tor-commits June 2013

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1571 discussions

[tor/maint-0.2.4] Tweak bug9063_redux patch: {n_p}_chan_cells, not {n, p}_conn_cells
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit efa342f5fa2c6700ed8273557b7fb39bdc577120 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 10:25:10 2013 -0400 Tweak bug9063_redux patch: {n_p}_chan_cells, not {n,p}_conn_cells --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index ac33ecf..3dc362f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1508,18 +1508,18 @@ marked_circuit_free_cells(circuit_t *circ) log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-marked circuit"); return; } - cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells); + cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_chan_cells); if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) - cell_queue_clear(& TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_conn_cells); + cell_queue_clear(& TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan_cells); } /** Return the number of cells used by the circuit c's cell queues. */ static size_t n_cells_in_circ_queues(const circuit_t *c) { - size_t n = c->n_conn_cells.n; + size_t n = c->n_chan_cells.n; if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) - n += TO_OR_CIRCUIT((circuit_t*)c)->p_conn_cells.n; + n += TO_OR_CIRCUIT((circuit_t*)c)->p_chan_cells.n; return n; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Implement a real OOM-killer for too-long circuit queues.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit 2e1fe1fcf93c2a77805048bea5c535ca4456d583 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jun 16 09:55:44 2013 -0400 Implement a real OOM-killer for too-long circuit queues. This implements "algorithm 1" from my discussion of bug #9072: on OOM, find the circuits with the longest queues, and kill them. It's also a fix for #9063 -- without the side-effects of bug #9072. The memory bounds aren't perfect here, and you need to be sure to allow some slack for the rest of Tor's usage. This isn't a perfect fix; the rest of the solutions I describe on codeable. --- changes/bug9063_redux | 15 ++++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 9 +++++ src/common/mempool.h | 2 + src/or/circuitlist.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.h | 1 + src/or/config.c | 7 ++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++ src/or/relay.c | 33 +++++++++++++++- src/or/relay.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug9063_redux b/changes/bug9063_redux new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6fae72 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9063_redux @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - When we have too much memory queued in circuits (according to a new + MaxMemInCellQueues option), close the circuits consuming the most + memory. This prevents us from running out of memory as a relay if + circuits fill up faster than they can be drained. Fixes + bug 9063; bugfix on the 54th commit of Tor. This bug is a further + fix beyond bug 6252, whose fix was merged into 0.2.3.21-rc. + + Also fixes an earlier approach taken in 0.2.4.13-alpha, where we + tried to solve this issue simply by imposing an upper limit on the + number of queued cells for a single circuit. That approach proved to + be problematic, since there are ways to provoke clients to send a + number of cells in excess of any such reasonable limit. + Fixes bug 9072; bugfix on 0.2.4.13-alpha. + diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 773fccf..1f3afef 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1475,6 +1475,15 @@ is non-zero): localhost, RFC1918 addresses, and so on. This can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. (Default: 0) +**MaxMemInCellQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: + This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it + needs to stop queueing cells because it's about to run out of memory. + If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until it + has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too + low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only + effects circuit queues, so the actual process size will be larger than + this. (Default: 8GB) + DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS ------------------------ diff --git a/src/common/mempool.h b/src/common/mempool.h index d0a7bc2..bc424ac 100644 --- a/src/common/mempool.h +++ b/src/common/mempool.h @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ void mp_pool_destroy(mp_pool_t *pool); void mp_pool_assert_ok(mp_pool_t *pool); void mp_pool_log_status(mp_pool_t *pool, int severity); +#define MP_POOL_ITEM_OVERHEAD (sizeof(void*)) + #define MEMPOOL_STATS #ifdef MEMPOOL_PRIVATE diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 93ba69d..d9ea4d1 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1359,6 +1359,108 @@ _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, } } +/** Given a marked circuit circ, aggressively free its cell queues to + * recover memory. */ +static void +marked_circuit_free_cells(circuit_t *circ) +{ + if (!circ->marked_for_close) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-marked circuit"); + return; + } + cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells); + if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) + cell_queue_clear(& TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_conn_cells); +} + +/** Return the number of cells used by the circuit c's cell queues. */ +static size_t +n_cells_in_circ_queues(const circuit_t *c) +{ + size_t n = c->n_conn_cells.n; + if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) + n += TO_OR_CIRCUIT((circuit_t*)c)->p_conn_cells.n; + return n; +} + +/** helper to sort a list of circuit_q by total queue lengths, in descending + * order. */ +static int +circuits_compare_by_queue_len_(const void **a_, const void **b_) +{ + const circuit_t *a = *a_; + const circuit_t *b = *b_; + size_t a_n = n_cells_in_circ_queues(a); + size_t b_n = n_cells_in_circ_queues(b); + + if (a_n < b_n) + return 1; + else if (a_n == b_n) + return 0; + else + return -1; +} + +#define FRACTION_OF_CIRCS_TO_RETAIN_ON_OOM 0.90 + +/** We're out of memory for cells, having allocated current_allocation + * bytes' worth. Kill the 'worst' circuits until we're under + * FRACTION_OF_CIRCS_TO_RETAIN_ON_OOM of our maximum usage. */ +void +circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation) +{ + /* Let's hope there's enough slack space for this allocation here... */ + smartlist_t *circlist = smartlist_new(); + circuit_t *circ; + size_t n_cells_removed=0, n_cells_to_remove; + int n_circuits_killed=0; + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We're low on memory. Killing circuits with " + "over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by " + "MaxMemInCellQueues.)"); + + { + size_t mem_target = (size_t)(get_options()->MaxMemInCellQueues * + FRACTION_OF_CIRCS_TO_RETAIN_ON_OOM); + size_t mem_to_recover; + if (current_allocation <= mem_target) + return; + mem_to_recover = current_allocation - mem_target; + n_cells_to_remove = CEIL_DIV(mem_to_recover, packed_cell_mem_cost()); + } + + /* This algorithm itself assumes that you've got enough memory slack + * to actually run it. */ + for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) + smartlist_add(circlist, circ); + + /* This is O(n log n); there are faster algorithms we could use instead. + * Let's hope this doesn't happen enough to be in the critical path. */ + smartlist_sort(circlist, circuits_compare_by_queue_len_); + + /* Okay, now the worst circuits are at the front of the list. Let's mark + * them, and reclaim their storage aggressively. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circlist, circuit_t *, circ) { + size_t n = n_cells_in_circ_queues(circ); + if (! circ->marked_for_close) { + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT); + } + marked_circuit_free_cells(circ); + + ++n_circuits_killed; + n_cells_removed += n; + if (n_cells_removed >= n_cells_to_remove) + break; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); + + clean_cell_pool(); /* In case this helps. */ + + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Removed "U64_FORMAT" bytes by killing %d circuits.", + U64_PRINTF_ARG(n_cells_removed * packed_cell_mem_cost()), + n_circuits_killed); + + smartlist_free(circlist); +} + /** Verify that cpath layer cp has all of its invariants * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index 6e77354..44f0c1f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ int circuit_count_pending_on_or_conn(or_connection_t *or_conn); void assert_cpath_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp); void assert_circuit_ok(const circuit_t *c); void circuit_free_all(void); +void circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation); #endif diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 90a5dfb..d5c5689 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(MaxAdvertisedBandwidth, MEMUNIT, "1 GB"), V(MaxCircuitDirtiness, INTERVAL, "10 minutes"), V(MaxClientCircuitsPending, UINT, "32"), + V(MaxMemInCellQueues, MEMUNIT, "8 GB"), V(MaxOnionsPending, UINT, "100"), OBSOLETE("MonthlyAccountingStart"), V(MyFamily, STRING, NULL), @@ -3668,6 +3669,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "EntryNodes is set, but UseEntryGuards is disabled. " "EntryNodes will be ignored."); + if (options->MaxMemInCellQueues < (500 << 20)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "MaxMemInCellQueues must be at least 500 MB for now. " + "Ideally, have it as large as you can afford."); + options->MaxMemInCellQueues = (500 << 20); + } + options->_AllowInvalid = 0; if (options->AllowInvalidNodes) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(options->AllowInvalidNodes, const char *, cp) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 83bf8c8..dd95c34 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3064,6 +3064,10 @@ typedef struct { config_line_t *DirPort_lines; config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */ + uint64_t MaxMemInCellQueues; /**< If we have more memory than this allocated + * for circuit cell queues, run the OOM handler + */ + /** @name port booleans * * Derived booleans: True iff there is a non-listener port on an AF_INET or diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index fdb4bff..fda9e89 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -1799,7 +1799,7 @@ circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) #endif /** The total number of cells we have allocated from the memory pool. */ -static int total_cells_allocated = 0; +static size_t total_cells_allocated = 0; /** A memory pool to allocate packed_cell_t objects. */ static mp_pool_t *cell_pool = NULL; @@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@ dump_cell_pool_usage(int severity) ++n_circs; } log(severity, LD_MM, "%d cells allocated on %d circuits. %d cells leaked.", - n_cells, n_circs, total_cells_allocated - n_cells); + n_cells, n_circs, (int)total_cells_allocated - n_cells); mp_pool_log_status(cell_pool, severity); } @@ -1978,6 +1978,29 @@ cell_queue_pop(cell_queue_t *queue) return cell; } +/** Return the total number of bytes used for each packed_cell in a queue. + * Approximate. */ +size_t +packed_cell_mem_cost(void) +{ + return sizeof(packed_cell_t) + MP_POOL_ITEM_OVERHEAD + + get_options()->CellStatistics ? + (sizeof(insertion_time_elem_t)+MP_POOL_ITEM_OVERHEAD) : 0; +} + +/** Check whether we've got too much space used for cells. If so, + * call the OOM handler and return 1. Otherwise, return 0. */ +static int +cell_queues_check_size(void) +{ + size_t alloc = total_cells_allocated * packed_cell_mem_cost(); + if (alloc >= get_options()->MaxMemInCellQueues) { + circuits_handle_oom(alloc); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + /** Return a pointer to the "next_active_on_{n,p}_conn" pointer of circ, * depending on whether conn matches n_conn or p_conn. */ static INLINE circuit_t ** @@ -2574,6 +2597,12 @@ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *orconn, cell_queue_append_packed_copy(queue, cell); + if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(cell_queues_check_size())) { + /* We ran the OOM handler */ + if (circ->marked_for_close) + return; + } + /* If we have too many cells on the circuit, we should stop reading from * the edge streams for a while. */ if (!streams_blocked && queue->n >= CELL_QUEUE_HIGHWATER_SIZE) diff --git a/src/or/relay.h b/src/or/relay.h index 41675e2..c55813b 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.h +++ b/src/or/relay.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ void init_cell_pool(void); void free_cell_pool(void); void clean_cell_pool(void); void dump_cell_pool_usage(int severity); +size_t packed_cell_mem_cost(void); void cell_queue_clear(cell_queue_t *queue); void cell_queue_append(cell_queue_t *queue, packed_cell_t *cell);

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Limit hidden service descriptors to at most 10 guard nodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit dc516a543604e081583cbe725bc4b0a89768fc78 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jun 16 20:23:33 2013 -0400 Limit hidden service descriptors to at most 10 guard nodes. Fixes bug 9002; bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha (which introduced guard nodes), or on 0.0.6pre1 (which introduced hidden services). --- changes/bug9002 | 4 ++++ src/or/rendcommon.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug9002 b/changes/bug9002 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c41ace3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9002 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Limit hidden service descriptors to at most ten introduction + points, to slow one kind of guard enumeration. Fixes bug 9002; + bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 4722690..812fce9 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -1002,6 +1002,10 @@ rend_cache_lookup_v2_desc_as_dir(const char *desc_id, const char **desc) return 0; } +/* Do not allow more than this many introduction points in a hidden service + * descriptor */ +#define MAX_INTRO_POINTS 10 + /** Parse *desc, calculate its service id, and store it in the cache. * If we have a newer v0 descriptor with the same ID, ignore this one. * If we have an older descriptor with the same ID, replace it. @@ -1070,6 +1074,15 @@ rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len, int published, rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed); return -1; } + if (parsed->intro_nodes && + smartlist_len(parsed->intro_nodes) > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden " + "service descriptor for %s. This is probably a (misguided) " + "attempt to improve reliability, but it could also be an " + "attempt to do a guard enumeration attack. Rejecting.", + safe_str_client(query)); + return -2; + } tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "0%s", query); e = (rend_cache_entry_t*) strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key); if (e && e->parsed->timestamp > parsed->timestamp) { @@ -1288,6 +1301,7 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, } /* Decode/decrypt introduction points. */ if (intro_content) { + int n_intro_points; if (rend_query->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH && !tor_mem_is_zero(rend_query->descriptor_cookie, sizeof(rend_query->descriptor_cookie))) { @@ -1308,13 +1322,20 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, intro_size = ipos_decrypted_size; } } - if (rend_parse_introduction_points(parsed, intro_content, - intro_size) <= 0) { + n_intro_points = rend_parse_introduction_points(parsed, intro_content, + intro_size); + if (n_intro_points <= 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the " "service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have " "provided invalid authorization data."); retval = -2; goto err; + } else if (n_intro_points > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden " + "service descriptor for %s. This is probably a (misguided) " + "attempt to improve reliability, but it could also be an " + "attempt to do a guard enumeration attack. Rejecting.", + safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); } } else { log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor does not contain any introduction points.");

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Merge branch 'bug9063_redux_023_squashed' into maint-0.2.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit c37fdc2eef0ccfeff56df5a9b7dfae9396fc643c Merge: dc516a5 2e1fe1f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 10:16:47 2013 -0400 Merge branch 'bug9063_redux_023_squashed' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug9063_redux | 15 ++++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 9 +++++ src/common/mempool.h | 2 + src/or/circuitlist.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitlist.h | 1 + src/or/config.c | 7 ++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++ src/or/relay.c | 33 +++++++++++++++- src/or/relay.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[chutney/master] Don't require directory 'net'.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit 1678c99b286fdf4c172c696671308b9ea503d029 Author: Linus Nordberg <linus(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jun 5 15:48:57 2013 +0200 Don't require directory 'net'. We don't need it and it doesn't exist in a fresh tree. --- tools/bootstrap-network.sh | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/bootstrap-network.sh b/tools/bootstrap-network.sh index a686669..17c9792 100755 --- a/tools/bootstrap-network.sh +++ b/tools/bootstrap-network.sh @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ myname=$(basename "$0") [ -x $CHUTNEY ] || { echo "$myname: missing $CHUTNEY"; exit 1; } [ -d networks ] || { echo "$myname: missing directory: networks"; exit 1; } -[ -d net ] || { echo "$myname: missing directory: net"; exit 1; } flavour=basic; [ -n "$1" ] && { flavour=$1; shift; } $CHUTNEY stop networks/$flavour

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[translation/https_everywhere_completed] Update translations for https_everywhere_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit 423f99a3d1aed1424bf260e6dc9ba137d21d7c82 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 13:16:09 2013 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere_completed --- de/ssl-observatory.dtd | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/de/ssl-observatory.dtd b/de/ssl-observatory.dtd index 51fdea5..73c0d1b 100644 --- a/de/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/de/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ to turn it on?">--> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.alt_roots_tooltip "Es ist sicher (und eine gute Idee), diese Option zu aktivieren, es sei denn, Sie benutzen ein aufdringliches Firmennetzwerk, oder Kaspersky Antiviren-Software, die Sie beim Browsen mittels eines TLS Proxyservers und einer privaten Zertifizierungsstelle überwacht. Wenn diese Option in einem solchen Netzwerk verwendet wird, könnte Sie Hinweise (in Form der dadurch erstellten eindeutigen Zertifikate) auf die durch diesen Proxyserver besuchten https:// Domains hinterlassen."> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Überprüfe Zertifikate, die Tor für Anonymität benutzt"> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Überprüfe Zertifikate mit Tor, um Anonymität zu bewahren"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_unavailable -"Üerprüfte Zertifikate, die Tor für Anonymität benutzt (benötigt Torbutton)"> +"Üerprüfte Zertifikate mit Tor, um Anonymität zu bewahren (benötigt Torbutton)"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_tooltip "Diese Option macht die Installation von Tor und Torbutton erforderlich">

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit e1c3161a789b189d7a8408c57bb4804e82016a94 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 13:16:04 2013 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- de/ssl-observatory.dtd | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/de/ssl-observatory.dtd b/de/ssl-observatory.dtd index 51fdea5..73c0d1b 100644 --- a/de/ssl-observatory.dtd +++ b/de/ssl-observatory.dtd @@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ to turn it on?">--> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.alt_roots_tooltip "Es ist sicher (und eine gute Idee), diese Option zu aktivieren, es sei denn, Sie benutzen ein aufdringliches Firmennetzwerk, oder Kaspersky Antiviren-Software, die Sie beim Browsen mittels eines TLS Proxyservers und einer privaten Zertifizierungsstelle überwacht. Wenn diese Option in einem solchen Netzwerk verwendet wird, könnte Sie Hinweise (in Form der dadurch erstellten eindeutigen Zertifikate) auf die durch diesen Proxyserver besuchten https:// Domains hinterlassen."> -<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Überprüfe Zertifikate, die Tor für Anonymität benutzt"> +<!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous "Überprüfe Zertifikate mit Tor, um Anonymität zu bewahren"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_unavailable -"Üerprüfte Zertifikate, die Tor für Anonymität benutzt (benötigt Torbutton)"> +"Üerprüfte Zertifikate mit Tor, um Anonymität zu bewahren (benötigt Torbutton)"> <!ENTITY ssl-observatory.prefs.anonymous_tooltip "Diese Option macht die Installation von Tor und Torbutton erforderlich">

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[translation/tor-launcher-network-settings] Update translations for tor-launcher-network-settings
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit b8a53933c55866e0ae8194f9778ea0a1243c8a9c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 12:17:35 2013 +0000 Update translations for tor-launcher-network-settings --- ku/network-settings.dtd | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ szl/network-settings.dtd | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) diff --git a/ku/network-settings.dtd b/ku/network-settings.dtd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0458e75 --- /dev/null +++ b/ku/network-settings.dtd @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +<!ENTITY torsettings.dialog.title ""> + + + +<!ENTITY torsettings.prompt ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.yes ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.no ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.firstQuestion ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt1 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt2 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configure ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt1 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt2 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connect ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.proxyQuestion ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.proxyHelp ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.enterProxy ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.firewallQuestion ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.firewallHelp ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.enterFirewall ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeQuestion ""> + + + +<!ENTITY torsettings.startingTor ""> + +<!ENTITY torsettings.optional ""> + +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.checkbox ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.address ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.address.placeholder ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.port ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.username ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.password ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.socks4 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.socks5 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.http ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.firewall.checkbox ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.firewall.allowedPorts ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.checkbox ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.label ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.placeholder ""> + +<!ENTITY torsettings.copyLog ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelpTitle ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp1 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp2 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp3 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp4 ""> diff --git a/szl/network-settings.dtd b/szl/network-settings.dtd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0458e75 --- /dev/null +++ b/szl/network-settings.dtd @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +<!ENTITY torsettings.dialog.title ""> + + + +<!ENTITY torsettings.prompt ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.yes ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.no ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.firstQuestion ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt1 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt2 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configure ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt1 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt2 ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.connect ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.proxyQuestion ""> + +<!ENTITY torSettings.proxyHelp ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.enterProxy ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.firewallQuestion ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.firewallHelp ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.enterFirewall ""> +<!ENTITY torSettings.bridgeQuestion ""> + + + +<!ENTITY torsettings.startingTor ""> + +<!ENTITY torsettings.optional ""> + +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.checkbox ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.address ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.address.placeholder ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.port ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.username ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.password ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.socks4 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.socks5 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.http ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.firewall.checkbox ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.firewall.allowedPorts ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.checkbox ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.label ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.placeholder ""> + +<!ENTITY torsettings.copyLog ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelpTitle ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp1 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp2 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp3 ""> +<!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp4 "">

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[translation/tor-launcher-progress] Update translations for tor-launcher-progress
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit 73e4c6c3d4124bcb48a692df2866a6463341563e Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 12:17:30 2013 +0000 Update translations for tor-launcher-progress --- ku/progress.dtd | 4 ++++ szl/progress.dtd | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/ku/progress.dtd b/ku/progress.dtd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0dcfcc --- /dev/null +++ b/ku/progress.dtd @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +<!ENTITY torprogress.dialog.title ""> +<!ENTITY torprogress.openSettings ""> +<!ENTITY torprogress.heading ""> +<!ENTITY torprogress.pleaseWait ""> diff --git a/szl/progress.dtd b/szl/progress.dtd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0dcfcc --- /dev/null +++ b/szl/progress.dtd @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +<!ENTITY torprogress.dialog.title ""> +<!ENTITY torprogress.openSettings ""> +<!ENTITY torprogress.heading ""> +<!ENTITY torprogress.pleaseWait "">

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[translation/tor-launcher-properties] Update translations for tor-launcher-properties
by translation＠torproject.org 18 Jun '13

18 Jun '13

commit ff434a9f6f13dc868d21c3a499fb3f93364b14e3 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 18 12:17:26 2013 +0000 Update translations for tor-launcher-properties --- ku/torlauncher.properties | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ szl/torlauncher.properties | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+) diff --git a/ku/torlauncher.properties b/ku/torlauncher.properties new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e49bc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/ku/torlauncher.properties @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +### Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. +### See LICENSE for licensing information. + +# torlauncher.error_title=Tor Launcher + +# torlauncher.tor_exited=Tor unexpectedly exited. +# torlauncher.tor_controlconn_failed=Could not connect to Tor control port. +# torlauncher.tor_failed_to_start=Tor failed to start. +# torlauncher.tor_bootstrap_failed=Tor failed to establish a Tor network connection.\n\n%S + +# torlauncher.unable_to_start_tor=Unable to start Tor.\n\n%S +# torlauncher.tor_missing=The Tor executable is missing. +# torlauncher.torrc_missing=The torrc file is missing. +# torlauncher.datadir_missing=The Tor data directory does not exist. +# torlauncher.password_hash_missing=Failed to get hashed password. + +# torlauncher.failed_to_get_settings=Unable to retrieve Tor settings.\n\n%S +# torlauncher.failed_to_save_settings=Unable to save Tor settings.\n\n%S +# torlauncher.ensure_tor_is_running=Please ensure that Tor is running. + +# torlauncher.error_proxy_addr_missing=You must specify both an IP address or hostname and a port number to configure Tor to use a proxy to access the Internet. +# torlauncher.error_proxy_type_missing=You must select the proxy type. +# torlauncher.error_bridges_missing=You must specify one or more bridges. + +# torlauncher.connect=Connect +# torlauncher.quit=Quit +# torlauncher.quit_win=Exit +# torlauncher.done=Done + +# torlauncher.forAssistance=For assistance, contact %S diff --git a/szl/torlauncher.properties b/szl/torlauncher.properties new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e49bc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/szl/torlauncher.properties @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +### Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. +### See LICENSE for licensing information. + +# torlauncher.error_title=Tor Launcher + +# torlauncher.tor_exited=Tor unexpectedly exited. +# torlauncher.tor_controlconn_failed=Could not connect to Tor control port. +# torlauncher.tor_failed_to_start=Tor failed to start. +# torlauncher.tor_bootstrap_failed=Tor failed to establish a Tor network connection.\n\n%S + +# torlauncher.unable_to_start_tor=Unable to start Tor.\n\n%S +# torlauncher.tor_missing=The Tor executable is missing. +# torlauncher.torrc_missing=The torrc file is missing. +# torlauncher.datadir_missing=The Tor data directory does not exist. +# torlauncher.password_hash_missing=Failed to get hashed password. + +# torlauncher.failed_to_get_settings=Unable to retrieve Tor settings.\n\n%S +# torlauncher.failed_to_save_settings=Unable to save Tor settings.\n\n%S +# torlauncher.ensure_tor_is_running=Please ensure that Tor is running. + +# torlauncher.error_proxy_addr_missing=You must specify both an IP address or hostname and a port number to configure Tor to use a proxy to access the Internet. +# torlauncher.error_proxy_type_missing=You must select the proxy type. +# torlauncher.error_bridges_missing=You must specify one or more bridges. + +# torlauncher.connect=Connect +# torlauncher.quit=Quit +# torlauncher.quit_win=Exit +# torlauncher.done=Done + +# torlauncher.forAssistance=For assistance, contact %S

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