaxMemInCellQueues to 256 MBytes (but leave + the default at 8GBytes), to better support Raspberry Pi users. Fixes + bug 9686; bugfix on 0.2.4.14-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (compilation): + - Fix a compilation error when compiling with --disable-cuve25519. + Fixes bug 9700; bugfix on 0.2.4.17-rc. + + o Minor features (performance, compatibility): + - Update the list of TLS cipehrsuites that a client advertises + to match those advertised by Firefox 28. This enables selection of + (fast) GCM ciphersuites, disables some strange old ciphers, and + disables the ECDH (not to be confused with ECDHE) ciphersuites. + Resolves ticket 11438. + + o Major bugfixes (security, OOM) + - Fix a memory leak that could occur if a microdescriptor parse + fails during the tokenizing step. This could enable a memory + exhaustion attack by directory servers. Fixes bug #11649; bugfix + on 0.2.2.6-alpha. + + o Minor features: + - Servers now trust themselves to have a better view than clients of + which TLS ciphersuites to choose. (Thanks to #11513, the server + list is now well-considered, whereas the client list has been + chosen mainly for anti-fingerprinting purposes.) Resolves ticket + 11528. + + + Changes in version 0.2.4.21 - 2014-02-28 Tor 0.2.4.21 further improves security against potential adversaries who find breaking 1024-bit crypto doable, and backports several stability diff --git a/changes/bug10849_023 b/changes/bug10849_023 deleted file mode 100644 index 480dea3..0000000 --- a/changes/bug10849_023 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - When running a hidden service, do not allow TunneledDirConns 0; - this will keep the hidden service from running, and also - make it publish its descriptors directly over HTTP. Fixes bug 10849; - bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug11437 b/changes/bug11437 deleted file mode 100644 index f5117ca..0000000 --- a/changes/bug11437 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Stop leaking memory when we successfully resolve a PTR record. - Fixes bug 11437; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug11464_023 b/changes/bug11464_023 deleted file mode 100644 index 80c04b2..0000000 --- a/changes/bug11464_023 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major features (security): - - Block authority signing keys that were used on an authorities - vulnerable to the "heartbleed" bug in openssl (CVE-2014-0160). - (We don't have any evidence that these keys _were_ compromised; - we're doing this to be prudent.) Resolves ticket 11464. diff --git a/changes/bug11513 b/changes/bug11513 deleted file mode 100644 index 820c026..0000000 --- a/changes/bug11513 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Generate the server's preference list for ciphersuites - automatically based on uniform criteria, and considering all - OpenSSL ciphersuites with acceptable strength and forward - secrecy. (The sort order is: prefer AES to 3DES; break ties by - preferring ECDHE to DHE; break ties by preferring GCM to CBC; - break ties by preferring SHA384 to SHA256 to SHA1; and finally, - break ties by preferring AES256 to AES128.) This resolves bugs - #11513, #11492, #11498, #11499. Bugs reported by 'cypherpunks'. - Bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. - - diff --git a/changes/bug11519 b/changes/bug11519 deleted file mode 100644 index 5c1e6af..0000000 --- a/changes/bug11519 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Avoid sending an garbage value to the controller when a circuit is - cannibalized. Fixes bug 11519; bugfix on 0.2.3.11-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug11553 b/changes/bug11553 deleted file mode 100644 index 1540f46..0000000 --- a/changes/bug11553 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - When we run out of usable circuit IDs on a channel, log only one - warning for the whole channel, and include a description of - how many circuits there were on the channel. Fix for part of ticket - #11553. diff --git a/changes/bug7164_downgrade b/changes/bug7164_downgrade deleted file mode 100644 index 4d75586..0000000 --- a/changes/bug7164_downgrade +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Downgrade the warning severity for the the "md was still referenced 1 - node(s)" warning. Tor 0.2.5.4-alpha has better code for trying to - diagnose this bug, and the current warning in earlier versions of - tor achieves nothing useful. Addresses warning from bug 7164. - diff --git a/changes/bug9213_doc b/changes/bug9213_doc deleted file mode 100644 index 2f959dd..0000000 --- a/changes/bug9213_doc +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Documentation: - - Correctly document that we search for a system torrc file before - looking in ~/.torrc. Fixes documentation side of 9213; bugfix - on 0.2.3.18-rc. - diff --git a/changes/bug9229 b/changes/bug9229 deleted file mode 100644 index ad7fd22..0000000 --- a/changes/bug9229 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Avoid 60-second delays in the bootstrapping process when Tor - is launching for a second time while using bridges. Fixes bug 9229; - bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9393 b/changes/bug9393 deleted file mode 100644 index 9aedd12..0000000 --- a/changes/bug9393 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Give the correct URL in the warning message that we present - when the user is trying to run a Tor relay on an ancient version - of Windows. Fixes bug 9393. diff --git a/changes/bug9686_024 b/changes/bug9686_024 deleted file mode 100644 index 8705379..0000000 --- a/changes/bug9686_024 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (security): - - Decrease the lower limit of MaxMemInCellQueues to 256 MBytes (but leave - the default at 8GBytes), to better support Raspberry Pi users. Fixes - bug 9686; bugfix on 0.2.4.14-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9700 b/changes/bug9700 deleted file mode 100644 index f59f54c..0000000 --- a/changes/bug9700 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (compilation): - - Fix a compilation error when compiling with --disable-cuve25519. - Fixes bug 9700; bugfix on 0.2.4.17-rc. diff --git a/changes/ff28_ciphers b/changes/ff28_ciphers deleted file mode 100644 index 05eb4e9..0000000 --- a/changes/ff28_ciphers +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (performance, compatibility): - - Update the list of TLS cipehrsuites that a client advertises - to match those advertised by Firefox 28. This enables selection of - (fast) GCM ciphersuites, disables some strange old ciphers, and - disables the ECDH (not to be confused with ECDHE) ciphersuites. - Resolves ticket 11438. diff --git a/changes/md_leak_bug b/changes/md_leak_bug deleted file mode 100644 index 26270aa..0000000 --- a/changes/md_leak_bug +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (security, OOM) - - Fix a memory leak that could occur if a microdescriptor parse - fails during the tokenizing step. This could enable a memory - exhaustion attack by directory servers. Fixes bug #11649; bugfix - on 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket11528 b/changes/ticket11528 deleted file mode 100644 index 15daad9..0000000 --- a/changes/ticket11528 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Servers now trust themselves to have a better view than clients of - which TLS ciphersuites to choose. (Thanks to #11513, the server - list is now well-considered, whereas the client list has been - chosen mainly for anti-fingerprinting purposes.) Resolves ticket - 11528.

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[tor/release-0.2.4] mark backported changelog entries and ensure that they match the changelog.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit 3dfd8dd97b8b89bddc772d8b66be3d782f91f831 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed May 7 23:42:04 2014 -0400 mark backported changelog entries and ensure that they match the changelog. --- ChangeLog | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 7992f70..51faaf1 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -7,36 +7,44 @@ Changes in version 0.2.4.22 - 2014-05-?? make it publish its descriptors directly over HTTP. Fixes bug 10849; bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. - o Minor bugfixes: + o Minor bugfixes (exit relay, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): - Stop leaking memory when we successfully resolve a PTR record. Fixes bug 11437; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. - o Major features (security): - - Block authority signing keys that were used on an authorities - vulnerable to the "heartbleed" bug in openssl (CVE-2014-0160). - (We don't have any evidence that these keys _were_ compromised; - we're doing this to be prudent.) Resolves ticket 11464. - - o Major bugfixes: - - Generate the server's preference list for ciphersuites - automatically based on uniform criteria, and considering all - OpenSSL ciphersuites with acceptable strength and forward - secrecy. (The sort order is: prefer AES to 3DES; break ties by - preferring ECDHE to DHE; break ties by preferring GCM to CBC; - break ties by preferring SHA384 to SHA256 to SHA1; and finally, - break ties by preferring AES256 to AES128.) This resolves bugs - #11513, #11492, #11498, #11499. Bugs reported by 'cypherpunks'. - Bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + o Major features (security, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): + - Block authority signing keys that were used on authorities + vulnerable to the "heartbleed" bug in OpenSSL (CVE-2014-0160). (We + don't have any evidence that these keys _were_ compromised; we're + doing this to be prudent.) Resolves ticket 11464. + + o Major bugfixes (TLS cipher selection, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): + - The relay ciphersuite list is now generated automatically based on + uniform criteria, and includes all OpenSSL ciphersuites with + acceptable strength and forward secrecy. Previously, we had left + some perfectly fine ciphersuites unsupported due to omission or + typo. Resolves bugs 11513, 11492, 11498, 11499. Bugs reported by + 'cypherpunks'. Bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Relays now trust themselves to have a better view than clients of + which TLS ciphersuites are better than others. (Thanks to bug + 11513, the relay list is now well-considered, whereas the client + list has been chosen mainly for anti-fingerprinting purposes.) + Relays prefer: AES over 3DES; then ECDHE over DHE; then GCM over + CBC; then SHA384 over SHA256 over SHA1; and last, AES256 over + AES128. Resolves ticket 11528. + - Clients now try to advertise the same list of ciphersuites as + Firefox 28. This change enables selection of (fast) GCM + ciphersuites, disables some strange old ciphers, and stops + advertising the ECDH (not to be confused with ECDHE) ciphersuites. + Resolves ticket 11438. - o Minor bugfixes: + o Minor bugfixes (controller, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): - Avoid sending an garbage value to the controller when a circuit is cannibalized. Fixes bug 11519; bugfix on 0.2.3.11-alpha. - o Minor features: + o Minor features (log verbosity, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): - When we run out of usable circuit IDs on a channel, log only one - warning for the whole channel, and include a description of - how many circuits there were on the channel. Fix for part of ticket - #11553. + warning for the whole channel, and describe how many circuits + there were on the channel. Fixes part of ticket 11553. o Minor bugfixes: - Downgrade the warning severity for the the "md was still referenced 1 @@ -44,22 +52,21 @@ Changes in version 0.2.4.22 - 2014-05-?? diagnose this bug, and the current warning in earlier versions of tor achieves nothing useful. Addresses warning from bug 7164. - o Documentation: + o Documentation (backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): - Correctly document that we search for a system torrc file before - looking in ~/.torrc. Fixes documentation side of 9213; bugfix - on 0.2.3.18-rc. + looking in ~/.torrc. Fixes documentation side of 9213; bugfix on + 0.2.3.18-rc. - o Minor bugfixes: - - Avoid 60-second delays in the bootstrapping process when Tor - is launching for a second time while using bridges. Fixes bug 9229; + o Minor bugfixes (bridge client, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): + - Avoid 60-second delays in the bootstrapping process when Tor is + launching for a second time while using bridges. Fixes bug 9229; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. - o Minor bugfixes: - - Give the correct URL in the warning message that we present - when the user is trying to run a Tor relay on an ancient version - of Windows. Fixes bug 9393. + o Minor bugfixes (relays and bridges, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): + - Give the correct URL in the warning message when trying to run a + relay on an ancient version of Windows. Fixes bug 9393. - o Minor features (security): + o Minor features (security, backport from 0.2.5.4-alpha): - Decrease the lower limit of MaxMemInCellQueues to 256 MBytes (but leave the default at 8GBytes), to better support Raspberry Pi users. Fixes bug 9686; bugfix on 0.2.4.14-alpha. @@ -68,26 +75,12 @@ Changes in version 0.2.4.22 - 2014-05-?? - Fix a compilation error when compiling with --disable-cuve25519. Fixes bug 9700; bugfix on 0.2.4.17-rc. - o Minor features (performance, compatibility): - - Update the list of TLS cipehrsuites that a client advertises - to match those advertised by Firefox 28. This enables selection of - (fast) GCM ciphersuites, disables some strange old ciphers, and - disables the ECDH (not to be confused with ECDHE) ciphersuites. - Resolves ticket 11438. - o Major bugfixes (security, OOM) - Fix a memory leak that could occur if a microdescriptor parse fails during the tokenizing step. This could enable a memory exhaustion attack by directory servers. Fixes bug #11649; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - o Minor features: - - Servers now trust themselves to have a better view than clients of - which TLS ciphersuites to choose. (Thanks to #11513, the server - list is now well-considered, whereas the client list has been - chosen mainly for anti-fingerprinting purposes.) Resolves ticket - 11528. - Changes in version 0.2.4.21 - 2014-02-28

1 0

[meek/master] Remove a useless type.
by dcf＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit d3762db183fc752a0a146f168a6aed8313fb625a Author: David Fifield <david(a)bamsoftware.com> Date: Wed May 7 20:01:25 2014 -0700 Remove a useless type. --- meek-client-torbrowser/windows.go | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/meek-client-torbrowser/windows.go b/meek-client-torbrowser/windows.go index 8a3c90f..3a68de7 100644 --- a/meek-client-torbrowser/windows.go +++ b/meek-client-torbrowser/windows.go @@ -6,6 +6,6 @@ package main const ( - firefoxPath string = "Browser/firefox.exe" - firefoxProfilePath = "Data/Browser/profile.meek-http-helper" + firefoxPath = "Browser/firefox.exe" + firefoxProfilePath = "Data/Browser/profile.meek-http-helper" )

1 0

[meek/master] Rename Expired to IsExpired.
by dcf＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit 6e531bdb1ab9fc09d2f806a82a4b8b95b3ee8938 Author: David Fifield <david(a)bamsoftware.com> Date: Wed May 7 20:11:57 2014 -0700 Rename Expired to IsExpired. --- meek-server/meek-server.go | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/meek-server/meek-server.go b/meek-server/meek-server.go index c24b8cc..933c742 100644 --- a/meek-server/meek-server.go +++ b/meek-server/meek-server.go @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func (session *Session) Touch() { session.LastSeen = time.Now() } -func (session *Session) Expired() bool { +func (session *Session) IsExpired() bool { return time.Since(session.LastSeen) > maxSessionStaleness } @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func (state *State) ExpireSessions() { time.Sleep(maxSessionStaleness / 2) state.lock.Lock() for sessionId, session := range state.sessionMap { - if session.Expired() { + if session.IsExpired() { // log.Printf("deleting expired session %q", sessionId) session.Or.Close() delete(state.sessionMap, sessionId)

1 0

[meek/master] Doc comments.
by dcf＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit 0ef39a5661475d3d414079284b2bbe3f24176f46 Author: David Fifield <david(a)bamsoftware.com> Date: Wed May 7 19:47:15 2014 -0700 Doc comments. --- meek-client-torbrowser/meek-client-torbrowser.go | 33 ++++++++-- meek-client/helper.go | 3 +- meek-client/meek-client.go | 68 +++++++++++++++++--- meek-server/meek-server.go | 49 +++++++++++--- terminateprocess-buffer/terminateprocess-buffer.go | 3 +- 5 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/meek-client-torbrowser/meek-client-torbrowser.go b/meek-client-torbrowser/meek-client-torbrowser.go index 6ddcf2f..21ef4d9 100644 --- a/meek-client-torbrowser/meek-client-torbrowser.go +++ b/meek-client-torbrowser/meek-client-torbrowser.go @@ -1,12 +1,31 @@ -// Usage: -// meek-client-torbrowser --log meek-client-torbrowser.log -- meek-client --url=https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/ --front=www.google.com --log meek-client.log +// meek-client-torbrowser is an auxiliary program that helps with connecting +// meek-client to meek-http-helper running in Tor Browser. // -// The meek-client-torbrowser program starts a copy of Tor Browser running -// meek-http-helper in a special profile, and then starts meek-client set up to -// use the browser helper. +// Sample usage in torrc (exact paths depend on platform): +// ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client-torbrowser --log meek-client-torbrowser.log -- ./meek-client --url=https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/ --front=www.google.com --log meek-client.log +// Everything up to "--" is options for this program. Everything following it is +// a meek-client command line. The command line for running firefox is implicit +// and hardcoded in this program. // -// Arguments to this program are passed unmodified to meek-client, with the -// addition of a --helper option pointing to the browser helper. +// This program, meek-client-torbrowser, starts a copy of firefox under the +// meek-http-helper profile, which must have configured the meek-http-helper +// extension. This program reads the stdout of firefox, looking for a special +// line with the listening port number of the extension, one that looks like +// "meek-http-helper: listen <address>". The meek-client command is then +// executed as given, except that a --helper option is added that points to the +// port number read from firefox. +// +// This program proxies stdin and stdout to and from meek-client, so it is +// actually meek-client that drives the pluggable transport negotiation with +// tor. +// +// The special --exit-on-stdin-eof is a special workaround for Windows. On +// Windows we don't get a detectable shutdown signal that allows us to kill the +// subprocesses we've started. Instead, use the --exit-on-stdin-eof option and +// run this program inside of terminateprocess-buffer. When +// terminateprocess-buffer is killed, it will close our stdin, and we can exit +// gracefully. --exit-on-stdin-eof and terminateprocess-buffer need to be used +// together. package main import ( diff --git a/meek-client/helper.go b/meek-client/helper.go index 98fd771..49423fb 100644 --- a/meek-client/helper.go +++ b/meek-client/helper.go @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ type JSONResponse struct { Body []byte `json:"body"` } -// Ask a locally running browser extension to make the request for us. +// Do an HTTP roundtrip through the configured browser extension, using the +// payload data in buf and the request metadata in info. func roundTripWithHelper(buf []byte, info *RequestInfo) (*http.Response, error) { s, err := net.DialTCP("tcp", nil, options.HelperAddr) if err != nil { diff --git a/meek-client/meek-client.go b/meek-client/meek-client.go index 229bfd2..b3cce7a 100644 --- a/meek-client/meek-client.go +++ b/meek-client/meek-client.go @@ -1,3 +1,31 @@ +// meek-client is the client transport plugin for the meek pluggable transport. +// +// Sample usage in torrc: +// Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:1 +// ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client --url=https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/ --front=www.google.com --log meek-client.log +// The transport ignores the bridge address 0.0.2.0:1 and instead connects to +// the URL given by --url. When --front is given, the domain in the URL is +// replaced by the front domain for the purpose of the DNS lookup, TCP +// connection, and TLS SNI, but the HTTP Host header in the request will be the +// one in --url. (For example, in the configuration above, the connection will +// appear on the outside to be going to www.google.com, but it will actually be +// dispatched to meek-reflect.appspot.com by the Google frontend server.) +// +// Most user configuration can happen either through SOCKS args (i.e., args on a +// Bridge line) or through command line options. SOCKS args take precedence +// per-connection over command line options. For example, this configuration +// using SOCKS args: +// Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:1 url=https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/ front=www.google.com +// ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client +// is the same as this one using command line options. +// Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:1 +// ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client --url=https://meek-reflect.appspot.com/ --front=www.google.com +// The advantage of SOCKS args is that multiple Bridge lines can have different +// configurations, but it requires a newer tor. +// +// The --helper option prevents this program from doing any network operations +// itself. Rather, it will send all requests through a browser extension that +// makes HTTP requests. package main import ( @@ -22,12 +50,27 @@ import ( import "git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/goptlib.git" const ( - ptMethodName = "meek" - sessionIdLength = 32 - maxPayloadLength = 0x10000 - initPollInterval = 100 * time.Millisecond - maxPollInterval = 5 * time.Second - pollIntervalMultiplier = 1.5 + ptMethodName = "meek" + // A session ID is a randomly generated string that identifies a + // long-lived session. We split a TCP stream across multiple HTTP + // requests, and those with the same session ID belong to the same + // stream. + sessionIdLength = 32 + // The size of the largest chunk of data we will read from the SOCKS + // port before forwarding it in a request, and the maximum size of a + // body we are willing to handle in a reply. + maxPayloadLength = 0x10000 + // We must poll the server to see if it has anything to send; there is + // no way for the server to push data back to us until we send an HTTP + // request. When a timer expires, we send a request even if it has an + // empty body. The interval starts at this value and then grows. + initPollInterval = 100 * time.Millisecond + // Maximum polling interval. + maxPollInterval = 5 * time.Second + // Geometric increase in the polling interval each time we fail to read + // data. + pollIntervalMultiplier = 1.5 + // Safety limits on interaction with the HTTP helper. maxHelperResponseLength = 10000000 helperReadTimeout = 60 * time.Second helperWriteTimeout = 2 * time.Second @@ -35,6 +78,7 @@ const ( var ptInfo pt.ClientInfo +// Store for command line options. var options struct { URL string Front string @@ -63,6 +107,8 @@ type RequestInfo struct { HTTPProxyURL *url.URL } +// Do an HTTP roundtrip using the payload data in buf and the request metadata +// in info. func roundTripWithHTTP(buf []byte, info *RequestInfo) (*http.Response, error) { tr := http.DefaultTransport if info.HTTPProxyURL != nil { @@ -82,6 +128,8 @@ func roundTripWithHTTP(buf []byte, info *RequestInfo) (*http.Response, error) { return tr.RoundTrip(req) } +// Send the data in buf to the remote URL, wait for a reply, and feed the reply +// body back into conn. func sendRecv(buf []byte, conn net.Conn, info *RequestInfo) (int64, error) { roundTrip := roundTripWithHTTP if options.HelperAddr != nil { @@ -100,6 +148,8 @@ func sendRecv(buf []byte, conn net.Conn, info *RequestInfo) (int64, error) { return io.Copy(conn, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxPayloadLength)) } +// Repeatedly read from conn, issue HTTP requests, and write the responses back +// to conn. func copyLoop(conn net.Conn, info *RequestInfo) error { var interval time.Duration @@ -183,6 +233,7 @@ func genSessionId() string { return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(buf) } +// Callback for new SOCKS requests. func handler(conn *pt.SocksConn) error { handlerChan <- 1 defer func() { @@ -190,7 +241,6 @@ func handler(conn *pt.SocksConn) error { }() defer conn.Close() - // Ignore the IP address in the SOCKS request. err := conn.Grant(&net.TCPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("0.0.0.0"), Port: 0}) if err != nil { return err @@ -333,7 +383,7 @@ func main() { sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1) signal.Notify(sigChan, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) - // wait for first signal + // Wait for first signal. sig = nil for sig == nil { select { @@ -352,7 +402,7 @@ func main() { return } - // wait for second signal or no more handlers + // Wait for second signal or no more handlers. sig = nil for sig == nil && numHandlers != 0 { select { diff --git a/meek-server/meek-server.go b/meek-server/meek-server.go index 30964b8..cdbf448 100644 --- a/meek-server/meek-server.go +++ b/meek-server/meek-server.go @@ -1,3 +1,11 @@ +// meek-server is the server transport plugin for the meek pluggable transport. +// It acts as an HTTP server, keeps track of session ids, and forwards received +// data to a local OR port. +// +// Sample usage in torrc: +// ServerTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-server --port 8443 --cert cert.pem --key key.pem --log meek-server.log +// Plain HTTP usage: +// ServerTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-server --port 8080 --disable-tls --log meek-server.log package main import ( @@ -20,14 +28,22 @@ import ( import "git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/goptlib.git" const ( - ptMethodName = "meek" + ptMethodName = "meek" + // Reject session ids shorter than this, as a weak defense against + // client bugs that send an empty session id or something similarly + // likely to collide. minSessionIdLength = 32 - maxPayloadLength = 0x10000 - // How long we try to read something back from the ORPort before returning the - // response. + // The largest request body we are willing to process, and the largest + // chunk of data we'll send back in a response. + maxPayloadLength = 0x10000 + // How long we try to read something back from the OR port before + // returning the response. turnaroundTimeout = 10 * time.Millisecond - // Passed as ReadTimeout and WriteTimeout when constructing the http.Server. - readWriteTimeout = 20 * time.Second + // Passed as ReadTimeout and WriteTimeout when constructing the + // http.Server. + readWriteTimeout = 20 * time.Second + // Cull unused session ids (with their corresponding OR port connection) + // if we haven't seen any activity for this long. maxSessionStaleness = 120 * time.Second ) @@ -45,19 +61,27 @@ func httpInternalServerError(w http.ResponseWriter) { http.Error(w, "Internal server error.\n", http.StatusInternalServerError) } +// Every session id maps to an existing OR port connection, which we keep open +// between received requests. The first time we see a new session id, we create +// a new OR port connection. type Session struct { Or *net.TCPConn LastSeen time.Time } +// Mark a session as having been seen just now. func (session *Session) Touch() { session.LastSeen = time.Now() } +// Is this session old enough to be culled? func (session *Session) IsExpired() bool { return time.Since(session.LastSeen) > maxSessionStaleness } +// There is one state per HTTP listener. In the usual case there is just one +// listener, so there is just one global state. State also serves as the http +// Handler. type State struct { sessionMap map[string]*Session lock sync.Mutex @@ -85,6 +109,7 @@ func (state *State) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { } } +// Handle a GET request. This doesn't have any purpose apart from diagnostics. func (state *State) Get(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { if path.Clean(req.URL.Path) != "/" { http.NotFound(w, req) @@ -95,6 +120,8 @@ func (state *State) Get(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { w.Write([]byte("I’m just a happy little web server.\n")) } +// Look up a session by id, or create a new one (with its OR port connection) if +// it doesn't already exist. func (state *State) GetSession(sessionId string, req *http.Request) (*Session, error) { state.lock.Lock() defer state.lock.Unlock() @@ -115,6 +142,8 @@ func (state *State) GetSession(sessionId string, req *http.Request) (*Session, e return session, nil } +// Feed the body of req into the OR port, and write any data read from the OR +// port back to w. func transact(session *Session, w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error { body := http.MaxBytesReader(w, req.Body, maxPayloadLength+1) _, err := io.Copy(session.Or, body) @@ -140,6 +169,7 @@ func transact(session *Session, w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) error return nil } +// Handle a POST request. Look up the session id and then do a transaction. func (state *State) Post(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { sessionId := req.Header.Get("X-Session-Id") if len(sessionId) < minSessionIdLength { @@ -162,6 +192,8 @@ func (state *State) Post(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { } } +// Remove a session from the map and closes its corresponding OR port +// connection. Does nothing if the session id is not known. func (state *State) CloseSession(sessionId string) { state.lock.Lock() defer state.lock.Unlock() @@ -173,6 +205,7 @@ func (state *State) CloseSession(sessionId string) { } } +// Loop forever, checking for expired sessions and removing them. func (state *State) ExpireSessions() { for { time.Sleep(maxSessionStaleness / 2) @@ -319,7 +352,7 @@ func main() { sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1) signal.Notify(sigChan, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) - // wait for first signal + // Wait for first signal. sig = nil for sig == nil { select { @@ -338,7 +371,7 @@ func main() { return } - // wait for second signal or no more handlers + // Wait for second signal or no more handlers. sig = nil for sig == nil && numHandlers != 0 { select { diff --git a/terminateprocess-buffer/terminateprocess-buffer.go b/terminateprocess-buffer/terminateprocess-buffer.go index 16a7297..f826159 100644 --- a/terminateprocess-buffer/terminateprocess-buffer.go +++ b/terminateprocess-buffer/terminateprocess-buffer.go @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -// This program is designed to sit between tor and a transport plugin on +// The terminateprocess-buffer program is designed to act as a +// TerminateProcess-absorbing buffer between tor and a transport plugin on // Windows. On Windows, transport plugins are killed with a TerminateProcess, // which doesn't give them a chance to clean up before exiting. // https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9330

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[meek/master] Log SIGTERM in meek-server.
by dcf＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit dfea22d596cfb89d5807f2bbf33eef2004e44dd0 Author: David Fifield <david(a)bamsoftware.com> Date: Wed May 7 20:22:11 2014 -0700 Log SIGTERM in meek-server. --- meek-server/meek-server.go | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/meek-server/meek-server.go b/meek-server/meek-server.go index 933c742..30964b8 100644 --- a/meek-server/meek-server.go +++ b/meek-server/meek-server.go @@ -332,7 +332,9 @@ func main() { ln.Close() } + log.Printf("got signal %s", sig) if sig == syscall.SIGTERM { + log.Printf("done") return } @@ -346,5 +348,6 @@ func main() { } } + log.Printf("got second signal %s", sig) log.Printf("done") }

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[tor/release-0.2.4] Elevate server TLS cipher preferences over client
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit 0b319de60f7c80ab5c37c57af182f4f710ceb5b7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 17 10:23:18 2014 -0400 Elevate server TLS cipher preferences over client The server cipher list is (thanks to #11513) chosen systematically to put the best choices for Tor first. The client cipher list is chosen to resemble a browser. So let's set SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE to have the servers pick according to their own preference order. --- changes/ticket11528 | 6 ++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket11528 b/changes/ticket11528 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15daad9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket11528 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features: + - Servers now trust themselves to have a better view than clients of + which TLS ciphersuites to choose. (Thanks to #11513, the server + list is now well-considered, whereas the client list has been + chosen mainly for anti-fingerprinting purposes.) Resolves ticket + 11528. diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 886ee0d..8eb524e 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -1261,6 +1261,10 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, goto error; SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); + /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has + * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */ + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); + /* Disable TLS1.1 and TLS1.2 if they exist. We need to do this to * workaround a bug present in all OpenSSL 1.0.1 versions (as of 1 * June 2012), wherein renegotiating while using one of these TLS

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[tor/release-0.2.4] New sort order for server choice of ciphersuites.
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit bd3db82906a2efcd678b5f4b61fef26c93828777 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Apr 14 14:10:05 2014 -0400 New sort order for server choice of ciphersuites. Back in 175b2678, we allowed servers to recognize clients who are telling them the truth about their ciphersuites, and select the best cipher from on that list. This implemented the server side of proposal 198. In bugs 11492, 11498, and 11499, cypherpunks found a bunch of mistakes and omissions and typos in the UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST we had. In #11513, I found a couple more. Rather than try to hand-edit this list, I wrote a short python script to generate our ciphersuite preferences from the openssl headers. The new rules are: * Require forward secrecy. * Require RSA (since our servers only configure RSA keys) * Require AES or 3DES. (This means, reject RC4, DES, SEED, CAMELLIA, and NULL.) * No export ciphersuites. Then: * Prefer AES to 3DES. * If both suites have the same cipher, prefer ECDHE to DHE. * If both suites have the same DHE group type, prefer GCM to CBC. * If both suites have the same cipher mode, prefer SHA384 to SHA256 to SHA1. * If both suites have the same digest, prefer AES256 to AES128. --- changes/bug11513 | 12 ++++ src/common/gen_server_ciphers.py | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/tortls.c | 40 +++++++++---- 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug11513 b/changes/bug11513 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..820c026 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug11513 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Generate the server's preference list for ciphersuites + automatically based on uniform criteria, and considering all + OpenSSL ciphersuites with acceptable strength and forward + secrecy. (The sort order is: prefer AES to 3DES; break ties by + preferring ECDHE to DHE; break ties by preferring GCM to CBC; + break ties by preferring SHA384 to SHA256 to SHA1; and finally, + break ties by preferring AES256 to AES128.) This resolves bugs + #11513, #11492, #11498, #11499. Bugs reported by 'cypherpunks'. + Bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + + diff --git a/src/common/gen_server_ciphers.py b/src/common/gen_server_ciphers.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000..97ed9d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/gen_server_ciphers.py @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python +# Copyright 2014, The Tor Project, Inc +# See LICENSE for licensing information + +# This script parses openssl headers to find ciphersuite names, determines +# which ones we should be willing to use as a server, and sorts them according +# to preference rules. +# +# Run it on all the files in your openssl include directory. + +import re +import sys + +EPHEMERAL_INDICATORS = [ "_EDH_", "_DHE_", "_ECDHE_" ] +BAD_STUFF = [ "_DES_40_", "MD5", "_RC4_", "_DES_64_", + "_SEED_", "_CAMELLIA_", "_NULL" ] + +# these never get #ifdeffed. +MANDATORY = [ + "TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA", + "TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA", + "SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA", +] + +def find_ciphers(filename): + with open(filename) as f: + for line in f: + m = re.search(r'(?:SSL3|TLS1)_TXT_\w+', line) + if m: + yield m.group(0) + +def usable_cipher(ciph): + ephemeral = False + for e in EPHEMERAL_INDICATORS: + if e in ciph: + ephemeral = True + if not ephemeral: + return False + + if "_RSA_" not in ciph: + return False + + for b in BAD_STUFF: + if b in ciph: + return False + return True + +# All fields we sort on, in order of priority. +FIELDS = [ 'cipher', 'fwsec', 'mode', 'digest', 'bitlength' ] +# Map from sorted fields to recognized value in descending order of goodness +FIELD_VALS = { 'cipher' : [ 'AES', 'DES'], + 'fwsec' : [ 'ECDHE', 'DHE' ], + 'mode' : [ 'GCM', 'CBC' ], + 'digest' : [ 'SHA384', 'SHA256', 'SHA' ], + 'bitlength' : [ '256', '128', '192' ], +} + +class Ciphersuite(object): + def __init__(self, name, fwsec, cipher, bitlength, mode, digest): + self.name = name + self.fwsec = fwsec + self.cipher = cipher + self.bitlength = bitlength + self.mode = mode + self.digest = digest + + for f in FIELDS: + assert(getattr(self, f) in FIELD_VALS[f]) + + def sort_key(self): + return tuple(FIELD_VALS[f].index(getattr(self,f)) for f in FIELDS) + + +def parse_cipher(ciph): + m = re.match('(?:TLS1|SSL3)_TXT_(EDH|DHE|ECDHE)_RSA(?:_WITH)?_(AES|DES)_(256|128|192)(|_CBC|_CBC3|_GCM)_(SHA|SHA256|SHA384)$', ciph) + + if not m: + print "/* Couldn't parse %s ! */"%ciph + return None + + fwsec, cipher, bits, mode, digest = m.groups() + if fwsec == 'EDH': + fwsec = 'DHE' + + if mode in [ '_CBC3', '_CBC', '' ]: + mode = 'CBC' + elif mode == '_GCM': + mode = 'GCM' + + return Ciphersuite(ciph, fwsec, cipher, bits, mode, digest) + +ALL_CIPHERS = [] + +for fname in sys.argv[1:]: + ALL_CIPHERS += (parse_cipher(c) + for c in find_ciphers(fname) + if usable_cipher(c) ) + +ALL_CIPHERS.sort(key=Ciphersuite.sort_key) + +for c in ALL_CIPHERS: + if c is ALL_CIPHERS[-1]: + colon = ';' + else: + colon = ' ":"' + + if c.name in MANDATORY: + print " /* Required */" + print ' %s%s'%(c.name,colon) + else: + print "#ifdef %s"%c.name + print ' %s%s'%(c.name,colon) + print "#endif" + + diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 886ee0d..bbbf6a5 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -714,31 +714,47 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa, /** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have * our choice of what cipher to use. */ const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CHC_SHA - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":" -#endif + /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script; + * don't hand-edit it. */ #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" #endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":" +#endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" #endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":" +#endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":" #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":" #endif -//#if TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -// TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ":" -//#endif - /* These next two are mandatory. */ - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" + /* Required */ + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" + /* Required */ + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA ":" #endif - SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA; + /* Required */ + SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA; /* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to

1 0

[tor/release-0.2.4] Update ciphers.inc to match ff28
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit 4231729176c63d28f7adb61074f79464e2ee73a7 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 8 11:31:48 2014 -0400 Update ciphers.inc to match ff28 The major changes are to re-order some ciphers, to drop the ECDH suites (note: *not* ECDHE: ECDHE is still there), to kill off some made-up stuff (like the SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA suite), to drop some of the DSS suites... *and* to enable the ECDHE+GCM ciphersuites. This change is autogenerated by get_mozilla_ciphers.py from Firefox 28 and OpenSSL 1.0.1g. Resolves ticket 11438. --- changes/ff28_ciphers | 6 ++ src/common/ciphers.inc | 169 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ff28_ciphers b/changes/ff28_ciphers new file mode 100644 index 0000000..05eb4e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ff28_ciphers @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features (performance, compatibility): + - Update the list of TLS cipehrsuites that a client advertises + to match those advertised by Firefox 28. This enables selection of + (fast) GCM ciphersuites, disables some strange old ciphers, and + disables the ECDH (not to be confused with ECDHE) ciphersuites. + Resolves ticket 11438. diff --git a/src/common/ciphers.inc b/src/common/ciphers.inc index 137d78b..ab4ac40 100644 --- a/src/common/ciphers.inc +++ b/src/common/ciphers.inc @@ -4,86 +4,51 @@ * * This file was automatically generated by get_mozilla_ciphers.py. */ -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc00a, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc00a, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc014, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc014, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0x0088, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0x0088, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0x0087, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + CIPHER(0xc02b, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) #else - XCIPHER(0x0087, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc02b, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA - CIPHER(0x0039, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + CIPHER(0xc02f, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) #else - XCIPHER(0x0039, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc02f, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA - CIPHER(0x0038, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0xc00a, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0038, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc00a, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc00f, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0xc009, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0xc00f, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc009, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc005, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0xc013, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0xc005, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc013, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0x0084, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0xc014, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0084, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc014, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA - CIPHER(0x0035, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA + CIPHER(0xc012, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0035, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) + XCIPHER(0xc012, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA CIPHER(0xc007, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) #else XCIPHER(0xc007, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc009, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc009, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -#endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA CIPHER(0xc011, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) #else XCIPHER(0xc011, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc013, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc013, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0x0045, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0x0045, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0x0044, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0x0044, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) -#endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA CIPHER(0x0033, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) #else @@ -94,89 +59,63 @@ #else XCIPHER(0x0032, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - CIPHER(0xc00c, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc00c, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc00e, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc00e, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - CIPHER(0xc002, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc002, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xc004, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0x0045, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0xc004, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0045, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA - CIPHER(0x0096, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA + CIPHER(0x0039, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0096, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0039, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0x0041, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA + CIPHER(0x0038, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0041, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0038, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA) #endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 - CIPHER(0x0004, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0x0088, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0004, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5) + XCIPHER(0x0088, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA - CIPHER(0x0005, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA) +#ifdef SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA + CIPHER(0x0016, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0005, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0016, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA CIPHER(0x002f, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) #else XCIPHER(0x002f, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0xc008, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc008, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0xc012, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#else - XCIPHER(0xc012, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) -#endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0x0016, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0x0041, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0016, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0041, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0x0013, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA + CIPHER(0x0035, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0x0013, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0035, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0xc00d, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA + CIPHER(0x0084, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0xc00d, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0084, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA) #endif -#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0xc003, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) +#ifdef SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA + CIPHER(0x000a, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0xc003, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x000a, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) #endif -/* No openssl macro found for 0xfeff */ -#ifdef SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - CIPHER(0xfeff, SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) +#ifdef SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA + CIPHER(0x0005, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA) #else - XCIPHER(0xfeff, SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0005, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA) #endif -#ifdef SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA - CIPHER(0x000a, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) +#ifdef SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 + CIPHER(0x0004, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5) #else - XCIPHER(0x000a, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) + XCIPHER(0x0004, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5) #endif

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[tor/release-0.2.4] Supply better and less frequent warnings on circID exhaustion
by nickm＠torproject.org 08 May '14

08 May '14

commit bb9b4c37f8e7f5cf78918f382e90d8b11ff42551 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 18 12:28:30 2014 -0400 Supply better and less frequent warnings on circID exhaustion Fixes the surface behavior of #11553 --- changes/bug11553 | 5 +++++ src/or/channel.h | 2 ++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug11553 b/changes/bug11553 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1540f46 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug11553 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - When we run out of usable circuit IDs on a channel, log only one + warning for the whole channel, and include a description of + how many circuits there were on the channel. Fix for part of ticket + #11553. diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index 2dca817..29ba40e 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ struct channel_s { ENUM_BF(circ_id_type_t) circ_id_type:2; /** DOCDOC*/ unsigned wide_circ_ids:1; + /** Have we logged a warning about circID exhaustion on this channel? */ + unsigned warned_circ_ids_exhausted:1; /* * Which circ_id do we try to use next on this connection? This is * always in the range 0..1<<15-1. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index e47a278..2b4d3c3 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -127,7 +127,14 @@ get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan) /* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This * matters because it's an external DoS opportunity. */ - log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circ IDs. Failing."); + if (! chan->warned_circ_ids_exhausted) { + chan->warned_circ_ids_exhausted = 1; + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circIDs found on channel %s wide " + "circID support, with %u inbound and %u outbound circuits. " + "Failing a circuit.", + chan->wide_circ_ids ? "with" : "without", + chan->num_p_circuits, chan->num_n_circuits); + } return 0; } test_circ_id |= high_bit;

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