June 2011 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.1] Abandon rendezvous circuits on SIGNAL NEWNYM
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 010b8dd4f6e8e3c3d2e44ff589ff61cbf64b952a Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 9 19:56:40 2011 -0700 Abandon rendezvous circuits on SIGNAL NEWNYM --- changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym b/changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67cb2dc --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/abandon-rend-circs-on-newnym @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Security fixes: + - Don't attach new streams to old rendezvous circuits after SIGNAL + NEWNYM. Previously, we would keep using an existing rendezvous + circuit if it remained open (i.e. if it were kept open by a + long-lived stream or if a new stream were attached to it before + Tor could notice that it was old and no longer in use and close + it). Bugfix on 0.1.1.15-rc; fixes bug 3375. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 41c1899..48fc198 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, return 0; } - if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) + if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || + purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) if (circ->timestamp_dirty && circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now) return 0;

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[tor/master] Correct some outdated comments
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 39480c797851c8c70914153b403a282a02e7aebb Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue May 24 22:20:12 2011 -0700 Correct some outdated comments --- src/or/control.c | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 0dad1b9..5d2d135 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -606,12 +606,12 @@ send_control_event_string(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); } -/** Helper for send_control1_event and send_control1_event_extended: +/** Helper for send_control_event and control_event_status: * Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code * event. The event's body is created by the printf-style format in * format, and other arguments as provided. * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the + * Currently the length of the message is limited to 10064 (including the * ending \\r\\n\\0). */ static void send_control_event_impl(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, @@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ send_control_event_impl(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, * event. The event's body is created by the printf-style format in * format, and other arguments as provided. * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the + * Currently the length of the message is limited to 10064 (including the * ending \\n\\r\\0. */ static void send_control_event(uint16_t event, event_format_t which,

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[tor/master] log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 64bfbcb918a59edf8e7167954171f311d032fc4b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 03:31:59 2011 -0400 log when we finish ssl handshake and move to renegotiation debug-level since it will be quite common. logged at both client and server side. this step should help us track what's going on with people filtering tor connections by our ssl habits. --- src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index ed174c9..c019f65 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -929,13 +929,16 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) { if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) { if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { - // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was TLS_HANDSHAKING."); + log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). " + "Requesting renegotiation."); conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING; goto again; } // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state); } else { /* improved handshake, but not a client. */ + log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). " + "Expecting renegotiation."); tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls, connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb, conn);

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[tor/master] Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 68cd0a9abeab126b3d954f060d922fd71cb945f7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jun 15 21:16:44 2011 -0700 Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane --- changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/control.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6fa092 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + * Code simplifications and refactoring: + + - Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane. Its callers + expect it to emit a CRLF iff the format string ends with CRLF; + it actually emits a CRLF iff (a) the format string ends with + CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or + (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the + resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer. Bugfix on + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes bug 3407. + diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 5d2d135..2308cd6 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -481,33 +481,26 @@ decode_escaped_string(const char *start, size_t in_len_max, } /** Acts like sprintf, but writes its formatted string to the end of - * conn-\>outbuf. The message may be truncated if it is too long, - * but it will always end with a CRLF sequence. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the - * ending CR LF NUL ("\\r\\n\\0"). */ + * conn-\>outbuf. */ static void connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...) { -#define CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE 1024 va_list ap; - char buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE]; - int r; - size_t len; + char *buf = NULL; + int len; + va_start(ap,format); - r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap); + len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap); va_end(ap); - if (r<0) { + + if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format string for controller."); return; } - len = strlen(buf); - if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) { - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r'; - } - connection_write_to_buf(buf, len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + connection_write_to_buf(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + tor_free(buf); } /** Write all of the open control ports to ControlPortWriteToFile */

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[tor/master] Fix comment typo
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 70785f87bb47e481053719f2a514bf0598c62b2d Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 16 02:57:58 2011 -0700 Fix comment typo --- src/or/control.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 2308cd6..2170a9b 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int disable_log_messages = 0; static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; /** If authentication_cookie_is_set, a secret cookie that we've stored to disk * and which we're using to authenticate controllers. (If the controller can - * read it off disk, it has permission to connect. */ + * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */

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[tor/master] Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 227896e447625b0718690d7228f1239a0fc399d1 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 16 03:39:37 2011 -0700 Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane --- changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 7 ++++++- src/or/control.c | 33 +++++++++------------------------ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf index b6fa092..e191eac 100644 --- a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf +++ b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf @@ -6,5 +6,10 @@ CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer. Bugfix on - 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes bug 3407. + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes part of bug 3407. + + - Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane. Its callers + expect it to always emit a CRLF at the end of the string; it + might emit extra control characters as well. Bugfix on + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes another part of bug 3407. diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 2170a9b..e7d2044 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -602,43 +602,28 @@ send_control_event_string(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, /** Helper for send_control_event and control_event_status: * Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code * event. The event's body is created by the printf-style format in - * format, and other arguments as provided. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 10064 (including the - * ending \\r\\n\\0). */ + * format, and other arguments as provided. */ static void send_control_event_impl(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, const char *format, va_list ap) { - /* This is just a little longer than the longest allowed log message */ -#define SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE 10064 - int r; - char buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE]; - size_t len; + char *buf = NULL; + int len; - r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap); - if (r<0) { + len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap); + if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format event for controller."); return; } - len = strlen(buf); - if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) { - /* if it is not properly terminated, do it now */ - buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0'; - buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n'; - buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r'; - } - send_control_event_string(event, which|ALL_FORMATS, buf); + + tor_free(buf); } /** Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code * event. The event's body is created by the printf-style format in - * format, and other arguments as provided. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 10064 (including the - * ending \\n\\r\\0. */ + * format, and other arguments as provided. */ static void send_control_event(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, const char *format, ...)

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug3407' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 209229f100d20958d0826d4f6773d7f6b3a43ade Merge: 64bfbcb 227896e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 14:59:39 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3407' into maint-0.2.2 changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 15 ++++++++ src/or/control.c | 66 +++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 31b9b1a5bb3d3fb60e39f5a789ee4fbc2009f6a4 Merge: a857f61 209229f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jun 17 15:04:29 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 15 ++++++++ src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++- src/or/control.c | 66 +++++++++++---------------------- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 68cd0a9abeab126b3d954f060d922fd71cb945f7 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jun 15 21:16:44 2011 -0700 Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane --- changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/control.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6fa092 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ + * Code simplifications and refactoring: + + - Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane. Its callers + expect it to emit a CRLF iff the format string ends with CRLF; + it actually emits a CRLF iff (a) the format string ends with + CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or + (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the + resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer. Bugfix on + 0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes bug 3407. + diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 5d2d135..2308cd6 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -481,33 +481,26 @@ decode_escaped_string(const char *start, size_t in_len_max, } /** Acts like sprintf, but writes its formatted string to the end of - * conn-\>outbuf. The message may be truncated if it is too long, - * but it will always end with a CRLF sequence. - * - * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the - * ending CR LF NUL ("\\r\\n\\0"). */ + * conn-\>outbuf. */ static void connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...) { -#define CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE 1024 va_list ap; - char buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE]; - int r; - size_t len; + char *buf = NULL; + int len; + va_start(ap,format); - r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap); + len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap); va_end(ap); - if (r<0) { + + if (len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format string for controller."); return; } - len = strlen(buf); - if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) { - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n'; - buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r'; - } - connection_write_to_buf(buf, len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + connection_write_to_buf(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn)); + + tor_free(buf); } /** Write all of the open control ports to ControlPortWriteToFile */

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix comment typo
by nickm＠torproject.org 17 Jun '11

17 Jun '11

commit 70785f87bb47e481053719f2a514bf0598c62b2d Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu Jun 16 02:57:58 2011 -0700 Fix comment typo --- src/or/control.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 2308cd6..2170a9b 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int disable_log_messages = 0; static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; /** If authentication_cookie_is_set, a secret cookie that we've stored to disk * and which we're using to authenticate controllers. (If the controller can - * read it off disk, it has permission to connect. */ + * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */

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