March 2013 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Free prepend_policy values in origin circuits
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 73a35dc3c0b4ab6cf79d88fc513c5c2762eff28a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 12:29:08 2013 -0400 Free prepend_policy values in origin circuits --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 17e18c7..eab3ebf 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "nodelist.h" #include "onion.h" #include "onion_fast.h" +#include "policies.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" @@ -653,6 +654,7 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) memwipe(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len); tor_free(ocirc->socks_password); } + addr_policy_list_free(ocirc->prepend_policy); } else { or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); /* Remember cell statistics for this circuit before deallocating. */

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug7582_v2' into maint-0.2.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 4eaca17f2f755cb1aca9a20216002a4ad652d7ef Merge: 597cd89 73a35dc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 12:29:29 2013 -0400 Merge branch 'bug7582_v2' into maint-0.2.4 changes/bug7582 | 9 ++++++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 2 + src/or/circuituse.c | 13 +++++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 4 +++ src/or/policies.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/policies.h | 2 + src/or/relay.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 9 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.4'
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit e6602f5991cc9def107eb8723444017bcdc860d1 Merge: c101ecc 4eaca17 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 14:16:46 2013 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.4' changes/bug7582 | 9 ++++++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 2 + src/or/circuituse.c | 13 +++++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 4 +++ src/or/policies.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/policies.h | 2 + src/or/relay.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 9 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.4] On END_REASON_EXITPOLICY, mark circuit as unusable for that address.
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 2b22c0aeef6e71d56b12411d10484aaece769178 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 11 23:37:47 2013 -0400 On END_REASON_EXITPOLICY, mark circuit as unusable for that address. Also, don't call the exit node 'reject *' unless our decision to pick that node was based on a non-summarized version of that node's exit policy. rransom and arma came up with the ideas for this fix. Fix for 7582; the summary-related part is a bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha. --- changes/bug7582 | 9 ++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 +++++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 4 +++ src/or/policies.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/policies.h | 2 + src/or/relay.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 8 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug7582 b/changes/bug7582 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3b0635 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7582 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + + - When an exit node tells us that it is rejecting because of its + exit policy a stream we expected it to accept (because of its exit + policy), do not mark the node as useless for exiting if our + expectation was only based on an exit policy summary. Instead, + mark the circuit as unsuitable for that particular address. Fixes + part of bug 7582; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 51d8716..6b5ca90 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + tor_addr_t addr; + const int family = tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address); if (!exitnode && !build_state->onehop_tunnel) { log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Not considering circuit with unknown router."); return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet, @@ -125,9 +127,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; /* this is a circuit to somewhere else */ if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) { /* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */ - tor_addr_t addr; - int r = tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address); - if (r < 0 || + if (family < 0 || !tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) || build_state->chosen_exit->port != conn->socks_request->port) return 0; @@ -139,6 +139,13 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; } } + if (origin_circ->prepend_policy && family != -1) { + int r = compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&addr, + conn->socks_request->port, + origin_circ->prepend_policy); + if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) + return 0; + } if (exitnode && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode)) { /* can't exit from this router */ return 0; diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index ee1bc39..5f3b843 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -688,6 +688,24 @@ node_exit_policy_rejects_all(const node_t *node) return 1; } +/** Return true iff the exit policy for node is such that we can treat + * rejecting an address of type family unexpectedly as a sign of that + * node's failure. */ +int +node_exit_policy_is_exact(const node_t *node, sa_family_t family) +{ + if (family == AF_UNSPEC) { + return 1; /* Rejecting an address but not telling us what address + * is a bad sign. */ + } else if (family == AF_INET) { + return node->ri != NULL; + } else if (family == AF_INET6) { + return 0; + } + tor_fragile_assert(); + return 1; +} + /** Return list of tor_addr_port_t with all OR ports (in the sense IP * addr + TCP port) for node. Caller must free all elements * using tor_free() and free the list using smartlist_free(). diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.h b/src/or/nodelist.h index 65cf0d0..8a4665a 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.h +++ b/src/or/nodelist.h @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int node_get_purpose(const node_t *node); (node_get_purpose((node)) == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) int node_is_me(const node_t *node); int node_exit_policy_rejects_all(const node_t *node); +int node_exit_policy_is_exact(const node_t *node, sa_family_t family); smartlist_t *node_get_all_orports(const node_t *node); int node_allows_single_hop_exits(const node_t *node); const char *node_get_nickname(const node_t *node); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index c7d2598..c893fba 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3059,6 +3059,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * ISO_STREAM. */ uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id; /**@}*/ + /** A list of addr_policy_t for this circuit in particular. Used by + * adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure. + */ + smartlist_t *prepend_policy; } origin_circuit_t; struct onion_queue_t; diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index 9696b81..be4da55 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -837,6 +837,24 @@ append_exit_policy_string(smartlist_t **policy, const char *more) } } +/** Add "reject addr:*" to dest, creating the list as needed. */ +void +addr_policy_append_reject_addr(smartlist_t **dest, const tor_addr_t *addr) +{ + addr_policy_t p, *add; + memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p)); + p.policy_type = ADDR_POLICY_REJECT; + p.maskbits = tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6 ? 128 : 32; + tor_addr_copy(&p.addr, addr); + p.prt_min = 1; + p.prt_max = 65535; + + add = addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(&p); + if (!*dest) + *dest = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(*dest, add); +} + /** Detect and excise "dead code" from the policy *dest. */ static void exit_policy_remove_redundancies(smartlist_t *dest) diff --git a/src/or/policies.h b/src/or/policies.h index da375c4..c0e7a9e 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.h +++ b/src/or/policies.h @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ int policies_parse_exit_policy(config_line_t *cfg, smartlist_t **dest, int rejectprivate, const char *local_address, int add_default_policy); void policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(smartlist_t **dest); +void addr_policy_append_reject_addr(smartlist_t **dest, + const tor_addr_t *addr); void policies_set_node_exitpolicy_to_reject_all(node_t *exitrouter); int exit_policy_is_general_exit(smartlist_t *policy); int policy_is_reject_star(const smartlist_t *policy, sa_family_t family); diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 9ff9e1e..a4f402d 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ static int circuit_resume_edge_reading_helper(edge_connection_t *conn, static int circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); static int circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circuit_t *circ); +static void adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(origin_circuit_t *circ, + entry_connection_t *conn, + node_t *node, + const tor_addr_t *addr); /** Stop reading on edge connections when we have this many cells * waiting on the appropriate queue. */ @@ -710,7 +714,6 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( relay_header_t *rh, cell_t *cell, origin_circuit_t *circ, entry_connection_t *conn, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) { - struct in_addr in; node_t *exitrouter; int reason = *(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE); int control_reason; @@ -753,10 +756,10 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( stream_end_reason_to_string(reason)); exitrouter = node_get_mutable_by_id(chosen_exit_digest); switch (reason) { - case END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY: + case END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY: { + tor_addr_t addr; + tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr); if (rh->length >= 5) { - tor_addr_t addr; - int ttl = -1; tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr); if (rh->length == 5 || rh->length == 9) { @@ -808,16 +811,11 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( } } /* check if he *ought* to have allowed it */ - if (exitrouter && - (rh->length < 5 || - (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in) && - !conn->chosen_exit_name))) { - log_info(LD_APP, - "Exitrouter %s seems to be more restrictive than its exit " - "policy. Not using this router as exit for now.", - node_describe(exitrouter)); - policies_set_node_exitpolicy_to_reject_all(exitrouter); - } + + adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(circ, + conn, + exitrouter, + &addr); if (conn->chosen_exit_optional || conn->chosen_exit_retries) { @@ -837,6 +835,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( return 0; /* else, conn will get closed below */ break; + } case END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED: if (!conn->chosen_exit_optional) break; /* break means it'll close, below */ @@ -901,6 +900,47 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( return 0; } +/** Called when we have gotten an END_REASON_EXITPOLICY failure on circ + * for conn, while attempting to connect via node. If the node + * told us which address it rejected, then addr is that address; + * otherwise it is AF_UNSPEC. + * + * If we are sure the node should have allowed this address, mark the node as + * having a reject *:* exit policy. Otherwise, mark the circuit as unusable + * for this particular address. + **/ +static void +adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(origin_circuit_t *circ, + entry_connection_t *conn, + node_t *node, + const tor_addr_t *addr) +{ + int make_reject_all = 0; + const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr); + + if (node) { + tor_addr_t tmp; + int asked_for_family = tor_addr_parse(&tmp, conn->socks_request->address); + if (family == AF_UNSPEC) { + make_reject_all = 1; + } else if (node_exit_policy_is_exact(node, family) && + asked_for_family != -1 && !conn->chosen_exit_name) { + make_reject_all = 1; + } + + if (make_reject_all) { + log_info(LD_APP, + "Exitrouter %s seems to be more restrictive than its exit " + "policy. Not using this router as exit for now.", + node_describe(node)); + policies_set_node_exitpolicy_to_reject_all(node); + } + } + + if (family != AF_UNSPEC) + addr_policy_append_reject_addr(&circ->prepend_policy, addr); +} + /** Helper: change the socks_request->address field on conn to the * dotted-quad representation of new_addr, * and send an appropriate REMAP event. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.4] Free prepend_policy values in origin circuits
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 73a35dc3c0b4ab6cf79d88fc513c5c2762eff28a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 12:29:08 2013 -0400 Free prepend_policy values in origin circuits --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 17e18c7..eab3ebf 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "nodelist.h" #include "onion.h" #include "onion_fast.h" +#include "policies.h" #include "relay.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" @@ -653,6 +654,7 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) memwipe(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len); tor_free(ocirc->socks_password); } + addr_policy_list_free(ocirc->prepend_policy); } else { or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); /* Remember cell statistics for this circuit before deallocating. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.4] Merge branch 'bug7582_v2' into maint-0.2.4
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 4eaca17f2f755cb1aca9a20216002a4ad652d7ef Merge: 597cd89 73a35dc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 12:29:29 2013 -0400 Merge branch 'bug7582_v2' into maint-0.2.4 changes/bug7582 | 9 ++++++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 2 + src/or/circuituse.c | 13 +++++++-- src/or/nodelist.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + src/or/or.h | 4 +++ src/or/policies.c | 18 +++++++++++++ src/or/policies.h | 2 + src/or/relay.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 9 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

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[translation/torbirdy] Update translations for torbirdy
by translation＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit ddf5a9529336bb1aa1a6377165268b786a91fce6 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 18:16:15 2013 +0000 Update translations for torbirdy --- fa/torbirdy.dtd | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fa/torbirdy.dtd b/fa/torbirdy.dtd index 4d83bd0..20b0969 100644 --- a/fa/torbirdy.dtd +++ b/fa/torbirdy.dtd @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.extra2.key "g"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.proxy.label "تنظیمات پراکسی"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.privacy.label "تنظیمات حریم خصوصی"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail.label ""> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.security.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail.label "تنظیمات Enigmail"> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.security.label "تنظیمات امنیت "> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.recommended.text "از تنظیمات پراکسی توصیه شده برای توربِردی استفاده کن (تور)"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.recommended.key "r"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.anonservice.text "یک سرویس ناشناسی انتخاب کنید"> @@ -28,20 +28,20 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.socks_host.key "h"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.socks_port.label "درگاه:"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.socks_port.key "p"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.torification.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.torification.label "پروکسی نا پیدا"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.torification.key "t"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.global "جهانی"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.imap.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.imap.label "قابلیت شناسایی کلید در پیغام به رمز شده [پیش فرض: خاموش ]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.imap.key "i"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.key "l"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.label "ساعت تاندربِرد را به UTC تغییر نده [پیش فرض: تغییر به UTC]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.key "z"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.label "قابلیت شناسایی کلید در پیغام به رمز شده [پیش فرض: خاموش ]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.key "g"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.confirmemail.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.confirmemail.label "تایید قبل از ارسال کردن ایمیل، در صورتی که Enigmail فعال باشد. [ پیشفرض: خاموش] "> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.confirmemail.key "m"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.emailwizard.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.emailwizard.label "فعال کردن سیستم اتومیتک تنظیم ایمیل در Thunderbird. [ پیش فرض: خاموش ]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.emailwizard.key "w"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.renegotiation.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.renegotiation.key ""> @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usetor.label "از روترِ پیازیِ تور استفاده کن"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usejondo.label "از JonDo استفاده کن (ویژه)"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usewhonix.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usewhonix.label "استفاده از سیستم Whonix"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.preferences.label "تنظیمات توربِردی را باز کن"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.firstrun.title ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.firstrun.title "اولین راه اندازی TorBirdy">

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[torspec/master] Mark proposals 180 and 198 as closed
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 2f031167c120761fa2a3ef3e1dc62e630ab7372a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 19 13:26:16 2013 -0400 Mark proposals 180 and 198 as closed --- proposals/000-index.txt | 8 ++++---- proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt | 2 +- proposals/198-restore-clienthello-semantics.txt | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt index f1fed25..eaa103c 100644 --- a/proposals/000-index.txt +++ b/proposals/000-index.txt @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Proposals by number: 177 Abstaining from votes on individual flags [OPEN] 178 Require majority of authorities to vote for consensus parameters [CLOSED] 179 TLS certificate and parameter normalization [CLOSED] -180 Pluggable transports for circumvention [FINISHED] +180 Pluggable transports for circumvention [CLOSED] 181 Optimistic Data for Tor: Client Side [CLOSED] 182 Credit Bucket [DRAFT] 183 Refill Intervals [CLOSED] @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Proposals by number: 195 TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x [DRAFT] 196 Extended ORPort and TransportControlPort [OPEN] 197 Message-based Inter-Controller IPC Channel [OPEN] -198 Restore semantics of TLS ClientHello [FINISHED] +198 Restore semantics of TLS ClientHello [CLOSED] 199 Integration of BridgeFinder and BridgeFinderHelper [OPEN] 200 Adding new, extensible CREATE, EXTEND, and related cells [CLOSED] 201 Make bridges report statistics on daily v3 network status requests [OPEN] @@ -205,8 +205,6 @@ Proposals by status: 160 Authorities vote for bandwidth offsets in consensus [for 0.2.1.x] 161 Computing Bandwidth Adjustments [for 0.2.1.x] 162 Publish the consensus in multiple flavors [in 0.2.3.1-alpha] - 180 Pluggable transports for circumvention [in 0.2.3.x] - 198 Restore semantics of TLS ClientHello [for 0.2.4.x] 204 Subdomain support for Hidden Service addresses CLOSED: 101 Voting on the Tor Directory System [in 0.2.0.x] @@ -244,12 +242,14 @@ Proposals by status: 176 Proposed version-3 link handshake for Tor [for 0.2.3] 178 Require majority of authorities to vote for consensus parameters [in 0.2.3.9-alpha] 179 TLS certificate and parameter normalization [for 0.2.3.x] + 180 Pluggable transports for circumvention [in 0.2.3.x] 181 Optimistic Data for Tor: Client Side [in 0.2.3.3-alpha] 183 Refill Intervals [in 0.2.3.5-alpha] 184 Miscellaneous changes for a v3 Tor link protocol [for 0.2.3.x] 186 Multiple addresses for one OR or bridge [for 0.2.4.x+] 187 Reserve a cell type to allow client authorization [for 0.2.3.x] 193 Safe cookie authentication for Tor controllers + 198 Restore semantics of TLS ClientHello [for 0.2.4.x] 200 Adding new, extensible CREATE, EXTEND, and related cells [in 0.2.4.8-alpha] 205 Remove global client-side DNS caching [in 0.2.4.7-alpha.] 206 Preconfigured directory sources for bootstrapping [in 0.2.4.7-alpha] diff --git a/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt b/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt index 2e63f2e..c23e5fa 100644 --- a/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt +++ b/proposals/180-pluggable-transport.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 180-pluggable-transport.txt Title: Pluggable transports for circumvention Author: Jacob Appelbaum, Nick Mathewson Created: 15-Oct-2010 -Status: Finished +Status: Closed Implemented-In: 0.2.3.x Overview diff --git a/proposals/198-restore-clienthello-semantics.txt b/proposals/198-restore-clienthello-semantics.txt index c40da64..2a3a560 100644 --- a/proposals/198-restore-clienthello-semantics.txt +++ b/proposals/198-restore-clienthello-semantics.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 198-restore-clienthello-semantics.txt Title: Restore semantics of TLS ClientHello Author: Nick Mathewson Created: 19-Mar-2012 -Status: Finished +Status: Closed Target: 0.2.4.x Status:

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[tor/master] Validate SOCKS arguments.
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit faf4f6c6d1da54b0a6b0c9946112f2e448867a8f Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Dec 17 14:39:24 2012 +0200 Validate SOCKS arguments. --- src/or/config.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/connection.h | 8 ++++++++ src/or/transports.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/transports.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 3e75359..d057dd8 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -4025,6 +4025,40 @@ options_init_logs(or_options_t *options, int validate_only) return ok?0:-1; } +/** Given a smartlist of SOCKS arguments to be passed to a transport + * proxy in args, validate them and return -1 if they are + * corrupted. Return 0 if they seem OK. */ +static int +validate_transport_socks_arguments(const smartlist_t *args) +{ + char *socks_string = NULL; + size_t socks_string_len; + + tor_assert(args); + tor_assert(smartlist_len(args) > 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(args, const char *, s) { + if (!string_is_key_value(s)) /* arguments should be k=v items */ + return -1; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); + + socks_string = pt_stringify_socks_args(args); + if (!socks_string) + return -1; + + socks_string_len = strlen(socks_string); + tor_free(socks_string); + + if (socks_string_len > MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "SOCKS arguments can't be more than %u bytes (%lu).", + MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL, + (unsigned long) socks_string_len); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + /** Read the contents of a Bridge line from line. Return 0 * if the line is well-formed, and -1 if it isn't. If * validate_only is 0, and the line is well-formed, then add @@ -4143,6 +4177,11 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) bridge_add_from_config(&addr, port, fingerprint ? digest : NULL, transport_name, socks_args); + } else { + if (socks_args) { + if (validate_transport_socks_arguments(socks_args) < 0) + goto err; + } } r = 0; diff --git a/src/or/connection.h b/src/or/connection.h index c78fe6e..3e656ec 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.h +++ b/src/or/connection.h @@ -89,6 +89,14 @@ int connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, int *socket_error); +/** Maximum size of information that we can fit into SOCKS5 username + or password fields. */ +#define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE 255 + +/** Total maximum size of information that we can fit into SOCKS5 + username and password fields. */ +#define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL 2*MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE + int connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type); int connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn); void log_failed_proxy_connection(connection_t *conn); diff --git a/src/or/transports.c b/src/or/transports.c index 647b293..a9f7fa2 100644 --- a/src/or/transports.c +++ b/src/or/transports.c @@ -1424,6 +1424,41 @@ pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string(void) return the_string; } +/** Stringify the SOCKS arguments in socks_args according to + * 180_pluggable_transport.txt. The string is allocated on the heap + * and it's the responsibility of the caller to free it after use. */ +char * +pt_stringify_socks_args(const smartlist_t *socks_args) +{ + /* tmp place to store escaped socks arguments, so that we can + concatenate them up afterwards */ + smartlist_t *sl_tmp = NULL; + char *escaped_string = NULL; + char *new_string = NULL; + + tor_assert(socks_args); + tor_assert(smartlist_len(socks_args) > 0); + + sl_tmp = smartlist_new(); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(socks_args, const char *, s) { + /* Escape ';' and '\'. */ + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_socks_arg(s); + if (!escaped_string) + goto done; + + smartlist_add(sl_tmp, escaped_string); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); + + new_string = smartlist_join_strings(sl_tmp, ";", 0, NULL); + + done: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + + return new_string; +} + /** The tor config was read. * Destroy all managed proxies that were marked by a previous call to * prepare_proxy_list_for_config_read() and are not used by the new diff --git a/src/or/transports.h b/src/or/transports.h index 6ee82f4..16fd5d4 100644 --- a/src/or/transports.h +++ b/src/or/transports.h @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ void pt_prepare_proxy_list_for_config_read(void); void sweep_proxy_list(void); smartlist_t *get_transport_proxy_ports(void); +char *pt_stringify_socks_args(const smartlist_t *socks_args); #ifdef PT_PRIVATE /** State of the managed proxy configuration protocol. */

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[tor/master] Add support for parsing SOCKS arguments.
by nickm＠torproject.org 19 Mar '13

19 Mar '13

commit 757b03aacbf7051194bbe9faa2bfcc59e4cc3392 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon Dec 17 14:31:13 2012 +0200 Add support for parsing SOCKS arguments. --- src/or/config.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/or/entrynodes.c | 20 +++++++++++++- src/or/entrynodes.h | 4 ++- 3 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 31695ba..3e75359 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -4036,10 +4036,11 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) int r; char *addrport=NULL, *fingerprint=NULL; char *transport_name=NULL; - char *field1=NULL; + char *field=NULL; tor_addr_t addr; uint16_t port = 0; char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + smartlist_t *socks_args = NULL; items = smartlist_new(); smartlist_split_string(items, line, NULL, @@ -4049,13 +4050,13 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) goto err; } - /* field1 is either a transport name or addrport */ - field1 = smartlist_get(items, 0); + /* field is either a transport name or addrport */ + field = smartlist_get(items, 0); smartlist_del_keeporder(items, 0); - if (!(strstr(field1, ".") || strstr(field1, ":"))) { + if (!(strstr(field, ".") || strstr(field, ":"))) { /* new-style bridge line */ - transport_name = field1; + transport_name = field; if (smartlist_len(items) < 1) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Too few items to Bridge line."); goto err; @@ -4063,7 +4064,7 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) addrport = smartlist_get(items, 0); smartlist_del_keeporder(items, 0); } else { - addrport = field1; + addrport = field; } if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, &addr, &port)<0) { @@ -4077,8 +4078,28 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) port = 443; } + /* If transports are enabled, next field could be a fingerprint or a + socks argument. If transports are disabled, next field should be + a fingerprint. */ if (smartlist_len(items)) { - fingerprint = smartlist_join_strings(items, "", 0, NULL); + if (transport_name) { /* transports enabled: */ + field = smartlist_get(items, 0); + smartlist_del_keeporder(items, 0); + + /* If '=', it's a k=v value pair. */ + if (strchr(field, '=')) { + socks_args = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(socks_args, field); + } else { /* If no '=', it's the fingerprint. */ + fingerprint = field; + } + + } else { /* transports disabled: */ + fingerprint = smartlist_join_strings(items, "", 0, NULL); + } + } + + if (fingerprint) { if (strlen(fingerprint) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Key digest for Bridge is wrong length."); goto err; @@ -4089,13 +4110,39 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) } } + /* If we are using transports, any remaining items in the smartlist + must be k=v values. */ + if (transport_name && smartlist_len(items)) { + if (!socks_args) + socks_args = smartlist_new(); + + /* append remaining items of 'items' to 'socks_args' */ + smartlist_add_all(socks_args, items); + smartlist_clear(items); + + tor_assert(smartlist_len(socks_args) > 0); + } + if (!validate_only) { log_debug(LD_DIR, "Bridge at %s (transport: %s) (%s)", fmt_addrport(&addr, port), transport_name ? transport_name : "no transport", fingerprint ? fingerprint : "no key listed"); + + if (socks_args) { /* print socks arguments */ + int i = 0; + + tor_assert(smartlist_len(socks_args) > 0); + + log_debug(LD_DIR, "Bridge uses %d SOCKS arguments:", + smartlist_len(socks_args)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(socks_args, const char *, arg, + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "%d: %s", ++i, arg)); + } + bridge_add_from_config(&addr, port, - fingerprint ? digest : NULL, transport_name); + fingerprint ? digest : NULL, + transport_name, socks_args); } r = 0; @@ -4110,6 +4157,14 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) tor_free(addrport); tor_free(transport_name); tor_free(fingerprint); + + /* We only have to free socks_args if we are validating, since + otherwise bridge_add_from_config() steals its reference. */ + if (socks_args && validate_only) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(socks_args, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(socks_args); + } + return r; } diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 4ca56cb..63545ce 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ typedef struct { /** When should we next try to fetch a descriptor for this bridge? */ download_status_t fetch_status; + + /** A smartlist of k=v values to be passed to the SOCKS proxy, if + transports are used for this bridge. */ + smartlist_t *socks_args; } bridge_info_t; /** A list of our chosen entry guards. */ @@ -1446,6 +1450,11 @@ bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; tor_free(bridge->transport_name); + if (bridge->socks_args) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge->socks_args, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(bridge->socks_args); + } + tor_free(bridge); } @@ -1628,10 +1637,16 @@ bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, * is set, it tells us the identity key too. If we already had the * bridge in our list, unmark it, and don't actually add anything new. * If transport_name is non-NULL - the bridge is associated with a - * pluggable transport - we assign the transport to the bridge. */ + * pluggable transport - we assign the transport to the bridge. + * If transport_name is non-NULL - the bridge is associated + * with a pluggable transport - we assign the transport to the bridge. + * If socks_args is non-NULL, it's a smartlist carrying + * key=value pairs to be passed to the pluggable transports + * proxy. This function steals reference of the smartlist. */ void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest, const char *transport_name) + const char *digest, const char *transport_name, + smartlist_t *socks_args) { bridge_info_t *b; @@ -1645,6 +1660,7 @@ bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, if (transport_name) b->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name); b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE; + b->socks_args = socks_args; if (!bridge_list) bridge_list = smartlist_new(); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index b673d02..6865231 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -97,9 +97,11 @@ int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node); void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); +struct smartlist_t; void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest, - const char *transport_name); + const char *transport_name, + struct smartlist_t *socks_args); void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest); void fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache);

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