June 2012 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6244_part2' into maint-0.2.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit 217862b3172490d5a620d947d7d56be47ccf1dde Merge: dc9dd23 28c42fe Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 10:49:32 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug6244_part2' into maint-0.2.3 changes/bug6244_part2 | 4 ++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 13 +++++++++---- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Downgrade 'Got a certificate, but we already have it' log message from warning to info, except when we're a dirauth (fixes bug 5238)
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit bdc8270280b345f0e02a6615f8670f3c47d99a22 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 00:21:06 2012 -0700 Downgrade 'Got a certificate, but we already have it' log message from warning to info, except when we're a dirauth (fixes bug 5238) --- changes/bug5238 | 3 +++ src/or/routerlist.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5238 b/changes/bug5238 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f18707 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5238 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Downgrade "Got a certificate, but we already have it" log mesages from + warning to info, except when we're a dirauth. diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 490c123..8349b7a 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -217,9 +217,18 @@ trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(const char *contents, int from_store, * probably means we wanted a different secret key or we are trying to * replace an expired cert that has not in fact been updated. */ if (!from_store) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. " - "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.", - ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority"); + if (authdir_mode(get_options())) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, + "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. " + "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.", + ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority"); + } else { + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. " + "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.", + ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority"); + } + authority_cert_dl_failed(cert->cache_info.identity_digest, 404); }

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[tor/master] Add version and bug number to 5238 changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit dc9dd2324b848643908082442207469c50a46f43 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 10:45:56 2012 -0400 Add version and bug number to 5238 changes file --- changes/bug5238 | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5238 b/changes/bug5238 index 2f18707..866f796 100644 --- a/changes/bug5238 +++ b/changes/bug5238 @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Downgrade "Got a certificate, but we already have it" log mesages from - warning to info, except when we're a dirauth. + warning to info, except when we're a dirauth. Fixes bug #5238; bugfix + on 0.2.1.7-alpha.

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit d4a64fdc02e7aa6dc30dcb3cf15f3d6cf9e74f20 Merge: 5a73df0 dc9dd23 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 10:48:06 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3' changes/bug5238 | 4 ++++ src/or/routerlist.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Downgrade 'Got a certificate, but we already have it' log message from warning to info, except when we're a dirauth (fixes bug 5238)
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit bdc8270280b345f0e02a6615f8670f3c47d99a22 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea(a)persephoneslair.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 00:21:06 2012 -0700 Downgrade 'Got a certificate, but we already have it' log message from warning to info, except when we're a dirauth (fixes bug 5238) --- changes/bug5238 | 3 +++ src/or/routerlist.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5238 b/changes/bug5238 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f18707 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5238 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Downgrade "Got a certificate, but we already have it" log mesages from + warning to info, except when we're a dirauth. diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 490c123..8349b7a 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -217,9 +217,18 @@ trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(const char *contents, int from_store, * probably means we wanted a different secret key or we are trying to * replace an expired cert that has not in fact been updated. */ if (!from_store) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. " - "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.", - ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority"); + if (authdir_mode(get_options())) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, + "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. " + "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.", + ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority"); + } else { + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Got a certificate for %s, but we already have it. " + "Maybe they haven't updated it. Waiting for a while.", + ds ? ds->nickname : "an old or new authority"); + } + authority_cert_dl_failed(cert->cache_info.identity_digest, 404); }

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[tor/maint-0.2.3] Add version and bug number to 5238 changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit dc9dd2324b848643908082442207469c50a46f43 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 10:45:56 2012 -0400 Add version and bug number to 5238 changes file --- changes/bug5238 | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug5238 b/changes/bug5238 index 2f18707..866f796 100644 --- a/changes/bug5238 +++ b/changes/bug5238 @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ o Minor bugfixes: - Downgrade "Got a certificate, but we already have it" log mesages from - warning to info, except when we're a dirauth. + warning to info, except when we're a dirauth. Fixes bug #5238; bugfix + on 0.2.1.7-alpha.

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'sscanf_squashed'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit 5a73df02176fb4c6ccd6a627c2cd14c5cfe4d9f8 Merge: e12eba5 d4285f0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 09:59:36 2012 -0400 Merge branch 'sscanf_squashed' changes/bug4195 | 6 ++ src/common/util.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/or/rephist.c | 6 +- src/test/test_util.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Extend tor_sscanf so it can replace sscanf in rephist.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit d4285f03df475dccf2a7132e2a8808715f383c24 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 6 13:25:04 2011 -0400 Extend tor_sscanf so it can replace sscanf in rephist.c Fixes bug 4195 and Coverity CID 448 --- changes/bug4195 | 6 ++ src/common/util.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/or/rephist.c | 6 +- src/test/test_util.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug4195 b/changes/bug4195 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e7a724 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4195 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features: + - Enhance our internal sscanf replacement so that we can eliminate + the last remaining uses of the system sscanf. (Though those uses + of sscanf were safe, sscanf itself is generally error prone, so + we want to eliminate when we can.) Fixes ticket 4195 and Coverity + CID 448. diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index d63acea..099cdd3 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -2694,9 +2694,9 @@ digit_to_num(char d) * success, store the result in out, advance bufp to the next * character, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */ static int -scan_unsigned(const char **bufp, unsigned *out, int width, int base) +scan_unsigned(const char **bufp, unsigned long *out, int width, int base) { - unsigned result = 0; + unsigned long result = 0; int scanned_so_far = 0; const int hex = base==16; tor_assert(base == 10 || base == 16); @@ -2708,8 +2708,8 @@ scan_unsigned(const char **bufp, unsigned *out, int width, int base) while (**bufp && (hex?TOR_ISXDIGIT(**bufp):TOR_ISDIGIT(**bufp)) && scanned_so_far < width) { int digit = hex?hex_decode_digit(*(*bufp)++):digit_to_num(*(*bufp)++); - unsigned new_result = result * base + digit; - if (new_result > UINT32_MAX || new_result < result) + unsigned long new_result = result * base + digit; + if (new_result < result) return -1; /* over/underflow. */ result = new_result; ++scanned_so_far; @@ -2722,6 +2722,89 @@ scan_unsigned(const char **bufp, unsigned *out, int width, int base) return 0; } +/** Helper: Read an signed int from *bufp of up to width + * characters. (Handle arbitrary width if width is less than 0.) On + * success, store the result in out, advance bufp to the next + * character, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */ +static int +scan_signed(const char **bufp, long *out, int width) +{ + int neg = 0; + unsigned long result = 0; + + if (!bufp || !*bufp || !out) + return -1; + if (width<0) + width=MAX_SCANF_WIDTH; + + if (**bufp == '-') { + neg = 1; + ++*bufp; + --width; + } + + if (scan_unsigned(bufp, &result, width, 10) < 0) + return -1; + + if (neg) { + if (result > ((unsigned long)LONG_MAX) + 1) + return -1; /* Underflow */ + *out = -(long)result; + } else { + if (result > LONG_MAX) + return -1; /* Overflow */ + *out = (long)result; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Helper: Read a decimal-formatted double from *bufp of up to + * width characters. (Handle arbitrary width if width is less + * than 0.) On success, store the result in out, advance bufp to the + * next character, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */ +static int +scan_double(const char **bufp, double *out, int width) +{ + int neg = 0; + double result = 0; + int scanned_so_far = 0; + + if (!bufp || !*bufp || !out) + return -1; + if (width<0) + width=MAX_SCANF_WIDTH; + + if (**bufp == '-') { + neg = 1; + ++*bufp; + } + + while (**bufp && TOR_ISDIGIT(**bufp) && scanned_so_far < width) { + const int digit = digit_to_num(*(*bufp)++); + result = result * 10 + digit; + ++scanned_so_far; + } + if (**bufp == '.') { + double fracval = 0, denominator = 1; + ++*bufp; + ++scanned_so_far; + while (**bufp && TOR_ISDIGIT(**bufp) && scanned_so_far < width) { + const int digit = digit_to_num(*(*bufp)++); + fracval = fracval * 10 + digit; + denominator *= 10; + ++scanned_so_far; + } + result += fracval / denominator; + } + + if (!scanned_so_far) /* No actual digits scanned */ + return -1; + + *out = neg ? -result : result; + return 0; +} + /** Helper: copy up to width non-space characters from bufp to * out. Make sure out is nul-terminated. Advance bufp * to the next non-space character or the EOS. */ @@ -2758,6 +2841,7 @@ tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) } } else { int width = -1; + int longmod = 0; ++pattern; if (TOR_ISDIGIT(*pattern)) { width = digit_to_num(*pattern++); @@ -2770,17 +2854,57 @@ tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) if (!width) /* No zero-width things. */ return -1; } + if (*pattern == 'l') { + longmod = 1; + ++pattern; + } if (*pattern == 'u' || *pattern == 'x') { - unsigned *u = va_arg(ap, unsigned *); + unsigned long u; const int base = (*pattern == 'u') ? 10 : 16; if (!*buf) return n_matched; - if (scan_unsigned(&buf, u, width, base)<0) + if (scan_unsigned(&buf, &u, width, base)<0) + return n_matched; + if (longmod) { + unsigned long *out = va_arg(ap, unsigned long *); + *out = u; + } else { + unsigned *out = va_arg(ap, unsigned *); + if (u > UINT_MAX) + return n_matched; + *out = u; + } + ++pattern; + ++n_matched; + } else if (*pattern == 'f') { + double *d = va_arg(ap, double *); + if (!longmod) + return -1; /* float not supported */ + if (!*buf) + return n_matched; + if (scan_double(&buf, d, width)<0) return n_matched; ++pattern; ++n_matched; + } else if (*pattern == 'd') { + long lng=0; + if (scan_signed(&buf, &lng, width)<0) + return n_matched; + if (longmod) { + long *out = va_arg(ap, long *); + *out = lng; + } else { + int *out = va_arg(ap, int *); + if (lng < INT_MIN || lng > INT_MAX) + return n_matched; + *out = (int)lng; + } + ++pattern; + ++n_matched; } else if (*pattern == 's') { char *s = va_arg(ap, char *); + if (longmod) + return -1; if (width < 0) return -1; if (scan_string(&buf, s, width)<0) @@ -2789,6 +2913,8 @@ tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) ++n_matched; } else if (*pattern == 'c') { char *ch = va_arg(ap, char *); + if (longmod) + return -1; if (width != -1) return -1; if (!*buf) @@ -2799,6 +2925,8 @@ tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) } else if (*pattern == '%') { if (*buf != '%') return n_matched; + if (longmod) + return -1; ++buf; ++pattern; } else { @@ -2812,9 +2940,14 @@ tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) /** Minimal sscanf replacement: parse buf according to pattern * and store the results in the corresponding argument fields. Differs from - * sscanf in that it: Only handles %u, %x, %c and %Ns. Does not handle - * arbitrarily long widths. %u and %x do not consume any space. Is - * locale-independent. Returns -1 on malformed patterns. + * sscanf in that: + * <ul><li>It only handles %u, %lu, %x, %lx, %<NUM>s, %d, %ld, %lf, and %c. + * <li>It only handles decimal inputs for %lf. (12.3, not 1.23e1) + * <li>It does not handle arbitrarily long widths. + * <li>Numbers do not consume any space characters. + * <li>It is locale-independent. + * <li>%u and %x do not consume any space. + * <li>It returns -1 on malformed patterns.</ul> * * (As with other locale-independent functions, we need this to parse data that * is in ASCII without worrying that the C library's locale-handling will make diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 720d14c..fa02f98 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(time_t now) wfu_timebuf[0] = '\0'; if (format == 1) { - n = sscanf(line, "%40s %ld %lf S=%10s %8s", + n = tor_sscanf(line, "%40s %ld %lf S=%10s %8s", hexbuf, &wrl, &trw, mtbf_timebuf, mtbf_timebuf+11); if (n != 3 && n != 5) { log_warn(LD_HIST, "Couldn't scan line %s", escaped(line)); @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(time_t now) wfu_idx = find_next_with(lines, i+1, "+WFU "); if (mtbf_idx >= 0) { const char *mtbfline = smartlist_get(lines, mtbf_idx); - n = sscanf(mtbfline, "+MTBF %lu %lf S=%10s %8s", + n = tor_sscanf(mtbfline, "+MTBF %lu %lf S=%10s %8s", &wrl, &trw, mtbf_timebuf, mtbf_timebuf+11); if (n == 2 || n == 4) { have_mtbf = 1; @@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(time_t now) } if (wfu_idx >= 0) { const char *wfuline = smartlist_get(lines, wfu_idx); - n = sscanf(wfuline, "+WFU %lu %lu S=%10s %8s", + n = tor_sscanf(wfuline, "+WFU %lu %lu S=%10s %8s", &wt_uptime, &total_wt_time, wfu_timebuf, wfu_timebuf+11); if (n == 2 || n == 4) { diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 632ef68..b07fa3b 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -1461,12 +1461,28 @@ test_util_control_formats(void) tor_free(out); } +#define test_feq(value1,value2) do { \ + double v1 = (value1), v2=(value2); \ + double tf_diff = v1-v2; \ + double tf_tolerance = ((v1+v2)/2.0)/1e8; \ + if (tf_diff<0) tf_diff=-tf_diff; \ + if (tf_tolerance<0) tf_tolerance=-tf_tolerance; \ + if (tf_diff<tf_tolerance) { \ + TT_BLATHER(("%s ~~ %s: %f ~~ %f",#value1,#value2,v1,v2)); \ + } else { \ + TT_FAIL(("%s ~~ %s: %f != %f",#value1,#value2,v1,v2)); \ + } \ + } while(0) + static void test_util_sscanf(void) { unsigned u1, u2, u3; char s1[20], s2[10], s3[10], ch; int r; + long lng1,lng2; + int int1, int2; + double d1,d2,d3,d4; /* Simple tests (malformed patterns, literal matching, ...) */ test_eq(-1, tor_sscanf("123", "%i", &r)); /* %i is not supported */ @@ -1595,6 +1611,65 @@ test_util_sscanf(void) test_eq(4, tor_sscanf("1.2.3 foobar", "%u.%u.%u%c", &u1, &u2, &u3, &ch)); test_eq(' ', ch); + r = tor_sscanf("12345 -67890 -1", "%d %ld %d", &int1, &lng1, &int2); + test_eq(r,3); + test_eq(int1, 12345); + test_eq(lng1, -67890); + test_eq(int2, -1); + +#if SIZEOF_INT == 4 + r = tor_sscanf("-2147483648. 2147483647.", "%d. %d.", &int1, &int2); + test_eq(r,2); + test_eq(int1, -2147483648); + test_eq(int2, 2147483647); + + r = tor_sscanf("-2147483679.", "%d.", &int1); + test_eq(r,0); + + r = tor_sscanf("2147483678.", "%d.", &int1); + test_eq(r,0); +#elif SIZEOF_INT == 8 + r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775808. 9223372036854775807.", + "%d. %d.", &int1, &int2); + test_eq(r,2); + test_eq(int1, -9223372036854775808); + test_eq(int2, 9223372036854775807); + + r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775809.", "%d.", &int1); + test_eq(r,0); + + r = tor_sscanf("9223372036854775808.", "%d.", &int1); + test_eq(r,0); +#endif + +#if SIZEOF_LONG == 4 + r = tor_sscanf("-2147483648. 2147483647.", "%ld. %ld.", &lng1, &lng2) + test_eq(r,2); + test_eq(lng1, -2147483647 - 1); + test_eq(lng2, 2147483647); +#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 8 + r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775808. 9223372036854775807.", + "%ld. %ld.", &lng1, &lng2); + test_eq(r,2); + test_eq(lng1, -9223372036854775807L - 1); + test_eq(lng2, 9223372036854775807L); + + r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775808. 9223372036854775808.", + "%ld. %ld.", &lng1, &lng2); + test_eq(r,1); + r = tor_sscanf("-9223372036854775809. 9223372036854775808.", + "%ld. %ld.", &lng1, &lng2); + test_eq(r,0); +#endif + + r = tor_sscanf("123.456 .000007 -900123123.2000787 00003.2", + "%lf %lf %lf %lf", &d1,&d2,&d3,&d4); + test_eq(r,4); + test_feq(d1, 123.456); + test_feq(d2, .000007); + test_feq(d3, -900123123.2000787); + test_feq(d4, 3.2); + done: ; }

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[torspec/master] Fix some typos in proposal 203.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit 903a65f6cc580c3652e1f44af101eaae16863848 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Thu Jun 28 14:20:19 2012 +0200 Fix some typos in proposal 203. --- proposals/203-https-frontend.txt | 14 +++++++------- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt b/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt index f559d92..8d3c2e3 100644 --- a/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt +++ b/proposals/203-https-frontend.txt @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Goals and requirements: any particular HTTP or HTTPS implementation. If we're replacing our own profile with that of an HTTPS service, we - should do so in a way that lets us use a the profile of a popular + should do so in a way that lets us use the profile of a popular HTTPS implementation. Efficiency would be good: layering TLS inside TLS is best avoided if @@ -94,12 +94,12 @@ Design #1: TLS in Tor thoroughly. To authenticate, we would need to take a hybrid approach, and begin - forwarding traffic to the webserver as soon as soon as a webserver + forwarding traffic to the webserver as soon as a webserver might respond to the traffic. This could be pretty complicated, since it requires us to have a model of how the webserver would respond to any given set of bytes. As a workaround, we might try relaying _all_ input to the webserver, and only replying as Tor in - the cases where the website hasn't replied. (This would likely to + the cases where the website hasn't replied. (This would likely create recognizable timing patterns, though.) The authentication itself could use a system akin to Tor proposals @@ -137,9 +137,9 @@ Design #2: TLS in the web server subsystem at all. The Tor client would need to connect and prove its status as a Tor - client. If the client uses some means other then AUTHORIZE cells, or + client. If the client uses some means other than AUTHORIZE cells, or if we want to do the authentication in a pluggable transport, and we - therefore decided to offload the responsibility TLS itself to the + therefore decided to offload the responsibility for TLS itself to the pluggable transport, that would scare me: Supporting pluggable transports that have the responsibility for TLS would make it fairly easy to mess up the crypto, and I'd rather not have it be so easy to @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ Design #3: Reverse proxy called a "reverse proxy", so that's the term I'm using here.) To avoid fingerprinting, we should choose a proxy that's already in - common use as a TLS frontend for webservers -- nginx, perhaps. + common use as a TLS front-end for webservers -- nginx, perhaps. Unfortunately, the more popular tools here seem to be pretty complex, and the simpler tools less widely deployed. More investigation would be needed. @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ How to authenticate: The easiest way HTTP header, is an open problem that we should solve in proposals 190 and 191 and their successors. I'm calling it out-of-scope here; please see those proposals, their attendant discussion, and their - eventual successors + eventual successors. How to authenticate: a slightly harder way

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[translation/orbot_completed] Update translations for orbot_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 28 Jun '12

28 Jun '12

commit 3e0789daee7fbc5f4b1127c030af786287f4f9d7 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 28 09:15:42 2012 +0000 Update translations for orbot_completed --- values/strings.xml | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/values/strings.xml b/values/strings.xml index c2a5e2d..6d398c2 100644 --- a/values/strings.xml +++ b/values/strings.xml @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ <string name="libevent_version">LibEvent v2.1: http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/</string> <string name="privoxy_version">Privoxy v3.0.12: http://www.privoxy.org</string> <string name="iptables_version">Iptables v1.4.7: http://www.netfilter.org</string> - <string name="openssl_version">OpenSSL v1.0.0f: http://www.openssl.org</string> + <string name="openssl_version">OpenSSL v0.9.8c: http://www.openssl.org</string> <string name="hidden_service_request">An app wants to open hidden server port %S to the Tor network. This is safe if you trust the app.</string> <string name="found_existing_tor_process">found existing Tor process...</string> <string name="something_bad_happened">Something bad happened. Check the log</string>

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