March 2012 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] bump to 0.2.3.13-alpha-dev
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Mar '12

27 Mar '12

commit 4121e7f861732b43fa2c38e68147718a15848d45 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Mar 27 01:26:01 2012 -0400 bump to 0.2.3.13-alpha-dev --- configure.in | 2 +- contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index 31d586e..e14d56e 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2008, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_INIT -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.3.13-alpha) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.3.13-alpha-dev) AM_CONFIG_HEADER(orconfig.h) AC_CANONICAL_HOST diff --git a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 6df34b6..383a40d 100644 --- a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.3.13-alpha" +!define VERSION "0.2.3.13-alpha-dev" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index f6bced5..dc27f34 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.3.13-alpha" +#define VERSION "0.2.3.13-alpha-dev"

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r25573: {website} 0.2.3.13-alpha tarball is up (website/trunk/include)
by Roger Dingledine 27 Mar '12

27 Mar '12

Author: arma Date: 2012-03-27 04:37:29 +0000 (Tue, 27 Mar 2012) New Revision: 25573 Modified: website/trunk/include/versions.wmi Log: 0.2.3.13-alpha tarball is up Modified: website/trunk/include/versions.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/include/versions.wmi 2012-03-26 21:09:52 UTC (rev 25572) +++ website/trunk/include/versions.wmi 2012-03-27 04:37:29 UTC (rev 25573) @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ <define-tag version-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.2.35</define-tag> -<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.3.12-alpha</define-tag> +<define-tag version-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.3.13-alpha</define-tag> <define-tag version-win32-stable whitespace=delete>0.2.2.35</define-tag> <define-tag version-win32-alpha whitespace=delete>0.2.3.12-alpha</define-tag>

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[tor/master] merge in the safecookie changelog entry too
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Mar '12

27 Mar '12

commit de73e3692a6d83774027ac9d29e1ec8608076385 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 22:15:02 2012 -0400 merge in the safecookie changelog entry too --- ChangeLog | 7 +++++++ changes/safecookie | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index d6cc6d6..52c7345 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.13-alpha - 2012-03-26 - Change IP address for maatuska (v3 directory authority). o Security fixes: + - Provide controllers with a safer way to implement the cookie + authentication mechanism. With the old method, if another locally + running program could convince a controller that it was the Tor + process, then that program could trick the contoller into telling + it the contents of an arbitrary 32-byte file. The new "SAFECOOKIE" + authentication method uses a challenge-response approach to prevent + this attack. Fixes bug 5185, implements proposal 193. - Never use a bridge or a controller-supplied node as an exit, even if its exit policy allows it. Found by wanoskarnet. Fixes bug 5342. Bugfix on 0.1.1.15-rc (for controller-purpose descriptors) diff --git a/changes/safecookie b/changes/safecookie deleted file mode 100644 index fd7d7af..0000000 --- a/changes/safecookie +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - o Security Features: - - Provide controllers with a safer way to implement the cookie - authentication mechanism. With the old method, if another locally - running program could convince a controller that it was the Tor - process, then that program could trick the contoller into - telling it the contents of an arbitrary 32-byte file. The new - "SAFECOOKIE" authentication method uses a challenge-response - approach to prevent this. Fixes bug 5185, implements proposal 193. -

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[tor/master] merge the change that 2f3ec43e5b4e wanted to merge
by arma＠torproject.org 27 Mar '12

27 Mar '12

commit 65bf007a77be579a05e2bbc4fdcdea3741439f3e Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 22:12:52 2012 -0400 merge the change that 2f3ec43e5b4e wanted to merge --- ChangeLog | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 3f2ccf1..d6cc6d6 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.13-alpha - 2012-03-26 control port. Bug found by Esteban Manchado Velázquez, and independently by Robert Connolly from Matta Consulting who further noted that it allows a post-authentication heap overflow. Patch - by "flupzor". Fixes bugs 5090 and 5402 (CVE 2012-1668); bugfix - on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + by Alexander Schrijver. Fixes bugs 5090 and 5402 (CVE 2012-1668); + bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. - Fix a compile warning when using the --enable-openbsd-malloc configure option. Fixes bug 5340; bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc. - Directory caches no longer refuse to clean out descriptors because

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[tor/master] Safe cookie authentication gets a changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit 9740f067c4bed47beb63483be4f4636167a04019 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 14:06:27 2012 -0400 Safe cookie authentication gets a changes file --- changes/safecookie | 9 +++++++++ 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/safecookie b/changes/safecookie new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd7d7af --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/safecookie @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Security Features: + - Provide controllers with a safer way to implement the cookie + authentication mechanism. With the old method, if another locally + running program could convince a controller that it was the Tor + process, then that program could trick the contoller into + telling it the contents of an arbitrary 32-byte file. The new + "SAFECOOKIE" authentication method uses a challenge-response + approach to prevent this. Fixes bug 5185, implements proposal 193. +

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/safecookie-022-v3' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit 6dcbfec82d1a76cf19dd385b1b91841189c8c4ab Merge: 650e2aa e111e37 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 14:03:29 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/safecookie-022-v3' into maint-0.2.2 src/or/connection.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 6 ++ 3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit 5a2d0fbe64eda754a87ec35cfbd5d49c91ebc4b2 Merge: f5c59eb 9740f06 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 26 18:51:37 2012 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/control.c changes/safecookie | 9 +++ src/or/connection.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 6 ++ 4 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/control.c index 9a07777,ddfc80e..1eb6b80 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@@ -2903,9 -2789,11 +2935,11 @@@ handle_control_protocolinfo(control_con { int passwd = (options->HashedControlPassword != NULL || options->HashedControlSessionPassword != NULL); - smartlist_t *mlist = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_t *mlist = smartlist_new(); - if (cookies) + if (cookies) { smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"COOKIE"); + smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"SAFECOOKIE"); + } if (passwd) smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"HASHEDPASSWORD"); if (!cookies && !passwd)

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[tor/master] Implement 'safe cookie authentication'
by nickm＠torproject.org 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

commit e111e371b4f44456182e7f237837a0f9466487cd Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon Feb 6 10:49:45 2012 -0800 Implement 'safe cookie authentication' --- src/or/connection.c | 1 + src/or/control.c | 159 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 6 ++ 3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index a3481ec..36e192a 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn) } if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) { control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn); + tor_free(control_conn->safecookie_client_hash); tor_free(control_conn->incoming_cmd); } diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 1e411ec..ddfc80e 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; +#define SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT \ + "Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash" +#define SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT \ + "Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash" +#define SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN DIGEST256_LEN + /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */ #define BOOTSTRAP_MSG_LEN 1024 @@ -1078,6 +1084,32 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, used_quoted_string = 1; } + if (conn->safecookie_client_hash != NULL) { + /* The controller has chosen safe cookie authentication; the only + * acceptable authentication value is the controller-to-server + * response. */ + + tor_assert(authentication_cookie_is_set); + + if (password_len != DIGEST256_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_CONTROL, + "Got safe cookie authentication response with wrong length " + "(%d)", (int)password_len); + errstr = "Wrong length for safe cookie response."; + goto err; + } + + if (tor_memneq(conn->safecookie_client_hash, password, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_CONTROL, + "Got incorrect safe cookie authentication response"); + errstr = "Safe cookie response did not match expected value."; + goto err; + } + + tor_free(conn->safecookie_client_hash); + goto ok; + } + if (!options->CookieAuthentication && !options->HashedControlPassword && !options->HashedControlSessionPassword) { /* if Tor doesn't demand any stronger authentication, then @@ -2758,8 +2790,10 @@ handle_control_protocolinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, int passwd = (options->HashedControlPassword != NULL || options->HashedControlSessionPassword != NULL); smartlist_t *mlist = smartlist_create(); - if (cookies) + if (cookies) { smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"COOKIE"); + smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"SAFECOOKIE"); + } if (passwd) smartlist_add(mlist, (char*)"HASHEDPASSWORD"); if (!cookies && !passwd) @@ -2787,6 +2821,121 @@ handle_control_protocolinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, return 0; } +/** Called when we get an AUTHCHALLENGE command. */ +static int +handle_control_authchallenge(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, + const char *body) +{ + const char *cp = body; + char *client_nonce; + size_t client_nonce_len; + char server_hash[DIGEST256_LEN]; + char server_hash_encoded[HEX_DIGEST256_LEN+1]; + char server_nonce[SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN]; + char server_nonce_encoded[(2*SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN) + 1]; + + cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r"); + if (!strcasecmpstart(cp, "SAFECOOKIE")) { + cp += strlen("SAFECOOKIE"); + } else { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 AUTHCHALLENGE only supports SAFECOOKIE " + "authentication", conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + + if (!authentication_cookie_is_set) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("515 Cookie authentication is disabled", conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + + cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r"); + if (*cp == '"') { + const char *newcp = + decode_escaped_string(cp, len - (cp - body), + &client_nonce, &client_nonce_len); + if (newcp == NULL) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Invalid quoted client nonce", + conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + cp = newcp; + } else { + size_t client_nonce_encoded_len = strspn(cp, "0123456789ABCDEFabcdef"); + + client_nonce_len = client_nonce_encoded_len / 2; + client_nonce = tor_malloc_zero(client_nonce_len); + + if (base16_decode(client_nonce, client_nonce_len, + cp, client_nonce_encoded_len) < 0) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Invalid base16 client nonce", + conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return -1; + } + + cp += client_nonce_encoded_len; + } + + cp += strspn(cp, " \t\n\r"); + if (*cp != '\0' || + cp != body + len) { + connection_write_str_to_buf("513 Junk at end of AUTHCHALLENGE command", + conn); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + tor_free(client_nonce); + return -1; + } + + tor_assert(!crypto_rand(server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN)); + + /* Now compute and send the server-to-controller response, and the + * server's nonce. */ + tor_assert(authentication_cookie != NULL); + + { + size_t tmp_len = (AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN + + client_nonce_len + + SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN); + char *tmp = tor_malloc_zero(tmp_len); + char *client_hash = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN); + memcpy(tmp, authentication_cookie, AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN); + memcpy(tmp + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN, client_nonce, client_nonce_len); + memcpy(tmp + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN + client_nonce_len, + server_nonce, SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN); + + crypto_hmac_sha256(server_hash, + SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT, + strlen(SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT), + tmp, + tmp_len); + + crypto_hmac_sha256(client_hash, + SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT, + strlen(SAFECOOKIE_CONTROLLER_TO_SERVER_CONSTANT), + tmp, + tmp_len); + + conn->safecookie_client_hash = client_hash; + + tor_free(tmp); + } + + base16_encode(server_hash_encoded, sizeof(server_hash_encoded), + server_hash, sizeof(server_hash)); + base16_encode(server_nonce_encoded, sizeof(server_nonce_encoded), + server_nonce, sizeof(server_nonce)); + + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, + "250 AUTHCHALLENGE SERVERHASH=%s " + "SERVERNONCE=%s\r\n", + server_hash_encoded, + server_nonce_encoded); + return 0; +} + /** Called when we get a USEFEATURE command: parse the feature list, and * set up the control_connection's options properly. */ static int @@ -2888,7 +3037,10 @@ is_valid_initial_command(control_connection_t *conn, const char *cmd) if (conn->_base.state == CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN) return 1; if (!strcasecmp(cmd, "PROTOCOLINFO")) - return !conn->have_sent_protocolinfo; + return (!conn->have_sent_protocolinfo && + conn->safecookie_client_hash == NULL); + if (!strcasecmp(cmd, "AUTHCHALLENGE")) + return (conn->safecookie_client_hash == NULL); if (!strcasecmp(cmd, "AUTHENTICATE") || !strcasecmp(cmd, "QUIT")) return 1; @@ -3104,6 +3256,9 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "PROTOCOLINFO")) { if (handle_control_protocolinfo(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) return -1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "AUTHCHALLENGE")) { + if (handle_control_authchallenge(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) + return -1; } else { connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "510 Unrecognized command \"%s\"\r\n", conn->incoming_cmd); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index c0714ee..eecd375 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1254,6 +1254,12 @@ typedef struct control_connection_t { * connection. */ unsigned int is_owning_control_connection:1; + /** If we have sent an AUTHCHALLENGE reply on this connection and + * have not received a successful AUTHENTICATE command, points to + * the value which the client must send to authenticate itself; + * otherwise, NULL. */ + char *safecookie_client_hash; + /** Amount of space allocated in incoming_cmd. */ uint32_t incoming_cmd_len; /** Number of bytes currently stored in incoming_cmd. */

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r25572: {website} Openssl 1.0.0 was released a while ago (website/trunk/docs/en)
by Sebastian Hahn 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

Author: sebastian Date: 2012-03-26 21:09:52 +0000 (Mon, 26 Mar 2012) New Revision: 25572 Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml Log: Openssl 1.0.0 was released a while ago Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2012-03-26 21:09:46 UTC (rev 25571) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2012-03-26 21:09:52 UTC (rev 25572) @@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519.html">release unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL - 1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use + 1.0.0 or newer, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use this feature.</li> <li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or

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r25571: {website} Stop calling the linux tbb beta (website/trunk/download/en)
by Sebastian Hahn 26 Mar '12

26 Mar '12

Author: sebastian Date: 2012-03-26 21:09:46 +0000 (Mon, 26 Mar 2012) New Revision: 25571 Modified: website/trunk/download/en/download-easy.wml website/trunk/download/en/download.wml Log: Stop calling the linux tbb beta Modified: website/trunk/download/en/download-easy.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/download/en/download-easy.wml 2012-03-26 21:03:55 UTC (rev 25570) +++ website/trunk/download/en/download-easy.wml 2012-03-26 21:09:46 UTC (rev 25571) @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ <define-tag button-win-tbb64>Currently Unused</define-tag> <define-tag button-osx-tbb32>Tor Browser Bundle</define-tag> <define-tag button-osx-tbb64>Mac 64-bit</define-tag> -<define-tag button-lin-tbb32>Tor Browser Bundle (Beta)</define-tag> -<define-tag button-lin-tbb64>Linux 64-bit (Beta)</define-tag> +<define-tag button-lin-tbb32>Tor Browser Bundle</define-tag> +<define-tag button-lin-tbb64>Linux 64-bit</define-tag> #include "dlhead.wmi" TITLE="Download Tor" CHARSET="UTF-8" Modified: website/trunk/download/en/download.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/download/en/download.wml 2012-03-26 21:03:55 UTC (rev 25570) +++ website/trunk/download/en/download.wml 2012-03-26 21:09:46 UTC (rev 25571) @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ <define-tag button-win-tbb64>Currently Unused</define-tag> <define-tag button-osx-tbb32>Tor Browser Bundle</define-tag> <define-tag button-osx-tbb64>64-bit</define-tag> -<define-tag button-lin-tbb32>Tor Browser Bundle (Beta)</define-tag> -<define-tag button-lin-tbb64>64-bit (Beta)</define-tag> +<define-tag button-lin-tbb32>Tor Browser Bundle</define-tag> +<define-tag button-lin-tbb64>64-bit</define-tag> #include "dlhead.wmi" TITLE="Download Tor" CHARSET="UTF-8"

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