June 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Make last_hid_serv_requests functions less fragile
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit a1d866edc9af82c2134590f7ee3c4e18156a655c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 2 02:24:18 2011 -0700 Make last_hid_serv_requests functions less fragile Previously, Tor would dereference a NULL pointer and crash if lookup_last_hid_serv_request were called before the first call to directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests. As far as I can tell, that's currently impossible, but I want that undocumented invariant to go away in case I^Wwe break it someday. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 29b9d26..ec6e3f2 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -377,7 +377,17 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, * certain queries; keys are strings consisting of base32-encoded * hidden service directory identities and base32-encoded descriptor IDs; * values are pointers to timestamps of the last requests. */ -static strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = NULL; +static strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests_ = NULL; + +/** Returns last_hid_serv_requests_, initializing it to a new strmap if + * necessary. */ +static strmap_t * +get_last_hid_serv_requests(void) +{ + if (!last_hid_serv_requests_) + last_hid_serv_requests_ = strmap_new(); + return last_hid_serv_requests_; +} /** Look up the last request time to hidden service directory hs_dir * for descriptor ID desc_id_base32. If set is non-zero, @@ -391,6 +401,7 @@ lookup_last_hid_serv_request(routerstatus_t *hs_dir, char hsdir_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; char hsdir_desc_comb_id[2 * REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; time_t *last_request_ptr; + strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = get_last_hid_serv_requests(); base32_encode(hsdir_id_base32, sizeof(hsdir_id_base32), hs_dir->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); tor_snprintf(hsdir_desc_comb_id, sizeof(hsdir_desc_comb_id), "%s%s", @@ -416,8 +427,7 @@ directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(void) { strmap_iter_t *iter; time_t cutoff = time(NULL) - REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD; - if (!last_hid_serv_requests) - last_hid_serv_requests = strmap_new(); + strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = get_last_hid_serv_requests(); for (iter = strmap_iter_init(last_hid_serv_requests); !strmap_iter_done(iter); ) { const char *key;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Clear last_hid_serv_requests on SIGNAL NEWNYM
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit b0e7925c0205a68d730025cc8832110c1675cfd7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 2 02:46:04 2011 -0700 Clear last_hid_serv_requests on SIGNAL NEWNYM Fixes bug #3309. --- changes/bug3309 | 9 +++++++++ src/or/main.c | 1 + src/or/rendclient.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3309 b/changes/bug3309 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5df0d9d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3309 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Clear the table recording the time of the last request for each + hidden service descriptor from each HS directory on SIGNAL + NEWNYM. Previously, we would clear our HS descriptor cache on + SIGNAL NEWNYM, but if we had previously retrieved a descriptor + (or tried to) from every directory responsible for it, we would + refuse to fetch it again for up to 15 minutes. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.25-alpha; fixes bug 3309. + diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index adbde90..3c84dda 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -855,6 +855,7 @@ signewnym_impl(time_t now) addressmap_clear_transient(); rend_cache_purge(); rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(); + rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); time_of_last_signewnym = now; signewnym_is_pending = 0; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index ec6e3f2..12b54df 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -444,6 +444,25 @@ directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(void) } } +/** Purge the history of request times to hidden service directories, + * so that future lookups of an HS descriptor will not fail because we + * accessed all of the HSDir relays responsible for the descriptor + * recently. */ +void +rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void) +{ + /* Don't create the table if it doesn't exist yet (and it may very + * well not exist if the user hasn't accessed any HSes)... */ + strmap_t *old_last_hid_serv_requests = last_hid_serv_requests_; + /* ... and let get_last_hid_serv_requests re-create it for us if + * necessary. */ + last_hid_serv_requests_ = NULL; + + if (old_last_hid_serv_requests != NULL) { + strmap_free(old_last_hid_serv_requests, _tor_free); + } +} + /** Determine the responsible hidden service directories for desc_id * and fetch the descriptor belonging to that ID from one of them. Only * send a request to hidden service directories that we did not try within diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 6910c1a..2bfc850 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, size_t request_len); void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query); void rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void); +void rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void); int rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, const rend_data_t *rend_query); int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug3309' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit 80038b545359e5156fde6d6be4015bdf7f80e779 Merge: 385c597 fc4158d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 2 15:06:04 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug3309' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3309 | 13 +++++++++++++ src/or/main.c | 3 +-- src/or/rendclient.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/or/rendclient.h | 3 +++ src/or/rendcommon.c | 4 +++- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Refactor HS client state-clearing code into a separate function
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit d7af8a2f076a38d8be32798d34049ce150c8dda0 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 2 02:57:29 2011 -0700 Refactor HS client state-clearing code into a separate function --- src/or/main.c | 4 +--- src/or/rendclient.c | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index 3c84dda..bc639db 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -853,9 +853,7 @@ signewnym_impl(time_t now) circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(); addressmap_clear_transient(); - rend_cache_purge(); - rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(); - rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); + rend_client_purge_state(); time_of_last_signewnym = now; signewnym_is_pending = 0; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 12b54df..329b256 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query, const int strict, const int warnings); +/** Purge all potentially remotely-detectable state held in the hidden + * service client code. Called on SIGNAL NEWNYM. */ +void +rend_client_purge_state(void) +{ + rend_cache_purge(); + rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(); + rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(); +} + /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ void diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 2bfc850..c6cf82b 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #ifndef _TOR_RENDCLIENT_H #define _TOR_RENDCLIENT_H +void rend_client_purge_state(void); + void rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ); void rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ); int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Add info-level log messages during HS-client-state purge
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit fc4158dad706a76acbfd3adae8b505495f1004e5 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 2 03:07:09 2011 -0700 Add info-level log messages during HS-client-state purge I hope these will never be useful, but having them and not needing them is better than needing them and not having them. --- changes/bug3309 | 4 ++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 1 + src/or/rendcommon.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3309 b/changes/bug3309 index 5df0d9d..104056d 100644 --- a/changes/bug3309 +++ b/changes/bug3309 @@ -7,3 +7,7 @@ refuse to fetch it again for up to 15 minutes. Bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha; fixes bug 3309. + o Minor features: + - Log (at info level) when purging pieces of hidden-service-client + state on SIGNAL NEWNYM. + diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 329b256..533dfb8 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void) last_hid_serv_requests_ = NULL; if (old_last_hid_serv_requests != NULL) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Purging client last-HS-desc-request-time table"); strmap_free(old_last_hid_serv_requests, _tor_free); } } diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c index 4d4a90f..683e11a 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c @@ -839,8 +839,10 @@ rend_cache_clean(void) void rend_cache_purge(void) { - if (rend_cache) + if (rend_cache) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Purging client/v0-HS-authority HS descriptor cache"); strmap_free(rend_cache, _rend_cache_entry_free); + } rend_cache = strmap_new(); }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Make last_hid_serv_requests functions less fragile
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit a1d866edc9af82c2134590f7ee3c4e18156a655c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 2 02:24:18 2011 -0700 Make last_hid_serv_requests functions less fragile Previously, Tor would dereference a NULL pointer and crash if lookup_last_hid_serv_request were called before the first call to directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests. As far as I can tell, that's currently impossible, but I want that undocumented invariant to go away in case I^Wwe break it someday. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 29b9d26..ec6e3f2 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -377,7 +377,17 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, * certain queries; keys are strings consisting of base32-encoded * hidden service directory identities and base32-encoded descriptor IDs; * values are pointers to timestamps of the last requests. */ -static strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = NULL; +static strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests_ = NULL; + +/** Returns last_hid_serv_requests_, initializing it to a new strmap if + * necessary. */ +static strmap_t * +get_last_hid_serv_requests(void) +{ + if (!last_hid_serv_requests_) + last_hid_serv_requests_ = strmap_new(); + return last_hid_serv_requests_; +} /** Look up the last request time to hidden service directory hs_dir * for descriptor ID desc_id_base32. If set is non-zero, @@ -391,6 +401,7 @@ lookup_last_hid_serv_request(routerstatus_t *hs_dir, char hsdir_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; char hsdir_desc_comb_id[2 * REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; time_t *last_request_ptr; + strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = get_last_hid_serv_requests(); base32_encode(hsdir_id_base32, sizeof(hsdir_id_base32), hs_dir->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); tor_snprintf(hsdir_desc_comb_id, sizeof(hsdir_desc_comb_id), "%s%s", @@ -416,8 +427,7 @@ directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(void) { strmap_iter_t *iter; time_t cutoff = time(NULL) - REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD; - if (!last_hid_serv_requests) - last_hid_serv_requests = strmap_new(); + strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = get_last_hid_serv_requests(); for (iter = strmap_iter_init(last_hid_serv_requests); !strmap_iter_done(iter); ) { const char *key;

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug3321' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit 385c59798af80e2609b66afb2998acb508060f95 Merge: df42eb0 7039c34 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 2 12:55:56 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug3321' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3321 | 7 +++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit 6a320b99058ff19a2b71425e7cd6f267798411be Merge: 0a4a3de 385c597 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 2 13:05:00 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' This merge was a bit nontrivial, since I had to write a new node_is_a_configured_bridge to parallel router_is_a_configured_bridge. Conflicts: src/or/circuitbuild.c changes/bug3321 | 7 +++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/circuitbuild.c index 8140cc4,3f08448..96cd333 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@@ -3388,17 -3377,18 +3388,19 @@@ entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e *reason = NULL; /* Do we want to mark this guard as bad? */ - if (!ri) + if (!node) *reason = "unlisted"; - else if (!ri->is_running) + else if (!node->is_running) *reason = "down"; - else if (options->UseBridges && ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) + else if (options->UseBridges && (!node->ri || + node->ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)) *reason = "not a bridge"; - else if (options->UseBridges && !routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(ri)) ++ else if (options->UseBridges && !node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + *reason = "not a configured bridge"; - else if (!options->UseBridges && !ri->is_possible_guard && - !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes,ri)) + else if (!options->UseBridges && !node->is_possible_guard && + !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes,node)) *reason = "not recommended as a guard"; - else if (routerset_contains_router(options->ExcludeNodes, ri)) + else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) *reason = "excluded"; if (*reason && ! e->bad_since) { @@@ -3484,14 -3474,16 +3486,18 @@@ entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int nee *msg = "not a bridge"; return NULL; } - if (!routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(r)) { ++ if (!node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) { + *msg = "not a configured bridge"; + return NULL; + } - } else if (r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) { - *msg = "not general-purpose"; - return NULL; + } else { /* !get_options()->UseBridges */ + if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) { + *msg = "not general-purpose"; + return NULL; + } } if (options->EntryNodes && - routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) { + routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) { /* they asked for it, they get it */ need_uptime = need_capacity = 0; } @@@ -4584,6 -4575,6 +4590,24 @@@ routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(cons return get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri) ? 1 : 0; } ++/** Return 1 if node is one of our configured bridges, else 0. */ ++int ++node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node) ++{ ++ tor_addr_t addr; ++ uint16_t orport; ++ if (!node) ++ return 0; ++ if (node_get_addr(node, &addr) < 0) ++ return 0; ++ orport = node_get_orport(node); ++ if (orport == 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest( ++ &addr, orport, node->identity) != NULL; ++} ++ /** We made a connection to a router at addr:port * without knowing its digest. Its digest turned out to be digest. * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it. diff --cc src/or/circuitbuild.h index 87adb9a,0e673e1..b1eb5a6 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@@ -65,7 -64,7 +65,8 @@@ int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control void mark_bridge_list(void); void sweep_bridge_list(void); -int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri); +int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); ++int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node); void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,

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[tor/master] fix a bridge edge case similar to 2511
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit 7039c34519e29a18081a9bc7f3c957c473c70bc4 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue May 31 20:43:55 2011 -0400 fix a bridge edge case similar to 2511 If you had configured a bridge but then switched to a different bridge via the controller, you would still be willing to use the old one. --- changes/bug3321 | 7 +++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3321 b/changes/bug3321 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3605efc --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3321 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - In bug 2511 we fixed a case where you could use an unconfigured + bridge if you had configured it as a bridge the last time you ran + Tor. Now fix another edge case: if you had configured it as a bridge + but then switched to a different bridge via the controller, you + would still be willing to use the old one. Bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha; + fixes bug 3321. diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2f70b67..3f08448 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -3383,6 +3383,8 @@ entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, routerinfo_t *ri, *reason = "down"; else if (options->UseBridges && ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) *reason = "not a bridge"; + else if (options->UseBridges && !routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(ri)) + *reason = "not a configured bridge"; else if (!options->UseBridges && !ri->is_possible_guard && !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes,ri)) *reason = "not recommended as a guard"; @@ -3467,11 +3469,16 @@ entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity, *msg = "no descriptor"; return NULL; } - if (get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) { - *msg = "not a bridge"; - return NULL; - } - if (!get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) { + if (options->UseBridges) { + if (r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) { + *msg = "not a bridge"; + return NULL; + } + if (!routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(r)) { + *msg = "not a configured bridge"; + return NULL; + } + } else if (r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) { *msg = "not general-purpose"; return NULL; }

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 02 Jun '11

02 Jun '11

commit 0a4a3de3def27a7c7f8a514546b33662d0cfe6c5 Merge: 9ac2f63 df42eb0 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 2 12:56:45 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/dirserv.c src/or/connection.c | 4 ++-- src/or/dirserv.c | 4 ++-- src/or/router.c | 18 +++++++++++------- src/or/router.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/dirserv.c index c591d90,d114d86..fef9450 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@@ -2835,8 -2812,8 +2835,8 @@@ generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(void "dir-options%s%s%s%s\n" "%s" /* client version line, server version line. */ "dir-signing-key\n%s", - hostname, ipaddr, + hostname, fmt_addr32(addr), - (int)router_get_advertised_dir_port(options), + (int)router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0), fingerprint, contact, published,

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