tor-commits February 2013

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19 participants
783 discussions

[tor/master] Clarify documentation of connection_finished_flushing
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit 690ea9e8cf3b9c047484a6aea30fa94650fb66c8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Jan 30 17:07:32 2013 -0500 Clarify documentation of connection_finished_flushing --- src/or/connection.c | 5 +++-- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 3e6341b..10fee12 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3872,8 +3872,9 @@ connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn) return r; } -/** We just finished flushing bytes from conn-\>outbuf, and there - * are no more bytes remaining. +/** We just finished flushing bytes to the appropriately low network layer, + * and there are no more bytes remaining in conn-\>outbuf, conn-\>bev, or + * conn-\>tls to be flushed. * * This function just passes conn to the connection-specific * connection_*_finished_flushing() function.

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[tor/master] Fix serious breakage in connection_handle_write_impl
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit b4429307899afd637ae33e8e6a1400f30b57085e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Dec 11 17:46:12 2012 -0500 Fix serious breakage in connection_handle_write_impl When we first implemented TLS, we assumed in conneciton_handle_write that a TOR_TLS_WANT_WRITE from flush_buf_tls meant that nothing had been written. But when we moved our buffers to a ring buffer implementation back in 0.1.0.5-rc (!), we broke that invariant: it's possible that some bytes have been written but nothing. That's bad. It means that if we do a sequence of TLS writes that ends with a WANTWRITE, we don't notice that we flushed any bytes, and we don't (I think) decrement buckets. Fixes bug 7708; bugfix on 0.1.0.5-rc --- changes/bug7708 | 5 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug7708 b/changes/bug7708 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e272adf --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7708 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - When a TLS write is partially successful but incomplete, remember + that the flushed part has been flushed, and notice that bytes were + actually written. Reported and fixed pseudonymously. Fixes bug + 7708; bugfix on Tor 0.1.0.5-rc. diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index eac9c4f..3e6341b 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3168,6 +3168,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) ssize_t max_to_write; time_t now = approx_time(); size_t n_read = 0, n_written = 0; + int dont_stop_writing = 0; tor_assert(!connection_is_listener(conn)); @@ -3220,6 +3221,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && conn->state > OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING) { or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + size_t initial_size; if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING || conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING) { connection_stop_writing(conn); @@ -3235,6 +3237,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) } /* else open, or closing */ + initial_size = buf_datalen(conn->outbuf); result = flush_buf_tls(or_conn->tls, conn->outbuf, max_to_write, &conn->outbuf_flushlen); @@ -3257,7 +3260,8 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE: log_debug(LD_NET,"wanted write."); /* we're already writing */ - return 0; + dont_stop_writing = 1; + break; case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* Make sure to avoid a loop if the receive buckets are empty. */ log_debug(LD_NET,"wanted read."); @@ -3279,6 +3283,12 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(or_conn->tls, &n_read, &n_written); log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "After TLS write of %d: %ld read, %ld written", result, (long)n_read, (long)n_written); + /* So we notice bytes were written even on error */ + /* XXXX024 This cast is safe since we can never write INT_MAX bytes in a + * single set of TLS operations. But it looks kinda ugly. If we refactor + * the *_buf_tls functions, we should make them return ssize_t or size_t + * or something. */ + result = (int)(initial_size-buf_datalen(conn->outbuf)); } else { CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, result = flush_buf(conn->s, conn->outbuf, @@ -3313,7 +3323,8 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) connection_mark_for_close(conn); } - if (!connection_wants_to_flush(conn)) { /* it's done flushing */ + if (!connection_wants_to_flush(conn) && + !dont_stop_writing) { /* it's done flushing */ if (connection_finished_flushing(conn) < 0) { /* already marked */ return -1;

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug7708_023_v3_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit c93f66b1037e151268b5662f3957d13c4c94d1fb Merge: 4074ff4 690ea9e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Feb 1 17:11:46 2013 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug7708_023_v3_squashed' changes/bug7708 | 5 +++++ src/or/connection.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/connection.c index c1cfbd6,10fee12..0d8242a --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@@ -3437,23 -3319,12 +3447,24 @@@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection if (result > 0) { /* If we wrote any bytes from our buffer, then call the appropriate * functions. */ - if (connection_flushed_some(conn) < 0) - connection_mark_for_close(conn); + if (connection_flushed_some(conn) < 0) { + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { + connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), + END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC, + "Got error back from " + "connection_flushed_some()"); + } + + /* + * This can bypass normal channel checking since we did + * connection_or_notify_error() above. + */ + connection_mark_for_close_internal(conn); + } } - if (!connection_wants_to_flush(conn)) { /* it's done flushing */ + if (!connection_wants_to_flush(conn) && + !dont_stop_writing) { /* it's done flushing */ if (connection_finished_flushing(conn) < 0) { /* already marked */ return -1;

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[tor/master] Clarify state transition and related pathbias comments
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit 173ed05d2f7233371dfcb1ef32a4d95f5096c435 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jan 30 17:01:10 2013 -0400 Clarify state transition and related pathbias comments --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 10 +++++----- src/or/circuituse.c | 8 +++++--- src/or/or.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index e3a9d59..9732a48 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1605,13 +1605,13 @@ pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /** - * Check the circuit's path stat is appropriate and it as successfully - * used. + * Check the circuit's path state is appropriate and mark it as + * successfully used. Used for path bias usage accounting. * * We don't actually increment the guard's counters until - * pathbias_check_close(). - * - * Used for path bias usage accounting. + * pathbias_check_close(), because the circuit can still transition + * back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED if a stream fails later (this + * is done so we can probe the circuit for liveness at close). */ void pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 48a7743..cfd41be 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1498,15 +1498,17 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) && circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { /* Path bias: Cannibalized rends pre-emptively count as a - * successfully used circ. We don't wait until the extend, - * because the rend point could be malicious. + * successfully built but unused closed circuit. We don't + * wait until the extend (or the close) because the rend + * point could be malicious. * * Same deal goes for client side introductions. Clients * can be manipulated to connect repeatedly to them * (especially web clients). * * If we decide to probe the initial portion of these circs, - * (up to the adversaries final hop), we need to remove this. + * (up to the adversary's final hop), we need to remove this, + * or somehow mark the circuit with a special path state. */ /* This must be called before the purpose change */ diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index df933c3..b5ccd0c 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2827,8 +2827,18 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { /** * Describes the circuit building process in simplified terms based - * on the path bias accounting state for a circuit. Created to prevent - * overcounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See Bug #6475. + * on the path bias accounting state for a circuit. + * + * NOTE: These state values are enumerated in the order for which we + * expect circuits to transition through them. If you add states, + * you need to preserve this overall ordering. The various pathbias + * state transition and accounting functions (pathbias_mark_* and + * pathbias_count_*) contain ordinal comparisons to enforce proper + * state transitions for corrections. + * + * This state machine and the associated logic was created to prevent + * miscounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See also tickets + * #6475 and #7802. */ typedef enum { /** This circuit is "new". It has not yet completed a first hop @@ -2851,10 +2861,8 @@ typedef enum { /** Did any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions actually succeed on * this circuit? * - * Note: If we ever implement end-to-end stream timing through test - * stream probes (#5707), we must *not* set this for those probes - * (or any other automatic streams) because the adversary could - * just tag at a later point. + * If any streams detatch/fail from this circuit, the code transitions + * the circuit back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED to ensure we probe. */ PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED = 4, @@ -2905,8 +2913,11 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * cannibalized circuits. */ unsigned int has_opened : 1; - /** Kludge to help us prevent the warn in bug #6475 and eventually - * debug why we are not seeing first hops in some cases. */ + /** + * Path bias state machine. Used to ensure integrity of our + * circuit building and usage accounting. See path_state_t + * for more details. + */ ENUM_BF(path_state_t) path_state : 3; /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe stream ID

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[tor/master] Mark entry guard state dirty everwhere the pathbias code touches it.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit 2b2c7f23f5b36ee01540d40acae1230b38aa66a0 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jan 30 17:51:37 2013 -0400 Mark entry guard state dirty everwhere the pathbias code touches it. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index ddc11d0..958e410 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1539,6 +1539,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) { circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED; guard->circ_successes++; + entry_guards_changed(); log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s=%s", guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, @@ -1623,6 +1624,7 @@ pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (guard) { pathbias_check_use_rate(guard); guard->use_attempts++; + entry_guards_changed(); log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used for guard %s=%s.", @@ -1706,6 +1708,7 @@ pathbias_count_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); if (guard) { guard->use_successes++; + entry_guards_changed(); log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used successfully for guard " @@ -2244,6 +2247,7 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); guard->path_bias_disabled = 1; guard->bad_since = approx_time(); + entry_guards_changed(); return -1; } } else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) { @@ -2315,6 +2319,7 @@ pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) "Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f (%d open) for guard %s=%s", guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, opened_attempts, guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + entry_guards_changed(); } return 0; @@ -2366,6 +2371,7 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); guard->path_bias_disabled = 1; guard->bad_since = approx_time(); + entry_guards_changed(); return -1; } } else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) { @@ -2470,6 +2476,8 @@ pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) guard->circ_attempts += opened_attempts; guard->circ_successes += opened_built; + entry_guards_changed(); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Scaled pathbias counts to (%f,%f)/%f (%d/%d open) for guard " "%s=%s",

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[tor/master] Add a tristate to guard against unexpected circ purpose transitions
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit 6828a19670080a3d19bdddf1e55d53928d81a410 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jan 30 17:46:25 2013 -0400 Add a tristate to guard against unexpected circ purpose transitions --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 9732a48..ddc11d0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1352,6 +1352,24 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED || (circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) { + + /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a + * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results. + * + * The reason we check the path state too here is because for the + * cannibalized versions of these purposes, we count them as successful + * before their purpose change. + */ + if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED + && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted " + "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); + } + circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED; return 0; } @@ -1374,9 +1392,33 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ) } tor_fragile_assert(); } + + /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a + * unexpected change that would affect our results */ + if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "One-hop circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted " + "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); + } + circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED; return 0; } + /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a + * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results */ + if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Circuit %d is now being counted despite being ignored " + "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); + } + circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED; + return 1; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index b5ccd0c..3c962e3 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2920,6 +2920,18 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { */ ENUM_BF(path_state_t) path_state : 3; + /** + * Tristate variable to guard against pathbias miscounting + * due to circuit purpose transitions changing the decision + * of pathbias_should_count(). This variable is informational + * only. The current results of pathbias_should_count() are + * the official decision for pathbias accounting. + */ + uint8_t pathbias_shouldcount; +#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_UNDECIDED 0 +#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED 1 +#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED 2 + /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe stream ID * for response comparison */ streamid_t pathbias_probe_id;

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[tor/master] Bounds-check path bias rate parameters.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit 95d272f5d843b0b8d30e183444b78910e72b04f7 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jan 30 22:21:36 2013 -0400 Bounds-check path bias rate parameters. The other remaining parameters don't really need range checks. --- src/or/config.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 70d8703..2ba9c76 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -2649,6 +2649,37 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, RECOMMENDED_MIN_CIRCUIT_BUILD_TIMEOUT ); } + if (options->PathBiasNoticeRate > 1.0) { + tor_asprintf(msg, + "PathBiasNoticeRate is too high. " + "It must be between 0 and 1.0"); + return -1; + } + if (options->PathBiasWarnRate > 1.0) { + tor_asprintf(msg, + "PathBiasWarnRate is too high. " + "It must be between 0 and 1.0"); + return -1; + } + if (options->PathBiasExtremeRate > 1.0) { + tor_asprintf(msg, + "PathBiasExtremeRate is too high. " + "It must be between 0 and 1.0"); + return -1; + } + if (options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate > 1.0) { + tor_asprintf(msg, + "PathBiasNoticeUseRate is too high. " + "It must be between 0 and 1.0"); + return -1; + } + if (options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate > 1.0) { + tor_asprintf(msg, + "PathBiasExtremeUseRate is too high. " + "It must be between 0 and 1.0"); + return -1; + } + if (options->MaxCircuitDirtiness < MIN_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "MaxCircuitDirtiness option is too short; " "raising to %d seconds.", MIN_MAX_CIRCUIT_DIRTINESS);

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[tor/master] Fix a log typo found by sysrqb.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit 6e4610de0226f4fa80b68f92c458a5ad42f21b5b Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Thu Jan 31 09:37:12 2013 -0400 Fix a log typo found by sysrqb. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 545184b..6689f73 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2402,7 +2402,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) "amount of circuits. " "Most likely this means the Tor network is " "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against " - "you or the potentially the guard itself. " + "you or potentially the guard itself. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " "and %ld timed out. "

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[tor/master] Refactor code that rolls back the use state
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit bce6714f99df6fd00c90918ac0a7407bf1f764e3 Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Wed Jan 30 21:27:38 2013 -0400 Refactor code that rolls back the use state Also document it better. Mention this refactoring in the comments for the path state machine. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.h | 1 + src/or/connection_edge.c | 25 +++++++------------------ src/or/or.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2a3c40c..545184b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1678,6 +1678,31 @@ pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /** + * If a stream ever detatches from a circuit in a retriable way, + * we need to mark this circuit as still needing either another + * successful stream, or in need of a probe. + * + * An adversary could let the first stream request succeed (ie the + * resolve), but then tag and timeout the remainder (via cell + * dropping), forcing them on new circuits. + * + * Rolling back the state will cause us to probe such circuits, which + * should lead to probe failures in the event of such tagging due to + * either unrecognized cells coming in while we wait for the probe, + * or the cipher state getting out of sync in the case of dropped cells. + */ +void +pathbias_mark_use_rollback(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Rolling back pathbias use state to 'attempted' for detached " + "circuit %d", circ->global_identifier); + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; + } +} + +/** * Actually count a circuit success towards a guard's usage counters * if the path state is appropriate. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index d03a7c5..3ca8d15 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell); void pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ); void pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ); +void pathbias_mark_use_rollback(origin_circuit_t *circ); #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 9e2c15d..b4fa3e6 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -637,21 +637,15 @@ connection_ap_expire_beginning(void) } if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) { if (seconds_idle >= options->SocksTimeout) { - /* Path bias: We need to probe the circuit to ensure validity. - * Roll its state back if it succeeded so that we do so upon close. */ - if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Rolling back pathbias use state to 'attempted' for timed " - "out rend circ %d", - TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier); - TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; - } - log_fn(severity, LD_REND, "Rend stream is %d seconds late. Giving up on address" " '%s.onion'.", seconds_idle, safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address)); + /* Roll back path bias use state so that we probe the circuit + * if nothing else succeeds on it */ + pathbias_mark_use_rollback(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)); + connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT); connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT); } @@ -816,14 +810,9 @@ connection_ap_detach_retriable(entry_connection_t *conn, control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_FAILED_RETRIABLE, reason); ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->timestamp_lastread = time(NULL); - /* Path bias: We need to probe the circuit to ensure validity. - * Roll its state back if it succeeded so that we do so upon close. */ - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Rolling back pathbias use state to 'attempted' for detached " - "circuit %d", circ->global_identifier); - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; - } + /* Roll back path bias use state so that we probe the circuit + * if nothing else succeeds on it */ + pathbias_mark_use_rollback(circ); if (conn->pending_optimistic_data) { generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&conn->sending_optimistic_data, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index e5fc06a..11158ff 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2862,7 +2862,8 @@ typedef enum { * this circuit? * * If any streams detatch/fail from this circuit, the code transitions - * the circuit back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED to ensure we probe. + * the circuit back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED to ensure we probe. See + * pathbias_mark_use_rollback() for that. */ PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED = 4,

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[tor/master] Increment an informational counter for use failed state.
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Feb '13

01 Feb '13

commit b3e57b760e7a7b77d2da414b52820283563c473d Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git(a)fscked.org> Date: Thu Jan 31 10:17:11 2013 -0400 Increment an informational counter for use failed state. This informational counter is probably now redundant, but might as well keep it consistent I guess. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 6689f73..91f7077 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2002,6 +2002,10 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) pathbias_count_use_success(ocirc); break; + case PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED: + pathbias_count_use_failed(ocirc); + break; + default: // Other states are uninteresting. No stats to count. break;

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