tor-commits August 2012

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901 discussions

[translation/https_everywhere_completed] Update translations for https_everywhere_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit be77f0562d50968bfcaf8e7826846db4a561dd36 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 23:45:37 2012 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere_completed --- ar/https-everywhere.properties | 4 +++- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/ar/https-everywhere.properties b/ar/https-everywhere.properties index a3b6089..4b89ae3 100644 --- a/ar/https-everywhere.properties +++ b/ar/https-everywhere.properties @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable = فعّل HTTPS Everywhere https-everywhere.menu.globalDisable = أوقف HTTPS Everywhere - +https-everywhere.menu.enableDisable = فعل / اوقف القوانين +https-everywhere.menu.noRules = (هذه الصفحة لا تحتوي على قوانين) +https-everywhere.menu.unknownRules = (قواين هذه الصفحة غير معروفة)

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[translation/https_everywhere] Update translations for https_everywhere
by translation＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit 3544e63ac2179f3846f8fd67daef148172599442 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 23:45:34 2012 +0000 Update translations for https_everywhere --- ar/https-everywhere.properties | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ar/https-everywhere.properties b/ar/https-everywhere.properties index 75a9736..4b89ae3 100644 --- a/ar/https-everywhere.properties +++ b/ar/https-everywhere.properties @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ https-everywhere.menu.globalEnable = فعّل HTTPS Everywhere https-everywhere.menu.globalDisable = أوقف HTTPS Everywhere -# https-everywhere.menu.enableDisable = Enable / Disable Rules -# https-everywhere.menu.noRules = (No Rules for This Page) -# https-everywhere.menu.unknownRules = (Rules for This Page Unknown) +https-everywhere.menu.enableDisable = فعل / اوقف القوانين +https-everywhere.menu.noRules = (هذه الصفحة لا تحتوي على قوانين) +https-everywhere.menu.unknownRules = (قواين هذه الصفحة غير معروفة)

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[translation/orbot_completed] Update translations for orbot_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit aee55b8d2ca7af7862d3de8cca682b2d08855280 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 23:45:11 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot_completed --- values-ar/strings.xml | 5 +++-- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-ar/strings.xml b/values-ar/strings.xml index 0d6debe..f56d446 100644 --- a/values-ar/strings.xml +++ b/values-ar/strings.xml @@ -119,8 +119,9 @@ <string name="pref_entrance_node">نقاط الدخول</string> <string name="pref_entrance_node_summary">بصمات، اسماء مستعارة، البلدان و العناوين لأول نقطة اتصال</string> <string name="pref_entrance_node_dialog">أدخل نقاط الدخول</string> - <string name="pref_use_whispercore">استخدم WhisperCore</string> - <string name="pref_use_whispercore_summary">استخدم مكتبة NetFilter مغلقة المصدر و المقدمة من WhisperSystems (تحتاج لتنزيل WhisperCore)</string> +  + <string name="pref_proxy_title">بروكسي الشبكة</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_title">نوع البروكسي</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_summary">البروتوكول ليستخدم مع خادم البروكسي: HTTP, HTTPS, Socks4, Socks5</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_dialog">أدخل نوع البروكسي</string>

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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit 93e75df4571065a64283b9cb97ed09ec21610e9e Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 23:45:05 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-ar/strings.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-ar/strings.xml b/values-ar/strings.xml index 3afb075..f56d446 100644 --- a/values-ar/strings.xml +++ b/values-ar/strings.xml @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ <string name="pref_entrance_node_dialog">أدخل نقاط الدخول</string>  - <string name="pref_proxy_title">Outbound Network Proxy</string> + <string name="pref_proxy_title">بروكسي الشبكة</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_title">نوع البروكسي</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_summary">البروتوكول ليستخدم مع خادم البروكسي: HTTP, HTTPS, Socks4, Socks5</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_dialog">أدخل نوع البروكسي</string>

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[tor/master] Speak not the name of INT_MIN; it can upset older compilers
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit d373922217dc8c2c2f1bcb243f2b8b08379d0582 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 13:54:12 2012 -0400 Speak not the name of INT_MIN; it can upset older compilers And more to the point, some GCCs will warn that you can't say it before C90. Bug not in any released version of Tor. --- src/test/test_util.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 5c119d3..64976f3 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ test_util_sscanf(void) #if SIZEOF_INT == 4 r = tor_sscanf("-2147483648. 2147483647.", "%d. %d.", &int1, &int2); test_eq(r,2); - test_eq(int1, -2147483648); + test_eq(int1, -2147483647-1); test_eq(int2, 2147483647); r = tor_sscanf("-2147483679.", "%d.", &int1); @@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ test_util_sscanf(void) r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775808. 9223372036854775807.", "%d. %d.", &int1, &int2); test_eq(r,2); - test_eq(int1, -9223372036854775808); + test_eq(int1, -9223372036854775807-1); test_eq(int2, 9223372036854775807); r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775809.", "%d.", &int1);

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Clarify security impact of bug 6530
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit 55f635745afacefffdaafc72cc176ca7ab817546 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 11:16:13 2012 -0400 Clarify security impact of bug 6530 --- changes/bug6530 | 7 ++++--- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6530 b/changes/bug6530 index a6b7caa..825bbb7 100644 --- a/changes/bug6530 +++ b/changes/bug6530 @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ - o Major bugfixes: + o Major security fixes: - Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus - document with an unrecognized flavor name. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on - 0.2.2.6-alpha. + document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a + remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. +

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Try to clarify impact of bug 6537
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit d48cebc5e498b0ae673635f40fc57cdddab45d5b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 11:54:11 2012 -0400 Try to clarify impact of bug 6537 I don't personally agree that this is likely to be easy to exploit, and some initial experimention I've done suggests that cache-miss times are just plain too fast to get useful info out of when they're mixed up with the rest of Tor's timing noise. Nevertheless, I'm leaving Robert's initial changelog entry in the git history so that he can be the voice of reason if I'm wrong. :) --- changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a | 16 +++++++++------- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a index cad2af5..2e642c7 100644 --- a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a +++ b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a @@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would stop iterating through the list of available relays as - soon as it had chosen one, thus leaking information about which - relays it picked for a circuit to a timing attack. (Tor is - likely to still leak information about which relays it has - chosen for a circuit to other processes on the same computer, - through e.g. which cache lines it loads while building the - circuit.) - + soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier + when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker + can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not + proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse- + grained information about which relays a client was picking + (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than + exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors + (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to + take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Mitigate a side-channel leak of which relays Tor chooses for a circuit
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit 308f6dad20675c42b29862f4269ad1fbfb00dc9a Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 14 17:15:54 2012 +0000 Mitigate a side-channel leak of which relays Tor chooses for a circuit Tor's and OpenSSL's current design guarantee that there are other leaks, but this one is likely to be more easily exploitable, and is easy to fix. --- changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a | 12 ++++++++++++ src/or/routerlist.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cad2af5 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + o Security fixes: + + - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is + choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client + would stop iterating through the list of available relays as + soon as it had chosen one, thus leaking information about which + relays it picked for a circuit to a timing attack. (Tor is + likely to still leak information about which relays it has + chosen for a circuit to other processes on the same computer, + through e.g. which cache lines it loads while building the + circuit.) + diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index d21b40c..30c20bf 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1674,6 +1674,8 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl, double *bandwidths; double tmp = 0; unsigned int i; + unsigned int i_chosen; + unsigned int i_has_been_chosen; int have_unknown = 0; /* true iff sl contains element not in consensus. */ /* Can't choose exit and guard at same time */ @@ -1835,12 +1837,17 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl, * from 1 below. See bug 1203 for details. */ /* Last, count through sl until we get to the element we picked */ + i_chosen = (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); + i_has_been_chosen = 0; tmp = 0.0; for (i=0; i < (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); i++) { tmp += bandwidths[i]; - if (tmp >= rand_bw) - break; + if (tmp >= rand_bw && !i_has_been_chosen) { + i_chosen = i; + i_has_been_chosen = 1; + } } + i = i_chosen; if (i == (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl)) { /* This was once possible due to round-off error, but shouldn't be able @@ -1877,6 +1884,8 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule, int statuses) { unsigned int i; + unsigned int i_chosen; + unsigned int i_has_been_chosen; routerinfo_t *router; routerstatus_t *status=NULL; int32_t *bandwidths; @@ -2092,6 +2101,8 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule, /* Last, count through sl until we get to the element we picked */ tmp = 0; + i_chosen = (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); + i_has_been_chosen = 0; for (i=0; i < (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); i++) { is_exit = bitarray_is_set(exit_bits, i); is_guard = bitarray_is_set(guard_bits, i); @@ -2106,9 +2117,12 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule, else tmp += bandwidths[i]; - if (tmp >= rand_bw) - break; + if (tmp >= rand_bw && !i_has_been_chosen) { + i_chosen = i; + i_has_been_chosen = 1; + } } + i = i_chosen; if (i == (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl)) { /* This was once possible due to round-off error, but shouldn't be able * to occur any longer. */

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Avoid possible segfault when handling networkstatus vote with bad flavor
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit 57e35ad3d91724882c345ac709666a551a977f0f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 10:53:00 2012 -0400 Avoid possible segfault when handling networkstatus vote with bad flavor Fix for 6530; fix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. --- changes/bug6530 | 4 ++++ src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug6530 b/changes/bug6530 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6b7caa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug6530 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus + document with an unrecognized flavor name. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on + 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 8c4f582..2ff546b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, int flavor = networkstatus_parse_flavor_name(tok->args[1]); if (flavor < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't parse document with unknown flavor %s", - escaped(tok->args[2])); + escaped(tok->args[1])); goto err; } ns->flavor = flav = flavor;

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Aug '12

03 Aug '12

commit 909f18910efddc107a3602529c7029b40bf0aeed Merge: fce6eb1 d48cebc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 3 13:33:36 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' into release-0.2.2 changes/bug6530 | 5 +++++ changes/geoip-june2012 | 3 +++ changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a | 14 ++++++++++++++ changes/revert-geoip-may2012 | 6 ++++++ src/or/routerlist.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

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tor-commits August 2012