tor-commits March 2013

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1373 discussions

[tor/master] Unit tests for a few more functions and cases in address.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit a6c763084570b07fc240415f01114a6937e66e48 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 14:48:33 2013 -0500 Unit tests for a few more functions and cases in address.c This brings address's coverage up over 80%. --- changes/address_tests | 2 + src/test/test_addr.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/address_tests b/changes/address_tests new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5a8012 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/address_tests @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + o New unit tests: + - More unit tests for address-manipulation functions. diff --git a/src/test/test_addr.c b/src/test/test_addr.c index 890dfe4..f182bca 100644 --- a/src/test/test_addr.c +++ b/src/test/test_addr.c @@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ test_addr_basic(void) test_eq(u32, 0x7f000001u); test_eq(u16, 0); tor_free(cp); + + test_assert(addr_port_lookup(LOG_WARN, "localhost:3", &cp, &u32, NULL)); + tor_free(cp); + test_eq(0, addr_mask_get_bits(0x0u)); test_eq(32, addr_mask_get_bits(0xFFFFFFFFu)); test_eq(16, addr_mask_get_bits(0xFFFF0000u)); @@ -217,11 +221,12 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) /* ==== Converting to and from sockaddr_t. */ sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa_storage; sin->sin_family = AF_INET; - sin->sin_port = 9090; + sin->sin_port = htons(9090); sin->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7f7f0102); /*127.127.1.2*/ - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin, NULL); + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin, &port1); test_eq(tor_addr_family(&t1), AF_INET); test_eq(tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&t1), 0x7f7f0102); + tt_int_op(port1, ==, 9090); memset(&sa_storage, 0, sizeof(sa_storage)); test_eq(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), @@ -235,8 +240,9 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; sin6->sin6_port = htons(7070); sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr[0] = 128; - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin6, NULL); + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin6, &port1); test_eq(tor_addr_family(&t1), AF_INET6); + tt_int_op(port1, ==, 7070); p1 = tor_addr_to_str(buf, &t1, sizeof(buf), 0); test_streq(p1, "8000::"); @@ -464,6 +470,9 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) test_eq(0, i); i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "Foobar.baz", AF_UNSPEC, 1); test_eq(0, i); + i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "9999999999999999999999999999.in-addr.arpa", + AF_UNSPEC, 1); + test_eq(-1, i); i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "1.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa", AF_UNSPEC, 1); test_eq(1, i); @@ -843,6 +852,91 @@ test_virtaddrmap(void *data) ; } +static void +test_addr_localname(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("localhost")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LOCALHOST")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LocalHost")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("local")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LOCAL")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("here.now.local")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("here.now.LOCAL")); + + + tt_assert(!tor_addr_hostname_is_local(" localhost")); + tt_assert(!tor_addr_hostname_is_local("www.torproject.org")); + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_addr_dup_ip(void *arg) +{ + char *v = NULL; + (void)arg; +#define CHECK(ip, s) do { \ + v = tor_dup_ip(ip); \ + tt_str_op(v,==,(s)); \ + tor_free(v); \ + } while (0) + + CHECK(0xffffffff, "255.255.255.255"); + CHECK(0x00000000, "0.0.0.0"); + CHECK(0x7f000001, "127.0.0.1"); + CHECK(0x01020304, "1.2.3.4"); + +#undef CHECK + done: + tor_free(v); +} + +static void +test_addr_sockaddr_to_str(void *arg) +{ + char *v = NULL; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + struct sockaddr_storage ss; +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + struct sockaddr_un sun; +#endif +#define CHECK(sa, s) do { \ + v = tor_sockaddr_to_str((const struct sockaddr*) &(sa)); \ + tt_str_op(v,==,(s)); \ + tor_free(v); \ + } while (0) + (void)arg; + + memset(&ss,0,sizeof(ss)); + ss.ss_family = AF_UNSPEC; + CHECK(ss, "unspec"); + + memset(&sin,0,sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7f808001); + sin.sin_port = htons(1234); + CHECK(sin, "127.128.128.1:1234"); + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + memset(&sun,0,sizeof(sun)); + sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sun.sun_path, "/here/is/a/path", sizeof(sun.sun_path)); + CHECK(sun, "unix:/here/is/a/path"); +#endif + + memset(&sin6,0,sizeof(sin6)); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + memcpy(sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, "\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x1a\x2b\x3c\x4d\x5e\x00\x01", 16); + sin6.sin6_port = htons(1234); + CHECK(sin6, "[2000::1a:2b3c:4d5e:1]:1234"); + + done: + tor_free(v); +} + #define ADDR_LEGACY(name) \ { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_addr_ ## name } @@ -851,6 +945,9 @@ struct testcase_t addr_tests[] = { ADDR_LEGACY(ip6_helpers), ADDR_LEGACY(parse), { "virtaddr", test_virtaddrmap, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "localname", test_addr_localname, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "dup_ip", test_addr_dup_ip, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "sockaddr_to_str", test_addr_sockaddr_to_str, 0, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };

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[tor/master] More unit tests for old TAP onion handshake.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit f6697d5b3bbd4fbb18362158b01346aab8915254 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 14:06:09 2013 -0500 More unit tests for old TAP onion handshake. The test coverage for onion_tap.c is now at 89%, up from 67%. --- changes/onion_tap_tests | 2 + src/test/test.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/onion_tap_tests b/changes/onion_tap_tests new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f982433 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/onion_tap_tests @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + o New unit tests: + - Unit tests for failing cases of the TAP onion handshake. diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 6c64d35..41ab421 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -821,43 +821,130 @@ test_onion_handshake(void) crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL; char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; char c_keys[40]; - /* server-side */ char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN]; char s_keys[40]; - + int i; /* shared */ - crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL; pk = pk_generate(0); + pk2 = pk_generate(1); /* client handshake 1. */ memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)); - /* server handshake */ - memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN); - memset(s_keys, 0, 40); - test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL, - s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i) { + crypto_pk_t *k1, *k2; + if (i==1) { + /* server handshake: only one key known. */ + k1 = pk; k2 = NULL; + } else if (i==2) { + /* server handshake: try the right key first. */ + k1 = pk; k2 = pk2; + } else { + /* server handshake: try the right key second. */ + k1 = pk2; k2 = pk; + } - /* client handshake 2 */ - memset(c_keys, 0, 40); - test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN); + memset(s_keys, 0, 40); + test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, k1, k2, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); - if (memcmp(c_keys, s_keys, 40)) { - puts("Aiiiie"); - exit(1); + /* client handshake 2 */ + memset(c_keys, 0, 40); + test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + + test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40); + memset(s_buf, 0, 40); + test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40); } - test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40); - memset(s_buf, 0, 40); - test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40); + done: + crypto_dh_free(c_dh); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); +} + +static void +test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg) +{ + char junk_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + char junk_buf2[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + /* client-side */ + crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL; + char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + char c_keys[40]; + /* server-side */ + char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN]; + char s_keys[40]; + /* shared */ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL; + + (void)arg; + + pk = pk_generate(0); + pk2 = pk_generate(1); + + /* Server: Case 1: the encrypted data is degenerate. */ + memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf)); + crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, + junk_buf, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* Server: Case 2: the encrypted data is not long enough. */ + memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf)); + memset(junk_buf2, 0, sizeof(junk_buf2)); + crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, sizeof(junk_buf2), + junk_buf, 48, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* client handshake 1: do it straight. */ + memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); + test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)); + + /* Server: Case 3: we just don't have the right key. */ + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk2, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* Server: Case 4: The RSA-encrypted portion is corrupt. */ + c_buf[64] ^= 33; + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + c_buf[64] ^= 33; + + /* (Let the server procede) */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* Client: Case 1: The server sent back junk. */ + s_buf[64] ^= 33; + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + s_buf[64] ^= 33; + + /* Let the client finish; make sure it can. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + test_memeq(s_keys, c_keys, 40); + + /* Client: Case 2: The server sent back a degenerate DH. */ + memset(s_buf, 0, sizeof(s_buf)); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); done: - if (c_dh) - crypto_dh_free(c_dh); - if (pk) - crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_dh_free(c_dh); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); } #ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED @@ -1991,6 +2078,7 @@ static struct testcase_t test_array[] = { ENT(buffers), { "buffer_copy", test_buffer_copy, 0, NULL, NULL }, ENT(onion_handshake), + { "bad_onion_handshake", test_bad_onion_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL }, #ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED { "ntor_handshake", test_ntor_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL }, #endif

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[translation/torbirdy] Update translations for torbirdy
by translation＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit 1599665bbd05cb45bfac0c364527cf2d34afe737 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 16:16:09 2013 +0000 Update translations for torbirdy --- ko/torbirdy.dtd | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ko/torbirdy.dtd b/ko/torbirdy.dtd index fb2fd21..bbb9514 100644 --- a/ko/torbirdy.dtd +++ b/ko/torbirdy.dtd @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.accountprefs.title "계정 설정"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.accountprefs.startup.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.accountprefs.startup.label "시작시에 새로운 메시지 확인"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.accountprefs.startup.key "C"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.accountprefs.minutes.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.accountprefs.minutes.key "y"> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.imap.key "i"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.startup_folder.key "l"> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.label "썬더버드의 타임존을 UTC로 설정하지 마십시오 [기본값 : UTC로 설정]"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.timezone.key "z"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.prefs.enigmail_throwkeyid.key "g"> @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usetor.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usejondo.label ""> -<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usewhonix.label ""> +<!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.usewhonix.label "Whonix 사용"> <!ENTITY torbirdy.panel.preferences.label ""> <!ENTITY torbirdy.firstrun.title "">

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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit 08598501cb75fbef4a65d3610bd26c5f4be4180c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 16:15:12 2013 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-ko/strings.xml | 4 +++- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-ko/strings.xml b/values-ko/strings.xml index c39f433..612a196 100644 --- a/values-ko/strings.xml +++ b/values-ko/strings.xml @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ <string name="pref_transparent_all_title">토르의 모든 것</string> <string name="pref_transparent_all_summary">토르를 통한 모든 응용 프로그램에 대한 프록시 트래픽</string> <string name="pref_transparent_port_fallback_title">포트 프록시 대체</string> + <string name="pref_transparent_port_fallback_summary">경고 : 흔한 포트(80,443 등)만 순환. 전체 모드나 앱 모드가 작동하지 않을 경우에만 사용할 것.</string> <string name="pref_transparent_port_title">포트 목록</string> + <string name="pref_transparent_port_summary">프록시 처리할 포트 목록. 만약 전체 모드나 앱 모드가 작동하지 않을 경우에만 사용할 것.</string> <string name="pref_has_root">루트 권한에 대한 접근 필요</string> <string name="pref_has_root_summary">명백한 프록시를 위해 루트 권한 요구</string> <string name="status_install_success">Tor 바이너리가 성공적으로 설치됨!</string> @@ -128,6 +130,6 @@ <string name="privoxy_version">Privoxy v3.0.12: http://www.privoxy.org</string> <string name="iptables_version">Iptables v1.4.7: http://www.netfilter.org</string> <string name="openssl_version">OpenSSL v0.9.8h: http://www.openssl.org</string> - <string name="default_bridges"/> + <string name="default_bridges"></string> <string name="powered_by">토르 프로젝트에 의해 구동 </string> </resources>

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[tor/master] Fix bootstrapping with bridges by making is_dir_cache is set on them.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit ad49abe5a147187582c8070b0b33d476f37fc792 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 28 17:20:46 2013 -0500 Fix bootstrapping with bridges by making is_dir_cache is set on them. This fixes bug 8367, introduced in d7089ff228227259137b5a8b. Not in any released Tor. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 51c3a56..e89eabc 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, const node_t *node, if (node) { int is_dir = node_is_dir(node) && node->rs && node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (options->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + is_dir = 1; if (e->is_dir_cache != is_dir) { e->is_dir_cache = is_dir; changed = 1; @@ -354,6 +356,8 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend, } entry->is_dir_cache = node->rs && node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + entry->is_dir_cache = 1; return NULL; } } else if (!for_directory) {

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[tor/master] Correctly set entry->is_dir_cache when adding an entry guard for the first time
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit 74c33945e3c8c441111f0cb3dd0e5097ad2155f5 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 01:59:25 2013 -0800 Correctly set entry->is_dir_cache when adding an entry guard for the first time (Second part of a bug8367 fix. -NM) --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index e89eabc..5d356b6 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -381,6 +381,8 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend, memcpy(entry->identity, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN); entry->is_dir_cache = node_is_dir(node) && node->rs && node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + entry->is_dir_cache = 1; /* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here * is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.4'
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit 045c989d037058293e9320db7c7d8143d5d3aa4c Merge: dc4ccfd 74c3394 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 10:19:19 2013 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.4'

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[tor/maint-0.2.4] Fix bootstrapping with bridges by making is_dir_cache is set on them.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

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[tor/maint-0.2.4] Correctly set entry->is_dir_cache when adding an entry guard for the first time
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

1 0

[tor/master] Correctly set entry->is_dir_cache when adding an entry guard for the first time
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Mar '13

01 Mar '13

commit 8b26766a6672f71a83c13dec18abd62658f6a6fc Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 1 01:59:25 2013 -0800 Correctly set entry->is_dir_cache when adding an entry guard for the first time (Second part of a bug8367 fix. -NM) --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index e89eabc..5d356b6 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -381,6 +381,8 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend, memcpy(entry->identity, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN); entry->is_dir_cache = node_is_dir(node) && node->rs && node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + entry->is_dir_cache = 1; /* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here * is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they

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tor-commits March 2013