tor-commits December 2014

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'asn-karsten-task-13192-5-squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

1 0

[tor/master] Add two hidden-service related statistics.
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

commit 14e83e626be84c4f311b8e8f0d80ca141675fa9e Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue Dec 2 12:20:35 2014 +0000 Add two hidden-service related statistics. The two statistics are: 1. number of RELAY cells observed on successfully established rendezvous circuits; and 2. number of .onion addresses observed as hidden-service directory. Both statistics are accumulated over 24 hours, obfuscated by rounding up to the next multiple of a given number and adding random noise, and written to local file stats/hidserv-stats. Notably, no statistics will be gathered on clients or services, but only on relays. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 5 ++ src/or/command.c | 9 +++ src/or/config.c | 13 ++++ src/or/main.c | 5 ++ src/or/or.h | 8 ++ src/or/rendcommon.c | 7 ++ src/or/rendmid.c | 7 ++ src/or/rephist.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rephist.h | 7 ++ src/or/router.c | 5 ++ 10 files changed, 282 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index e876829..b09f322 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1764,6 +1764,11 @@ is non-zero): When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the bidirectional use of connections to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0) +[[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes statistics on its role as + hidden-service directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point to disk + every 24 hours. (Default: 0) + [[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 268c495..8e214bf 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) static void command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); circuit_t *circ; int reason, direction; @@ -511,6 +512,14 @@ command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) direction==CELL_DIRECTION_OUT?"forward":"backward"); circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -reason); } + + /* If this is a cell in an RP circuit, count it as part of the + hidden service stats */ + if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics && + !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && + TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats) { + rep_hist_seen_new_rp_cell(); + } } /** Process a 'destroy' cell that just arrived from diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 28f1df0..9a6f952 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VAR("HiddenServicePort", LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceVersion",LINELIST_S, RendConfigLines, NULL), VAR("HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient",LINELIST_S,RendConfigLines, NULL), + V(HiddenServiceStatistics, BOOL, "0"), V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), @@ -1714,6 +1715,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) if (options->CellStatistics || options->DirReqStatistics || options->EntryStatistics || options->ExitPortStatistics || options->ConnDirectionStatistics || + options->HiddenServiceStatistics || options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir) { time_t now = time(NULL); int print_notice = 0; @@ -1722,6 +1724,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) if (!public_server_mode(options)) { options->CellStatistics = 0; options->EntryStatistics = 0; + options->HiddenServiceStatistics = 0; options->ExitPortStatistics = 0; } @@ -1767,6 +1770,11 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) options->ConnDirectionStatistics) { rep_hist_conn_stats_init(now); } + if ((!old_options || !old_options->HiddenServiceStatistics) && + options->HiddenServiceStatistics) { + log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Configured to measure hidden service statistics."); + rep_hist_hs_stats_init(now); + } if ((!old_options || !old_options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir) && options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir) { rep_hist_desc_stats_init(now); @@ -1778,6 +1786,8 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) "data directory in 24 hours from now."); } + /* If we used to have statistics enabled but we just disabled them, + stop gathering them. */ if (old_options && old_options->CellStatistics && !options->CellStatistics) rep_hist_buffer_stats_term(); @@ -1787,6 +1797,9 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) if (old_options && old_options->EntryStatistics && !options->EntryStatistics) geoip_entry_stats_term(); + if (old_options && old_options->HiddenServiceStatistics && + !options->HiddenServiceStatistics) + rep_hist_hs_stats_term(); if (old_options && old_options->ExitPortStatistics && !options->ExitPortStatistics) rep_hist_exit_stats_term(); diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index e78e9bf..160bfa0 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -1384,6 +1384,11 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (next_write && next_write < next_time_to_write_stats_files) next_time_to_write_stats_files = next_write; } + if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics) { + time_t next_write = rep_hist_hs_stats_write(time_to_write_stats_files); + if (next_write && next_write < next_time_to_write_stats_files) + next_time_to_write_stats_files = next_write; + } if (options->ExitPortStatistics) { time_t next_write = rep_hist_exit_stats_write(time_to_write_stats_files); if (next_write && next_write < next_time_to_write_stats_files) diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 0de3745..ee86697 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3204,6 +3204,10 @@ typedef struct or_circuit_t { /** True iff this circuit was made with a CREATE_FAST cell. */ unsigned int is_first_hop : 1; + /** If set, this circuit carries HS traffic. Consider it in any HS + * statistics. */ + unsigned int circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats : 1; + /** Number of cells that were removed from circuit queue; reset every * time when writing buffer stats to disk. */ uint32_t processed_cells; @@ -3961,6 +3965,10 @@ typedef struct { /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */ int EntryStatistics; + /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service + * directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */ + int HiddenServiceStatistics; + /** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */ int ExtraInfoStatistics; diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index df74b74..e779ecf 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ rend_cache_lookup_v2_desc_as_dir(const char *desc_id, const char **desc) rend_cache_store_status_t rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir(const char *desc) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); rend_service_descriptor_t *parsed; char desc_id[DIGEST_LEN]; char *intro_content; @@ -1003,6 +1004,12 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir(const char *desc) log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully stored service descriptor with desc ID " "'%s' and len %d.", safe_str(desc_id_base32), (int)encoded_size); + + /* Statistics: Note down this potentially new HS. */ + if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics) { + rep_hist_stored_maybe_new_hs(e->parsed->pk); + } + number_stored++; goto advance; skip: diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c index 6a701e7..1c56471 100644 --- a/src/or/rendmid.c +++ b/src/or/rendmid.c @@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ int rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); or_circuit_t *rend_circ; char hexid[9]; int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; @@ -316,6 +317,12 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } + /* Statistics: Mark this circuit as an RP circuit so that we collect + stats from it. */ + if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics) { + circ->circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats = 1; + } + /* Send the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to Alice. */ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ), RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2, diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index f1e8827..a190fc8 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2908,11 +2908,227 @@ rep_hist_log_circuit_handshake_stats(time_t now) memset(onion_handshakes_requested, 0, sizeof(onion_handshakes_requested)); } +/* Hidden service statistics section */ + +/** Start of the current hidden service stats interval or 0 if we're + * not collecting hidden service statistics. */ +static time_t start_of_hs_stats_interval; + +/** Carries the various hidden service statistics, and any other + * information needed. */ +typedef struct hs_stats_t { + /** How many relay cells have we seen as rendezvous points? */ + int64_t rp_relay_cells_seen; + + /** Set of unique public key digests we've seen this stat period + * (could also be implemented as sorted smartlist). */ + digestmap_t *onions_seen_this_period; +} hs_stats_t; + +/** Our statistics structure singleton. */ +static hs_stats_t *hs_stats = NULL; + +/** Allocate, initialize and return an hs_stats_t structure. */ +static hs_stats_t * +hs_stats_new(void) +{ + hs_stats_t * hs_stats = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_stats_t)); + hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period = digestmap_new(); + + return hs_stats; +} + +/** Free an hs_stats_t structure. */ +static void +hs_stats_free(hs_stats_t *hs_stats) +{ + if (!hs_stats) { + return; + } + + digestmap_free(hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period, NULL); + tor_free(hs_stats); +} + +/** Initialize hidden service statistics. */ +void +rep_hist_hs_stats_init(time_t now) +{ + if (!hs_stats) { + hs_stats = hs_stats_new(); + } + + start_of_hs_stats_interval = now; +} + +/** Clear history of hidden service statistics and set the measurement + * interval start to now. */ +static void +rep_hist_reset_hs_stats(time_t now) +{ + if (!hs_stats) { + hs_stats = hs_stats_new(); + } + + hs_stats->rp_relay_cells_seen = 0; + + digestmap_free(hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period, NULL); + hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period = digestmap_new(); + + start_of_hs_stats_interval = now; +} + +/** Stop collecting hidden service stats in a way that we can re-start + * doing so in rep_hist_buffer_stats_init(). */ +void +rep_hist_hs_stats_term(void) +{ + rep_hist_reset_hs_stats(0); +} + +/** We saw a new HS relay cell, Count it! */ +void +rep_hist_seen_new_rp_cell(void) +{ + if (!hs_stats) { + return; // We're not collecting stats + } + + hs_stats->rp_relay_cells_seen++; +} + +/** As HSDirs, we saw another hidden service with public key + * pubkey. Check whether we have counted it before, if not + * count it now! */ +void +rep_hist_stored_maybe_new_hs(const crypto_pk_t *pubkey) +{ + char pubkey_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; + + if (!hs_stats) { + return; // We're not collecting stats + } + + /* Get the digest of the pubkey which will be used to detect whether + we've seen this hidden service before or not. */ + if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pubkey, pubkey_hash) < 0) { + /* This fail should not happen; key has been validated by + descriptor parsing code first. */ + return; + } + + /* Check if this is the first time we've seen this hidden + service. If it is, count it as new. */ + if (!digestmap_get(hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period, + pubkey_hash)) { + digestmap_set(hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period, + pubkey_hash, (void*)(uintptr_t)1); + } +} + +/* The number of cells that are supposed to be hidden from the adversary + * by adding noise from the Laplace distribution. This value, divided by + * EPSILON, is Laplace parameter b. */ +#define REND_CELLS_DELTA_F 2048 +/* Security parameter for obfuscating number of cells with a value between + * 0 and 1. Smaller values obfuscate observations more, but at the same + * time make statistics less usable. */ +#define REND_CELLS_EPSILON 0.3 +/* The number of cells that are supposed to be hidden from the adversary + * by rounding up to the next multiple of this number. */ +#define REND_CELLS_BIN_SIZE 1024 +/* The number of service identities that are supposed to be hidden from + * the adversary by adding noise from the Laplace distribution. This + * value, divided by EPSILON, is Laplace parameter b. */ +#define ONIONS_SEEN_DELTA_F 8 +/* Security parameter for obfuscating number of service identities with a + * value between 0 and 1. Smaller values obfuscate observations more, but + * at the same time make statistics less usable. */ +#define ONIONS_SEEN_EPSILON 0.3 +/* The number of service identities that are supposed to be hidden from + * the adversary by rounding up to the next multiple of this number. */ +#define ONIONS_SEEN_BIN_SIZE 8 + +/** Allocate and return a string containing hidden service stats that + * are meant to be placed in the extra-info descriptor. */ +static char * +rep_hist_format_hs_stats(time_t now) +{ + char t[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + char *hs_stats_string; + int64_t obfuscated_cells_seen; + int64_t obfuscated_onions_seen; + + obfuscated_cells_seen = round_int64_to_next_multiple_of( + hs_stats->rp_relay_cells_seen, + REND_CELLS_BIN_SIZE); + obfuscated_cells_seen = add_laplace_noise(obfuscated_cells_seen, + crypto_rand_double(), + REND_CELLS_DELTA_F, REND_CELLS_EPSILON); + obfuscated_onions_seen = round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(digestmap_size( + hs_stats->onions_seen_this_period), + ONIONS_SEEN_BIN_SIZE); + obfuscated_onions_seen = add_laplace_noise(obfuscated_onions_seen, + crypto_rand_double(), ONIONS_SEEN_DELTA_F, + ONIONS_SEEN_EPSILON); + + format_iso_time(t, now); + tor_asprintf(&hs_stats_string, "hidserv-stats-end %s (%d s)\n" + "hidserv-rend-relayed-cells "I64_FORMAT" delta_f=%d " + "epsilon=%.2f bin_size=%d\n" + "hidserv-dir-onions-seen "I64_FORMAT" delta_f=%d " + "epsilon=%.2f bin_size=%d\n", + t, (unsigned) (now - start_of_hs_stats_interval), + I64_PRINTF_ARG(obfuscated_cells_seen), REND_CELLS_DELTA_F, + REND_CELLS_EPSILON, REND_CELLS_BIN_SIZE, + I64_PRINTF_ARG(obfuscated_onions_seen), + ONIONS_SEEN_DELTA_F, + ONIONS_SEEN_EPSILON, ONIONS_SEEN_BIN_SIZE); + + return hs_stats_string; +} + +/** If 24 hours have passed since the beginning of the current HS + * stats period, write buffer stats to $DATADIR/stats/hidserv-stats + * (possibly overwriting an existing file) and reset counters. Return + * when we would next want to write buffer stats or 0 if we never want to + * write. */ +time_t +rep_hist_hs_stats_write(time_t now) +{ + char *str = NULL; + + if (!start_of_hs_stats_interval) { + return 0; /* Not initialized. */ + } + + if (start_of_hs_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL > now) { + goto done; /* Not ready to write */ + } + + /* Generate history string. */ + str = rep_hist_format_hs_stats(now); + + /* Reset HS history. */ + rep_hist_reset_hs_stats(now); + + /* Try to write to disk. */ + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "hidserv-stats", str, + "hidden service stats"); + } + + done: + tor_free(str); + return start_of_hs_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; +} + /** Free all storage held by the OR/link history caches, by the * bandwidth history arrays, by the port history, or by statistics . */ void rep_hist_free_all(void) { + hs_stats_free(hs_stats); digestmap_free(history_map, free_or_history); tor_free(read_array); tor_free(write_array); diff --git a/src/or/rephist.h b/src/or/rephist.h index d853fe2..8fd1599 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.h +++ b/src/or/rephist.h @@ -99,6 +99,13 @@ void rep_hist_note_circuit_handshake_requested(uint16_t type); void rep_hist_note_circuit_handshake_assigned(uint16_t type); void rep_hist_log_circuit_handshake_stats(time_t now); +void rep_hist_hs_stats_init(time_t now); +void rep_hist_hs_stats_term(void); +time_t rep_hist_hs_stats_write(time_t now); +char *rep_hist_get_hs_stats_string(void); +void rep_hist_seen_new_rp_cell(void); +void rep_hist_stored_maybe_new_hs(const crypto_pk_t *pubkey); + void rep_hist_free_all(void); #endif diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 01838b4..3e60880 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -2654,6 +2654,11 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo, "dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } + if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics && + load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"hidserv-stats", + "hidserv-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { + smartlist_add(chunks, contents); + } if (options->EntryStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats", "entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {

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[tor/master] HS stats: Add changes file and improve man page.
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

commit 13a6fb9a2aa499e160e2b7d71794d6f5614bbd19 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Dec 18 17:44:47 2014 +0200 HS stats: Add changes file and improve man page. --- changes/feature13192 | 13 +++++++++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/feature13192 b/changes/feature13192 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a9741c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/feature13192 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +m o Major features (hidden services): + - Add a HiddenServiceStatistics option that allows Tor relays to + gather and publish statistics about hidden service usage, to + better understand the size and volume of the hidden service + network. Specifically, if a Tor relay is an HSDir it will + publish the approximate number of hidden services that have + published descriptors to it the past 24 hours. Also, if a relay + has acted as a hidden service rendezvous point, it will publish + the approximate amount of rendezvous cells it has relayed the + past 24 hours. The statistics themselves are obfuscated so that + the exact values cannot be derived. For more details see + proposal 238 "Better hidden service stats from Tor relays". This + feature is currently disabled by default. Implements feature 13192. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index b09f322..6526a89 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1765,9 +1765,11 @@ is non-zero): of connections to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0) [[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes statistics on its role as - hidden-service directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point to disk - every 24 hours. (Default: 0) + When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated + statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction + point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If + ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further + published to the directory authorities. (Default: 0) [[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in

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[tor/master] Add better support to obfuscate statistics.
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

commit 7cd53b75c10831e01e288b01f63cab069d3e3035 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Mon Dec 8 15:00:58 2014 +0100 Add better support to obfuscate statistics. --- src/common/util.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/util.h | 4 ++++ src/test/test_util.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 50097da..c52b279 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -513,6 +513,51 @@ round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(uint64_t number, uint64_t divisor) return number; } +/** Return the lowest x in [INT64_MIN, INT64_MAX] such that x is at least + * number, and x modulo divisor == 0. */ +int64_t +round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(int64_t number, int64_t divisor) +{ + tor_assert(divisor > 0); + if (number >= 0 && INT64_MAX - divisor + 1 >= number) + number += divisor - 1; + number -= number % divisor; + return number; +} + +/** Transform a random value p from the uniform distribution in + * [0.0, 1.0[ into a Laplace distributed value with location parameter + * mu and scale parameter b in [-Inf, Inf[. */ +double +sample_laplace_distribution(double mu, double b, double p) +{ + tor_assert(p >= 0.0 && p < 1.0); + /* This is the "inverse cumulative distribution function" from: + * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace_distribution */ + return mu - b * (p > 0.5 ? 1.0 : -1.0) + * tor_mathlog(1.0 - 2.0 * fabs(p - 0.5)); +} + +/** Add random noise between INT64_MIN and INT64_MAX coming from a + * Laplace distribution with mu = 0 and b = delta_f/epsilon + * to signal based on the provided random value in + * [0.0, 1.0[. */ +int64_t +add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal, double random, double delta_f, + double epsilon) +{ + /* cast to int64_t intended */ + int64_t noise = sample_laplace_distribution( + 0.0, /* just add noise, no further signal */ + delta_f / epsilon, random); + if (noise > 0 && INT64_MAX - noise < signal) + return INT64_MAX; + else if (noise < 0 && INT64_MIN - noise > signal) + return INT64_MIN; + else + return signal + noise; +} + /** Return the number of bits set in v. */ int n_bits_set_u8(uint8_t v) diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index 921dd79..b8fd20f 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ uint64_t round_to_power_of_2(uint64_t u64); unsigned round_to_next_multiple_of(unsigned number, unsigned divisor); uint32_t round_uint32_to_next_multiple_of(uint32_t number, uint32_t divisor); uint64_t round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(uint64_t number, uint64_t divisor); +int64_t round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(int64_t number, int64_t divisor); +double sample_laplace_distribution(double mu, double b, double p); +int64_t add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal, double random, double delta_f, + double epsilon); int n_bits_set_u8(uint8_t v); /* Compute the CEIL of a divided by b, for nonnegative a diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index b952bb2..6e73ccf 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -4619,6 +4619,58 @@ test_util_round_to_next_multiple_of(void *arg) tt_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,7) == 105); tt_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,9) == 99); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(0,1) == 0); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(0,7) == 0); + + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(99,1) == 99); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(99,7) == 105); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(99,9) == 99); + + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(-99,1) == -99); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(-99,7) == -98); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(-99,9) == -99); + + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(INT64_MIN,2) == INT64_MIN); + tt_assert(round_int64_to_next_multiple_of(INT64_MAX,2) == + INT64_MAX-INT64_MAX%2); + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_util_laplace(void *arg) +{ + /* Sample values produced using Python's SciPy: + * + * >>> from scipy.stats import laplace + * >>> laplace.ppf([-0.01, 0.0, 0.01, 0.5, 0.51, 0.99, 1.0, 1.01], + ... loc = 24, scale = 24) + * array([ nan, -inf, -69.88855213, 24. , + * 24.48486498, 117.88855213, inf, nan]) + */ + const double mu = 24.0, b = 24.0; + const double delta_f = 15.0, epsilon = 0.3; /* b = 15.0 / 0.3 = 50.0 */ + (void)arg; + + tt_assert(isinf(sample_laplace_distribution(mu, b, 0.0))); + test_feq(-69.88855213, sample_laplace_distribution(mu, b, 0.01)); + test_feq(24.0, sample_laplace_distribution(mu, b, 0.5)); + test_feq(24.48486498, sample_laplace_distribution(mu, b, 0.51)); + test_feq(117.88855213, sample_laplace_distribution(mu, b, 0.99)); + + /* >>> laplace.ppf([0.0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 0.99], + * ... loc = 0, scale = 50) + * array([ -inf, -80.47189562, -34.65735903, 0. , + * 34.65735903, 80.47189562, 195.60115027]) + */ + tt_assert(LONG_MIN + 20 == + add_laplace_noise(20, 0.0, delta_f, epsilon)); + tt_assert(-60 == add_laplace_noise(20, 0.1, delta_f, epsilon)); + tt_assert(-14 == add_laplace_noise(20, 0.25, delta_f, epsilon)); + tt_assert(20 == add_laplace_noise(20, 0.5, delta_f, epsilon)); + tt_assert(54 == add_laplace_noise(20, 0.75, delta_f, epsilon)); + tt_assert(100 == add_laplace_noise(20, 0.9, delta_f, epsilon)); + tt_assert(215 == add_laplace_noise(20, 0.99, delta_f, epsilon)); done: ; } @@ -4880,6 +4932,7 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_LEGACY(strtok), UTIL_LEGACY(di_ops), UTIL_TEST(round_to_next_multiple_of, 0), + UTIL_TEST(laplace, 0), UTIL_TEST(strclear, 0), UTIL_TEST(find_str_at_start_of_line, 0), UTIL_TEST(string_is_C_identifier, 0),

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[tor/master] Fix: call circuit_has_opened() for rendezvous circuit
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

commit 3d83907ab168dd4b8cfc0919dbbbd188f02dca6b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> Date: Wed Dec 10 13:05:41 2014 -0500 Fix: call circuit_has_opened() for rendezvous circuit In circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(), for a rendezvous circuit, rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened() but circuit_has_opened() is preferred here since it will call the right function for a specific circuit purpose. Furthermore, a controller event is triggered where the former did not. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)ev0ke.net> --- changes/bug13936 | 6 ++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug13936 b/changes/bug13936 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..75dc9cd --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug13936 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Use circuit_has_opened() instead of rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened() + when a rendezvous circuit is opened because circuit_has_opened() jobs + is to call a specialized function depending on the circuit purpose. + Furthermore, a controller event will be triggered here where the + former did not. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 714754a..071aac9 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2016,7 +2016,7 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data); if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND && circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) - rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ); + circuit_has_opened(circ); } } } /* endif (!circ) */

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug13936_025_v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

commit eee248bc593ab57cd905195458dd2b64c94e9ac1 Merge: f7e8bc2 3d83907 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Dec 19 09:38:46 2014 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug13936_025_v2' changes/bug13936 | 6 ++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

1 0

[tor-browser-bundle/master] Updating the README.build.
by gk＠torproject.org 19 Dec '14

19 Dec '14

commit fa3ac404e97e5dcb25e31e9ec7dfddf229714d22 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Dec 19 10:38:33 2014 +0000 Updating the README.build. This update takes account of the changes landed in #13379 and earlier updater related bugs. It removes the section with spurious hangs during builds as the underlying libfaketime problems should be fixed with the switch to a newer libfaketime providing a more fine-grained control via FAKETIME_SKIP_CMDS and friends. --- gitian/README.build | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/gitian/README.build b/gitian/README.build index 24a67a8..670e84c 100644 --- a/gitian/README.build +++ b/gitian/README.build @@ -46,15 +46,19 @@ Detailed Explanation of Scripts: several helper scripts to make things easier. 0. Makefile: The main Makefile. It has the following commands: + - all: The default. It calls the 'clean', 'prep' and 'build' rules - prep: Check OS prerequisites and download source dependency inputs - build: Build localized bundles for Linux, Windows, and Mac - clean: Remove prior partial build stages (see 'Partial Rebuilds' below for the usage of clean-* commands) - vmclean: Remove VM base images - - distclean: Remove source dependency inputs, and run clean and vmclean - - all: The default. It calls clean, prep, and then build. - - sign: Signs your build output and uploads it to people.torproject.org - - match: Checks your build output against public signed hashes + - distclean: Remove source dependency inputs, and run 'clean' and 'vmclean' + - sign: Sign your build output and uploads it to people.torproject.org + - match: Check your build output against public signed hashes + - hash: Create the SHA256 sums + - incrementals: Create the incremental update (.mar) files + - update_responses: Create .xml and .htaccess files for the updater + - signmars: Create the signatures for the update (.mar) files To build beta/alpha/nightly bundles, alternate targets are provided: - nightly: The equivalent to the 'all' rule for nightly packages - alpha: The equivalent to the 'all' rule for alpha packages @@ -71,6 +75,12 @@ Detailed Explanation of Scripts: - match-nightly: The equivalent to the 'match' rule for nightly packages - match-alpha: The equivalent to the 'match' rule for alpha packages - match-beta: The equivalent to the 'match' rule for beta packages + - hash-nightly: The equivalent to the 'hash' rule for nightly packages + - hash-alpha: The equivalent to the 'hash' rule for alpha packages + - hash-beta: The equivalent to the 'hash' rule for beta packages + - signmars-nightly: The equivalent to the 'signmars' rule for nightly packages + - signmars-alpha: The equivalent to the 'signmars' rule for alpha packages + - signmars-beta: The equivalent to the 'signmars' rule for beta packages 1. check-prerequisites.sh: This script checks if your system is capable of running Gitian, and if it is not, it tells you what you need to do. @@ -119,7 +129,13 @@ Detailed Explanation of Scripts: 12. upload-signature.sh: This script signs and uploads your 'sha256sums.txt' file (for use if you are an official builder). - + 13. signmars.sh: This script generates the signatures on the update (.mar) + files. It expects an nssdb directory, containing the key, in the same + directory (i.e. tor-browser-bundle/gitian where it is located, too) and + a certificate with "marsigner" as nickname. Both the default nssdb + directory and the default certificate nickname can get overwritten by + exporting 'NSS_DB_DIR' and 'NSS_CERTNAME' pointing to the directory and + the nickname to be used instead. Partial Rebuilds: @@ -174,22 +190,14 @@ Known Issues and Quirks: creation hangs in the future (or help us write a wrapper script that tests VMs and re-runs the VM creation step if they don't boot). - 2. One out of every 50 builds or so, 'make' locks up at some point during a - build, probably due to timestamp issues inside the Gitian VM. The - symptoms of this are a hung build where the VM or LXC container processes - are consuming no CPU. - - Simply re-running 'make build' will resume the appropriate bundle - component for you. - - 3. If you use git branches for any repos instead of tags (for example, for + 2. If you use git branches for any repos instead of tags (for example, for a development or nightly build), fresh commits will need to be merged manually (or better git-fu is needed in ./fetch-inputs.sh, as it is currently meant to deal with tags only). - 4. Running more than one instance of Gitian at a time is not supported. + 3. Running more than one instance of Gitian at a time is not supported. - 5. Related: If you perform a fresh Gitian checkout for purposes of + 4. Related: If you perform a fresh Gitian checkout for purposes of verification, be sure to kill any stray qemu VM processes before starting the new build (because the new Gitian checkout will not have the PID or SSH keys of the previous instances' VM, and VM startup will either hang

1 0

[tor-browser/tor-browser-31.3.0esr-4.5-1] Bug 13379: Adding our MAR signing keys.
by gk＠torproject.org 18 Dec '14

18 Dec '14

commit e1fdf99b8cf2d98e13ef5fa112935f96614d6af5 Author: Georg Koppen <gk(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 18 13:25:44 2014 +0000 Bug 13379: Adding our MAR signing keys. --- toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_primary.der | Bin 709 -> 1229 bytes toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_secondary.der | Bin 713 -> 1233 bytes 2 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_primary.der b/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_primary.der index 11417c3..542fb24 100644 Binary files a/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_primary.der and b/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_primary.der differ diff --git a/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_secondary.der b/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_secondary.der index 16a7ef6..334fad8 100644 Binary files a/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_secondary.der and b/toolkit/mozapps/update/updater/release_secondary.der differ

1 0

[tor-messenger-build/master] Use Messenger/ as $HOME for start-tor-messenger
by sukhbir＠torproject.org 18 Dec '14

18 Dec '14

commit 6eae988888a4238cc19752548e839697ce7bea7e Author: Sukhbir Singh <sukhbir(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 18 16:39:57 2014 +0530 Use Messenger/ as $HOME for start-tor-messenger --- projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger b/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger index c94d816..7997832 100755 --- a/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger +++ b/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ if [ ! "${PWD}" ]; then export HOME surveysays="This system has a messed up shell.\n" else - HOME="${PWD}" + HOME="${PWD}/Messenger" export HOME fi @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ if [ $SYSARCHITECTURE -ne $TORARCHITECTURE ]; then exit 1 fi -LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${HOME}/Messenger/lib/:${HOME}/Messenger/extensions/tor-launcher@torproject.org/TorBrowser/Tor:${HOME}/Messenger/extensions/ctypes-otr@tormessenger/chrome/content" +LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${HOME}/lib/:${HOME}/extensions/tor-launcher@torproject.org/TorBrowser/Tor:${HOME}/extensions/ctypes-otr@tormessenger/chrome/content" export LD_LIBRARY_PATH function setControlPortPasswd() { @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ cd "${HOME}" # !!! Dash above comment! Now we pass command-line arguments we got (except --debug) to Firefox. # !!! Use at your own risk! # Adding --class for fixing bug 11102. -TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD=${TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD} ./Messenger/instantbird "${@}" +TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD=${TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD} ./instantbird "${@}" exitcode="$?" if [ "$exitcode" -ne 0 ]; then complain "Tor Messenger exited abnormally. Exit code: $exitcode"

1 0

[tor-messenger-build/master] Also update start-tor-messenger with directory changes
by sukhbir＠torproject.org 18 Dec '14

18 Dec '14

commit 135eee5934fe1ca2f24f62f44703177f7fd8a23d Author: Sukhbir Singh <sukhbir(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 18 15:35:50 2014 +0530 Also update start-tor-messenger with directory changes --- projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger b/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger index 406fb48..c94d816 100755 --- a/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger +++ b/projects/tor-messenger/start-tor-messenger @@ -210,14 +210,14 @@ else fi SYSARCHITECTURE=$(getconf LONG_BIT) -TORARCHITECTURE=$(expr "$(file instantbird)" : '.*ELF $[[:digit:]]*$') +TORARCHITECTURE=$(expr "$(file Messenger/instantbird)" : '.*ELF $[[:digit:]]*$') if [ $SYSARCHITECTURE -ne $TORARCHITECTURE ]; then complain "Wrong architecture? 32-bit vs. 64-bit." exit 1 fi -LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${HOME}/lib/:${HOME}/extensions/tor-launcher@torproject.org/TorBrowser/Tor:${HOME}/extensions/ctypes-otr@tormessenger/chrome/content" +LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${HOME}/Messenger/lib/:${HOME}/Messenger/extensions/tor-launcher@torproject.org/TorBrowser/Tor:${HOME}/Messenger/extensions/ctypes-otr@tormessenger/chrome/content" export LD_LIBRARY_PATH function setControlPortPasswd() { @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ cd "${HOME}" # !!! Dash above comment! Now we pass command-line arguments we got (except --debug) to Firefox. # !!! Use at your own risk! # Adding --class for fixing bug 11102. -TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD=${TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD} ./instantbird "${@}" +TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD=${TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD} ./Messenger/instantbird "${@}" exitcode="$?" if [ "$exitcode" -ne 0 ]; then complain "Tor Messenger exited abnormally. Exit code: $exitcode"

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